LISA JOHNSON and GALE MILLER ANDERSON v. Amazon .com Services LLC

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-1028
LISA JOHNSON and GALE M ILLER A NDERSON ,
Plaintiffs- Appellants,
v.
A MAZON .COM S ERVICES LLC,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:23-CV-00685 — Thomas M. Durkin, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED S EPTEMBER 25, 2024 — DECIDED J ULY 8, 2025
____________________
Before S CUDDER , K IRSCH , and M ALDONADO, Circuit Judges.
M ALDONADO, Circuit Judge. Lisa Johnson and Gale Miller
Anderson allege that Amazon violated federal and Illinois
wage laws by failing to pay them and other warehouse em-
ployees for time spent in mandatory pre-shift COVID-19
screenings. The district court dismissed their Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) and Illinois Minimum Wage Law
(IMWL) claims, finding that both claims were foreclosed by
the federal Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 (PPA), which

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2 No. 24-1028
amended the FLSA to exclude certain pre-shift activities from
compensable time.
On appeal, the employees challenge only the district
court’s holding that the IMWL incorporates the PPA’s exclu-
sions for compensable time. The employees contend that Illi-
nois law affords them broader protections than federal law,
and that their IMWL claims therefore should have survived
dismissal.
No Illinois decision squarely addresses whether the
IMWL integrates the PPA’s limitations on pre-shift compen-
sation. Rather than decide this important and unsettled ques-
tion of state law in the first instance, we certify it to the Illinois
Supreme Court. Certification respects federalism and ensures
a definitive answer to this dispositive issue.
I. Background
Amazon owns and operates large distribution warehouses
across the country where it fulfills orders made on Ama-
zon.com. The warehouses operate 24 hours a day and employ
over 20,000 workers in Illinois alone. Johnson and Miller An-
derson both previously worked for Amazon in Illinois ware-
houses. Both held hourly, non-exempt positions that included
moving, stacking, and loading packages.
After the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020,
Amazon required that all hourly, non-exempt employees un-
dergo COVID-19 medical “screenings” prior to clocking in for
their shift. Employees formed a line at the entrance to the fa-
cility and underwent a brief examination, which included
temperature checks and symptom screening questions. If the
employee passed the examination, they were given a mask
and only then permitted to clock-in for their shift.

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No. 24-1028 3
Johnson and Miller Anderson allege that these uncompen-
sated pre-shift COVID-19 screenings took 10-15 minutes on
average (and sometimes longer). The screenings occasionally
prevented Miller Anderson from clocking in until after her
scheduled start time, resulting in a further loss of wages.
Johnson and Miller Anderson sued Amazon claiming that
the screening time should have been compensable because
employees were required to be on the premises, the screen-
ings were necessary to their work, and the screenings were
undertaken primarily for the benefit of Amazon and its cus-
tomers to keep its fulfillment centers and distribution centers
operational. By sustaining a safe workplace, Amazon was
able to comply with the law and continue operations during
the pandemic, earning profits, and growing its business dur-
ing a time that many other businesses struggled.
Amazon moved to dismiss the employees’ complaint,
which the district court granted in full. It held that the FLSA
claims were barred by the PPA, which generally excludes
from compensable time those employee activities that are
“preliminary to or postliminary to” their principal work ac-
tivities. 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(2). The district court found that the
COVID-19 screenings fell into the preliminary activity exclu-
sion and were not compensable because they were not “inte-
gral and indispensable” to plaintiffs’ principal activities of
“moving boxes, stacking packages, and loading boxes.” John-
son v. Amazon.com Servs., LLC, No. 1:23-CV-685, 2023 WL
8475658, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2023). While the district court
recognized that the screenings enhanced worker safety and
improved the business’s efficiency, it ultimately concluded
that they were not essential to overall operations or to em-
ployees carrying out their duties as warehouse workers.

