David Martin v. KWAME RAOUL, Attorney General of Illinois

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted September 2, 2025*
Decided September 3, 2025
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1915
DAVID MARTIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KWAME RAOUL, Attorney General of
Illinois, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 22 C 6296
Sunil R. Harjani,
Judge.
O R D E R
After an Illinois state court ordered David Martin to contribute financially to his
son’s college expenses, Martin filed this federal lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking
injunctive and declaratory relief related to his attempts to appeal. He alleged that
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-1915 Page 2
several officials involved in the litigation violated his constitutional rights during the
proceedings. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the suit,
relying on abstention principles. Because we agree with the district court that federal
courts should not interfere with the state court’s proceedings, we affirm the judgment.
In July 2021, the mother of Martin’s child filed a petition in the Circuit Court of
Cook County, Illinois, seeking for Martin to contribute to his son’s college expenses.
Judge Gregory Ahern presided over the proceedings via Zoom. According to Martin’s
complaint, the clerk’s office gave him the incorrect Zoom information and he thus
missed two hearings, leading to a finding of default. At a third hearing in March 2022,
Martin appeared but objected to the court’s jurisdiction and refused to participate in the
proceedings any further. Ahern overruled his objection and ordered Martin to split the
costs of his son’s college education with his son’s mother under the Illinois College
Contribution Statute. See 750 ILCS 5/513. Martin moved to certify a bystander’s report of
the March hearing, in lieu of a transcript, to support an appeal. See ILL. S. C T. R. 323(c).
Ahern denied the motion and did not certify the report Martin had offered.
While this litigation was ongoing in state court, Martin sued Attorney General
Kwame Raoul, Judge Ahern, unnamed clerks in the Circuit Court of Cook County, and
Cook County itself for declaratory and injunctive relief, invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He
alleged that Ahern violated his rights by refusing to certify his bystander’s report and
the clerks violated his rights by giving him the incorrect Zoom information and keeping
an inaccurate record. He also asserted that the College Contribution Statute is
unconstitutional and sued the attorney general seeking to prohibit its enforcement.
The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that it
should abstain. See J.B. v. Woodard, 997 F.3d 714, 721 (7th Cir. 2021). Because Martin
sought only to influence the proceedings in state court, the district court concluded it
must abstain to honor principles of federalism. In the alternative, the court determined
that Ahern had judicial immunity, the attorney general had sovereign immunity, and
Martin had not effectuated service on the clerks and county—all requiring dismissal.
On appeal, Martin primarily argues that his complaint should proceed because
he seeks only prospective relief. He contends that the judge is not immune to such
claims under Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541–42 (1984), and that he should be able to
obtain a prospective declaration that the College Contribution Act is unconstitutional.
He otherwise contends that he did not serve the clerks at the advice of the court (when a
prior judge was presiding) and to avoid further delay in the proceedings.

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No. 24-1915 Page 3
The district court properly abstained from exercising jurisdiction over Martin’s
case. In J.B., we held that principles of equity, comity, and federalism counsel federal
courts to abstain even in cases where no named doctrine is a perfect fit. J.B., 997 F.3d at
722–23. When a plaintiff seeks “to receive a favorable federal constitutional ruling that
can be used affirmatively or offensively to shape—or perhaps change—the direction
and course of the state court proceedings,” the federal court must abstain. Id. at 723.
That description fits Martin’s claims perfectly. Martin insists his request for a
bystander’s report is not a federal collateral challenge to the judgment because he wants
the report only to enable him to appeal that judgment within the state system. But this
is a direct admission that he seeks federal relief solely to shape the course of the state
court’s proceedings, a goal we will not facilitate under J.B. Likewise, our adjudicating
whether the clerks gave Martin incorrect Zoom information or altered records could
benefit Martin only by casting doubt on the state court’s finding of default. And he
admits his sole reason for suing the attorney general is because he knew he could not
sue his child’s mother directly to get the federal courts to dismiss her petition for
College Contribution. Resolving any of these claims would “reflect a lack of respect for
the state’s ability to resolve [the issues] properly before its courts.” Id. at 724 (alteration
in original) (quoting SKS & Assocs. v. Dart, 619 F.3d 674, 679 (7th Cir. 2010)). Martin’s
remedies, if any, for his alleged errors rest exclusively with those state courts.
Martin’s attempts to distinguish J.B. from his case are unpersuasive. First, he
asserts that J.B. does not apply because the state trial court’s proceedings have
concluded and he again seeks only to appeal within the state system. But the principles
of abstention apply with equal force to state appellate proceedings. See Simpson v.
Rowan, 73 F.3d 134, 138 (7th Cir. 1995). Second, he argues that his case is distinguishable
from J.B. because he was unable to participate in the state-court hearings. But Martin’s
appearance and participation in (and efforts to object to) the third hearing, as well as his
appeal, demonstrate his ability to seek relief from the default in the state courts, if he
did so consistent with the state courts’ procedures.
In short, Martin filed this lawsuit in the federal courts seeking “a favorable
federal court judgment so that he can use that judgment to influence ongoing state court
decision making.” J.B., 997 F.3d at 721. But the Illinois state courts are capable of
adjudicating their own cases, including any federal issues that may arise in those cases,
and infringing upon their authority to do so would upset the principles of equity,
comity, and federalism. Accordingly, we refrain from addressing Martin’s other

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arguments, see Greening v. Moran, 953 F.2d 301, 304 (7th Cir. 1992), and we affirm the
district court’s decision to abstain.
AFFIRMED

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