Ruben Santoyo v. City of Chicago

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-2352
R UBEN S ANTOYO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
C ITY OF C HICAGO, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:22-cv-03559 — Martha M. Pacold, Judge.
____________________
S UBMITTED M AY 9, 2025 — DECIDED J ULY 7, 2025
____________________
Before S CUDDER , S T. EVE, and K OLAR , Circuit Judges.
S CUDDER , Circuit Judge. In the course of litigation against
the City of Chicago and two of its police officers, Ruben San-
toyo filed many frivolous motions. The district judge warned
him that another would bring sanctions. When Santoyo disre-
garded the admonition and filed yet another baseless and in-
flammatory motion, the district judge sanctioned him. On ap-
peal Santoyo complains that the judge violated his right to
due process by neither notifying him of the forthcoming

-- 1 of 5 --

2 No. 24-2352
sanction nor giving him an opportunity to respond. We disa-
gree and affirm.
I
Proceeding without counsel, Santoyo invoked 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and challenged the constitutionality of an arrest.
Throughout three years of litigation, he repeatedly filed friv-
olous motions. Many leveled unfounded attacks on the com-
petence and integrity of the district judge handling his case.
The judge repeatedly denied these motions and, exhibiting
extraordinary patience, warned Santoyo no less than seven
times that another frivolous filing would lead to sanctions.
In time the district judge entered summary judgment for
the defendants and denied two motions to vacate the judg-
ment. Santoyo appealed that denial. We address the denial of
his post-judgment motions in a separate non-precedential or-
der also issued today. Our opinion here focuses on the sanc-
tion that followed from Santoyo’s failing to heed the district
judge’s warning that another baseless filing would have con-
sequences.
As prevailing parties at summary judgment, the defend-
ants moved to recover their costs while Santoyo’s appeal was
pending. Santoyo reacted not by engaging with the merits of
the motion, but by accusing the defendants of acting in bad
faith and insisting that the district judge refer defense counsel
to the state bar for disciplinary action. By this point, the judge
was out of patience. Alongside granting the defendants’ mo-
tion for costs, the judge—on her own initiative—imposed a
$1,500 sanction on Santoyo and referred him to the district’s
Executive Committee, which in turn barred future filings un-
til he paid the sanction.

-- 2 of 5 --

No. 24-2352 3
Santoyo challenges the sanction on appeal. Before consid-
ering the merits, however, we address his contention that the
district court lacked jurisdiction to sanction him while his ap-
peal was pending. He is mistaken: a notice of appeal does not
divest a district court of its authority to award costs and con-
sider related matters of sanctions. See Lorenz v. Valley Forge
Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 1259, 1260 (7th Cir. 1994). Nor, by extension,
does the pendency of an appeal. We need not say more on the
point.
II
As a general matter, before a federal court sanctions a liti-
gant, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment re-
quires fair notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Roadway
Exp., Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 & n.14 (1980). The amount
of process due varies according to the facts of each case and
the deprivation at stake. See generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339
U.S. 306 (1950).
But Santoyo misses the mark in how considerations of fair
process apply here. In insisting he had no notice, he ignores
what transpired in the district court, entirely disregarding the
judge’s clear warnings that another frivolous filing would
bring sanctions. When Santoyo crossed the line yet again, he
could not have been surprised at the ensuing consequences.
As the Supreme Court put the point in Link v. Wabash Railroad
Co., “the adequacy of notice and hearing respecting proceed-
ings that may affect a party’s rights turns, to a considerable
extent, on the knowledge which the circumstances show such
party may be taken to have of the consequences of his own
conduct.” 370 U.S. 628, 632 (1962); see also Martin v. D.C. Ct.

-- 3 of 5 --

4 No. 24-2352
of Appeals, 506 U.S. 1, 3 (1992) (sanctioning a petitioner for fil-
ing a frivolous petition for certiorari because the petitioner
had filed ten frivolous petitions in one year, and the Court
had previously warned him that “[f]uture similar filings”
would “merit additional measures.”).
Indeed, we have already rejected Santoyo’s general con-
tention that a district court must conduct a separate or formal
hearing before imposing sanctions. See Vega v. Chi. Bd. of
Educ., 109 F.4th 948, 955 (7th Cir. 2024). Santoyo needed only
notice of the district court’s intent to impose sanctions suffi-
cient to allow him a meaningful opportunity to respond or
defend himself. See id.
He had it here. The district judge could not have been
more transparent in warning Santoyo that another round of
frivolous motions or baseless credibility attacks would earn
sanctions. The record is unequivocal on this front. As just a
small sampling—in an August 2023 order the judge informed
Santoyo that it would impose sanctions if he continued to “file
frivolous or repetitive motions.” In a September 2023 order
the judge informed Santoyo for the “final time” that it was
considering assessing sanctions against him for his repetitive
filings. And in a March 2024 order the judge, emphasizing his
“extended pattern” of filing “frivolous motions seeking re-
consideration and complaining of bias, impropriety, or mis-
conduct when the court takes an action” he views as “adverse
to his interests,” gave Santoyo a final warning: “if plaintiff
continues to file frivolous motions, the motions will be
stricken and plaintiff will be sanctioned.”
But instead of heeding that warning, Santoyo filed what
was perhaps his most frivolous motion of all: he requested
that the City of Chicago pay him attorney’s fees for the time

-- 4 of 5 --

No. 24-2352 5
spent responding to its motion for costs. He also wanted the
City’s counsel sanctioned and referred to the bar authorities.
That was the final straw that drew the sanctions.
We see no error on these facts. To the contrary, we see a
record replete with indications of fair notice to a party who
had multiple opportunities to explain his perspective and
avoid abusing the judicial process. Due process required no
more, leaving us to AFFIRM.

-- 5 of 5 --