United States of America v. Matthew Burton

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted July 9, 2025
Decided July 9, 2025
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1814
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MATTHEW BURTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:23-CR-00478(1)
Nancy L. Maldonado,
Judge.
O R D E R
Matthew Burton appeals the sentence imposed upon the revocation of his
supervised release, but his appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and
moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). A defendant who
appeals a revocation order does not have an unqualified constitutional right to counsel,
see Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788–90 (1973), so the Anders safeguards need not
govern our review. Even so, our practice is to apply them. See United States v. Durham,
922 F.3d 845, 847 (7th Cir. 2019). Counsel’s brief explains the nature of the case and
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-1814 Page 2
addresses the issues that an appeal of this kind would be expected to involve. Because
counsel’s analysis appears thorough, and Burton did not respond to the motion,
see C IR . R. 51(b), we limit our review to the subjects that counsel discusses.
See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).
Burton pleaded guilty in 2022 to possessing a firearm as a felon, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1), and was sentenced to 24 months in prison and 24 months of supervised
release. He served his prison term.
Three months into Burton’s term of supervised release, his probation officer
petitioned for revocation because Burton had been arrested for a firearm offense. At the
revocation hearing, Burton admitted that he had possessed a gun. The district court
revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to eight months in prison and two
additional years of supervised release.
In the Anders brief, counsel reports that Burton did not respond to her attempts
to communicate with him about this appeal. Unsure if Burton wishes to challenge the
admission on which his revocation was based, counsel considers whether he could raise
a nonfrivolous challenge to the voluntariness of his admission or to the revocation
decision. See United States v. Wheeler, 814 F.3d 856, 857 (7th Cir. 2016). But counsel
correctly concludes that any challenge would be frivolous because the district court
provided Burton with the necessary procedural safeguards—written notice of the
alleged violation; disclosure of the evidence against him; representation by counsel; and
the opportunity for allocution. See F ED. R. C RIM . P. 32.1(b)(2); United States v. Jones,
774 F.3d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 2014).
Counsel next considers whether Burton could raise any nonfrivolous procedural
challenges to his sentence and rightly concludes that he could not. Revocation was
mandatory because Burton admitted to gun possession—a violation of one of the
conditions of his release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g)(2); United States v. Dawson, 980 F.3d
1156, 1161 (7th Cir. 2020). The court appropriately calculated his policy-statement range
at 8 to 14 months’ reimprisonment based on his grade B violation, see U.S.S.G.
§ 7B1.1(a)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 922(g), and his category III criminal history from his original
sentencing, see U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4. His eight-month sentence was within the policy-
statement range and did not exceed the two-year statutory maximum based on Burton’s
original class C conviction. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).
Counsel also considers challenging the substantive reasonableness of Burton’s
prison term but correctly concludes that any challenge would be frivolous. Burton’s

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No. 24-1814 Page 3
sentence was at the bottom of his policy statement range and is therefore presumed to
be reasonable. See Jones, 774 F.3d at 404. The district court adequately addressed the
§ 3553(a) factors, highlighting the seriousness of the violation (possessing a loaded
firearm) and the need for deterrence (based on his gun possession and drug use while
on supervised release).
Finally, counsel appropriately concludes that any challenge to Burton’s
additional two-year term of supervised release or its conditions would be frivolous. The
court appropriately exercised its discretion by imposing additional supervised release
to allow Burton to use mental health and employment resources. Further, Burton
waived any challenge to the conditions of supervised release when he confirmed at
sentencing that he had no objection to them. See United States v. Gibbs, 130 F.4th 619, 622
(7th Cir. 2025).
We therefore GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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