Tanya Blumenshine v. Bloomington School District No. 87

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-3250
T ANYA BLUMENSHINE ,
Plaintiff-Appellant.
v.
BLOOMINGTON SCHOOL D ISTRICT NO. 87,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Central District of Illinois.
No. 1:21-cv-01227-JES-JEH — James E. Shadid, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED SEPTEMBER 17, 2024 — D ECIDED A UGUST 29, 2025
____________________
Before EASTERBROOK , HAMILTON, and MALDONADO, Cir-
cuit Judges.
MALDONADO, Circuit Judge. Special educator Tanya Blu-
menshine alleges her employer, an Illinois public school dis-
trict, created an unlawfully hostile work environment based
on her age under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. The district court granted
summary judgment to the school district. Blumenshine ap-
peals. Blumenshine failed to adduce evidence from which a

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reasonable juror could conclude that she suffered workplace
hostility based on her age. We therefore affirm.
I
Tanya Blumenshine was born on May 7, 1967. Since 1989,
Blumenshine has worked for Bloomington School District No.
87, a public school district in Bloomington, Illinois. She has
primarily served as a kindergarten teacher. Relevant here,
Blumenshine was employed at Stevenson Elementary School
from 2001 to 2019, and at Sheridan Elementary School from
2019 to the present.
Throughout her 18 years teaching at Stevenson, Blumen-
shine was an exemplary teacher. By all accounts, she per-
formed with distinction, helping some of the District’s most
challenged students. The dynamic started to change on May
21, 2019, when Blumenshine, then age 52, learned she was be-
ing involuntarily transferred from Stevenson to Sheridan. On
that day, Blumenshine attended a meeting with Stevenson
Principal Katy Killian. Killian informed her that she would be
transferred from Stevenson to Sheridan for the 2019–2020 ac-
ademic year.
In addition to Killian, the other decisionmakers on Blu-
menshine's transfer were Dr. Barry Reilly (the District’s Su-
perintendent), Herschel Hannah (the District’s Assistant Su-
perintendent for Human Resources), and Jennifer McGowan
(Sheridan’s Principal). Superintendent Reilly and Principal
Killian stated that the District reassigned Blumenshine to re-
place a struggling, less experienced teacher at Sheridan. Reilly
emphasized that Blumenshine had already “been a successful
teacher” at Stevenson, which “houses [the District’s] most

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No. 23-3250 3
severe and profound special education program.” He there-
fore had confidence in her ability to succeed at Sheridan.
The transfer did not go smoothly. Blumenshine identifies
four categories of harassment. She claims that the District: (1)
assigned her a disproportionate number of behaviorally-chal-
lenged students; (2) erroneously criticized her job perfor-
mance; (3) made intentional efforts to sabotage her teaching
efforts by not providing her with proper classroom support;
and (4) employed an administrator who intimidated her on
one occasion.
Blumenshine believes she experienced this workplace har-
assment at Sheridan because of her age. Blumenshine agreed
in her deposition that no one at Sheridan has ever made any
statement denigrating her on the basis of her age. But she tes-
tified that “the only” explanation for her treatment working
at Sheridan was “that I’m older.”
First, Blumenshine emphasizes the undisputed fact that,
of the three kindergarten classes at Sheridan, hers was the
most challenging. When Blumenshine started at Sheridan,
there were three kindergarten classrooms, one of which was
hers. In the whole incoming kindergarten class, there were six
students who scored as needing special academic support
and six who exhibited “physical behavioral tendencies,” two
of whom had Individual Education Plans (IEP) related to their
physician aggression. The record is unclear, however, as to
both when exactly this scoring occurred and how many of
these students were in her class. Reading the record in the
light most favorable to Blumenshine, we assume that at most
ten of these students were placed in her class: five of each
group of kindergarteners needing academic or behavioral
support, including both students with IEPs. She requested