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4 No. 24-1028
With respect to the IMWL claims, the district court sum-
marily concluded that they necessarily failed with the plain-
tiffs’ FLSA claims. It noted that state and federal courts fre-
quently look to case authority interpreting and applying the
FLSA for guidance in interpreting Illinois’s wage law. It fur-
ther recognized that a number of district courts, and this
Court on one occasion, had previously applied the PPA’s ex-
clusions to IMWL claims. See id. (collecting district court cases
applying the PPA to IMWL overtime claims); Chagoya v. City
of Chicago, 992 F.3d 607, 614 n.22 (7th Cir. 2021) (assuming,
based on the parties’ agreement, that the PPA applied to the
plaintiffs’ IMWL claims).
Plaintiffs timely filed this appeal, challenging the dismis-
sal of their IMWL claims alone. We have subject matter juris-
diction over this appeal under the Class Action Fairness Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
II. Discussion
We review de novo a district court’s decision to grant a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Zahn v. N. Am. Power & Gas,
LLC, 815 F.3d 1082, 1087 (7th Cir. 2016). The issue on appeal
is whether the district court erred by finding that the IMWL
excludes certain pre-shift work from compensation. Given the
lack of state court authority, plaintiffs ask us to certify to the
Illinois Supreme Court the question of whether the IMWL in-
corporates the limitations of the PPA. Alternatively, they ask
that we reach the merits of this statutory interpretation ques-
tion and affirmatively hold that the IMWL does not include
the PPA’s exclusions. Amazon argues that certification is un-
necessary because existing federal and state authority support
the district court’s conclusion.

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No. 24-1028 5
In reviewing the parties’ arguments, we find that both
have presented plausible arguments and that the most pru-
dent approach is to certify the question to the Illinois Supreme
Court. First, however, a bit of background on the statutory
framework of the FLSA, PPA, and IMWL is helpful to set the
context for the parties’ debate.
A. Federal and state law standards for compensable time.
The FLSA, enacted in 1938, established broad minimum
wage and overtime compensation protections for workers.
The overtime provision relevant here provides that, subject to
certain exceptions, “no employer shall employ any of his em-
ployees … for a workweek longer than forty hours unless
such employee receives compensation for his employment in
excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one
and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.”
29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).1
The original text of the FLSA left many key terms unde-
fined, including what constitutes a “workweek” for purposes
of compensation. See Chagoya, 992 F.3d at 616. In the absence
of statutory definitions, the Supreme Court initially inter-
preted compensable work broadly, defining the statutory
workweek as “all time during which an employee is neces-
sarily required to be on the employer’s premises, on duty or
at a prescribed workplace.” Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery
1 Plaintiffs’ IMWL claims seek unpaid overtime wages, so our discus-
sion centers around that statutory requirement. Of course, the PPA ex-
cludes compensation for preliminary and postliminary activities whether
paid at the minimum wage or overtime rate. Whether the IMWL incorpo-
rates the PPA’s compensation exclusions thus likely carries implications
beyond the overtime claims at issue here.

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6 No. 24-1028
Co., 328 U.S. 680, 690–91 (1946); see also Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R.
Co. v. Muscoda Loc. No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 598 (1944) (defining
“work” as any “physical or mental exertion (whether burden-
some or not) controlled or required by the employer and pur-
sued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer
and his business”).
The Supreme Court’s holdings in Anderson and Tennessee
Coal “provoked a flood of litigation,” which prompted Con-
gress to enact the PPA to walk back the Court’s expansive def-
inition of compensable work and limit employers’ potential
liability. Chagoya, 992 F.3d at 616 (citation omitted). Among its
changes, the PPA amended the FLSA to create two categories
of work-related activities for which employers were not liable:
(a) … [N]o employer shall be subject to any liability
or punishment … on account of the failure of such
employer to pay an employee minimum wages, or
to pay an employee overtime compensation, for or
on account of …
(1) walking, riding, or traveling to and from the
actual place of performance of the principal ac-
tivity or activities which such employee is em-
ployed to perform, and
(2) activities which are preliminary to or post-
liminary to said principal activity or activities,
which occur either prior to the time on any particu-
lar workday at which such employee commences,
or subsequent to the time on any particular work-
day at which he ceases, such principal activity or
activities.

