Timothy Upchurch v. STATE OF INDIANA and INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-1355
TIMOTHY U PCHURCH ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
STATE OF I NDIANA and I NDIANA DEPARTMENT OF C ORRECTION ,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:19-cv-04644 — Sarah Evans Barker, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED A PRIL 16, 2025 — DECIDED J ULY 25, 2025
____________________
Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and ST. EVE and JACKSON -
A KIWUMI , Circuit Judges.
ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Timothy Upchurch, a Black man, has
worked at the Indiana Department of Correction’s Correc-
tional Industrial Facility (“CIF”) for more than thirty years.
He brought discrimination and retaliation claims against the
State of Indiana under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2(a)(1),
2000e–3(a), challenging his demotion from Correctional

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2 No. 24-1355
Lieutenant to Officer, and subsequent written reprimands, a
suspension, and non-promotions. The district court substi-
tuted the Indiana Department of Correction for the State of
Indiana as the defendant, then granted summary judgment to
the Department. We affirm.
I. Background
Upchurch is a Black Correctional Officer at CIF. First hired
in 1994 as an Officer, he was promoted to Sergeant in Novem-
ber 2007 and Lieutenant in September 2015. In January 2019,
Warden Wendy Knight demoted him two levels.
His demotion back to an Officer position followed an in-
vestigation into a harassment complaint by Officer Colin
White against Officer David Myers. As relevant here, White
told the investigator that on November 18, 2018, Myers called
the shift supervisor’s office, reached Upchurch, and made fun
of White, including by telling Upchurch, “White hasn’t had
sex with his wife since he got married.” Officer Ty Palmer,
who was in the shift supervisor’s office with Upchurch that
day, confirmed the inappropriate comment, stating that Up-
church had repeated it to him. Myers, meanwhile, told the in-
vestigator that “he could have [made the comment to Up-
church] but he doesn’t remember,” and “if he did [make the
comment,] it would be because White told him that.” Up-
church denied hearing or repeating the comment. The inves-
tigator ultimately credited Palmer’s account and recom-
mended Upchurch receive a two-level demotion. Warden
Knight agreed, imposing the demotion on January 2, 2019.
Since the demotion, Deputy Warden Andrew Cole has is-
sued Upchurch three written reprimands in lieu of suspen-
sions: in February 2019 for refusing mandatory overtime; in

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No. 24-1355 3
March 2019 for an unauthorized 30-minute leave; and in July
2020 for 11.5 hours of unauthorized leave. In addition, Cole
suspended Upchurch for 10 days in February 2021 for pos-
sessing and using chewing tobacco found in a corridor, which
Cole attributed to Upchurch, although Upchurch denied that
he brought the tobacco into the facility.
Over this period and through September 2021, Upchurch
unsuccessfully applied for more than twenty positions at CIF
and other Department facilities.* The Department states that
its disciplinary actions explain many of the non-promotions:
Under a policy at both CIF and the Department’s Indiana
Women’s Prison (“IWP”), employees are ineligible for a pro-
motion within twelve months of formal discipline, including
a suspension or a written reprimand in lieu of a suspension.
All but five of Upchurch’s applications for promotions at CIF
and IWP fell within a year of formal discipline.
* At CIF, Upchurch applied for a Captain position in May 2019; Lieu-
tenant and Sergeant positions in July 2019; a Sergeant position in Novem-
ber 2019; Lieutenant and Sergeant positions in February 2020; Lieutenant
and Captain positions in June 2020; a Lieutenant position in August 2021;
and a Lieutenant position in September 2021.
At Indiana Women’s Prison, he applied for Sergeant and Lieutenant
positions in August 2019; Sergeant and Captain positions in April 2020; a
Lieutenant position in May 2020; a Correctional Caseworker position in
July 2020; and a Lieutenant position in August 2021.
At Miami Correctional Facility, he applied for a Lieutenant position in
October 2020; a Sergeant position in February 2021; and a Lieutenant po-
sition in August 2021.
He also applied for Parole Officer positions in May and August 2020.

