United States of America v. Daryl S. Arnold

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted September 2, 2025
Decided September 3, 2025
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1255
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DARYL S. ARNOLD,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:18-CR-00206(1)
Jorge L. Alonso,
Judge.
O R D E R
Daryl Arnold pleaded guilty to sex trafficking of a minor and was sentenced to
288 months in prison. He appeals, but his appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is
frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
Counsel’s brief details the nature of the case and discusses issues that an appeal of this
kind might be expected to involve. Because the analysis appears thorough, we limit our
review to the subjects that counsel discusses and that Arnold raises in his response
under Circuit Rule 51(b). See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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In 2017, Arnold engaged in sex trafficking of four minors aged 15 to 17. Arnold
organized paid sexual encounters between clients and the minors via email and
transported the minors around Chicago for the sexual encounters. Arnold kept half of
their earnings. He was charged with four counts of sex trafficking of a minor under
18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), (b)(2), and (c).
Arnold pleaded guilty to all four counts. In the plea agreement, Arnold waived
all appellate issues except challenges to the validity of his plea and the sentence
imposed. The district court conducted the change-of-plea hearing, and Arnold
confirmed under oath that he understood the charge, the minimum and maximum
penalties (imprisonment for 10 years to life, a term of supervised release of 5 years to
life, a maximum fine of $1,000,000, a special assessment of $400, restitution, and
registering as a sex offender), and the trial rights he was waiving. After finding that
Arnold was competent, that the plea was knowing and voluntary, and that there was an
adequate factual basis establishing Arnold’s guilt, the court accepted his guilty plea.
In the presentence investigation report (PSR), the probation officer calculated a
total offense level of 42 under the Sentencing Guidelines. From a base level of 30,
see U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(a)(2), the officer applied special offense characteristics to increase
the offense level: by two for unduly influencing a minor to participate in prohibited
sexual conduct, see § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B); by two for the use of a computer,
see § 2G1.3(b)(3)(B); and by two for involving the commission of a sex act,
see § 2G1.3(b)(4)(A). The officer also applied a four-level increase based on a
multiple-count adjustment, see § 3D1.4(a), and an enhancement of five because the
offense of conviction is a covered sex crime and he engaged in a pattern of activity
involving prohibited sexual conduct, see § 4B1.5(b)(1). Finally, the officer decreased the
offense level by three for acceptance of responsibility. See § 3E1.1.(a), (b). The officer
calculated Arnold’s criminal history score as eight based on two prior convictions (three
points for each) and two additional status points because Arnold was serving a sentence
at the time he committed this offense. See § 4A1.1(d). This resulted in a criminal history
category of IV.
Arnold raised objections to each of the increases. He argued that (1) he did not
unduly influence the minors to engage in commercial sex acts; (2) the court should not
apply the increase for use of a computer; (3) he did not engage in sex acts with any of
the minors and any increase for an offense involving the commission of a sex act would
impermissibly double count the facts already incorporated in his base offense level;
(4) the multiple-count adjustment should not apply because the counts should be

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grouped; and (5) the five-level enhancement should not apply because he does not meet
the definition of a repeat and dangerous sex offender against minors. The district court
overruled each of these objections. With the government’s agreement, the court
sustained Arnold’s objection to the calculation of his criminal history category because
the Guidelines no longer included additional status points under § 4A1.1(d). The court
additionally overruled the government’s objection and concluded that Arnold accepted
responsibility for his offense because he pleaded guilty, see § 3E1.1(a), although the
court noted it was a close call and that Arnold tried to minimize his role in the conduct.
The district court explained that Arnold had a total offense level of 42 and a
criminal history category of III, which results in a guidelines range of 360 months to life.
It also found by a preponderance of the evidence that Arnold, who was 41 years old at
the time of the offense, had sex with three of the minors. After hearing arguments from
both sides, as well as Arnold’s allocution, the court sentenced Arnold to 288 months’
imprisonment on each of the four counts, to be served concurrently. The court also
sentenced Arnold to 10 years’ supervised release and ordered him to pay a special
assessment of $400. Finally, the court overruled Arnold’s objection to the government’s
requested restitution and ordered that Arnold pay $136,700 in restitution.
In her brief, counsel first states that she consulted with Arnold and confirmed
that he does not wish to withdraw the guilty plea, so counsel properly omits discussion
of potential arguments related to the guilty plea or plea colloquy. See United States v.
Larry, 104 F.4th 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 2024).
Counsel rightly concludes that Arnold could not raise any nonfrivolous
argument that the district court clearly erred in finding that Arnold had sex with three
of the minors. We would review the district court’s finding of fact for clear error,
United States v. Shehadeh, 127 F.4th 1058, 1064 (7th Cir. 2025), and would affirm so long
as the finding is plausible in light of the entire record, United States v. McGraw, 571 F.3d
624, 629 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Raibley, 243 F.3d 1069, 1076 (7th Cir.
2001)). Here, the government offered evidence that two minors testified before the
grand jury that they had sex with Arnold and that Arnold admitted in his pro se
sentencing memo that he had sex with another minor. Considering this evidence,
Arnold could not show that the district court’s finding was clearly erroneous.
Next, counsel correctly concludes that Arnold could not plausibly challenge his
sentence on procedural grounds. We would review the district court’s application of the
Guidelines de novo. Shehadeh, 127 F.4th at 1064. Counsel considers whether Arnold

