United States of America v. Miguel Salinas -Salcedo

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-2653
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
M IGUEL S ALINAS -S ALCEDO,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:21-cr-00591-1 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED J ANUARY 14, 2025 — DECIDED S EPTEMBER 2, 2025
____________________
Before R IPPLE, BRENNAN , and K OLAR , Circuit Judges.
K OLAR , Circuit Judge. Miguel Salinas-Salcedo helped Mex-
ican drug cartels launder millions of dollars over two-and-a-
half-years. He did so by connecting cartel members with indi-
viduals in the United States who he believed were able to fun-
nel large sums of cash into cartel bank accounts without alert-
ing government authorities. At his sentencing (he pled
guilty), the district court applied a four-level guidelines en-
hancement for being in the business of laundering funds.

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2 No. 23-2653
Because Salinas-Salcedo’s undisputed actions, which he ad-
mitted were “integral” to the multi-year, multi-transaction
conspiracy, place his conduct squarely under that covered by
the “business of laundering funds” enhancement, we affirm.
I. Background
On August 7, 2023, Miguel Salinas-Salcedo pled guilty to
one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering in vio-
lation of 18 U.S.C. §1956(h). In his plea agreement, Salinas-
Salcedo admitted the facts relevant to this appeal.
From April 2019 through September 24, 2021, Salinas-
Salcedo helped the cartels transform bulk cash derived from
illegal drug sales into ostensibly legitimate bank account de-
posits. Salinas-Salcedo connected the cartels with two indi-
viduals who purported to be able to receive, deposit, and
transfer tens of thousands of dollars into United States bank
accounts without triggering government attention.
Here is how Salinas-Salcedo made it work. First, the car-
tels would contact Salinas-Salcedo when they needed to move
cash into one of their bank accounts. Then, Salinas-Salcedo
would reach out to one or both of his contacts who would pass
on cryptic instructions for Salinas-Salcedo to give to the cartel.
Duly informed by Salinas-Salcedo, the cartel then reached out
to the courier designated to receive the bulk cash and recited
back the secret verbal code Salinas-Salcedo gave them to au-
thenticate the transaction. After the cartel agent and courier
met up and the courier received the cash, Salinas-Salcedo con-
firmed with the courier the amount successfully deposited
into a bank account. He then circled back with the cartel to
obtain the bank account information for where to wire the

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No. 23-2653 3
funds and gave those details to the on-the-ground contacts to
complete the transfer.
Unbeknownst to Salinas-Salcedo, at one point, three of his
American contacts (individuals with access to accounts and a
courier) were undercover law enforcement agents. While he
hoped to enrich himself in dealing with these contacts, in re-
ality, Salinas-Salcedo was merely providing evidence of his
guilt.
Over the conspiracy’s lifespan, Salinas-Salcedo facilitated
24 transactions that laundered $2,969,082. He wanted to com-
plete many more “contracts”—in fact, over the period he dis-
cussed taking on 79 additional jobs, which would have laun-
dered roughly $15 million of additional cash. Nonetheless, the
24 completed transactions yielded Salinas-Salcedo $44,526.23
in personal commissions.
At sentencing, the government sought a four-level en-
hancement under U.S.S.G. §2S1.1(b)(2)(C) against Salinas-
Salcedo for being “in the business of laundering funds.”1 He
countered that he was not “in the business of laundering
funds,” as contemplated by the guidelines, because he was
merely a “middleman” who did not directly handle the laun-
dered cash. The district court heard argument on the issue—
recall there were no factual disputes about what Salinas-
Salcedo actually did—and pressed Salinas-Salcedo to justify
his central objection. The court questioned how Salinas-
Salcedo’s integral participation in the money laundering con-
spiracy did not put him in the business of laundering funds.
1 The district court considered and decided upon two other guidelines
adjustments, neither of which are on appeal before us.

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4 No. 23-2653
The district court then found the enhancement applied and
imposed a below guidelines sentence of 96 months in prison.
Salinas-Salcedo now revives the same argument on appeal
that, as merely a middleman, he was not in the business of
laundering funds.
II. Analysis
In the sentencing context, we review the district court’s
factual findings for clear error. United States v. Bowling, 952
F.3d 861, 869 (7th Cir. 2020). But because the parties agree on
all the relevant facts, our review is purely one of Sentencing
Guidelines interpretation, which is de novo. United States v.
Reese, 666 F.3d 1007, 1021 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
A. The Business of Laundering Funds Enhancement
We begin with the plain text of the guidelines and “‘give
effect, if possible, to every clause and word’ of the text.”
United States v. Feeney, 100 F.4th 841, 845 (7th Cir. 2024) (quot-
ing Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351, 358 (2014)). Guide-
line §2S1.1(b)(2)(C) enhances a sentence by four levels if the
defendant was “in the business of laundering funds.” The ap-
plication note defines “[l]aundering funds” as “making a
transaction, financial transaction, [or] monetary transaction ...
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 or § 1957,” the money launder-
ing statutes. U.S.S.G. §2S1.1 cmt. n.1. So, we turn to the stat-
utes.
One of them, 18 U.S.C. §1956, prohibits someone who,
knowing that “property involved in a financial transaction
represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity,
conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction
which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful

