United States of America v. SHELDON MORALES and EDUARDO SANTANA

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
Nos. 24-1682 & 24-1801
U NITED STATES OF A MERICA ,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
SHELDON MORALES and EDUARDO SANTANA ,
Defendants-Appellants.
____________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:19-cr-00850 — Mary M. Rowland, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED MAY 29, 2025 — D ECIDED A UGUST 1, 2025
____________________
Before EASTERBROOK , BRENNAN, and SCUDDER , Circuit
Judges.
BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. A jury found Sheldon Morales
and Eduardo Santana guilty of conspiring to possess and dis-
tribute controlled substances. The defendants raise a host of
issues related to their criminal proceedings. We affirm across
the board.

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2 Nos. 24-1682 & 24-1801
I
A
Soon after his release from prison for a federal drug traf-
ficking offense, Sheldon Morales fell back into similar habits.
The Drug Enforcement Administration, acting on information
from the Evanston, Illinois, Police Department, began surveil-
ling Morales. In early 2019, the DEA intercepted various
phone calls as part of its surveillance efforts.
The first relevant calls were between Morales and two un-
identified men, believed to be incarcerated at the time, who
presumably used a smuggled phone. These two inmates
served as brokers between drug suppliers and distributors.
Morales requested they arrange a shipment for samples of
heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine to a home in Evans-
ton. After receiving the initial samples, Morales spoke again
to the brokers about the structure of future transactions, such
as how shipment and payment would be handled. Morales
also told the brokers he would split proceeds with “Guajo,”
later determined to be Eduardo Santana.
Law enforcement, aware of an expected shipment to the
Evanston home, seized a drug delivery after a canine alerted
to the scent of narcotics. The package contained 5.43 kilo-
grams of methamphetamine and 827 grams of fentanyl, the
latter of which was mixed with other substances.
Calls intercepted in later weeks detailed Santana’s role in
the venture. He routinely served as a translator for conversa-
tions between Morales and a Mexican supplier—Omar—by-
passing the inmate brokers. Other conversations revealed
Santana was more than a mere translator. Speaking only to
Santana after a call with Omar, Morales said the suppliers

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Nos. 24-1682 & 24-1801 3
were going to “make us the office of Chicago,” and that the
two would “run[]” the city. And after purchasing a “brick” of
cocaine, Morales told Santana that the two were “finna go to
the moon, bro.”
At one point, Morales received a package that was suppos-
edly empty, yet he did not retrieve it out of fear the police
were watching the drop-off location. Upon prompting from
Morales and Omar, Santana went to the location to confirm
the box contained no drugs. Santana took a video of himself
kicking the box to document how light the delivery was. He
sent the video to Morales and Omar to ensure the suppliers
did not believe they were being shortchanged on payment.
Santana assured Omar “[i]n God’s name and in the name of
[his] kids” that the box was empty.
On another occasion, Morales and Santana discussed a
joint plan to defraud Omar. Santana suggested they make a
video of somebody getting arrested with what looked like a
shipment of drugs. The two thought that by staging this false
seizure, they could keep the shipment without paying their
suppliers. Santana also steered Morales away from retaliating
against a woman named Suzie, whom Morales feared had
“called the feds” on him.
In the months after these calls, law enforcement inter-
cepted two more packages containing narcotics. One had the
same return address as the previously seized shipment and
contained nearly two kilograms of cocaine. The other, which
had a different return address but was delivered to Morales’s
residence, had over 800 grams of fentanyl.

