United States of America v. Gary Sandiego

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted October 9, 2025
Decided October 10, 2025
Before
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1102
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
GARY SANDIEGO,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:23-CR-00100(1)
Jorge L. Alonso,
Judge.
O R D E R
Gary Sandiego pleaded guilty to two counts of willfully preparing and
presenting fraudulent tax returns. See 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2). Sandiego filed a notice of
appeal, but his appointed lawyer asserts that the appeal is frivolous and seeks to
withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We notified Sandiego of
counsel’s motion, and he did not respond. See C IR . R. 51(b). Counsel’s brief explains the
nature of the case and addresses potential issues that an appeal of this kind would
typically involve. Because counsel’s brief appears thorough, we limit our review to the
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 25-1102 Page 2
subjects that counsel discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).
We grant the motion and dismiss the appeal.
Sandiego owned a tax return preparation business and between January 2016
and June 2018, he knowingly prepared returns that included false residential energy
credits, false and inflated unreimbursed employment expenses, and understated total
tax. The fraudulent returns resulted in a loss to the IRS of approximately $4,586,154.
Sandiego was charged with seventeen counts of willfully preparing and
presenting fraudulent tax returns. Under a written agreement, he pleaded guilty to two
counts, and the government agreed to dismiss the remaining counts.
At Sandiego’s plea hearing, he confirmed that he understood the plea agreement
and that it was not the result of threats or other promises. Sandiego also confirmed that
he understood the charges, applicable penalties including restitution, his trial rights,
and the role of the Sentencing Guidelines. See F ED. R. C RIM . P. 11(b)(1)(C)–(N). The court
accepted Sandiego’s guilty plea after finding the factual basis sufficient.
The United States Probation Office prepared a presentence investigation report
(PSR) that calculated a guidelines range of 37 to 46 months’ imprisonment. The
probation officer began with a base offense level of 24 because Sandiego was
responsible for a tax loss of more than $3,500,000 but less than $9,500,000. See U.S.S.G.
§ 2T1.4(a). The officer added two levels because Sandiego was in the business of
preparing tax forms. See id. § 2T1.4(b)(1)(B). The officer reduced the offense level by
three for acceptance of responsibility, id. § 3E1.1(a)–(b), and by another two because
Sandiego was a zero-point offender, id. § 4C1.1(a)–(b). Sandiego’s resulting adjusted
offense level was 21 with a criminal history category of I. The PSR noted that each count
had a statutory maximum term of three years’ imprisonment. See 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2).
In sentencing memoranda, the parties agreed with the calculation of the
guidelines range but argued for different sentences. Sandiego pressed for probation,
and the government argued for a within-guidelines sentence.
At sentencing, the district court adopted the PSR’s guidelines calculation. The
court confirmed that Sandiego understood the conditions of supervised release. The
government then explained its restitution calculation of $2,910,442, and Sandiego
withdrew a previous objection to the amount. The court adopted the government’s
calculation, finding it credible and conservative.

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No. 25-1102 Page 3
The parties then argued about the appropriate sentence. Sandiego argued that
probation or home incarceration was appropriate because of his nonviolent nature,
obligation to pay restitution, and need to obtain care for medical conditions. The
government requested a within-guidelines sentence because of the seriousness of tax
fraud, the success of Sandiego’s business, and the ability of the Bureau of Prisons to
treat Sandiego’s medical conditions.
The court imposed a below-guidelines sentence of sixteen months’ imprisonment
on each count to run concurrently, and one year of supervised release. The district court
discussed the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, noting that Sandiego’s high-volume business
had resulted in significant personal gain. The court assessed Sandiego’s personal
history and characteristics, acknowledging that he was a first-time, nonviolent offender
who suffers from serious medical ailments.
In her Anders brief, counsel first considers whether Sandiego could challenge the
validity of his guilty plea. But counsel’s brief fails to explain whether she consulted with
Sandiego about the risks of withdrawing his plea and whether Sandiego wishes to do
so. Counsel should not consider a guilty-plea challenge without telling us that, after
advising the defendant about the benefits and risks of withdrawing the guilty plea, he
wants to do so. See United States v. Larry, 104 F.4th 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 2024);
United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012). But we need not reject
counsel’s brief, because counsel explains and the plea transcript confirms that the
district court substantially complied with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11,
rendering the plea valid. See Larry, 104 F.4th at 1022.
Because Sandiego did not move in the district court to withdraw his plea, we
would review the court’s acceptance of it only for plain error. F ED. R. C RIM . P. 52(b);
United States v. Collins, 986 F.3d 1029, 1030 (7th Cir. 2021). The district court determined
that Sandiego was competent to enter a plea, and it confirmed that he understood the
charges against him, the possible penalties, and the rights he was waiving by pleading
guilty. See F ED. R. C RIM. P. 11(b)(1)(B)–(O). As counsel notes, the sole flaw was the
court’s omission of a statement of its obligation to impose special assessments totaling
$200. F ED. R. C RIM . P. 11(b)(1)(L). But special assessments were mentioned in the PSR
and discussed at sentencing and Sandiego did not object, so the statement’s omission
was harmless. See United States v. Adams, 746 F.3d 734, 746–47 (7th Cir. 2014). We are
thus satisfied that Sandiego could not argue that the court erred in accepting his guilty
plea.

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No. 25-1102 Page 4
Next, counsel rightly concludes that Sandiego could not raise a nonfrivolous
challenge to the district court’s calculation of his sentence. The court correctly
determined that Sandiego’s guidelines range was 37 to 46 months’ imprisonment and
each count had a maximum term of three years’ imprisonment. See 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2).
Sandiego agreed with the guidelines calculation and thus any challenge to it would be
waived on appeal. See United States v. Boyle, 28 F.4th 798, 802 (7th Cir. 2022).
Counsel also considers, and appropriately rejects, any argument that the
sentence is substantively unreasonable. The below-guidelines sentence of sixteen
months’ imprisonment is presumptively reasonable. See United States v. Wehrle, 985 F.3d
549, 557 (7th Cir. 2021). And the court adequately justified the sentence based on the
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), discussing the seriousness of the offense and
Sandiego’s personal history and characteristics.
Finally, we agree with counsel that an argument about the restitution amount of
$2,910,442 would be frivolous. Any challenge on appeal would be waived because
Sandiego withdrew his objection to the restitution amount in the district court.
See United States v. Harris, 102 F.4th 847, 851–52 (7th Cir. 2024).
We therefore GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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