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No. 23-2653 5
activity ... knowing that the transaction is designed in whole
or in part ... to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the
source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of spec-
ified unlawful activity….” 18 U.S.C. §1956(a)(1).
The operative verb—“conducts or attempts to conduct”—
captures a wide array of activity. Id. (emphasis added). As de-
fined in the text, it includes “initiating, concluding, or partic-
ipating in initiating, or concluding a transaction….” 18 U.S.C.
§1956(c)(2). And the ordinary meaning of “participate” is “to
take part” or “to have a part or share in something.”2 See Niz-
Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155, 169 (2021) (appropriate to
“consult grammar and dictionary definitions” when deduc-
ing a text’s meaning because “the rules that govern language
often inform how ordinary people understand the rules that
govern them”).
In other statutory contexts we have “interpreted broadly
the phrase ‘participate in’ and ‘participation….’” Harden v.
Raffensperger, Hughes & Co., Inc., 65 F.3d 1392, 1400 (7th Cir.
1995) (citing Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 650 n.26 (1988)). In
securities fraud, for instance, a defendant “participates” in the
distribution of securities when they “engage in steps neces-
sary to the distribution of securities” even if they do not actu-
ally sell the financial instrument. Id. (citation omitted). Partic-
ipation cannot be read to impose a standard lower than a “but
for” standard of causation—“but for” Salinas-Salcedo’s ac-
tions, would the money laundering have occurred? See Gross
v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009) (equating a
2 Participate, Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online, https://www.mer-
riam-webster.com/dictionary/participate [https://perma.cc/FV5J-PJBS]
last visited Aug. 11, 2025).

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6 No. 23-2653
“but-for causal relationship” to a “necessary logical condi-
tion” for an event to occur (quoting Safeco Ins. Co. of America
v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 63–64 (2007))).
At sentencing, Salinas-Salcedo admitted that he was an
“integral” part of the money laundering scheme, and the stip-
ulated facts in his plea agreement reflect the same. He was the
nexus between the cartels and the purported on-the-ground
launderers. He did much more than merely “take part” in in-
itiating the laundering; the transactions would not have be-
gun nor concluded without his multi-phase involvement. We
do not need to broadly construe “participate” to affirm the
commonsense notion that one who is an “integral” part of an
operation—from beginning to end—necessarily participates
in it. The district court judge was undoubtedly thinking the
same thing when she asked: “if [Salinas-Salcedo] is participat-
ing in whether it is texting, sending e-mails regarding this,
even though he is not the one who takes money into the bank
or wires it directly to the bank, how is he not involved in the
overall business of money laundering?”
Squarely recognizing that Salinas-Salcedo’s actions consti-
tuted money laundering under 18 U.S.C. §1956(a)(1) is essen-
tial to clearing up the false premise underlying his appeal. Sa-
linas-Salcedo believes the “business of laundering funds” en-
hancement cannot apply because he was the middleman, not
the money launderer himself. But our textual analysis belies
that argument. The meaning of “business of laundering
funds” under §2S1.1(b)(2)(C) incorporates 18 U.S.C.
§1956(a)(1)’s definition of money laundering. U.S.S.G. §2S1.1
cmt. n.1. And §1956(a)(1) encompasses Salinas-Salcedo’s con-
duct because he participated in initiating and concluding
transactions §1956(a)(1) deems money laundering. Thus,

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No. 23-2653 7
Salinas-Salcedo did “launder funds” as §2S1.1(b)(2)(C) de-
scribes.
To be clear, Salinas-Salcedo was not in the “business of
laundering funds” merely because he engaged in one trans-
action meeting 18 U.S.C. §1956’s elements. Guideline
§2S1.1(b)(2)(B) addresses that scenario, which warrants only
a two-level enhancement. But to fall under §2S1.1(b)(2)(C), the
four-level “business of laundering funds” enhancement, the
sentencing court must determine if the “totality of the circum-
stances,” including weighing six non-exhaustive factors, re-
veal defendant’s laundering conduct was sufficiently exten-
sive to be “in the business” of laundering funds. U.S.S.G.
§2S1.1 cmt. n.4.
Salinas-Salcedo’s misguided textual argument permeates
the rest of his challenge. The non-exhaustive factors are: the
regularity and length of time with which a defendant “en-
gaged” in laundering funds (factors one and two), the number
of sources a defendant “engaged” to launder funds (factor
three), the amount of money a defendant earned for launder-
ing funds (factor four), prior money laundering or relevant
convictions (factor five), and statements a defendant made
during undercover government investigations about engag-
ing in any of the preceding five factors (factor six). U.S.S.G.
§2S1.1 cmt. n.4. Because he positions himself as merely a mid-
dleman rather than principal, Salinas-Salcedo argues he never
“engaged” in laundering funds as described in the factors. But
as explained above, he did launder funds as contemplated by
§2S1.1 and 18 U.S.C. §1956(a)(1). So, the “engaged” argument
falls flat.