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No. 24-1028 7
29 U.S.C. § 254(a). In short, under the PPA “ordinary com-
mute times and preliminary and postliminary activities that
occurred before or after the workday were no longer compen-
sable activities under the FLSA.” Chagoya, 992 F.3d at 617. In-
stead, the FLSA as amended applies only to an employee’s
“principal activities.” Id. at 618.
As for what constitutes a principal activity, the Supreme
Court has explained that principal activities include the activ-
ity or activities that an employee is employed to perform, as
well as those activities which are “integral and indispensable”
to the work the employee was employed to perform. Integrity
Staffing Sols., Inc. v. Busk, 574 U.S. 27, 33 (2014). An activity is
“integral and indispensable to the principal activities that an
employee is employed to perform if it is an intrinsic element
of those activities and one with which the employee cannot
dispense if he is to perform his principal activities.” Id. If a
preliminary or postliminary activity is not integral and indis-
pensable to an employee’s principal activity, compensation is
not required. See id. at 33–35.
Congress also specifically recognized that individual
states retained the authority to enact their own broader pro-
tections. The FLSA contains a savings clause that expressly
provides that nothing in the statute excuses an employer’s
noncompliance with state or local requirements that are more
generous than the federal law. See 29 U.S.C. § 218(a).
Turning to Illinois law, the Illinois General Assembly en-
acted the IMWL in 1971 to enshrine minimum wage and over-
time protections in state law. The IMWL’s language parallels
the FLSA in many respects, including in the overtime-wage
provision, which provides that “no employer shall employ
any of his employees for a workweek of more than 40 hours

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8 No. 24-1028
unless such employee receives compensation for his employ-
ment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less
than 1 1/2 times the regular rate at which he is employed.” 820
ILCS 105/4a(1).
Like the FLSA, the IMWL does not define “workweek” for
the purpose of determining what qualifies as compensable
time. To fill the gap, the IMWL empowers the Director of the
Illinois Department of Labor (DOL) to promulgate regula-
tions defining key terms and concepts. 820 ILCS 105/10. Rele-
vant here, the Illinois DOL regulation at section 210.110 de-
fines “hours worked” as “all the time an employee is required
to be on duty, or on the employer’s premises, or at other pre-
scribed places of work, and any additional time he or she is
required or permitted to work for the employer.” I LL. A DMIN .
C ODE tit. 56, § 210.110. If that language sounds familiar, it is
because it parallels the Supreme Court’s definition of the stat-
utory workweek under the FLSA in Anderson. 328 U.S. at 690–
91. Section 210.110’s definition of “hours worked” goes on to
describe the circumstances under which employees are enti-
tled to compensation for meal periods, on-call time, and travel
time.
Section 210.110 makes a single indirect reference to the
PPA, specifically incorporating the PPA regulations govern-
ing the compensability of travel time. I LL. A DMIN . C ODE tit. 56,
§ 210.110 (“An employee’s travel, performed for the em-
ployer’s benefit … is compensable work time as defined in 29
CFR 785.33 – 785.41 ….”).
Finally, the regulations implementing the IMWL also pro-
vide that the Director of the Illinois DOL may look to FLSA

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No. 24-1028 9
regulations for guidance in interpreting and enforcing the
IMWL. Id. at § 210.120.
B. Whether the IMWL incorporates the PPA’s exclusions
for preliminary and postliminary activities.
With this legal framework in mind, we turn next to the
parties’ arguments on appeal. Plaintiffs lead with their re-
quest for certification. But before reaching certification, we
must first examine whether the district court correctly held
that the federal standards for compensable time under the
PPA applied to plaintiffs’ IMWL claims. This is our necessary
starting point because we should only certify a question to a
state supreme court if we “find ourselves ‘genuinely uncer-
tain’ about the answer to the state-law question.” Jadair Int'l,
Inc. v. Am. Nat'l Prop. & Cas. Co., 77 F.4th 546, 557 (7th Cir.
2023) (citation omitted). We therefore first examine the par-
ties’ competing arguments on whether the IMWL excludes
compensation for preliminary and postliminary activities like
the PPA.
In interpreting the IMWL, we apply Illinois rules of statu-
tory construction. See Zahn, 815 F.3d at 1089. Our primary ob-
jective is to “ascertain and give effect to the intent of the leg-
islature,” and “[t]he best evidence of legislative intent is the
statutory language.” In re Hernandez, 918 F.3d 563, 569 (7th
Cir. 2019) (quoting People v. Donoho, 788 N.E.2d 707, 715 (Ill.
2003)). When assessing legislative intent, “courts should con-
sider, in addition to the statutory language, the reason for the
law, the problems to be remedied, and the objects and pur-
poses sought.” Id. “Statutory provisions should not be read in
isolation but ‘as a whole; all relevant parts of the statute must
be considered when courts attempt to divine the legislative
intent underlying the statute.’” Id. (citation omitted).