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4 No. 24-1355
From March to July 2020, the only relevant period when
the policy described by the Department did not preclude Up-
church from promotion at CIF, he applied for a Sergeant and
a Lieutenant position at CIF. Warden Knight made the hiring
decisions for both positions. She selected Brandon Richey, a
Sergeant at Pendleton Correctional Facility, for the Lieutenant
position, and Jerry Gilley, a Captain at Pendleton, for the Cap-
tain position. In her affidavit, Knight explained that Richey
and Gilley had superior qualifications to Upchurch: Richey
brought experience as a Sergeant at a maximum-security fa-
cility (Pendleton), and Gilley had served as a Captain at CIF
before transferring to Pendleton.
Upchurch claims that race discrimination and retaliation
for his complaints about discrimination motivated his disci-
plinary record and non-promotions. Since May 2019, he has
filed five charges of discrimination and retaliation with the
Indiana Civil Rights Commission and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). The EEOC responded to
each charge with a right-to-sue letter. In November 2019, Up-
church filed this lawsuit against the State of Indiana, invoking
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2 et seq.
During discovery, Upchurch did not take any depositions
in this case, including those of the decisionmakers. After the
close of discovery, the State of Indiana moved for summary
judgment, arguing that the Indiana Department of Correc-
tion, as Upchurch’s employer under Title VII, was the proper
defendant. The district court agreed that Upchurch had sued
the wrong defendant. Rather than grant the State’s motion,
however, the court substituted the Department for the State
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21.

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No. 24-1355 5
The Department then moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motion, finding insufficient evi-
dence in the record of race discrimination or retaliation for a
reasonable jury to return a verdict for Upchurch.
On appeal, Upchurch challenges the district court’s deci-
sion to substitute the Department for the State as the defend-
ant, and its determination that the record contains insufficient
evidence to support his Title VII claims.
II. Discussion
Title VII prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing]
against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of”
his race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). It further prohibits an em-
ployer from discriminating against employees or applicants
for employment because they have complained of race dis-
crimination. § 2000e-3(a).
In this case, we first define Upchurch’s “employer” under
Title VII. We then consider whether record evidence permits
an inference of illegal discrimination or retaliation.
A.
In lawsuits arising from state employment, “the particular
agency or part of the state apparatus that has actual hiring
and firing responsibility” is the “employer” for purposes of
Title VII and thus the appropriate defendant. DaSilva v. Indi-
ana, 30 F.4th 671, 674 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Hearne v. Chi. Bd.
of Educ., 185 F.3d 770, 777 (7th Cir. 1999)).
Applying this rule, we agree with the district court that the
Indiana Department of Correction, not the State of Indiana, is
the relevant employer here. Although the State Personnel

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6 No. 24-1355
Department provides human resource services (such as inves-
tigation services in this case), the Department has the author-
ity to hire and fire correctional workers in its facilities. Cf.
Sutherland v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 344 F.3d 603, 611–12 (6th
Cir. 2003) (holding that the Michigan Department of Treasury
was the “employer” of auditors under Title VII); see also Hol-
man v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 401 n.1 (7th Cir. 2000) (assuming
that the Indiana Department of Transportation was the “em-
ployer” of workers in its maintenance department under Title
VII). Indeed, Warden Knight made the ultimate decision to
demote Upchurch. We therefore reject Upchurch’s argument
that the district court premised its substitution decision on a
legal error about his employer under Title VII.
B.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
to the Department de novo. Vassileva v. City of Chi., 118 F.4th
869, 873 (7th Cir. 2024). Summary judgment is proper if “the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any ma-
terial fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In applying this standard, we
construe all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor
of the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
255 (1986). Even so, a movant may prevail at summary judg-
ment by showing an absence of evidence to support the non-
movant’s claims. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23
(1986); see, e.g., Vassileva, 118 F.4th at 873–75.
1.
Before we reach the merits of the district court’s decision,
we resolve an evidentiary challenge Upchurch raised. This
challenge concerns two exhibits he submitted in opposition to

