Fidel Santos Mendoza v. PAMELA J. BONDI , Attorney General of the United States

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-2796
F IDEL S ANTOS M ENDOZA,
Petitioner,
v.
PAMELA J. BONDI ,
Attorney General of the United States,
Respondent.
____________________
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals.
No. A216-405-264
____________________
A RGUED A PRIL 8, 2025 — DECIDED A UGUST 14, 2025
____________________
Before HAMILTON , LEE, and M ALDONADO, Circuit Judges.
HAMILTON , Circuit Judge. Federal law gives the Attorney
General discretion to cancel removal of an alien who is de-
portable from the United States if, among other conditions,
the alien “establishes that removal would result in excep-
tional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse,
parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” 8 U.S.C.

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2 No. 24-2796
§ 1229b(b)(1)(D); Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 211–12
(2024). An immigration judge found that petitioner Fidel San-
tos Mendoza satisfies all the criteria to be eligible for discre-
tionary cancellation of removal except the “exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship” requirement. He has petitioned
for judicial review of that decision. We find that we have ju-
risdiction to review at least some of his challenges to the de-
nial. But we also find that Santos Mendoza has not shown any
legal error in the finding that his removal would not cause
“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to his children
who are United States citizens. We therefore deny his petition
for review.
I. Factual Background
Fidel Santos Mendoza entered the United States illegally
in approximately 2006, and he has been here ever since. He
and his wife Feliciana have two children, Anthony and Mi-
chael, who are both United States citizens by birth. In addi-
tion, Feliciana has one child, Brian, from a prior relationship
who lives with her and Santos Mendoza and who is also a
United States citizen. Brian testified that Santos Mendoza has
raised and supported him from an early age and that he con-
siders Santos Mendoza to be his father. If Santos Mendoza is
returned to Mexico, his children will remain in the United
States with Feliciana.
Santos Mendoza is the family’s principal breadwinner. For
the past five or six years, he has worked at a factory in Indi-
ana. He makes approximately $3,600 per month and receives
health insurance through his employer that covers his entire
family. Feliciana also works, but she makes about $1,400 per
month. Santos Mendoza’s removal would undeniably cause
his family financial distress. He believes that if he is returned

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No. 24-2796 3
to Mexico, he would probably work as a construction worker
and make very little money. He does not believe that Feliciana
could obtain a better job because she does not have a social
security card, and she needs to care for their children.
By all accounts, Santos Mendoza is a good husband and
father. Feliciana testified that she had been a victim of family
violence in previous relationships and that Santos Mendoza
gives her crucial emotional support. She fears managing the
household alone, both economically and emotionally. Brian
testified that Santos Mendoza is a great man and that his re-
turn to Mexico would be difficult on the family. Santos Men-
doza himself testified that his younger children, Anthony and
Michael, showed symptoms of emotional distress during the
removal proceedings. They became disinterested in school
and extracurriculars and expressed anxiety about the result of
the proceedings, and both were diagnosed with anxiety dis-
orders about a month before the hearing before the immigra-
tion judge.
II. Procedural Background
After Santos Mendoza was arrested for driving on a sus-
pended license and leaving the scene of an accident that
caused property damage, the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity initiated removal proceedings against him. Santos Men-
doza’s Notice to Appear charged him with being removable
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as a noncitizen present
in the United States without having been admitted or paroled.
At a hearing before an immigration judge on February 7, 2018,
Santos Mendoza admitted the allegations contained in the
Notice to Appear and conceded that he is eligible for removal.
He filed an application for cancellation of removal pursuant
to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).

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4 No. 24-2796
On May 14, 2021, Santos Mendoza appeared before an im-
migration judge for a merits hearing on his application for
cancellation of removal. Under section 1229b(b)(1), the Attor-
ney General may cancel the removal of an alien who meets
four requirements. He must show (1) continuous physical
presence for at least ten years immediately prior to his appli-
cation; (2) good moral character during that period; (3) no dis-
qualifying convictions; and (4) that removal would result in
“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” for a qualify-
ing relative. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). Qualifying relatives in-
clude an “alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of
the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence.” § 1299b(b)(1)(D). The government stipulated that
Santos Mendoza had met the requirement of continuous
physical presence in the United States. The judge also found
that Santos Mendoza met the good moral character require-
ment and that he did not have any disqualifying criminal con-
victions. But the judge also found that Santos Mendoza was
not statutorily eligible for cancellation of removal because his
removal would not cause “exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship” to his United States citizen children.
Santos Mendoza appealed the judge’s decision to the
Board of Immigration Appeals. By the time the Board re-
solved the appeal, Brian was too old to serve as a qualifying
relative because he had reached the age of 21. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(b)(1). The Board assumed that Brian remained a quali-
fied relative and affirmed the judge’s decision based on his
dispositive finding that Santos Mendoza did not satisfy the
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship requirement.
Santos Mendoza then filed this petition for review.