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10 No. 24-1028
Beginning with the statutory text, plaintiffs correctly note
that the PPA’s compensation exclusions are absent from the
state statute. Both the IMWL and FLSA include nearly identi-
cal overtime requirements—requiring time-and-a-half pay for
hours worked in excess of 40 hours a week. But while the PPA
amended the FLSA to exclude preliminary and postliminary
activities from compensation, the IMWL contains no such ex-
clusion. Nor does the IMWL have language comparable to the
PPA establishing an employees’ “principal activities” as the
metric for measuring compensable time. Given that the “best
evidence of legislative intent is the statutory language,” the
absence in the IMWL of the express statutory exclusions
found in the PPA might suggest that the Illinois General As-
sembly did not intend to incorporate those same limitations
in the IMWL. See Donoho, 788 N.E.2d at 715.
We can find further evidence of legislative intent by utiliz-
ing the familiar statutory canon expressio unius est exclusio al-
terius, or “the expression of one thing is the exclusion of an-
other.” See Metzger v. DaRosa, 805 N.E.2d 1165, 1172 (Ill. 2004)
(citation omitted). The drafters of the IMWL chose to refer-
ence and incorporate other exclusions and limitations found
in the FLSA into the overtime provision of the IMWL. See, e.g.,
820 ILCS 105/4a(2)(E) (stating that the overtime requirements
do not apply to “[a]ny employee employed in a bona fide ex-
ecutive, administrative or professional capacity, including
any radio or television announcer, news editor, or chief engi-
neer, as defined by or covered by the Federal Fair Labor Standards
Act” (emphasis added)); 820 ILCS 105/4a(2)(D) (excluding
“[a]ny commissioned employee as described in [the FLSA]”).
That the legislature adopted some provisions of the FLSA,

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No. 24-1028 11
and not others, supports the plaintiffs’ position that the omis-
sion of the PPA’s exclusions was deliberate.
To be sure, statutory silence only takes us so far. Like the
FLSA, the IMWL does not define the “workweek” for the pur-
pose of determining whether an employee is owed overtime
pay in a given week. Does the ambiguity in the IMWL’s un-
defined terms suggest it incorporates the PPA’s exclusions,
given the identical state and federal statutory overtime provi-
sions? Perhaps. To answer that question, we must turn next
to the regulations implementing the IMWL.
As discussed above, section 210.110 of the Illinois Admin-
istrative Code defines “hours worked” under the IMWL as
“all the time an employee is required to be on duty, or on the
employer’s premises, or at other prescribed places of work,
and any additional time he or she is required or permitted to
work for the employer.” I LL. A DMIN . C ODE tit. 56, § 210.110.
This administrative rule carries “the force and effect of law”
and is entitled to deference so long as it is “not inconsistent
with the statute pursuant to which [it was] adopted.” Kerbes
v. Raceway Assocs., LLC, 961 N.E.2d 865, 870 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011)
(citing Kean v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 919 N.E.2d 926 (Ill. 2009)).
Plaintiffs argue that section 210.110’s definition of “hours
worked” resolves the question presented on appeal. They
note that this definition mirrors the pre-PPA definition of
work from the United States Supreme Court’s decision in An-
derson (the definition that Congress sought to curtail with the
PPA), and they argue that Illinois’s expansive definition
demonstrates that compensable work under the IMWL is not
subject to the limitations found in the PPA. Plaintiffs also

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12 No. 24-1028
point out that the Illinois DOL expressly adopted and refer-
enced other federal standards, including the PPA’s travel time
regulations, in other parts of section 210.10. By including an
express reference to the PPA’s travel time regulations but fail-
ing to reference the preliminary and postliminary activity ex-
clusion, plaintiffs maintain that the Illinois DOL was signal-
ing that the latter was deliberately left out.
Plaintiffs’ arguments with respect to section 210.110 are
well-taken, and the regulatory definition of “hours worked”
seems to support their position that the IMWL does not incor-
porate the preliminary and postliminary activities exclusions
found in the PPA. But as Amazon notes, section 210.110 is not
the only relevant regulation at issue. Amazon separately
points to section 210.120, the provision instructing that the Di-
rector of the DOL may look to FLSA regulations for guidance
in interpreting the IMWL. Amazon also correctly observes
that a number of courts, including Illinois appellate courts
and this Court, have relied on this regulation to construe the
IMWL consistent with federal standards. The argument goes
that if the Illinois agency tasked with enforcement and imple-
mentation of the IMWL is to look to federal law for guidance,
so too should the courts interpreting the statute. Amazon thus
argues that this regulatory instruction to look to federal law,
when read in tandem with the underlying parallel overtime
provisions in each statute, supports finding that the prelimi-
nary and postliminary activities exclusion under the PPA ap-
plies to overtime claims under the IMWL.
Amazon’s argument here has some traction. We have rec-
ognized that, in light of the parallel overtime provisions in the
IMWL and FLSA, and the instructions in section 210.120 of
the Illinois regulations, courts can look to federal standards

