Michael K. Gregory v. RICHARD CARSON and JERRY SNYDER

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted August 12, 2025*
Decided August 14, 2025
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2828
MICHAEL K. GREGORY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
RICHARD CARSON and JERRY
SNYDER,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Terre Haute Division.
No. 2:22-cv-00408-MPB-MKK
Matthew P. Brookman,
Judge.
O R D E R
Michael Gregory, an inmate in the secure housing unit at Wabash Valley
Correctional Facility in Carlisle, Indiana, sued two prison employees. He alleged that a
correctional officer sexually harassed him and applied overly tight handcuffs after he
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-2828 Page 2
complained and a unit manager failed to protect him. The district court entered
summary judgment for the defendants because Gregory did not present any evidence
from which a reasonable jury could find that the defendants violated Gregory’s
constitutional rights. We affirm.
We recount the facts in the light most favorable to Gregory, the party opposing
summary judgment. Douglas v. Reeves, 964 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 2020).
In November 2020, Gregory was in the shower when Richard Carson, a correctional
officer, offered to give him extra time if Gregory masturbated in front of Carson.
Gregory declined. On the same day, Carson filed a conduct report against Gregory for
interfering with count by refusing to get out of the shower.
A few days later, Gregory filed a complaint under the Prison Rape Elimination
Act (PREA), 34 U.S.C. § 30301, about Carson’s comment. After he filed the complaint,
Gregory said Carson applied overly tight handcuffs on at least two unspecified dates
while Carson escorted Gregory to the shower. According to Gregory, the handcuffs
restricted his circulation and caused tingling and pain. Gregory testified that during
these incidents, he asked Carson whether Carson was trying to hurt him and told
Carson he had pre-existing nerve damage in his wrist. Gregory said Carson responded
by “jerk[ing]” him and muttering “little stuff,” but that Carson did not adjust the
handcuffs. Gregory did not seek medical treatment after these incidents. Carson
disputed that he intentionally placed Gregory in handcuffs to cause pain after learning
of Gregory’s PREA complaint.
Gregory sued Carson and Jerry Snyder, the unit team manager for Gregory’s unit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Gregory alleged
that Carson’s comment about masturbation amounted to sexual harassment. He also
asserted that Carson used excessive force when handcuffing him. Further, Gregory said
that Carson retaliated against him for filing the PREA complaint by issuing the conduct
report and applying overly tight handcuffs. Gregory also alleged that Snyder knew
about Carson’s conduct and failed to protect Gregory from it. Specifically, Gregory said
that Snyder continued to assign Carson to duty shifts on Gregory’s unit despite
knowing that Carson was a danger to Gregory. And, Gregory said, Snyder conducted a
“sham investigation” into Gregory’s PREA complaint.
Gregory also moved for recruited counsel. But the district court denied the
motion because Gregory failed to present any evidence that he first attempted to obtain
counsel on his own.

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No. 24-2828 Page 3
The defendants then filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district
court granted. The court determined that no reasonable jury could conclude that
Carson’s single sexually offensive comment amounted to an inhumane condition of
confinement under the Eighth Amendment or sex discrimination under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Further, the court reasoned that the evidence did not support a finding
that Carson’s use of handcuffs w[Author]as an excessive use of force under the Eighth
Amendment. As for Gregory’s claims under the First Amendment, the court concluded
that Gregory had not presented evidence from which a jury could find that Carson
retaliated against him for filing a PREA complaint. Carson issued the conduct report
before Gregory filed the PREA complaint, and no evidence contradicted Carson’s sworn
statement that he did not intend to apply overly tight handcuffs after he learned about
the PREA complaint. The court also held that Snyder was entitled to summary
judgment on the failure-to-protect claim because Greogry presented no evidence that
Snyder was personally involved in duty assignments or PREA investigations. Finally,
the court granted the defendants’ motion to strike Greogry’s surreply because it did not
comply with the local rules.
Gregory appeals. His brief is short on detail, but we discern two arguments,
which we address in turn.
First, Gregory argues that the district court overlooked evidence that would
allow a reasonable jury to find that Carson’s use of overly tight handcuffs amounted to
excessive force. The Eighth Amendment prohibits “unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain” on prisoners. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992) (citation omitted). To
determine whether a use of force violates the Eighth Amendment, we consider whether
the “force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or
maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Id. at 7. In the context of an excessive-force
claim involving overly tight handcuffs, the plaintiff must supply some evidence that he
put the defendant on notice of the degree of pain or injury caused by the handcuffs.
Cf. Tibbs v. City of Chicago, 469 F.3d 661, 665–66 (7th Cir. 2006) (discussing subjective
knowledge requirement for excessive-force claim based on overly tight handcuffs under
the Fourth Amendment); Rooni v. Biser, 742 F.3d 737, 742–43 (7th Cir. 2014) (same).
Gregory has not supplied any evidence from which a reasonable jury could
conclude that Carson used excessive force. Gregory does not argue that the use of
handcuffs was unnecessary or that the handcuffs were in place for more than a short
period while Carson escorted Gregory to the shower. Moreover, Gregory admitted that
he did not seek medical care following any of the incidents. Further, Gregory has not

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produced evidence from which a jury could infer that Carson was on notice that the
handcuffs were causing excessive or unnecessary pain. To be sure, Gregory said he
asked Carson if Carson was trying to hurt him and told Carson that he had nerve
damage in his wrist. But these general complaints would not have put Carson on notice
that the handcuffs were causing excessive pain or injury. Considering the particular
facts in this case, a reasonable jury could not conclude that Carson tightly handcuffed
Gregory maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of causing harm.
Gregory next argues that the district court erred in denying his request for
counsel and striking his surreply. But the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Gregory’s motion for recruited counsel, because Gregory did not demonstrate
that he had attempted to obtain counsel on his own. See Eagan v. Dempsey, 987 F.3d 667,
682 (7th Cir. 2021). As for the surreply, the district court reasonably relied on its local
rules to strike it. See Hinterberger v. City of Indianapolis, 966 F.3d 523, 528 (7th Cir. 2020)
(“[D]istrict courts may require strict compliance with their local rules—a point we have
recognized time and again.”). The local rules would permit Gregory to file a surreply
only if Carson and Snyder cited new evidence in their reply or objected to the
admissibility of Gregory’s evidence. See S.D. I ND. LOC. R. 56-1. Because the defendants
did neither, the district court acted within its discretion to strike Gregory’s surreply.
Gregory has not sufficiently developed any other argument, so we do not
address the district court’s reasoning related to any other claim. See F ED. R. A PP . P.
28(a)(8); Behning v. Johnson, 56 F.4th 1137, 1140 (7th Cir. 2023) (citing Anderson v.
Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2001)). Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is
AFFIRMED.

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