Gricelda Ontiveros v. Exxon Mobil Corporation

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-2645
GRICELDA O NTIVEROS ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
EXXON M OBIL C ORPORATION ,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:21-cv-2335 — LaShonda A. Hunt, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED M AY 14, 2025 — DECIDED A UGUST 5, 2025
____________________
Before S YKES , Chief Judge, and JACKSON -A KIWUMI and
PRYOR , Circuit Judges.
JACKSON -A KIWUMI , Circuit Judge. Gricelda Ontiveros was a
customer service analyst with Exxon Mobil Corporation who
complained to human resources about her work conditions.
She disclosed that her managers behaved inappropriately to-
wards her, created an environment of “machismo,” and set
her up to fail by assigning her more work while also denying
her requests for overtime. Exxon investigated the complaints

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2 No. 24-2645
and found that, although morale was extremely low in the de-
partment where Ontiveros worked, there was no indication
of discrimination or harassment.
Over the next year, documented issues with Ontiveros’s
work performance increased. Her managers ultimately gave
her the lowest rating on her annual review, before presenting
her with the option of agreeing to a performance improve-
ment plan or resigning. Believing this change in her fate was
retaliation for her earlier complaints, Ontiveros reacted an-
grily. Exxon described the reaction as unprofessional and in-
appropriate. It informed her that the performance improve-
ment plan was no longer an option—her employment was
over.
Ontiveros responded to her termination with this lawsuit
against Exxon alleging gender discrimination, age discrimi-
nation, and retaliation. The district court awarded summary
judgment to Exxon. We have taken an independent look, as
we must, and we agree the record does not bear out Onti-
veros’s allegations. We therefore affirm.
I
We construe the facts in the light most favorable to Onti-
veros as the party opposing summary judgment. Dunlevy v.
Langfelder, 52 F.4th 349, 353 (7th Cir. 2022).
Ontiveros joined Exxon Mobil’s Cicero, Illinois, facility as
a contractor in 2010. Five years later, she became a full-time
employee. Her duties included handling sales orders, manag-
ing inventory, and triaging customer complaints. From 2017
until her termination in 2019, she reported to Pablo Villatoro,
who was supervised by plant manager Raul Sanchez.

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No. 24-2645 3
By all accounts, Ontiveros’s supervisor, Villatoro, had a
demanding management style. He instituted a new pre-ap-
proval policy for overtime hours and pushed his department
to complete more work within the workday. A year into
working under his supervision, on September 26, 2018, Onti-
veros called Exxon’s human resources hotline to complain
that Villatoro refused to approve her overtime pay despite in-
creasing her workload to unmanageable levels that required
overtime to complete. When interviewed as part of the inves-
tigation, Ontiveros explained that Villatoro was setting her up
for failure, and that she felt bullied in an environment of “ma-
chismo,” where everyone was afraid to lose their job. Exxon
eventually paid Ontiveros the overtime wages she was owed.
Given Ontiveros’s allegations, Christopher Holstead, a
member of human resources, opened a second investigation
with a colleague and scheduled an interview with Ontiveros.
She reported to him that Villatoro and Sanchez behaved inap-
propriately, used derogatory language, and created a hostile
work environment. Ontiveros later testified that she specifi-
cally told Holstead that Villatoro would stare at other women,
that he winked at her and at least one other woman, and that
Sanchez once told her he was going to sit on her lap. Holstead
asked her if she felt any of this behavior was motivated by
gender. His notes recorded this response: “[Ontiveros] did
not feel that the behavior was motivated by gender alone,
however she did state that she felt Raul [Sanchez] and Pablo
[Villatoro] judge her because she doesn’t try to dress up for
work.” Ontiveros added that she was one of only two female
employees at the plant.
As part of the investigation, Holstead also interviewed
Sanchez and Villatoro. Holstead’s final investigation report

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4 No. 24-2645
determined that Sanchez and Villatoro did not violate any
Exxon policy. Holstead noted that Villatoro’s department had
“extremely low morale.” Multiple employees shared that it
was difficult to complete their assigned work in eight-hour
workdays. Some employees believed this was management’s
doing. And witnesses offered troubling details. Gerald
Romero, for example, was a contractor who recalled that
Sanchez had called his work “garbage.” But, Holstead con-
cluded, “[n]one of [the witnesses interviewed] were experi-
encing or facing or brought forward any issues around age
discrimination, gender discrimination, or sexual harass-
ment.” The report marked the end of the investigation. For
her part, Ontiveros testified in a deposition that the sexual
harassment stopped after she submitted her complaint.
During her time at Exxon, Ontiveros received several
warnings about her work performance from Villatoro. Before
she complained about harassment to human resources, Villa-
toro twice advised her about proper service request reporting
procedures. After she complained in the fall of 2018, the warn-
ings about her work performance increased. In January 2019,
for example, Villatoro counseled her about missed deadlines
and issued her a formal warning about her failure to follow
pre-approval procedures for overtime work. Sanchez testified
that during this time he was receiving complaints from super-
visors and other employees that Ontiveros was being unpro-
fessional and was failing to deliver requested business infor-
mation in a timely fashion. But there is no written documen-
tation of these complaints.
In the summer of 2019, Villatoro reprimanded Ontiveros
for not updating a spreadsheet and for completing a task out-
side her regular duties that another employee asked her to