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No. 24-1028 13
under the FLSA to analyze overtime claims brought under the
IMWL. See, e.g., Driver v. AppleIllinois, LLC, 739 F.3d 1073, 1075
(7th Cir. 2014) (“Illinois courts (and likewise, therefore, fed-
eral courts administering Illinois law) seek guidance in the
federal case law interpreting the Fair Labor Standards Act.”
(citing I LL. A DMIN . C ODE tit. 56, § 210.120)); Urnikis-Negro v.
Am. Fam. Prop. Servs., 616 F.3d 665, 672 n.3 (7th Cir. 2010)
(“The overtime provision of the [IMWL] is parallel to that of
the FLSA, and Illinois courts apply the same principles … to
the state provision.”). Illinois appellate courts have consist-
ently recognized this same principle. See Kerbes, 961 N.E.2d at
870 (“[C]ourts have recognized that in light of their substan-
tial similarities, provisions of the FLSA and interpretations of
that legislation can be considered in applying the Minimum
Wage Law.” (citations omitted)). And in a recently issued
opinion, the Illinois Supreme Court confirmed that “[t]he De-
partment’s regulations provide that federal guidance as to the
meaning of the [FLSA] is probative of the meaning of the
[IMWL].” Mercado v. S&C Elec. Co., 2025 IL 129526, ¶ 33, 2025
WL 285291, at *7 (Ill. 2025). There is thus fairly strong support
for Amazon’s general proposition that we can and should
look at federal law to interpret the scope and meaning of the
IMWL.
Amazon is also correct that we have previously applied
the preliminary and postliminary exclusion under the PPA to
state law claims under the IMWL, but that proposition is not
binding on us here. See Chagoya, 992 F.3d at 615 n.21. In Cha-
goya, the plaintiffs sought compensation under the FLSA and
IMWL for time spent transporting equipment before and after
their shifts. Id. at 614. We explained in a brief footnote that,
because the parties agreed the same standards applied to both
the federal and state law claims, we would analyze them

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14 No. 24-1028
together. Id. at 615 n.21. Amazon argues that this footnote is
an affirmative holding of this Court that the standards under
the PPA apply to the IMWL. But that argument goes too far.
Our decision in Chagoya to apply the same standards was an
assumption made based on the parties’ agreement, devoid of
any legal analysis, and is therefore not precedential. See Mat-
ter of Volpert, 110 F.3d 494, 497 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Webster v.
Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925)) (noting that an assumption by a
prior panel did not amount to binding precedent where the
prior panel did not discuss the issue). Chagoya thus does not,
by itself, resolve the question here.
Still, setting aside the Court’s non-binding assumption in
Chagoya, there is a well-established trend of looking to federal
authority and standards to interpret and apply the IMWL, es-
pecially where the language of the statutes is parallel and Illi-
nois caselaw is silent on an issue. See Kerbes, 961 N.E.2d at 870;
Driver, 739 F.3d at 1075; Urnikis-Negro, 616 F.3d at 672 n.3; see
also Lewis v. Giordano’s Enters., Inc., 921 N.E.2d 740, 745 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2009) (“When, as in this case, there is an absence of
Illinois case law interpreting an Illinois wage statute, a court
may look for guidance to federal cases interpreting an analo-
gous federal statute, namely the Fair Labor Standards Act
….”).
Of course, as plaintiffs emphasize, none of the cases cited
by Amazon applying Illinois law (beyond the non-binding
Chagoya footnote) involved the same exclusions at issue here
under the PPA. And none of the cases involved a situation
comparable to what Amazon asks us to do here—to import a
FLSA statutory exclusion into the IMWL where it does not