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No. 24-2796 5
III. Jurisdiction
The government first argues that we should dismiss San-
tos Mendoza’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. Our jurisdic-
tion over a petition for review of the Board’s decision to deny
cancellation of removal is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Under
section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), we lack jurisdiction to review either
the Board’s factual findings or a discretionary judgment to
deny cancellation of removal to a person who is legally eligi-
ble for it. See Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328, 347 (2022). We re-
tain jurisdiction, however, to review constitutional claims and
other questions of law. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). In Wilkinson
v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 212 (2024), the Supreme Court care-
fully parsed section 1252 as applied to cancellation of re-
moval. The Court held that application of the exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship standard to an established set of
facts is a “quintessential mixed question of law and fact” and
therefore reviewable under section 1252(a)(2)(D) as a question
of law.
Santos Mendoza contends in part that the immigration
judge’s and Board’s finding that his removal would not cause
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his three chil-
dren who are United States citizens was the product of a legal
error. We therefore have jurisdiction over his petition.
The government argues that we lack jurisdiction over San-
tos Mendoza’s petition because his entire argument is prem-
ised on disputes with the judge’s unreviewable factual find-
ings. As we and our colleagues in other circuits have said re-
peatedly, “a petitioner can’t manufacture a legal dispute over
a disagreement on the facts.” Jawad v. Holder, 686 F.3d 400, 404
(7th Cir. 2012) (collecting cases). We agree that some of Santos
Mendoza’s arguments amount to disagreements with the

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6 No. 24-2796
judge’s factual findings. We do not entertain those arguments
here. Nonetheless, Santos Mendoza’s petition presents the re-
viewable claim that the judge’s factual findings show that, as
a matter of law, he meets the exceptional and extremely unu-
sual hardship standard. We have jurisdiction to assess that ar-
gument.
IV. The Merits
Santos Mendoza argues that we should review de novo
the judge’s and the Board’s application of the hardship stand-
ard to the facts. We disagree. The Supreme Court has yet to
determine the precise standard of review for evaluating the
Board’s hardship determination, but in Wilkinson, the Court
explained that the question whether established facts satisfy
the hardship standard “requires close engagement with the
facts,” which “suggests a more deferential standard of re-
view.” Wilkinson, 601 U.S. at 222. That instruction is clear
enough that we will not apply de novo review.
Since Wilkinson was decided, circuit courts have engaged
in a fairly abstract debate about a precise formulation for the
appropriate deferential standard of review. See Toalombo
Yanez v. Bondi, 140 F.4th 35, 41 (2d Cir. 2025) (collecting cases
from First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits declining to select a precise formulation). The Third
and Ninth Circuits have both held that the Board’s hardship
determination should be reviewed for substantial evidence,
as defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi,
137 F.4th 996, 1003 (9th Cir. 2025); Wilkinson v. Attorney
General, 131 F.4th 134, 140 (3d Cir. 2025) (on remand). The
Second Circuit, on the other hand, held that a modestly less
deferential standard of review for clear error applies.
Toalombo Yanez, 140 F.4th at 42.