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No. 24-2645 5
complete. Most seriously, a few months later, it came to light
that Ontiveros had failed to open a service request for ten
months. Ontiveros admitted she “completely dropped the
ball,” and Villatoro warned her again about the importance of
opening service requests within two business days.
Permanent employees at Exxon underwent annual perfor-
mance assessments. Managers assessed their own employees
and then jointly ranked employees across the company in
similar roles against each other. At the end of the annual re-
view process, employees like Ontiveros were assigned a letter
grade (A, B, C, or D), which represented their final assessment
category. Employees who received a D were placed into the
“Management of Lower Relative Performance” (MLRP) pro-
gram and given the option to go on a performance improve-
ment plan (PIP) or accept “Pay in Lieu” (a severance package).
Other members of Ontiveros’s department were contrac-
tors and thus not subject to the annual performance review
process. This includes two individuals we will return to
later—Nicole Salvaggio, a woman younger than Ontiveros,
and Sal Saucedo, a man younger than Ontiveros. Because no
other employee in Ontiveros’s department held a similar po-
sition, Exxon compared her performance against similar em-
ployees at other plants.
Ontiveros received four annual performance reviews as an
employee with the following letter grades: a B in both 2016
and 2017 when assessed by a prior manager, a C in 2018 from
Villatoro, and a D in 2019 from Villatoro. Ontiveros received
similar feedback on each review, namely, that she could im-
prove her communication, time management, and service re-
quest investigation quality. Sanchez, who joined the plant in
2017, signed off on the last three performance reviews. One

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6 No. 24-2645
man in Ontiveros’s assessment group from another plant, Ste-
phen Kimber, also received a D in 2019.
On August 28, 2019, Sanchez and Shannon McGuire, a
member of human resources, met with Ontiveros to inform
her of her D rating and consequent assignment to the MLRP
process. At that point, Ontiveros had twenty-one days to de-
cide whether to take a PIP or resign with severance. Accord-
ing to Ontiveros, once she heard her options, she excused her-
self from the meeting. She then informed Sanchez, who had
followed her out of the meeting, that she was going back to
her desk to finish the workday. Sanchez insisted that she
leave. Ontiveros initially refused but eventually agreed to
leave once Sanchez threatened to call the authorities.
Sanchez emailed HR the next day with his version of the
events. He reported that Ontiveros got very aggressive, raised
her voice at him, and repeatedly called him “[s]weetheart” de-
spite him telling her that was inappropriate. He informed HR
that he did not believe it was safe for him and his employees
to allow her to return. At his deposition, Sanchez also testified
that he believed Ontiveros was going to hit him. McGuire tes-
tified that she heard Ontiveros yelling at Sanchez.
Citing Ontiveros’s behavior, Exxon withdrew the PIP op-
tion. In the days that followed, McGuire attempted to call On-
tiveros to explain that the PIP was no longer an option.
McGuire’s calls were unsuccessful—Ontiveros picked up one
call but promptly hung up after McGuire attempted to con-
ference in Sanchez. So, on September 9, 2019, McGuire sent a
letter to Ontiveros explaining that her employment was end-
ing, either by resignation (with severance) or termination
(without severance), and that she needed to inform Exxon of
her decision by September 18, 2019. The letter explained that

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No. 24-2645 7
the PIP option was removed “as a result of the disrespectful
and unprofessional behaviors.”
Ontiveros never informed Exxon of her decision and
Exxon terminated her effective September 19, 2019. She was
forty-two at the time. Ontiveros sued Exxon claiming gender
discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, and age dis-
crimination and retaliation under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA). The district court granted sum-
mary judgment to Exxon. Ontiveros now appeals.
II
We review a district court’s summary judgment decision
de novo and construe the record in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Adebiyi v. S. Suburban Coll., 98 F.4th 886,
891 (7th Cir. 2024).
Ontiveros advances her claims under Ortiz v. Werner En-
terprises, Inc., so we ask, “whether the evidence would permit
a reasonable factfinder to conclude” that her protected char-
acteristics “caused the discharge.” 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir.
2016). Under Ortiz, “all evidence belongs in a single pile and
must be evaluated as a whole” for an “overall likelihood of
discrimination.” Id. at 763, 766. We address each claim in turn.
A. Gender Discrimination Claim
Title VII forbids an employer from discharging an individ-
ual on account of the individual’s gender. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–
2. Ontiveros argues Exxon terminated her because she is a
woman. She supports her argument with several compara-
tors, the treatment of male employees generally, evidence of
pretext, and inappropriate comments from decisionmakers.