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No. 24-1028 15
exist and an IMWL regulation suggests the opposite.2 Instead,
those cases look to federal regulations or precedent for guid-
ance when both the FLSA and IMWL speak in tandem (or are
silent) on the relevant topic. That is not the case here: while
the underlying overtime provisions in both statutes are iden-
tical, there is a relevant and express statutory exclusion from
compensable time in the federal statute that is not present in
the state statute. There is a difference between applying fed-
eral regulations and caselaw to interpret parallel state statu-
tory or regulatory language (the typical situation in the
caselaw) and importing federal statutory exclusions into the
state statute where they are not otherwise found (and where
the regulations are in tension with the statutory exclusion).
Furthermore, a general practice of looking at federal au-
thority under the FLSA to interpret the IMWL does not re-
quire that the IMWL and FLSA be read identically in every
2 Amazon relies on a Sixth Circuit case applying the same exclusions
under the PPA to Kentucky’s wage and hour statute, but the differences
between the Kentucky and Illinois regulatory regimes make that case dis-
tinguishable. See Vance v. Amazon.com, 852 F.3d 601, 613 (6th Cir. 2017).
The Sixth Circuit concluded that the PPA’s preliminary/postliminary lim-
itations were incorporated into Kentucky law, primarily because the Ken-
tucky wage regulations expressly reference the FLSA travel time and wait-
ing time rules under the PPA. See id. But unlike the Illinois regulations, the
Kentucky regulations use the same “principal activity” language as the
PPA in defining the circumstances under which travel time is compensa-
ble. Unlike here then, there was a direct connection between the Kentucky
regulatory definition of work and the limiting language in the PPA such
that it might make sense to incorporate all of the PPA’s limitations into the
Kentucky statute. That connection is missing here because, as noted
above, the Illinois regulations define the workweek in dramatically
broader terms than the PPA without referencing the “principal activity”
metric.

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16 No. 24-1028
case. Because of the FLSA’s savings clause, “federal law does
not preempt the state law if the latter is more generous,” and
an employer can run afoul of state wage law for practices that
do not otherwise violate federal law. See Mitchell v. JCG Indus.,
Inc., 745 F.3d 837, 838 (7th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). And
Illinois courts have recognized that, although federal law may
be instructive authority in interpreting the FLSA, it is not nec-
essarily controlling where the statutory language is different.
Soucek v. Breath of Life Pro. Servs., NFP, 205 N.E.3d 788, 799 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2021) (“As this court has emphasized before, Illinois
minimum wage law is not identical to the FLSA.” (cleaned
up)). It is thus not dispositive to say that the statutory over-
time provisions are parallel and that courts generally look to
federal standards to interpret the IMWL. Instead, where the
statutory language is different—the PPA’s exclusions are not
in the IMWL—federal authority is persuasive at best but not
controlling.
Ultimately, we need not resolve the tension created by the
statutes, regulations, and caselaw. Our goal in interpreting
state law is to decide an issue as we predict the Illinois Su-
preme Court would decide it. Murphy v. Smith, 844 F.3d 653,
658 (7th Cir. 2016). But in cases where the parties have pre-
sented plausible competing arguments on an issue of tremen-
dous significance to the state that make that prediction uncer-
tain, we have another tool at our disposal that respects feder-
alism: certification. In light of the parties’ reasonable positions
outlined above, and the other relevant considerations below,
we find that certification to the Illinois Supreme Court is war-
ranted.

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No. 24-1028 17
C. Whether to Certify the Question.
“Federal courts may ascertain the content of state substan-
tive law while sitting in diversity, but we sometimes certify a
question of state law based on several factors.” Finite Res., Ltd.
v. DTE Methane Res., LLC, 44 F.4th 680, 685 (7th Cir. 2022). The
most important factor in deciding whether to grant certifica-
tion is “whether we feel genuinely uncertain about an issue of
state law.” Id. (citation omitted). Other additional considera-
tions include whether (1) the case concerns a matter of vital
public concern, (2) the issue is likely to recur in other cases,
(3) the question to be certified is outcome determinative of the
case, and (4) the state supreme court has yet to have an oppor-
tunity to illuminate a clear path on the issue. Id. (citations
omitted). Consideration of these factors ensures “that federal
courts will not overburden state courts with requests for cer-
tification when what is required is not the promulgation of
new law but rather, the exercise of a court’s judgment.” State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pate, 275 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir.
2001).
Here, our consideration of the applicable factors all weigh
in favor of certification. First, whether the IMWL incorporates
the PPA’s preliminary and postliminary activities exclusion is
unresolved, and we are uncertain as to how the Illinois Su-
preme Court would decide the issue given the competing au-
thorities and plausible arguments on both sides. The absence
of any Illinois authority remotely on point, including any in-
termediate appellate authority, cautions us against guessing
how the Illinois Supreme Court would resolve the question in
the first instance.
The remaining factors likewise all weigh in favor of certi-
fication. The question is of vital public concern and is likely to