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8 No. 23-2653
Turning to the factors, four of the six clearly militate for
the enhancement.3 His 24 transactions over two-and-a-half
years were regular and over an extended period (factors one
and two). He generated a substantial amount of revenue, al-
most $45,000, for his services (factor four). And he discussed
his regular laundering activities with undercover agents dur-
ing the investigation (factor six). The enhancement was appli-
cable and, notwithstanding the textual arguments already ad-
dressed, Salinas-Salcedo lodges no objection to the contrary.
Stepping back from the non-exhaustive factors, we think
Salinas-Salcedo’s activity presents a model application for
§2S1.1(b)(2)(C). First, echoing the district court, we cannot ac-
cept that an admitted “integral” member of a multi-year
money laundering conspiracy, necessary to the transactions
at their inception and conclusion, and compensated hand-
somely, was not “in the business of laundering funds.”
Second, the stated purpose of the enhancement reinforces
our interpretation of the text. The Sentencing Commission’s
Commentary explained that “similar to a professional
‘fence’, see §2B1.1(b)(4)(B),[4] defendants who routinely
3 Salinas-Salcedo confined his objection to the textual meaning of the
word “engaged.” He did not alternatively argue, at the district court or on
appeal, that if he did “engage” in laundering funds, his activity was not
regular or for an extended period (factors one and two) or that he did not
discuss his regular money laundering activities for an extended period
during an undercover government investigation (factor six). While we
could likely forego a factor analysis as waived, we engage with the test in
the interest of completeness. United States v. Butler, 58 F.4th 364, 368 (7th
Cir. 2023) (appellants waive undeveloped argument on appeal).
4 Under the current version of the Sentencing Guidelines, the relevant
section is located at §2B1.1(b)(4).

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No. 23-2653 9
engage in laundering funds on behalf of others, and who gain
financially from engaging in such transactions, warrant sub-
stantial additional punishment because they encourage the
commission of additional criminal conduct.” U.S.S.G. App’x.
C, Vol. II, at 223 (2003). The “fence” enhancement applies to
individuals who are “in the business” of buying and selling
stolen property. U.S.S.G. §2B1.1(b)(4). In this way, the “in the
business of” enhancements harmonize to punish activity that
encourages the commission of more crimes by creating a mar-
ket for criminal proceeds. United States v. Aguasvivas-Castillo,
668 F.3d 7, 14 (1st Cir. 2012); United States v. Kimbrew, 406 F.3d
1149, 1152–53 (9th Cir. 2005) (enhancement for those who
make a business of buying and selling stolen property im-
portant because fencing businesses encourage theft by in-
creasing potential gains). That rationale applies to Salinas-
Salcedo’s activity because he made it easier for the cartels to
convert dirty cash into seemingly unimpeachable assets. See
U.S.S.G. App’x. C, Vol. II, at 223.
B. Procedural Error
Salinas-Salcedo alternatively argues that the district court
failed to adequately address his objection to the
§2S1.1(b)(2)(C) enhancement, which was procedural error
meriting reversal. He is incorrect. We must “ensure that the
district court committed no significant procedural error, such
as incorrectly calculating the guidelines range, failing to con-
sider the section 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on
clearly erroneous facts, or failing to explain adequately the
chosen sentence.” United States v. Griffith, 913 F.3d 683, 687
(7th Cir. 2019). “So long as the record gives us confidence that
the court meaningfully considered the defendant’s mitigation
arguments, ‘even if implicitly and imprecisely,’ that is

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10 No. 23-2653
enough.” United States v. Jones, 798 F.3d 613, 618 (7th Cir. 2015)
(quoting United States v. Diekemper, 604 F.3d 345, 355 (7th Cir.
2010)).
The district court judge went back and forth with Salinas-
Salcedo over his primary “business of laundering funds” ar-
gument, which leaves no doubt for the reasons she found the
enhancement applicable. She inquired about how to think
about the amount of money laundered (the amount at-
tempted or actually laundered) and expressed skepticism of
his textual argument before rejecting it. And while the district
judge’s general assertion that she considered the “totality of
the circumstances” did not necessarily explicitly encompass a
full exploration of the non-exhaustive factors, she responded
to his textual argument when she found a four-level enhance-
ment was appropriate because Salinas-Salcedo was liable as a
principal launderer of funds.
Critically, unlike in Salinas-Salcedo’s cited authority, the
parties agreed on the material facts, obviating any reason for
the district court to expound on its factual findings. Cf. United
States v. King, No. 23-1138, 2024 WL 911070 at *2 (7th Cir. Mar.
4, 2024) (unpublished) (error when district court failed to
identify which witnesses it credited on contested fact); United
States v. Lucena-Rivera, 750 F.3d 43, 52–53 (1st Cir. 2014) (error
to substantiate enhancement solely with statement that drug-
trafficking and money-laundering activity was “intertwined”
without additional laundering evidence). The crux of Salinas-
Salcedo’s argument was legal, not factual, and the district
court fully addressed it.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.

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