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that Sheridan Principal Jennifer McGowan transfer some of
the challenged students to another class, but that request was
denied. McGowan maintains that she had nothing to do with
the kindergarten classroom assignments and that the chal-
lenging nature of Blumenshine’s class, while unfortunate,
was “unknown until the students began attending school”
since these students were in kindergarten.
Second, Blumenshine felt unfairly criticized. She points to
an incident on September 26, 2019, where Principal McGowan
entered her classroom and proceeded to “yell and berate[]”
her for “pitting” McGowan and parents against one another.
Relatedly, on October 9, 2019, McGowan emailed Blumen-
shine after a parent complained that her son was injured by
another student in Blumenshine’s class. McGowan further
questioned Blumenshine’s classroom “behavior management
strategy,” and expressed concerns about how “extra recess”
time was being used in Blumenshine’s classroom. McGowan
requested a meeting with Blumenshine to discuss the issues.
That meeting happened on October 17, 2019. At the meet-
ing, Principal McGowan gave Blumenshine a memo listing
over a dozen recommended behavioral interventions to assert
greater control over her students and de-escalate conflicts be-
tween them. Blumenshine felt the recommendations were
“super condescending, first-year teacher instructions” inap-
plicable for someone like her “who has 30 years with this
grade level with exemplary evaluation[s].” In addition to the
October 17 meeting, Blumenshine was subjected to two simi-
lar meetings on October 24 and November 14.
Third, Blumenshine claims the District’s denial of her re-
quest for a full-time Crisis Prevention and Intervention (CPI)

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No. 23-3250 5
classroom aide to support her two IEP students also contrib-
uted to the hostile work environment. CPI-certified aides are
those that are trained to put physical ”holds” on children
“when they’re being completely unsafe with themselves or
others.” Blumenshine believes her classroom experience
would have been improved if she had been assigned a CPI-
certified aide, but Principal McGowan explained that the ad-
ministration’s goal was to assist Blumenshine in being “pro-
active” through verbal conflict de-escalation exercises to
avoid subjecting students to physical restraint.
Blumenshine testified that the two IEP students in her
class were not receiving the special attention required by law,
adding to challenges in her classroom. Blumenshine emailed
the District on behalf of one of the students, arguing that the
student was not receiving his legal benefits under his IEP,
which the District disputed. To Blumenshine, the District’s
denial amounted to “sabotage[].”
Lastly, Blumenshine identifies a confrontation with Dan
Zummo, a “principal intern” at Sheridan. McGowan ex-
plained that, as a principal intern, Zummo was a current
teacher in training for promotion to principal in the District
under her supervision and performed similar tasks to Princi-
pal McGowan. On October 15, 2019, at 4:00 p.m., Zummo un-
locked and entered Blumenshine’s classroom and positioned
himself between her and the only doorway. During their ex-
change, he questioned her struggles at Sheridan, noting that
she had come from Stevenson, “a school where kids punched
children in the face or…children punched teachers in the
face.” Zummo then asked, “Like what’s going on with you

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6 No. 23-3250
this year?” Blumenshine told Zummo she felt threatened and
“baited” and asked him to leave. He complied five minutes
later.
The next day, Blumenshine emailed Zummo and
McGowan to report the incident. She wrote:
As a woman who is also older, I am asking that you do
not enter my classroom again before 8:15 a.m. or after
3:45 p.m. unless, of course, a child is in danger. At 4:20
p.m., I asked you to leave and you did not. Continuing
your narrative with putting words in my mouth that I
did not say or think, standing and taking great pause
left me shaken.
After the school switched to remote learning at the start of
the COVID-19 pandemic, Principal McGowan herself was in-
voluntarily transferred away from Sheridan. Blumenshine
still worked at Sheridan on August 13, 2021, when she filed a
one-count complaint against the District, alleging that it had
unlawfully created a hostile work environment based on her
age in violation of the ADEA. After discovery, the district
court granted the District’s motion for summary judgment,
holding that, among other things, Blumenshine failed to ad-
duce evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude
that (1) the District created an objectively hostile work envi-
ronment, and that (2) even if it were otherwise, she had not
shown that the conditions she encountered were due to her
age. Blumenshine appealed.
II
This Court reviews grants of summary judgment de novo.
Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 408 (7th Cir. 2014). Summary
judgment is appropriate when, drawing all reasonable

