United States of America v. Andrzej Boryga

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued June 4, 2025
Decided June 16, 2025
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2374
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ANDRZEJ BORYGA,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:23CR00139-001
James R. Sweeney II,
Judge.
O R D E R
Andrzej Boryga pleaded guilty to four counts of interstate communication of
threats to injure. 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). The district court refused to group the four charges
and sentenced Boryga to 24 months in prison and two years of supervised release.
Boryga appeals his sentence, arguing that his communications targeted the same victim
and therefore the counts should have been grouped under § 3D1.2 of the Sentencing
Guidelines. But because Boryga threatened at least four victims, grouping was not
appropriate, and we affirm.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 24-2374 Page 2
For several months in 2022, Boryga phoned different locations of the Anti-
Defamation League (ADL), an organization committed to addressing antisemitism, and
left voicemails filled with antisemitic remarks and threats of violence. Boryga used
racial epithets, invoked the Holocaust, and made threats like “I will kill you,” “[c]ut
your fucking head off,” and “cut your fucking throat.” In a voicemail left at the branch
in New York, Boryga said he would “cut your fucking head off and put around display
on 3rd Avenue,” a reference to the location of the ADL’s New York branch. Each ADL
branch took the threats seriously and notified the FBI.
Based on voicemails Boryga left at locations in New York, Denver, Las Vegas,
and Houston, he was charged with four counts of transmitting threats to injure the
person of another in interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). The government reported
that it opted to charge Boryga for the voicemails that contained “the very most direct,
obvious threats.”
In an interview with the FBI, Boryga admitted that he wanted to scare the people
listening to the voicemails. He succeeded. ADL employees who heard the voicemails
submitted victim-impact statements saying that they were frightened, alarmed, and
intimidated. One expressed fear that a knock at the door could be “the voice on the
other end of the phone coming to act on his grievances.” Boryga pleaded guilty to the
four charges in March 2024.
Ahead of sentencing, probation prepared a presentence investigation report and,
as relevant here, recommended that Boryga’s four counts of conviction not be grouped
for guideline calculation purposes under § 3D1.2. Probation assessed a total offense
level of 18 and criminal history category of I, yielding a suggested imprisonment range
of 27 to 33 months. Boryga objected, pointing out, first, that § 3D1.2 requires that
charges be grouped when they involve substantially the same harm, and second, that in
the context of his charges (brought under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c)), threats can involve the
same harm when directed at the same person, see U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1 cmt. n.3. Boryga
argued that all his threats were made against one victim—either the ADL as an
organization or Jewish people generally. Grouping the charges would have lowered the
offense level to 14 and the sentencing range to 15 to 21 months.
The district court concluded that the charges should not be grouped. The court
observed that Boryga never threatened the ADL as an “entity.” The court further
concluded that each ADL branch that Boryga called—or each person who heard the
voicemails—could be considered a separate victim. Finally, the court weighed the
sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and—after considering Boryga’s age,

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No. 24-2374 Page 3
physical condition, and mental health struggles—sentenced him to a below-guidelines
prison term of 24 months.
For sentencing purposes, the Guidelines direct courts to group counts that
involve “substantially the same harm.” U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2. That section elaborates on
what conduct constitutes substantially the same harm. U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(a)–(d). But for
threats charged under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c)—the statute of Boryga’s conviction—threats
can be grouped under § 3D1.2 only when they are directed at the same victim.
See U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1 cmt. n.3. Threats to different victims are not to be grouped. Id. The
term “victim” in this context refers not to indirect or secondary victims, but to the “one
person who is directly and most seriously affected by the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2 cmt.
n.2.
On appeal, Boryga argues that the district court erred in concluding that the four
charges in the indictment should not have been grouped under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2. He
contends that all the counts of conviction should have been grouped because they
involved substantially the same harm—threats directed at the same victim, the Jewish
community. He draws on our decision in United States v. Haas, 37 F.4th 1256, 1268–69
(7th Cir. 2022), where we acknowledged that the guideline commentary left room to
define the victim as a group of people. Boryga maintains that he intended to threaten
the Jewish community at large, not anyone individually, and his intent should be
dispositive.
Boryga’s intent-based argument is a myopic reading of § 3D1.2. The Guideline
defines the victim as the person most directly and seriously affected by the conduct,
see U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2 cmt. n.2, and that is a “context-dependent” inquiry, Haas, 37 F.4th at
1269. Here, evidence shows that Boryga intended to threaten at least four separate
groups of people. He directed his threats at the four different offices by dialing their
separate phone numbers and leaving voicemails specific to each office. In his messages
left at the New York branch, he even explicitly referred to that office’s address. He
intended, then, to threaten each of the office locations, even if he hoped those threats
would spread fear through the greater community.
Additionally, courts can look at the impact the threats had on the people who
heard them, see United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 301, 304 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v.
Nedd, 262 F.3d 85, 92 (1st Cir. 2001); and multiple targets can constitute separate harms,
see Simmons, 649 F.3d at 304; United States v. Parker, 551 F.3d 1167, 1173–74 (10th Cir.
2008). Here, individuals from each ADL location filed victim-impact statements
detailing the fear and anxiety they felt after hearing Boryga’s threats. And Boryga’s

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No. 24-2374 Page 4
conduct (calling the four separate locations, frightening the employees who heard the
threats, and disrupting business at each branch) created four separate episodes of harm.
To the extent Boryga relies on Haas, that case does not support his position.
There, we upheld the district court’s decision that threats posted to a social media
website had two victim groups—federal employees in the aggregate and society at
large. 37 F.4th at 1268–69. Here, even if Boryga did not have identifiable individuals in
mind when he made the calls, the groups he threatened can readily be identified as the
employees at the respective branches who heard his threats.
At oral argument, Boryga urged that a finding of one victim would be consistent
with the policy behind grouping—to ensure that the sentence reflects the actual conduct
(and not the charging decisions). U.S.S.G. ch. 3, pt. D, intro. cmt. He argued that other
guidelines provisions, such as the increases he received for making multiple threats
(U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1(b)(2)(A)) and targeting people based on their Jewish heritage (U.S.S.G.
§ 3A1.1(a)), already ensured that his sentence accounted for his behavior. But the
Guidelines state that the sentence should reflect the number of victims threatened,
see U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1 cmt. n.3, which, here, corresponds to the employees at the ADL’s
four branch locations.
AFFIRMED

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