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4 Nos. 24-1682 & 24-1801
B
Morales and Santana were indicted in the Northern
District of Illinois for conspiring to possess with intent to dis-
tribute methamphetamine, fentanyl, and cocaine, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. Morales was also charged
with attempting to possess with intent to distribute metham-
phetamine and fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
Twice before trial Morales requested and was permitted to
obtain new counsel, causing delays of the trial date. When
Morales moved for new counsel a third time, the district court
told him: “This is it. This is your third counsel. If this doesn’t
work out, you will not have an opportunity to have another
counsel. Do you understand that?” Morales replied: “Yes,
ma’am, I do.” The court ultimately granted his request and
Lisa and Joseph Lopez substituted in as new counsel, delay-
ing the trial by another six months.
After five months of representing Morales, the Lopezes
filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. They asserted that Mo-
rales had become verbally abusive toward Lisa Lopez and had
attempted to micromanage litigation strategy. In response,
the district court held a hearing to address the motion. It per-
mitted Lisa Lopez to withdraw but declined to appoint new
counsel in Joseph Lopez’s stead. Santana remained in cus-
tody, and appointing Morales another lawyer would have re-
quired the district court to again delay the date of the joint
trial.
A motion, purportedly from Morales, was mailed to the
district court before the hearing. It asserted that the Lopezes
were overbilling Morales for work performed and requested
that the court appoint new counsel for him. Although the

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Nos. 24-1682 & 24-1801 5
document was sent before the hearing, it was not docketed
until afterward. At no point during the hearing did Morales
mention he had sent this to the court. To add further intrigue,
another pro se motion—ostensibly also from Morales—was
mailed after the hearing. It asserted that the motion to dismiss
the Lopezes was fraudulently filed. And it clarified Morales
would “retain his current attorney(ies).”
The case went to trial. Morales requested the district court
read the jury a buyer-seller instruction, arguing he did not
have a conspiratorial relationship with Omar and the two in-
mate brokers. See United States v. Page, 123 F.4th 851, 859 (7th
Cir. 2024) (en banc) (Proof “that two people are in a buyer-
seller relationship is insufficient to prove a drug-distribution
conspiracy.” (quoting United States v. Hidalgo-Sanchez, 29 F.4th
915, 925 (7th Cir. 2022))). The court declined to provide the
instruction, as it concluded the evidence did not support a
mere buyer-seller relationship.
A jury convicted Morales of all charged conduct and San-
tana of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute only
methamphetamine. Morales moved for a new trial under Fed-
eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, arguing that the lack of a
buyer-seller instruction deprived him of a fair trial. Santana
moved for a judgment of acquittal under Rule 29, claiming
that the government presented insufficient evidence to con-
vict him of conspiracy. The district court denied both motions.
At sentencing, Santana requested a two-level minor role
reduction, arguing that his part in the offense was limited to
serving as Morales’s translator and “kick[ing] a box on a
porch.” See U.S. SENT’G G UIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.2(b). The
district court refused the reduction. It concluded that Santana
was not simply “a translator,” but rather “an equal” in the

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6 Nos. 24-1682 & 24-1801
conspiracy. The court sentenced Morales to 235 months’ and
Santana to 200 months’ imprisonment. Both defendants now
appeal.
II
Santana raises two arguments. He first asserts that the
government presented insufficient evidence to show he
conspired to possess a controlled substance with intent to dis-
tribute. Second, he claims that the district court erred in not
granting his request for a minor role reduction at sentencing.
A
We review Santana’s sufficiency of the evidence challenge
de novo, looking at “the evidence presented at trial ‘in the
light most favorable to the government.’” United States v. Gus-
tafson, 130 F.4th 608, 613 (7th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States
v. Peterson, 823 F.3d 1113, 1120 (7th Cir. 2016)). We will “affirm
the conviction if any rational trier of fact could find the de-
fendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
For conspiracy, the government must have introduced
sufficient evidence to “prove that two or more people agreed
to commit an unlawful act and that the defendant knowingly
and intentionally joined in that agreement.” Page, 123 F.4th at
859. The government need not show the defendant engaged
in an overt act. Id. (citing United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10,
15 (1994)). Due to the secretive nature of conspiracies, the
prosecution’s case frequently will be “based largely (and of-
ten, solely) on circumstantial evidence.” Id. at 861.
Santana argues that the evidence showed he served only
as Morales’s translator, not as his co-conspirator. Yet multiple
aspects of the relationship between Morales and Santana sup-
port the conspiracy conviction. Co-conspirators possess

