Marquis Thompson v. Sheyde Perry

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted June 12, 2025*
Decided June 17, 2025
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1385
MARQUIS THOMPSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SHEYDE PERRY, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 21-cv-2171-JES
James E. Shadid,
Judge.
O R D E R
Marquis Thompson asserts that while he was a pretrial detainee, three officers at
Macon County Jail failed to protect him from an assault by another detainee in violation
of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district judge
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-1385 Page 2
entered summary judgment for the officers, concluding that no rational jury could find
that the officers’ actions were objectively unreasonable. We affirm the judgment.
We recount the facts in the light most favorable to Thompson, the party opposing
summary judgment. See Kemp v. Fulton County, 27 F.4th 491, 492 (7th Cir. 2022). In
October 2020, Thompson was in detention at Macon County Jail pending trial on federal
charges. He saw a detainee, Matthew Anderson, stealing from another detainee and
informed the victim, who then reported the theft to jail staff. Shortly thereafter, officials
moved Anderson to a housing unit near Thompson’s. Around this time, Anderson
threatened Thompson for informing the victim about the theft.
Four days later, Anderson entered Thompson’s housing unit through two open
doors and punched him, starting a fight. The parties dispute why the doors separating
Anderson’s and Thompson’s units were both open at the same time. The officers
maintain they left the doors open while responding to a diabetic detainee’s medical
emergency; Thompson denies any such emergency and contends the officers were
confirming that detainees were out of their cells. Regardless, it is undisputed that
Officers Terry Collins, Danielle Merrifield, and Sheyde Perry were in the area attending
to their duties. Perry noticed the altercation and called for help, leading Collins and
another officer to respond and break up the fight.
Thompson filed this lawsuit alleging that Collins, Merrifield, and Perry violated
his Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to protect him from Anderson’s attack. The
district judge granted the officers’ motion for summary judgment. He reasoned that, in
the absence of any evidence that the officers knew about Anderson’s threats against
Thompson, their failure to close or monitor the doors was not objectively unreasonable
and therefore did not amount to a constitutional violation.
On appeal Thompson argues that the district judge disregarded a genuine
dispute of fact on whether the officers breached their duty to protect him while he was
in their custody. We review the summary-judgment decision de novo. See Kemp,
27 F.4th at 494. To create a triable claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, Thompson
must supply evidence from which a rational jury could find that the officers’
purposeful, knowing, or perhaps reckless conduct was objectively unreasonable under
the circumstances and caused his injuries. See id. at 496–97; Miranda v. County of Lake,
900 F.3d 335, 352–53 (7th Cir. 2018). In the context of an assault by another detainee, an
officer’s actions will typically be unreasonable only if the officer had notice of a
substantial risk of injury. Thomas v. Dart, 39 F.4th 835, 841–42 (7th Cir. 2022).

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No. 24-1385 Page 3
Thompson does not present evidence from which a jury could find that the
officers’ actions were objectively unreasonable. Although he does not need to show that
the officers had subjective awareness of a risk of harm, the officers’ lack of notice about
Anderson’s threat remains critical to assessing their actions against those of a
reasonable officer in the same situation and with the same information. See Echols v.
Johnson, 105 F.4th 973, 978, 980 (7th Cir. 2024). Perry and Collins attested that they did
not know that Anderson had threatened Thompson, and Thompson did not provide
evidence that they or Merrifield should have been on notice of Anderson’s threats. The
complaint suggests that Anderson made his threats in the presence of officers, but these
allegations are not evidence, see Est. of Perry v. Wenzel, 872 F.3d 439, 461 (7th Cir. 2017),
and regardless Thompson does not offer reason to believe that any of the defendant
officers, specifically, should have heard the threats made days before the attack.
Instead of providing facts showing that a reasonable officer would have been on
notice of the threat Anderson posed, Thompson emphasizes that jail policy forbids
leaving two doors open at the same time. See 20 I LL. A DMIN . C ODE § 701.140(c)(3). But
failure to follow jail policies does not itself amount to a constitutional violation. See Est.
of Simpson v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d 740, 746 (7th Cir. 2017). Even if the officers intentionally
left the doors open contrary to policy and best practices, Thompson cannot show that a
reasonable officer would have appreciated that doing so in these circumstances
involved an unreasonably high degree of risk and therefore offended the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Thomas, 39 F.4th at 841–42.
AFFIRMED

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