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No. 24-1355 7
the Department’s motion. The district court observed that
these exhibits, which listed purported comparators and sum-
marized events, contained facts and arguments not raised in
Upchurch’s briefing, and that he had not sought leave from
the court to supplement his briefing or file an oversized brief.
The district court declined to consider facts and arguments
raised in the two exhibits but not the briefing. Through its rul-
ing, the district court enforced local rules in the Southern Dis-
trict of Indiana, which provide that “[t]he court has no duty
to search or consider any part of the record not specifically
cited” in support of a factual assertion in a brief. Local Rule
56-1(e), (h); see also Local Rule 7-1(e) (limiting supporting and
response briefs to 30 pages absent leave of the court).
To prove that he is entitled to relief because of this ruling,
Upchurch must show that the district court abused its discre-
tion and that any error prejudiced his substantial rights. See
McCurry v. Kenco Logistics Servs., LLC, 942 F.3d 783, 787 n.2
(7th Cir. 2019) (we review a district court’s decision to enforce
local summary-judgment rules for an abuse of discretion);
Rogers v. City of Chi., 320 F.3d 748, 751 (7th Cir. 2003), overruled
on other grounds by Hill v. Tangherlini, 724 F.3d 965 (7th Cir.
2013) (a party asserting an evidentiary error on appeal bears
the burden of showing not only that the court erred, but also
that the error prejudiced his “substantial rights”).
Upchurch has made neither showing. “[W]e have repeat-
edly held that district [courts] may strictly enforce local sum-
mary-judgment rules,” McCurry, 942 F.3d at 787, and the dis-
trict court reasonably did so in this case. Furthermore, Up-
church has not attempted to show that the court’s ruling prej-
udiced him. The only comparators and events Upchurch dis-
cussed on appeal are ones the district court considered, so we

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8 No. 24-1355
are unsure what evidence the court declined to consider be-
cause of its ruling, and what difference that evidence might
have made to its summary judgment decision.
2.
Turning to the merits, Upchurch claims that race discrim-
ination and retaliation motivated his January 2019 demotion
to Correctional Officer; his February 2019, March 2019, and
July 2020 written reprimands in lieu of suspensions; his Feb-
ruary 2021 suspension; and his non-promotions.
For Upchurch to survive summary judgment on his race
discrimination claims, the record must contain sufficient evi-
dence to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that his race
caused the adverse employment actions at issue in this case.
See Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016)
(identifying the summary judgment inquiry as “whether the
evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude
that the plaintiff’s race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or other pro-
scribed factor caused the discharge or other adverse employ-
ment action”). Likewise, to reach a jury on his retaliation
claims, the evidence must permit a reasonable jury to draw a
causal link between Upchurch’s complaints of race discrimi-
nation and the adverse actions underlying his claims. See Ro-
zumalski v. W.F. Baird & Assocs., Ltd., 937 F.3d 919, 924 (7th Cir.
2019) (“The key question is whether a reasonable juror could
conclude that there was a causal link between the protected
activity or status and the adverse action.”).
If the employer has offered a nondiscriminatory explana-
tion for its action, a Title VII claim turns on whether there is
sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that the
explanation is pretext for illegal discrimination or retaliation.

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No. 24-1355 9
See Vassileva, 118 F.4th at 874. “Pretext is ‘[a] lie, specifically a
phony reason for some action,’ not ‘just faulty reasoning or
mistaken judgment on the part of the employer….’” Napier v.
Orchard Sch. Found., 137 F.4th 884, 892 (7th Cir. 2025) (altera-
tions in original) (quoting Barnes v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of
Ill., 946 F.3d 384, 389–90 (7th Cir. 2020)).
a.
In this case, the Department has offered nondiscrimina-
tory explanations for its disciplinary actions, its non-promo-
tions within twelve months of Upchurch’s disciplinary ac-
tions, and its two June 2020 non-promotions at CIF. In re-
sponse, Upchurch attempts to show that the Department’s ex-
planations are pretextual through assertions that its explana-
tions are inaccurate or its decisions unfair, and by pointing to
employees allegedly treated better than him and the temporal
proximity between his complaints about racial discrimination
and certain adverse employment actions.
Upchurch maintains that he never heard or repeated an
inappropriate comment by Officer Palmer about Officer
White, contrary to Warden Knight’s conclusion, which the
Department cites to explain his demotion. Likewise, he main-
tains that he never brought chewing tobacco into CIF, con-
trary to Deputy Warden Cole’s conclusion, which the Depart-
ment cites to explain his ten-day suspension.
While Upchurch concedes that he refused the mandatory
overtime and took the unauthorized leave the Department
cites to explain his three written reprimands in lieu of suspen-
sions, Upchurch asserts that the reprimands were nonetheless
unfair for various reasons. First, Knight did not provide him
seven days’ notice of the shift change following his demotion,