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8 No. 24-2645
Ontiveros presents several colleagues as comparators, but
none are sufficiently similar to her to make a meaningful com-
parison. A comparator is a “similarly situated employee[] out-
side of the protected class, [who was] treated more favora-
bly.” See Naficy v. Ill. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 697 F.3d 504, 511
(7th Cir. 2012). While “congruence need not be perfect,” the
comparator employee must be “engaged in similar conduct
without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances as
would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s treatment
of them.” See Lesiv v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 39 F.4th 903, 919 (7th
Cir. 2022) (quoting Donley v. Stryker Sales Corp., 906 F.3d 635,
639 (7th Cir. 2018)).
Only three of the proposed comparators are from outside
Ontiveros’s protected class: Saucedo, Kimber, and Romero.
And none of these men are suitable comparators under our
caselaw. Saucedo was not “similarly situated” because he
held a different position and was a contractor, not an em-
ployee subject to the performance review process. See Gates v.
Caterpillar, Inc., 513 F.3d 680, 690 (7th Cir. 2008) (comparators
are similarly situated if they “dealt with the same supervisor,
were subject to the same standards, and had engaged in sim-
ilar conduct without such differentiating or mitigating cir-
cumstances” (quoting Snipes v. Ill. Dept. of Corr., 291 F.3d 460,
463 (7th Cir. 2002))). Kimber held a job similar to Ontiveros,
and Exxon evaluated him against her, but Exxon did not treat
him “more favorably.” Naficy, 697 F.3d at 511. Exxon rated
Kimber’s performance with a D and gave him the same op-
tions as Ontiveros: accept a PIP or severance. Lastly, Onti-
veros points to the fact that Sanchez called a male employee’s
work garbage (Ontiveros does not tell us the employee’s
name but the record reflects it was Romero). She would like
us to infer that Sanchez’s comment was a low assessment of

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No. 24-2645 9
Romero’s work. But even if we agree, Ontiveros does not tell
us if: (a) Exxon gave Romero a warning or negative employ-
ment review, which would mean he was treated similarly, or
(b) Exxon took no employment action, which would mean he
was not treated similarly. Without this information, we can-
not determine whether Romero was treated more favorably
than Ontiveros. There is, then, no adequate comparator evi-
dence to add to our assessment that Ontiveros’s gender
caused her termination.
Next, Ontiveros argues that gender discrimination ex-
plains why Exxon placed no men into MLRP at the Cicero
plant. But Ontiveros’s citations do not support her proposi-
tion that Exxon placed no men into MLRP. The record evi-
dence shows only that no man accepted a PIP which, recall, is
one of two options given to employees placed into MLRP. The
record is silent as to how many male employees underwent
MLRP and chose to resign instead of accepting a PIP. Finally,
we also do not know if any of the male employees at the Cic-
ero plant were supervised by Villatoro or Sanchez, had job
duties similar to Ontiveros, or had similar performance is-
sues. We cannot infer discrimination when so many facts are
missing from the record.
Ontiveros next argues that the district court improperly
credited Exxon’s stated reason for terminating her. We disa-
gree. The district court evaluated Exxon’s description of the
MLRP meeting in the context of determining whether Exxon’s
justification for the termination was pretextual. In this analy-
sis, what matters is whether Exxon fabricated reasons to fire
Ontiveros. Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724, 736 (7th
Cir. 2008) (noting pretext must be akin to a lie or a phony rea-
son). Ontiveros does not dispute that she left the meeting

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10 No. 24-2645
early and refused to leave the building when told to do so.
Ontiveros presented no evidence that Exxon’s stated reason
for terminating her—that she behaved inappropriately—was
a lie. As such, this argument also does not help Ontiveros
build a pile of evidence.
Ontiveros testified that Villatoro’s winking and Sanchez’s
inappropriate comment about sitting on Ontiveros’s lap oc-
curred before she complained to human resources in 2018.
However, Ontiveros does not connect the inappropriate com-
ment or behavior, which occurred a year before her termina-
tion, to the decision to fire her. To be sure, Ontiveros has
shown evidence of a work culture that put increasingly im-
possible workloads on staff, denied them overtime, and al-
lowed sexualized and inappropriate comments. But the evi-
dence Ontiveros presents is insufficient for a jury to reach a
different conclusion altogether: that her gender caused her
termination.
B. Age Discrimination Claim
“The ADEA protects workers 40 years of age and older
from age-based employment discrimination.” Tyburski v. City
of Chicago, 964 F.3d 590, 598 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Wrolstad
v. Cuna Mut. Ins. Soc’y, 911 F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 2018)). To
prove a claim, it is not enough for a plaintiff “to show that age
was a motivating factor.” Id. (quoting Wrolstad, 911 F.3d at
454). Rather, a plaintiff must present evidence that “but for
[her] age, the adverse action would not have occurred.” Id.
(quoting Wrolstad, 911 F.3d at 454).
Ontiveros was forty-two when she was terminated. Tak-
ing the broadest view of her claims, she cannot connect any of
the events that led to her termination to her age. Her strongest