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Nos. 24-1682 & 24-1801 7
“shared interests” in the illegal activity, which can be demon-
strated in many ways. United States v. Jones, 56 F.4th 455, 488
(7th Cir. 2022).
First, Santana “advised [Morales] on the conduct of” the
latter’s business. Page, 123 F.4th at 863 (quoting United States
v. Johnson, 592 F.3d 749, 755–56 (7th Cir. 2010)); Hidalgo-
Sanchez, 29 F.4th at 928. Most notably, Santana offered Mo-
rales a roadmap for how to cheat their supplier, Omar, out of
payment for drugs. He suggested that Morales “make a
video” of “somebody getting arrested” with a box, giving
Omar the false impression that the drugs had been inter-
cepted. Santana thought this advice was “big time.”
Second, Santana and Morales “contemplated expanding
their business relationship” with one another. Page, 123 F.4th
at 863. Morales stated that the suppliers were planning to
make him and Santana “the office of Chicago,” and that the
two would “run[]” the city. Although this expansion did not
come to fruition, it supports an inference that Santana had a
stake in the illicit venture. If that were not enough, the jury
also heard evidence that Santana directed Morales’s brother
to “tak[e] advantage” of Morales’s drug supply to sell to cus-
tomers, thereby expanding the distribution network.
Third, the two warned one another of “threats to each
other’s business” from law enforcement. Id.; United States v.
Wright, 85 F.4th 851, 862 (7th Cir. 2023). Santana advised Mo-
rales to “get some phones” because Santana did not “feel safe
talking on” the devices they were using at the time. At trial,
the government’s witness explained Santana offered this
“good advice” to Morales “out of fear”—which proved pres-
cient—that law enforcement was listening to their

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8 Nos. 24-1682 & 24-1801
conversations. And Santana guided Morales against acting
rashly when Morales feared a woman had “called the feds”
on him.
Santana also checked on a drug shipment after Morales
expressed concern that officers were watching the drop-off lo-
cation. Morales had instructed him to look into it because the
two thought the box was empty. So, to avoid having to pay
for an empty package, under Morales’s direction, Santana
took a video of himself kicking the box to capture its light
weight to show Omar that the package was delivered without
narcotics. Taken together, the evidence demonstrates Santana
was much more than a mere translator. Instead, he took an
active role in the conspiracy and repeatedly reaped the bene-
fits of its perpetuation.
Santana’s primary rejoinder—that no direct evidence
showed he possessed or controlled the drugs—is not persua-
sive. His sole conviction was for conspiring to possess with
intent to distribute narcotics, not for the underlying substan-
tive charge. And to sustain a conspiracy conviction under 21
U.S.C. § 846, the government needed only prove “that he
agreed to the activities,” not that he “personally bought, sold,
or possessed any narcotics.” United States v. Morales, 655 F.3d
608, 635 (7th Cir. 2011). Accordingly, the cases on which San-
tana relies are inapposite, as they each deal with substantive-
offense sufficiency challenges. Contra United States v. Garcia,
919 F.3d 489 (7th Cir. 2019); United States v. Jones, 713 F.3d 336
(7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Katz, 582 F.3d 749 (7th Cir.
2009).
In any event, the jury heard evidence belying Santana’s
claim that he did not possess drugs. Morales said on a phone
call with an unidentified male that Santana would receive “a