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10 No. 24-1355
so he was unable to rearrange childcare duties, which, he ex-
plains, caused him to refuse the mandatory overtime. Second,
Upchurch requested that Cole retroactively authorize one of
the unauthorized leaves, but Cole refused to do so. Third, Up-
church had submitted a request for time off because of harass-
ment and stress prior to his other unauthorized leaves, but the
State Personnel Department had failed to respond.
“If the [employer] honestly believed it made the correct
employment decision—even if its decision was inaccurate,
unfair, foolish, trivial, or baseless—[the plaintiff’s] claims can-
not succeed.” Barnes-Staples v. Carnahan, 88 F.4th 712, 716 (7th
Cir. 2023) (citation modified). Inaccuracy or unfairness might
support an inference of pretext if the evidence shows that no
reasonable person, in the exercise of impartial judgment,
could have made the challenged employment decision. Cf.
Cunningham v. Austin, 125 F.4th 783, 790 (7th Cir. 2025) (ex-
plaining that when an employer offers superior qualifications
as an explanation for a decision to a hire another candidate
over the plaintiff, a comparison of the candidates’ credentials
can only support an inference of pretext if the plaintiff’s cre-
dentials are “so superior to the credentials of the person se-
lected for the job that no reasonable person, in the exercise of
impartial judgment, could have chosen the candidate selected
over the plaintiff for the job in question” (quoting Millbrook v.
IBP, Inc., 280 F.3d 1169, 1180–81 (7th Cir. 2002)).
Upchurch has failed to meet this evidentiary bar with re-
spect to any of the decisions he challenges. Warden Knight
concluded that Upchurch heard and repeated an inappropri-
ate comment after receiving the report summarizing the State
Personnel Department’s findings from its investigation of the
November 2018 incident. That report described conflicting

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No. 24-1355 11
accounts of the incident by Palmer and Upchurch. A reasona-
ble person could have credited Palmer’s account over Up-
church’s. Deputy Warden Cole, for his part, concluded that
Upchurch possessed and used chewing tobacco at CIF after
reviewing surveillance footage. Upchurch failed to introduce
any evidence about that footage into the record. In addition,
he has failed to show that the mitigating circumstances sur-
rounding his mandatory overtime refusals and unauthorized
leaves were so compelling that no reasonable, impartial per-
son could have reprimanded him. Furthermore, there is no
evidence in the record that Cole, who made the reprimand
decisions, knew about some of these circumstances.
Next, we turn to the employees Upchurch offers as com-
parators. For a reasonable jury to draw an inference of pretext
from evidence that the employer treated another employee
differently, the comparator must be “directly comparable to
the plaintiff in all material respects.” Id. at 895 (quoting Cole-
man v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 846 (7th Cir. 2012)). At summary
judgment, “a plaintiff must usually ‘show that the compara-
tors (1) “dealt with the same supervisor,” (2) “were subject to
the same standards,” and (3) “engaged in similar conduct
without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances as
would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s treatment
of them.”’” Id. at 894 (quoting Coleman, 667 F.3d at 846).
Upchurch has failed to make the requisite showing with
respect to any of the comparators he identifies on appeal. Re-
garding his demotion claim, the Department explains that
Upchurch’s conduct warranted demotion because he failed to
report peer-to-peer harassment among employees whom he
supervised. The employees Upchurch offers as comparators
did not engage in this type of conduct. Furthermore, for some

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12 No. 24-1355
of them, there is no evidence in the record that they dealt with
the same supervisor as him (i.e., Warden Knight).
Upchurch compares himself to Officer Palmer and Cap-
tain Parrow, who were in the shift supervisor’s office on No-
vember 18, 2018, and who did not report Myers’s harassment
of White, but neither of whom Warden Knight demoted.
Palmer, however, did not supervise Myers and White. And
while Parrow held a supervisory position, like Upchurch, the
record contains no evidence that Parrow heard Myers’s inap-
propriate comment (either when Myers made it to Upchurch,
or when Upchurch repeated it to Palmer, or otherwise).
Upchurch also compares his demotion to informal repri-
mands other employees at CIF received for cursing over the
radio and for slapping a male officer on the buttocks. This con-
duct does not involve a supervisor’s failure to report peer-to-
peer harassment. In addition, the record contains no evidence
about who made these disciplinary decisions.
With respect to his post-demotion claims, the record is de-
void of evidence to support reasonable comparisons. In his
affidavit, Upchurch states that someone at CIF retroactively
authorized leave for Officer White, who had “a lot of” unau-
thorized leave. By contrast, Upchurch states that when he
asked Deputy Warden Cole to retroactively authorize a thirty-
minute leave, Cole refused and instead issued the March 2019
written reprimand. But the record leaves many unanswered
questions about the circumstances surrounding White’s
leave, including the supervisor who authorized the leave and
the amount and purpose of the leave, so Upchurch has failed
to show that White is similarly situated.