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No. 23-3250 7
inferences in the nonmovant’s favor, there is no genuine dis-
pute of material fact. Bunn v. Khoury Ents., Inc., 753 F.3d 676,
681–82 (7th Cir. 2014).
III
Before turning to the merits, we address a threshold dis-
pute: whether the ADEA permits hostile work environment
claims. The district court followed a line of this Court’s cases
that “have ‘assumed, but never decided, that plaintiffs may
bring hostile work environment claims under the ADEA.’”
Tyburski v. City of Chicago, 964 F.3d 590, 600–01 (7th Cir. 2020)
(quoting Racicot v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 414 F.3d 675, 678 (7th
Cir. 2005)).
We have repeatedly assumed that hostile work environ-
ment claims are cognizable under the ADEA and for good
reason. Start with the ADEA’s text, which provides that an
employer may not “otherwise discriminate against any indi-
vidual” who is 40 years of age or older “with respect to [her]
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment.” 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a), 631(a). Identical clauses feature in
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1), and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §
12112(a). The phrase “conditions[] or privileges of employ-
ment” is drawn directly from the earlier-enacted text of Title
VII and, in the context of those claims, the Supreme Court has
long-held that this language creates a cause of action for hos-
tile work environment. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57, 64 (1986). The Supreme Court has instructed us that
“when Congress uses the same language in two statutes hav-
ing similar purposes, particularly when one is enacted shortly
after the other, it is appropriate to presume that Congress in-
tended that text to have the same meaning in both statutes.”

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Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005) (importing Ti-
tle VII constructions to parallel language in the ADA).
As we recognized in interpreting identical text in the
ADA, “Congress wrote the ADA using the language of Title
VII, and Title VII recognizes hostile work environment
claims.” Ford v. Marion Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 942 F.3d 839, 852
(7th Cir. 2019). Just as with the ADA, at some point, “extended
hypothetical analysis [about whether a claim exists] should
end.” Id. (citation omitted). See also Rivera-Rivera v. Medina &
Medina, Inc., 898 F.3d 77, 91 (1st Cir. 2018) (citations omitted)
(recognizing hostile work environment claim under the
ADEA as actionable); Brennan v. Metropolitan Opera Ass’n, Inc.,
192 F.3d 310, 318 (2d Cir. 1999) (same); Dediol v. Best Chevrolet,
655 F.3d 435, 441 (5th Cir. 2011) (same); Crawford v. Medina
Gen. Hosp., 96 F.3d 830, 834 (6th Cir. 1996) (same); Moses v.
Dassault Falcon Jet-Wilmington Corp., 894 F.3d 911, 921–22 (8th
Cir. 2018) (same); Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Cmty. Coll. Dist.,
934 F.2d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 1991) (same), superseded on other
grounds by Dominguez-Curry v. Nev. Transp. Dep’t, 424 F.3d
1027, 1041 (9th Cir. 2015); (same) Steele v. Mattis, 899 F.3d 943,
943–44, 952 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (same). Whether or not Blumen-
shine’s claim under the ADEA exists (which we are inclined
to believe it does), her claim nonetheless fails because she has
not put forth any evidence of age-based harassment.
To establish a hostile work environment claim based on
her age, Blumenshine must demonstrate that “(1) she was
subject to unwelcome harassment, (2) the harassment was
based on her [age], (3) the harassment was sufficiently severe
or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of her employment
and create a hostile or abusive atmosphere, and (4) there is a

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No. 23-3250 9
basis for employer liability.” Tyburski, 964 F.3d at 601 (citation
omitted).
We apply a holistic approach to evaluating the parties’ ev-
idence in hostile work environment cases. See Ortiz v. Werner
Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016). Under that ap-
proach, the analysis boils down to whether “the non-moving
party produced sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict
of intentional discrimination.” David v. Bd. of Trs. of Cmty. Coll.
Dist. No. 508, 846 F.3d 216, 224 (7th Cir. 2017).
We find that Blumenshine has not offered sufficient evi-
dence for a jury to find that age-based animus motivated any
of the conduct about which she complains. The only evidence
connecting the complained-of conduct to age-based animus is
Blumenshine’s own belief. When asked why she believed
McGowan engaged in age discrimination, she stated that
[t]he only difference is that I am older. Again this is a
subjective question. You know like how I mentioned
before, I can’t get into her head. But it was very obvi-
ous that she was intentionally harassing – discriminat-
ing against me and harassing me. I do not believe that
she would have done that if I were her age.
This testimony does not satisfy Blumenshine’s burden to
provide “sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict that al-
leged harassment was based on [her] age.” Halloway v. Mil-
waukee Cnty., 180 F.3d 820, 827 (7th Cir. 1999). Blumenshine’s
contentions are purely speculative and conclusory and so are
not enough to move her claims past summary judgment. See
Widmar v. Sun Chem. Corp., 772 F.3d 457, 460 (7th Cir. 2014)
(personal knowledge “does not include speculating as to an
employer's state of mind, or other intuitions, hunches, or