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Nos. 24-1682 & 24-1801 9
whole one”—slang for a kilogram of drugs—for the “thing
that [Morales and Santana] did.” Further, Santana said he
hoped Morales obtained a fresh supply of cocaine because
Santana wanted to “push [his] little pow-wee”—or “pow-
der”—out.
In sum, Santana’s arguments, including “that he was
merely aware” of the illegal activity, “may have been valid
arguments to put before a jury, [but] they are not enough to
support a sufficiency of the evidence challenge on appeal.”
Morales, 655 F.3d at 635 (alteration in original) (quoting United
States v. Taylor, 600 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2010)). Because the
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the govern-
ment, showed he knowingly agreed with Morales to commit
an unlawful act, and had a stake in the illicit venture, we have
little hesitation affirming Santana’s conspiracy conviction.
B
Santana also challenges the district court’s refusal to grant
him a minor role reduction at sentencing. We review factual
findings supporting the court’s decision for clear error. United
States v. Tam, 82 F.4th 536, 540 (7th Cir. 2023). The focus here
is on the defendant’s role compared to that of the “average
member of the conspiracy,” not to those of the leaders. Id.
(quoting United States v. Orlando, 819 F.3d 1016, 1025 (7th Cir.
2016)). When reviewing role-adjustment decisions, we “rarely
reverse, as the sentencing court is in the best position to de-
termine the role that a defendant had in the criminal activity.”
Id. (quoting United States v. Campuzano-Benitez, 910 F.3d 982,
989 (7th Cir. 2018)).
The commentary to the Guidelines provides a list of non-
exhaustive factors for courts to weigh when considering a

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10 Nos. 24-1682 & 24-1801
mitigating role adjustment. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C).
We have summarized the factors by instructing sentencing
courts to consider a defendant’s “knowledge of the conspir-
acy, participation in planning and decision-making, and po-
tential financial gain.” United States v. Guzman-Ramirez, 949
F.3d 1034, 1037 (7th Cir. 2020).
At the outset, we note that Santana’s effort to contrast his
behavior with defendants from other cases misses the mark.
The sentencing court must compare his conduct only “to that
of other members in the same conspiracy.” Id. at 1038 (saying
that the defendant’s “comparing himself to defendants in
other cases” was “futile”).
The district court did not clearly err in concluding that
Santana was Morales’s “equal” in the venture. As discussed
in detail above, Santana had full knowledge of the conspiracy.
He planned its operations with Morales, routinely provided
necessary translation services, and benefited financially from
its proceeds. Even crediting his argument that Morales, the
brokers, and Omar were “more culpable,” that alone does not
warrant a sentencing reduction. United States v. Zhaofa Wang,
707 F.3d 911, 917 (7th Cir. 2013); see also United States v. Tur-
nipseed, 47 F.4th 608, 615 (7th Cir. 2022) (explaining that a de-
fendant must prove he was “substantially less culpable than
the average participant” (emphasis added) (quoting Orlando,
819 F.3d at 1025)).
In sum, we see no issues with Santana’s conviction or his
sentence.

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Nos. 24-1682 & 24-1801 11
III
Morales argues his conviction cannot stand for two rea-
sons.1 First, he asserts the district court erred in failing to give
the jury his requested buyer-seller instruction. Second, he
claims the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right
to counsel of choice when it failed to hold a hearing after he
purportedly filed his substitution-of-counsel motion.
A
We review de novo “a district court’s denial of a defend-
ant’s requested jury instruction.” United States v. Griffin, 76
F.4th 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2023). A defendant is entitled to an in-
struction only when it (1) “represents an accurate statement
of the law;” (2) “reflects a theory that is supported by the evi-
dence;” (3) “reflects a theory which is not already part of the
charge; and (4) the failure to include the instruction would
deny the [defendant] a fair trial.” Id. (alteration in original)
(quoting United States v. Walker, 746 F.3d 300, 307 (7th Cir.
2014)).
Morales proposed a buyer-seller jury instruction different
from this circuit’s pattern instruction.2 See William J. Bauer
1 Morales proceeded pro se before our court. We have reviewed his
submissions and determined that the facts and legal arguments are ade-
quately presented in the briefs and record, and that oral argument of his
appeal would not significantly aid the court. F ED . R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
2 Morales’s full proposed instruction read:
A conspiracy to distribute drugs or possess drugs
with intent to distribute requires more than simply an
agreement to exchange money for drugs which the seller
knows will be resold.