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No. 24-1355 13
Joshua Mills, another purported comparator, transferred
from Pendleton Correctional Facility to CIF with a promotion
to Sergeant one month after he received a three-shift suspen-
sion. Mills and Upchurch resemble each other in that they
both received suspensions. A key question for purposes of
drawing a reasonable comparison between Mills and Up-
church, however, is whether Warden Knight decided to pro-
mote Mills (but not Upchurch) within twelve months of their
suspensions. The record contains no evidence about when
Mills applied for the Sergeant position at CIF, the content of
his job application, or when Warden Knight decided to hire
Mills. In the absence of any such evidence, and given the short
(one-month) gap between Mills’s suspension at Pendleton
and his promotion to Sergeant at CIF, Upchurch has failed to
show that Mills is an appropriate comparator.
Upchurch also attempts to show pretext for retaliation
with evidence of suspicious timing. “Suspicious timing alone
… is generally insufficient to establish a retaliatory motiva-
tion.” Jokich v. Rush Univ. Med. Ctr., 42 F.4th 626, 634 (7th Cir.
2022) “Occasionally, … an adverse action comes so close on
the heels of a protected act that an inference of causation is
sensible.” Loudermilk v. Best Pallet Co., LLC, 636 F.3d 312, 315
(7th Cir. 2011). That is not the case here.
Upchurch points to several occasions prior to his January
2019 demotion when he complained of race discrimination. In
June 2012, after a Deputy Warden issued Upchurch an infor-
mal letter of reprimand for failing to correct a subordinate
who exhibited unprofessional conduct, Upchurch “com-
plained to him that [Upchurch] thought he was being a rac-
ist.” Then, in April 2018, in a meeting where Deputy Warden
Cole and a Major informed Upchurch that Warden Knight

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14 No. 24-1355
had selected Paul Parrow over him for a Captain position at
CIF, Upchurch complained that CIF was not hiring or promot-
ing enough Black employees. Six years later and nine months
later, respectively, Knight demoted him.
The decisionmaker for the relevant adverse action must
know about the earlier protected activity for an inference of
retaliation to attach. See Vassileva, 118 F.4th at 875; Tyburski v.
City of Chi., 964 F.3d 590, 603 (7th Cir. 2020). Upchurch has not
presented evidence that Warden Knight knew about his ear-
lier discrimination complaints when she made the decision to
demote him. He points to her statement in February 2019, af-
ter he asked her to explain his demotion, that he “had been a
hindrance since she arrived at CIF in about 2011” (as he relates
the statement in his affidavit). Upchurch links this statement
to his complaints of race discrimination in June 2012. But he
offers no evidence except the statement itself to support this
link, and the statement is too vague.
More convincingly, Upchurch points to suspicious timing
between his complaints of discrimination and the February
2019 reprimand. In a meeting with Deputy Warden Cole and
a Major on February 20, 2019, Upchurch expressed concerns
that he and other Black employees were experiencing unfair
treatment. Later that day, Cole issued him a written repri-
mand in lieu of a one-day suspension for refusing mandatory
overtime assigned on January 24 and 29, 2019.
Upchurch does not contest, however, that he refused man-
datory overtime on January 24 and 29. Furthermore, Cole
stated in his affidavit that he first found out about those man-
datory overtime refusals on the morning of February 20, be-
fore the meeting with Upchurch. The record contains no evi-
dence about a supervisor’s disciplinary discretion when faced

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No. 24-1355 15
with reported mandatory overtime refusals. In this context,
suspicious timing is not enough to show retaliation.
The ultimate question here is whether “all evidence,”
“evaluated as a whole” supports an inference of illegal dis-
crimination or retaliation. Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 766. Given the
weaknesses in the evidence discussed above, we conclude
that no reasonable jury could find that race discrimination or
retaliation motivated the demotion, written reprimands in
lieu of suspensions, non-promotions within twelve months of
formal discipline, or June 2020 non-promotions at CIF.
b.
We owe a final word to Upchurch’s three non-promotions
at IWP, his non-promotions at Miami Correctional Facility,
and his unsuccessful applications for Parole Officer positions.
Upchurch has failed to come forward with any evidence that
race discrimination or retaliation motivated these employ-
ment actions. So like his other Title VII claims, his claims
based on these actions fail for lack of proof.
* * *
The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.

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