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10 No. 23-3250
rumors”). Besides her own belief, there is no evidence—direct
or circumstantial—suggesting any conduct directed at Blu-
menshine was age-based. See Amadio v. Ford Motor Co., 238
F.3d 919, 927 (7th Cir. 2001) (“It is well-settled that [the plain-
tiff’s] speculation may not be used to manufacture a genuine
issue of fact.”).
Blumenshine attempts to conjure up other evidence of
age-based animus, but none of the evidence she points to
moves the needle. For example, she suggests that the involun-
tary transfer from Stevenson should be interpreted as age dis-
crimination. But uncontroverted evidence establishes that
Blumenshine was transferred from Stevenson as a lifeline for
a struggling inexperienced teacher, not based on age animus .
There is a glaring absence of evidence that Blumenshine’s
transfer had anything to do with her age. Nevertheless, she
emphasizes a dispute of fact as to whether her May 21, 2019,
meeting with Killian was recorded. True, the parties dispute
this fact; but that fact is not material. Brown v. Osmundson, 38
F.4th 545, 549 (7th Cir. 2022) (“A genuine issue of material fact
exists only if there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmov-
ing party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)). In other words, even
if the District recorded the meeting and lied about destroying
it as Blumenshine suggests, that still does not show that the
transfer occurred based on her age. See Wrolstad v. Cuna Mut.
Ins. Soc’y, 911 F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 2018) (“The ADEA pro-
tects workers 40 years of age or older from age-based employ-
ment discrimination.” (emphasis added)).
Blumenshine also contends that we can infer age discrim-
ination based on the actions of the staff at Sheridan. She cites
Principal McGowan’s email and performance review

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No. 23-3250 11
meetings as such evidence. However, those incidents
stemmed from a parent complaint and, in any case, had no
relationship to Blumenshine’s age. The parties agree that no
one made even an ambiguous age-related remark during
those meetings. Far from reflecting age-based animus, the dis-
cussions reflected a genuine pedagogical disagreement: Blu-
menshine favored a CPI aide and immediate physical re-
straint for unruly children, while McGowan preferred de-es-
calation to avoid using restraint at all.
For similar reasons, the District’s denial of her IEP-related
request on behalf of a student gets her nowhere. At best, the
denial is irrelevant to our ADEA analysis because, again,
there is no evidence linking it to Blumenshine’s age. At worst,
Blumenshine’s argument here undermines her age claim in-
sofar as she testified that Killian wanted to remove her from
Sheridan because of her complaints about IEP non-compli-
ance. Cf. Beamon v. Marshall & Ilsley Tr. Co., 411 F.3d 854, 864
(7th Cir. 2005) (affirming summary judgment in favor of de-
fendant where “[the plaintiff’s] sole basis for [arguing the al-
leged behaviors were based on racial hostility] is the fact that
he is African–American” and noting “[t]he ‘harassment’ of
which [plaintiff] complains could just as readily have been
perpetrated upon a white person without any alteration in its
character or purpose”).
Finally, Blumenshine’s confrontation with Zummo also
does not support an inference of age discrimination. Simply
put, the record provides us with no reason to think that
Zummo acted with age-based animus. Without diminishing
Blumenshine’s contention that Zummo acted in a manner that
made her feel threatened, this incident, standing alone, does
not permit an ADEA hostile work environment claim to

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12 No. 23-3250
survive summary judgment. See Runyon v. Applied Extrusion
Techs., Inc., 619 F.3d 735, 740–41 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that
it is the plaintiff’s burden to show that defendant was moti-
vated by age discrimination, rather than defendant’s “burden
to show that it was not.” (citing Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc.,
557 U.S. 167, 177–78 (2009)).
The District is entitled to summary judgment on Blumen-
shine’s ADEA claim because there is no reasonable basis to
infer that she experienced any workplace harassment on the
basis of her age.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district
court.

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