Monzer Al-Kassar v. United States of America

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted July 9, 2025*
Decided July 10, 2025
Before
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1019
MONZER AL-KASSAR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Terre Haute Division.
No. 2:18-cv-00086-JPH-MKK
James P. Hanlon,
Judge.
O R D E R
Monzer al-Kassar, a prisoner previously incarcerated at the Federal Correctional
Institute in Terre Haute, Indiana, sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671 to 2680. He alleged that from September to October 2016, the
Bureau of Prisons negligently and intentionally allowed deplorable conditions at FCI
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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Terre Haute and denied him medical care. After a bench trial, the district court entered
judgment in favor of the United States. Al-Kassar appeals, and we affirm.
Al-Kassar was an inmate in the general population of the Communications
Management Unit (CMU) at FCI Terre Haute from 2011 until 2016. In September 2016,
before being transferred to another prison, al-Kassar spent about one month in the
Special Housing Unit of the CMU. The Special Housing Unit consisted of six to eight
cells separated from the rest of the CMU. After he was transferred to a new prison, al-
Kassar sued the United States, alleging that the Bureau of Prisons breached its duty of
care to him by allowing conditions akin to torture in the Special Housing Unit. As a
result, al-Kassar asserted, his health deteriorated. The district court recruited counsel
for al-Kassar, and the case proceeded to a bench trial.
At trial, al-Kassar testified that his cell was excessively hot, loud, and unsanitary,
and that he was not given medications or adequate time outside his cell. But the district
court did not credit al-Kassar’s testimony because it was often inconsistent or evasive.
For example, the district court compared al-Kassar’s trial testimony that there was no
exhaust fan to cool down his cell with his prior grievance stating that the “industrial
size exhaust fan was purposefully left running in the cell window.” The court also
contrasted al-Kassar’s trial testimony that he was never given his self-carry medications
with his contemporaneous statements during a phone call to his daughter that he
received his medications and deposition testimony that he had been given his
medications after a week in the Special Housing Unit.
Although al-Kassar presented testimony and affidavits from other inmates, the
district court also found their sworn statements incredible or irrelevant. For example,
one witness gave conflicting accounts of the airflow within the cells and implausibly
asserted that the heat in the cells was like “walking into a furnace … 24 hours a day,
everyday.” A second witness was not in the Special Housing Unit at the same time as
al-Kassar. And a third witness was not housed at FCI Terre Haute at all during the
relevant period.
Instead, the district court found credible the testimony of Bureau employees,
including the former warden and staff responsible for overseeing the unit, and entered
judgment for the United States. Multiple Bureau employees testified that they regularly
visited the Special Housing Unit, and that it was not excessively hot, loud, or
unsanitary, and that al-Kassar received medical care. Further, two employees testified
that they regularly interacted with al-Kassar during his time in the Special Housing
Unit, and he never showed signs of distress or complained about the conditions. The

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No. 24-1019 Page 3
former warden testified that he visited the unit at least weekly and did not observe any
unacceptable conditions during al-Kassar’s time there. The warden also testified that
staff conducted internal surveys regarding noise level, temperature, ventilation, and
sanitation, and all readings were within acceptable levels. Finally, the district court
found that the results of an independent accreditation audit, conducted in June 2016,
bolstered the testimony of these employees.
Al-Kassar appeals, first arguing that the district court should have stayed the
proceedings because the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General was
investigating the independent accreditation process for federal prisons around the time
of the trial. But it is not clear that the investigation was public knowledge until the
report was published in November 2023, months after the district court entered
judgment. Indeed, al-Kassar never asked the district court to stay the case while the
investigation was completed. Even if the district court were aware of an ongoing
investigation, we would review its decision not to continue the proceedings only for
abuse of discretion. See Jackson v. Willis, 844 F.3d 696, 699–700 (7th Cir. 2016). The court
did not abuse its discretion by failing sua sponte to delay the proceedings based on
mere speculation that some evidence favorable to al-Kassar might eventually emerge.
Relatedly, al-Kassar next argues that the district court erroneously relied on the
June 2016 accreditation audit to support its credibility findings. He says that new
evidence in the November 2023 report on the accreditation process contradicts the
testimony of the Bureau employees and the earlier audit’s findings.
We see no error in the district court’s reliance on the 2016 audit. The 2023 report,
which al-Kassar appends to his brief, explains that beginning in December 2018, the
Bureau contracted to receive third-party audits of its facilities, but the contractor did not
conduct any independent review of prison facilities. As best we can tell, the report
neither covers the period al-Kassar was in the Special Housing Unit nor discusses FCI
Terre Haute specifically. In any event, al-Kassar did not move in the district court for a
new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) or to reopen the judgment under
Rule 60(b)(2) based on newly discovered evidence. And we do not consider new
evidence for the first time on appeal. Midwest Fence Corp. v. United States Dep’t of Transp.,
840 F.3d 932, 946–47 (7th Cir. 2016).
To the extent al-Kassar disputes more generally the district court’s credibility
determinations, his argument is unavailing. This court gives the district court’s
credibility determinations “a high degree of deference” and may reverse only where the
court credited “patently improbable testimony or its credibility assessments conflict

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with its other factual findings.” PNC Bank, Nat. Ass’n v. Boytor, 109 F.4th 495, 503
(7th Cir. 2024) (quoting Morisch v. United States, 653 F.3d 522, 529 (7th Cir. 2011)). That is
not the case here. The district court relied on ample evidence when it discounted al-
Kassar’s testimony, particularly the inconsistencies between statements in his grievance,
complaint, deposition, and trial testimony. Further, al-Kassar’s account of the
conditions conflicted with the plausible testimony of Bureau employees, some of whom
conceded that while the cells were sometimes warm or loud, conditions were not
extreme. Further, the Bureau employees testified consistently with one another, and
their testimony was supported by internal Bureau surveys.
Next, al-Kassar argues that during discovery he should have been provided with
the original Arabic transcription of the phone call he had with his daughter but instead
was given only the English translation. But we see no error. Al-Kassar has not explained
how the original transcription of the conversation would have differed from the English
translation he introduced at trial. Moreover, while al-Kassar testified that the translation
did not “show the emotion” of the conversation, he agreed that the translation “look[ed]
about right or about accurate.”
Finally, al-Kassar argues that the district court erred by failing to appoint an
Arabic language interpreter to help him better follow the proceedings and to assist his
attorneys. But the court was not required to appoint an interpreter where al-Kassar’s
lawsuit was not “instituted by the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(1); see also Ramirez
v. Young, 906 F.3d 530, 536–37 (7th Cir. 2018) (discussing right to interpreter in certain
judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings). And al-Kassar never requested interpretation
services in the district court, see 18 U.S.C. § 1827(g)(4), so we see no error.
AFFIRMED

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