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No. 24-2796 7
One can fairly wonder how different the two standards of
review might be in actual practice. Both standards of review
constrain appellate courts in essentially the same way—by re-
quiring deference to the initial factfinder in the absence of a
clear and unmistakable error. We need not choose here be-
tween substantial-evidence and clear-error review. Under ei-
ther standard, there was no reversible error here. See Donovan
v. Robbins, 752 F.2d 1170, 1177 (7th Cir. 1985) (“But as so often
in dealing with the standard of review, the verbal formulation
of the standard may not make much practical difference.”).1
Turning to the substance of Santos Mendoza’s challenge,
we must deny his petition “unless any reasonable adjudicator
would be compelled to conclude” that his removal would
cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his
United States citizen children. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Be-
cause the Board adopted and affirmed the immigration
judge’s hardship determination without supplementing his
reasoning, we focus our review on the immigration judge’s
decision. See Martinez-Baez v. Wilkinson, 986 F.3d 966, 972 (7th
Cir. 2021).
To be eligible for cancellation of removal under section
1229b(b)(1), Santos Mendoza had to show that his removal
1 In addition, we review de novo a petitioner’s argument that the
immigration judge or Board completely ignored evidence in the record
pertinent to his claim. Cruz-Moyaho v. Holder, 703 F.3d 991, 997 (7th Cir.
2012); Martinez-Baez v. Wilkinson, 986 F.3d 966, 978–79 (7th Cir. 2021)
(granting petition for review where immigration judge ignored evidence
of daughter’s developmental delay). That is an avenue through which
petitioners may receive more “meaningful review,” Toalombo Yanez, 140
F.4th at 43, than is otherwise available under the substantial-evidence or
clear-error standards of review.

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8 No. 24-2796
would cause hardship that “is substantially different from, or
beyond, that which would be normally expected from the de-
portation of an alien with close family members [in the United
States].” Id. at 975, quoting Cruz-Moyaho v. Holder, 703 F.3d
991, 995 (7th Cir. 2012) (alteration in original). The hardship
determination is inherently comparative, but “the IJ and
Board must consider individual hardships on their own
terms—generalizations will not do.” Id. at 976, citing In re An-
dazola-Rivas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 319, 323 (BIA 2002). The Board
considers “the ages, health, and circumstances” of the appli-
cant’s qualifying relatives. In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N.
Dec. 56, 63 (BIA 2001).
Here, the judge properly considered all the relevant fac-
tors and reasonably concluded that Santos Mendoza’s re-
moval would not produce hardship substantially beyond that
which would be ordinarily expected under these circum-
stances. First, the judge reasonably concluded that Santos
Mendoza’s children exhibited anxieties that are alas all too
common for a family in removal proceedings. The judge
noted that Santos Mendoza’s children are generally in good
health and that the removal proceedings had not prevented
them from attending age-appropriate grades in school, but he
did not rely on those facts alone. He acknowledged that the
children had been diagnosed with anxiety by a psychologist
who evaluated them one month before Santos Mendoza’s
merits hearing. But he reasonably weighed that evaluation
against the facts that none of the children had ever been insti-
tutionalized, treated with a form of anti-anxiety medication,
or had a history of therapy. The judge further observed that
“every family member suffers some level of emotional harm”
based on the removal of a loved one and that one would ex-
pect an evaluation prepared one month before “the most

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No. 24-2796 9
stressful single event in immigration proceedings” to report
heightened levels of anxiety. That reasonable conclusion is
supported by substantial evidence and is not clearly errone-
ous. We cannot say that any reasonable judge would have to
disagree with it.
Regarding financial hardship too, the judge’s analysis was
supported by substantial evidence and not clearly erroneous.
The removal of a primary breadwinner hurts a family finan-
cially, but we cannot say that any factfinder would be com-
pelled to find the financial harm here extremely unusual. In
addition, the judge found that some of the financial conse-
quences of Santos Mendoza’s removal could be mitigated. He
cited Santos Mendoza’s testimony that he would continue to
try and support his children from Mexico. He also relied on
the fact that Feliciana has a job. He rejected Santos Mendoza’s
argument that Feliciana cannot get a better job because she
does not have a work permit or driver’s license, noting that
Santos Mendoza himself had managed to secure a good fac-
tory job without either. Given those findings, we cannot say
that any reasonable factfinder would be compelled to find
that Santos Mendoza’s removal would produce financial
hardship substantially more severe than the ordinary case.
See also In re Andazola-Rivas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 319, 323 (BIA
2002) (“economic detriment alone is insufficient to support
even a finding of extreme hardship,” which is a lower stand-
ard than “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”).
We do not intend to minimize the severity of the financial
and emotional harm that Santos Mendoza’s removal will
cause his family. It is an unfortunate reality that these conse-
quences are common in these cases. See Arreola-Ochoa v. Gar-
land, 34 F.4th 603, 610 (7th Cir. 2022). But the immigration

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10 No. 24-2796
judge’s hardship determination did not amount to a legal er-
ror. The petition for review is DENIED.

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