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could plausibly revive on appeal any of his objections to the offense-level increases, but
we agree that such challenges would be frivolous.
First, as counsel explains, the district court correctly applied the two-level
increase for unduly influencing the minors. See § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B). The court relied on the
Application Note to the Guideline, which sets forth a rebuttable presumption that the
increase applies when the defendant is at least 10 years older than the minor.
§ 2G1.3(b)(2) cmt. n.3(B). Here, as the court noted, the age difference between Arnold
and the minors was more than 20 years, so the presumption applied. The court further
explained that Arnold’s “finesse” approach—that he did not use violence or force to
coerce the minors to engage in commercial sex—was insufficient to rebut the
presumption. See United States v. Miller, 601 F.3d 734, 737–38 (7th Cir. 2010). Arnold
asserts in his response that the court erred by failing to consider the minors’ behavior.
But this argument is frivolous because the court properly applied the standard for the
increase, which is to consider the effect of Arnold’s conduct on the minors, and
determined that Arnold unduly influenced them to participate in prohibited sexual
conduct. See id. at 738.
Second, counsel correctly concludes that a challenge to the two-level increase for
the use of a computer would be frivolous. See § 2G1.3(b)(3)(B). In the plea agreement,
Arnold agreed that he used an email account to set up encounters between the minors
and paying clients and that he communicated with the minors during and after the
encounters via smartphone. As such, there is no nonfrivolous basis on which to
challenge the two-level increase. See United States v. McMillian, 777 F.3d 444, 449–50
(7th Cir. 2015).
Third, counsel considers, and appropriately rejects, an argument that the court
erred in applying the two-level increase for commission of a sex act.
See § 2G1.3(b)(4)(A). Arnold asserts in his response, as he did in the district court, that
his base offense level already incorporates the commission of a sex act and that
applying the increase would double count his conduct. But, as the district court
recognized, “double counting is generally permissible unless the text of the guidelines
expressly prohibits it.” United States v. Vizcarra, 668 F.3d 516, 519 (7th Cir. 2012);
see also § 2G1.3(b)(4)(A).
Fourth, we agree with counsel that Arnold could not raise any nonfrivolous
argument that the multiple-count adjustment was improper because his counts should
have been grouped. See § 3D1.4(a). The court correctly determined that his counts did
not group because they involved more than one minor, see § 2G1.3(d)(1) cmt. n.6, and it

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properly added a four-level increase reflecting four equally serious counts,
see § 3D1.4(a); see also McMillian, 777 F.3d at 449.
Fifth, counsel properly concludes that Arnold could not bring a nonfrivolous
challenge to the five-level enhancement for a repeat and dangerous sex offender against
minors. See § 4B1.5(b)(1). The five-level enhancement applies when the defendant’s
offense of conviction is a covered sex crime and the defendant engaged in a pattern of
activity involving prohibited sexual conduct. § 4B1.5(b). The court correctly determined
that Arnold’s offense of conviction is a covered sex crime. See § 4B1.5 cmt. n.2(A)(iv).
Arnold argues in his response, as he did in the district court, that the conduct for which
he was convicted cannot also establish a pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual
conduct. But the Application Note to the Guideline clarifies that Arnold’s offense of
conviction qualifies. See § 4B1.5(b) cmt. n.4(A), (B)(i). Regardless, the court also
determined there was credible evidence that Arnold had sex with three of the minors,
which is sufficient to establish a pattern of activity. See United States v. Norwood, 982 F.3d
1032, 1059 (7th Cir. 2020).
As for substantive reasonableness, we agree with counsel that any challenge to
Arnold’s below-guidelines sentence would be frivolous. A below-guidelines sentence is
presumptively reasonable, and Arnold bears “a particularly onerous burden” to rebut
that presumption by showing that the sentence is unreasonably high in light of the
factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Moore, 851 F.3d 666, 674 (7th Cir. 2017).
Here, the court highlighted the “obvious extreme seriousness” of the offense and
Arnold’s lack of remorse for his actions. Balancing these factors against his difficult
childhood, the court settled on the below-guidelines sentence of 288 months. We do not
reweigh a sentencing court’s assessment of the aggravating and mitigating factors, and
that is all an appellate argument could ask us to do. See United States v. Abriz-Villa,
28 F.4th 786, 791–92 (7th Cir. 2022).
Counsel also correctly concludes that Arnold could not bring a nonfrivolous
challenge to his conditions of supervised release. Arnold objected to two conditions of
supervised release imposed by the district court. The court has wide discretion in
determining conditions of supervised release and must justify the conditions by stating
reasons that are reasonably related to the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Kappes,
782 F.3d 828, 838, 845 (7th Cir. 2015). Here, the court explained its reasons for overruling
Arnold’s objections with reference to Arnold’s offense conduct and the need for the
probation office to verify his employment during his supervised release.

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Finally, Arnold raises a challenge to the district court’s order of restitution, but
such a challenge would also be frivolous. Restitution was mandatory, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 1593, and the district court has broad discretion in calculating the amount of
restitution owed, see United States v. Dickey, 52 F.4th 680, 687 (7th Cir. 2022). Arnold
asserts in his response, as he did in the district court, that the government’s proposed
figures for restitution are speculative and untethered to the facts of Arnold’s offense.
But prospective figures often are uncertain, which does not make them wrong. Id. And
the government connected its requested amount to the estimated cost of child sexual
abuse for victims. It would be frivolous to argue that the court’s order of restitution,
which was based on the government’s evidence and was a conservative figure
compared to the estimated cost of child sexual abuse, was an abuse of the court’s
discretion. See United States v. Sainz, 827 F.3d 602, 604–06 (7th Cir. 2016).
We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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