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No. 24-2645 11
argument, and the only one she supports with facts and law,
is that two younger workers were treated more favorably: Sal-
vaggio and Saucedo. But as discussed above, contractors—
which Salvaggio and Saucedo both were—are not adequate
comparators because they were not subject to performance re-
views or the MLRP process. Without comparators or any
other evidence, no reasonable jury could find Ontiveros’s age
was the “but for” cause of her termination.
C. Retaliation Claim
An employer may not retaliate against an employee for
protesting employment discrimination. Both Title VII and the
ADEA protect against this. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a); see also
Murphy v. Caterpillar Inc., 140 F.4th 900, 911, 917 (7th Cir.
2025). To survive summary judgment on a retaliation claim, a
plaintiff must offer evidence of: “(1) a statutorily protected ac-
tivity; (2) a materially adverse action taken by the employer;
and (3) a causal connection between the two.” Skiba v. Ill. Cent.
R.R. Co., 884 F.3d 708, 718 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Baines v.
Walgreen Co., 863 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2017)).
Even assuming Ontiveros engaged in protected activity
when she complained to human resources about Villatoro
and Sanchez’s behavior, and even assuming that her worsen-
ing performance reviews constitute an adverse action, Onti-
veros has not sufficiently linked her complaint to her worsen-
ing performance reviews and termination. Ontiveros can do
so with circumstantial evidence, including “suspicious tim-
ing, ambiguous statements of animus, evidence other em-
ployees were treated differently, or evidence the employer’s
proffered reason for the adverse action was pretextual.”
Adebiyi, 98 F.4th at 892 (quoting Rozumalski v. W.F. Baird & As-
socs., Ltd., 937 F.3d 919, 924 (7th Cir. 2019)). Ontiveros puts

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12 No. 24-2645
forward three pieces of circumstantial evidence, but they are
unavailing.
Ontiveros first argues that suspicious timing supports an
inference of retaliation. As she sees it, documented concerns
with her performance increased after she complained about
overtime pay and harassment in the fall of 2018. Indeed, the
fact that her complaint in November 2018 preceded her termi-
nation nearly a year later in September 2019 is some evidence
of potential retaliation. Moser v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 406 F.3d
895, 905 (7th Cir. 2005). But this evidence is undercut, at least
partially, by her 2016 and 2017 performance reviews that pre-
dated her complaints and resulted in a B rating based on sev-
eral areas of concern: time management, communication, and
service request investigation effectiveness. And the written
warning she received in January 2019 appears to be an esca-
lation of an ongoing issue. That warning cited notices sent to
Ontiveros about required pre-approval going back to Septem-
ber 2017 plus issues with her compliance dating back to April
2018. So, although it is true that criticisms of her performance
increased after her complaints, that fact is insufficient to build
a causal chain as the performance issues began before she
complained and continued for months.
Ontiveros next argues that because there is no evidence
that Villatoro and Sanchez were expressly advised not to re-
taliate against her, there should be an inference that they did.
But we know of no authority, and Ontiveros points us to
none, that supports an inference of retaliation from such si-
lence in the record.
Finally, Ontiveros argues that the withdrawal of the PIP
option following the August 28, 2019, meeting suggests Villa-
toro and Sanchez retaliated against her. The parties agree that

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No. 24-2645 13
Ontiveros left the meeting before it finished and refused to
leave the building when asked. The undisputed facts cannot
support an inference of retaliation because Exxon believed
Ontiveros acted unprofessionally and Ontiveros has not sup-
plied anything to support an inference that Exxon’s stated
reason for removing the PIP was a lie.
In sum, on this record, we cannot conclude that Exxon re-
taliated against Ontiveros.
III
Ontiveros worked under difficult conditions in a toxic
workplace. As she tells it, her gender, age, and complaints of
discrimination caused her supervisors to nitpick at her work
and eventually push her out. We are not called upon to eval-
uate the truth of what happened. All we hold today is that the
present record does not bear out Ontiveros’s contentions and,
without record support, a reasonable factfinder cannot find
for her on any of her claims.
AFFIRMED.

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