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18 No. 24-1028
recur. Whether an employee’s IMWL wage claim for manda-
tory pre-shift activities like Amazon’s medical screenings fall
under the PPA’s exclusions, or a more expansive state law
standard, is of profound significance to workers and employ-
ers in Illinois. As alleged, Amazon alone has tens of thousands
of warehouse workers in Illinois, and there are likely thou-
sands of other similarly situated employees across numerous
other industries that have been required to participate in pre-
shift activities on their employer’s premises. It is vitally im-
portant for these workers and their employers to have clarity
on the compensability of these types of pre-shift activities un-
der the IMWL. Until the Illinois Supreme Court resolves the
issue, workers will likely continue to bring suits raising the
same question.
Additionally, whether the preliminary/postliminary activ-
ity exclusions under the PPA apply to the IMWL is dispositive
of plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs conceded on appeal that their
FLSA claims fail because of the PPA’s preliminary activity ex-
clusion, and they have not challenged the district court’s con-
clusion that the screenings were not integral and indispensa-
ble to plaintiffs’ principal work activities as warehouse work-
ers. If those same standards apply to plaintiffs’ IMWL claims,
those state law claims necessarily fail. But if the PPA stand-
ards do not apply, then plaintiffs’ claims appear subject only
to the limitation provided in the Illinois DOL regulations,
which define “hours worked” as “all the time an employee is
required to be … on the employer's premises.” I LL. A DMIN .
C ODE tit. 56, § 210.110. The question of whether the PPA ap-
plies is thus dispositive of whether plaintiffs’ claims can sur-
vive dismissal.

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No. 24-1028 19
Amazon’s counter points on this factor are not persuasive.
Amazon contends that, if the PPA does not apply, plaintiffs’
time is only compensable if it was primarily for the benefit of
their employer, the standard established by the pre-PPA Su-
preme Court case of Tennessee Coal. See 321 U.S. at 590. Ama-
zon argues that plaintiffs have already conceded that their
time spent in the medical screenings was not compensable un-
der this standard, because they have not challenged the dis-
trict court’s conclusion (with respect to their FLSA claims)
that the screenings were primarily for the benefit of employee
safety, not the benefit of Amazon.
But absent the exclusions under the PPA, it is not apparent
that plaintiffs’ IMWL claims would be subject to the “primar-
ily for the benefit of the employer” test for compensation from
Tennessee Coal. Rather, the claims would appear subject to sec-
tion 210.110 of the Illinois DOL regulations, which generally
mirrors Anderson’s broad definition of compensable work. Of
course, the Illinois Supreme Court might also prescribe a dif-
ferent rule or standard altogether. We need not speculate as
to other approaches the Court might take, because the possi-
bilities just further demonstrate why certification is war-
ranted. What matters is that if the PPA applies, plaintiffs’
IMWL claims fail. If it does not, they could survive under a
different standard. The answer to the question is thus dispos-
itive.
Finally, the last factor also weighs in favor of certification.
The Illinois Supreme Court has not yet had an opportunity to
pass on this question of great importance to workers and busi-
nesses. As the final authority on matters of Illinois statutory
interpretation, the Illinois Supreme Court should decide the
question. Certification is appropriate to respect cooperative

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20 No. 24-1028
federalism and to ensure a definitive answer to this unsettled
question of state law.
III. Conclusion
For the forgoing reasons, we respectfully request that the
Illinois Supreme Court answer the following certified ques-
tion:
Does the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, 820 ILCS
105/4a, incorporate the exclusion from compen-
sation for employee activities that are prelimi-
nary or postliminary to their principal activities,
as provided under the federal Portal-to-Portal
Act 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(2)?
Nothing in this opinion should be construed to limit the
Illinois Supreme Court's inquiry, and we welcome the Justices
reformulating the question to suit their review.
Accordingly, the question is CERTIFIED. All further pro-
ceedings in this Court are STAYED while the Illinois Supreme
Court considers this matter.

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