Nicole Freeling v. Indiana Department of Transportation

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted August 12, 2025*
Decided August 12, 2025
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1143
NICOLE FREELING,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:23-cv-00278-MPB-MJD
Matthew P. Brookman,
Judge.
O R D E R
Nicole Freeling, a real estate broker who twice was turned down for a consulting
position with the Indiana Department of Transportation (“INDOT”), appeals the
summary judgment rejecting her claims of race discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,
2000e-2. We affirm.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record
adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the
court. F ED . R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 25-1143 Page 2
Freeling sought to contract with INDOT on “relocation consulting”—assisting
people who are displaced by eminent domain projects. Before Freeling could enter into
a contract with INDOT, she had to meet the following “prequalification” application
requirements as set forth in the INDOT Manual: a minimum score of 70% on an exam;
demonstrated understanding of the federal programs and regulations governing
relocation; demonstrated understanding of construction and complex highway right-of-
way plans; a list of years’ experience in relocation work; and a list of performed
relocation services that involved the relevant federal regulations.
Freeling passed the exam and in June 2022 submitted her prequalification
application. She left blank the portion of the application covering work history,
experience, and qualifications. An INDOT employee, John Leming, notified her that he
denied her application because she did not specify her years of experience in relocation
work or list performed relocation services that applied the relevant federal regulations.
In August 2022, Freeling submitted a second application that included
information about her real estate experience. None of the listed experiences involved
relocation projects. After Leming expressed concerns about Freeling’s lack of relevant
experience to his supervisor, Crystal Weaver, they denied Freeling’s application.
Freeling, who is Black, sued INDOT, Leming, and Weaver, asserting that the
agency’s failure to hire her discriminated against her based on race, in violation of the
Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
see 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see id. § 2000e-2. She
also asserted a state-law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district
court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the due process and state-law claims,
as well as the equal protection claim against INDOT; this left only the Title VII claim
against INDOT and the equal protection claim against Leming and Weaver, in their
individual and official capacities.
The district court later granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
The court noted at the outset that Freeling could not sue state employees in their official
capacity under § 1983 because a suit against a state actor is an improper § 1983 suit
against the state. As for the individual-capacity equal-protection claim, the court
concluded that the defendants presented nondiscriminatory reasons for not approving
Freeling’s application—namely she failed to specify her years of experience in
relocation work or list performed relocation services in accordance with the relevant
federal regulations—and that Freeling had not provided evidence for a reasonable jury
to find these reasons pretextual. Finally, the court explained that Freeling could not

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No. 25-1143 Page 3
bring a Title VII failure-to-hire claim against INDOT because her stated goal of
contracting with the agency aligned more with the work of an independent contractor
than an employee.
On appeal, Freeling first contends that the district court ignored evidence that
she was a prospective INDOT employee, not an independent contractor. Employers
may be liable under Title VII for failing to hire prospective employees because of their
race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). To prove a prospective employment relationship, Freeling
needed to establish that INDOT would have had sufficient control over her work (e.g.,
by showing that the agency would supervise her and manage her payment and
benefits, see Frey v. Coleman, 903 F.3d 671, 676 (7th Cir. 2018)), and she points to
INDOT’s fee schedule and a section of the Manual outlining the duties of a relocation
consultant. But neither document reveals that the agency had a prospective
employment relationship with Freeling. In fact, the fee schedule expressly applies only
to “contract assignments,” not employees.
Next, Freeling challenges the district court’s ruling regarding her equal
protection claim and asserts that the district court disregarded an INDOT supervisor’s
statement to Leming that the agency had approved other applicants who did not meet
the Manual’s prequalification requirements. But to establish race discrimination under
§ 1983, Freeling needed to present evidence to permit a jury to find that her race caused
an adverse action. See Barnes v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 946 F.3d 384, 389 (7th Cir. 2020).
And Freeling cannot meet this standard. She submitted no evidence that Leming or
Weaver approved a prequalification application from an applicant of a different race
over hers. Nor for that matter did she present evidence to dispute that the defendants
provided a legitimate nondiscriminatory rationale for denying her application—she did
not comply with the Manual’s requirement that applicants specify their years of
experience in relocation work and list any performed relocation services under the
relevant federal regulations.
Finally, Freeling challenges the district court’s decision not to address her
argument that the defendants violated discovery procedure. During discovery, Freeling
requested documents from people who applied to be relocation consultants, but the
defendants objected to her request as overly broad and irrelevant. After discovery
closed, Freeling responded to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment by
contesting their objection. The district court declined to consider Freeling’s discovery
dispute because she failed first to confer with the defendants in good faith, as the local
rules require. See S.D. IND. L OC. R. 37-1. This was an appropriate exercise of the court’s

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No. 25-1143 Page 4
discretion. District courts may require strict compliance with the local rules,
see Hinterberger v. City of Indianapolis, 966 F.3d 523, 528 (7th Cir. 2020), and regardless,
summary judgment “is not the time to complain about what transpired during
discovery,” MAO-MSO Recovery II, LLC v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 994 F.3d 869,
877–78 (7th Cir. 2021).
AFFIRMED

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