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12 Nos. 24-1682 & 24-1801
Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit § 5.10(A)
(2023 ed.). In arguing that the district court erred in denying
this request, Morales posits that the evidence did not show a
conspiratorial relationship among himself, Omar, and the in-
mate brokers. Yet the government did not need to prove that
Morales conspired with them.
Instead, the government needed to show only that
Morales conspired with a single other person to secure a con-
viction. As discussed above, overwhelming evidence demon-
strated a conspiracy between him and Santana. See United
States v. Cruse, 805 F.3d 795, 816 (7th Cir. 2015) (“The ‘buyer-
seller’ argument is irrelevant [when] the conspirators are on
the same side of the sale.” (quoting United States v. Payton, 328
F.3d 910, 912 (7th Cir. 2003))). And “irrelevant” instructions
“would only serve to confuse the jury and need not be given.”
Id. at 814. So, even if Morales had only a buyer-seller relation-
ship with Omar and the brokers, as he contends, there was
more than enough evidence to show he conspired with
In order to establish that a defendant knowingly con-
spired to distribute drugs or possess drugs with intent to
distribute with a person from whom the defendant
bought drugs, the government must prove that, in addi-
tion to agreeing to buy drugs, the defendant further
agreed to participate with the seller in an arrangement in-
volving mutual dependence, cooperation or assistance in
distributing drugs. Such an agreement may be proved by
evidence showing sales on credit, in which the buyer is
permitted to pay for all or part of the drugs after the drugs
have been re-sold, coupled with other evidence showing
cooperation and an ongoing arrangement between the
defendant and the seller.

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Nos. 24-1682 & 24-1801 13
Santana to support his conviction. The lack of a buyer-seller
instruction, then, does not undermine the integrity of this
jury’s verdict.
B
Morales next argues that the district court violated his
Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice. Although such a
violation is a structural error, a defendant’s right to counsel of
choice is “not absolute.” United States v. Velazquez, 772 F.3d
788, 797 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Sellers, 645
F.3d 830, 834 (7th Cir. 2011)). A district court “retains wide
latitude to balance the right to choice of counsel against the
needs of fairness to the litigants and against the demands of
its calendar.” Id.
We need not engage with the merits of Morales’s argu-
ment, as it stumbles right out of the gate: The record reflects
that either he did not request or he disclaimed his request for
new counsel. The full timeline shows why. After Morales had
fired two attorneys, he retained Lisa and Joseph Lopez. On
May 4, 2022, the Lopezes filed a motion to withdraw, describ-
ing how their relationship with Morales had become strained.
Then, on May 11, a document—purportedly signed by Mo-
rales—was mailed to the district court, requesting the court to
appoint him new counsel. It was not filed with the court,
though, until May 18.
The district court held a hearing on the Lopezes’ with-
drawal motion on May 16—two days before it became aware
of Morales’s purported motion. The court excused Lisa Lopez
from the case, but it did not allow Joseph Lopez to withdraw
because doing so would unreasonably delay the trial. During
this hearing Morales did not mention the May 11 motion for

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14 Nos. 24-1682 & 24-1801
the court to appoint new counsel. Instead, he acquiesced to
the court’s decision to deny Joseph Lopez’s withdrawal.
Finally, on May 19—the day Morales learned of the May
11 document—he mailed a “notice of improper and fraudu-
lent filing” to the district court, telling it that he did not send
the prior request for new counsel. He asserted the first filing
came from an organization called “Country Wide Legal As-
sistance,” which did not have his approval to send the new-
counsel motion. Morales clarified in the May 19 filing that he
would “retain his current attorney(ies).” And, tellingly, on
appeal Morales does not contest the validity of his “notice of
improper and fraudulent filing,” which disclaimed his partic-
ipation in the May 11 document purportedly seeking new
counsel.
Given this timeline, we are satisfied that Morales did not
request an attorney other than Joseph Lopez.3 Even if he did
so in the May 11 filing, he expressly disavowed any request
in the May 19 document. Either way, Morales cannot now
fault the district court for denying him counsel of his choice
when he expressly stated he would retain his current counsel.
* * *
We see no errors in the defendants’ trial or sentences. The
district court’s judgments are therefore A FFIRMED.
3 Morales also notes that he complained about Joseph Lopez’s perfor-
mance at a hearing less than a week before trial. Yet the record shows that
at this hearing, the district court spoke to Morales about his concerns. Dkt.
224 at 3–10.

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