United States of America v. Brett Siegel

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued September 30, 2025
Decided October 17, 2025
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1537
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
BRETT SIEGEL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
No. 1:19-cr-00391-1
John Robert Blakey,
Judge.
O R D E R
Brett Siegel pleaded guilty to knowingly receiving child pornography. The district
court imposed a within-guidelines sentence of 76 months’ imprisonment. On appeal
Siegel contends that the district court inadequately considered his mitigation arguments
and explained its sentence. He also contends that his sentence is substantively
unreasonable based on unwarranted sentencing disparities. Seeing no error on any front,
we affirm.
I
For over three years, Siegel used his computer to receive sexually explicit images of
children, including boys under the age of five. He also encouraged another individual to
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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sexually abuse young boys and then to share photos, videos, and audio files of the
conduct. Siegel pleaded guilty to one count of knowingly receiving child pornography,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A). The statutory minimum sentence was 60
months’ imprisonment. But the Sentencing Guidelines recommended 70 to 87 months.
Siegel argued for the statutory minimum without challenging the guidelines
calculation. He asserted that the guidelines range overstated his culpability and risked
an unwarranted sentencing disparity. In advancing the latter argument, Siegel did not
compare himself to any similar defendants.
At sentencing the district court adopted the undisputed guidelines range and then
proceeded to consider Siegel’s arguments in mitigation. The district court expressly
acknowledged that Siegel was receiving mental health treatment and had a low risk of
recidivism, and further that he had no criminal history, strong family support, worked
as a pediatric social worker, and complied with the terms of his pretrial release.
Acknowledging Siegel’s concerns about certain aspects of the guidelines calculation, the
court addressed his culpability, observing that nearly all offenders use computers, that
he had a relatively low number of images, and that his conduct entailed no more than
receipt and possession. The district court then asked Siegel whether it had “considered
[his] factors in mitigation?” Siegel replied, “Yes.”
The district court also considered aggravating factors. The court recognized that
Siegel’s conduct occurred over a long period of time and that he encouraged another
person to sexually abuse children. The court acknowledged the victim impact statements
and that the victims continue to experience harm.
At the end of the sentencing, after sharing its proposed 76-month sentence, the district
court asked whether “either side ha[d] any legal objection to the sentence I propose or
request any further elaboration of my reasons under 3553 both as to the term of
imprisonment … or any other aspect of sentencing?” Both parties replied, “No.”
II
We see no merit to Siegel’s contention that the district court procedurally erred by
inadequately considering his arguments in mitigation.
We have encouraged courts, “after imposing a sentence … to inquire of defense
counsel whether they are satisfied” with the explanation provided. See United States v.
Garcia-Segura, 717 F.3d 566, 568–69 (7th Cir. 2013). “If the response is in the affirmative, a
later challenge for failure to address a principal mitigation argument … [is] waived.”
United States v. Brown, 932 F.3d 1011, 1019 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Garcia-Segura, 717 F.3d
at 569). Waiver forecloses appellate review of a challenge to a sentencing court’s failure

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to address a defendant’s arguments in mitigation. See United States v. Tyler, 139 F.4th 598,
602–03 (7th Cir. 2025).
By twice affirming that the district court sufficiently considered his mitigation
arguments, Siegel waived any challenge on this basis. After addressing each of his
contentions, the court asked Siegel whether it “had considered [the] factors in
mitigation,” and Siegel responded that it had. And then in connection with announcing
Siegel’s sentence, the court asked whether he wanted “further elaboration” of the reasons
for it. Siegel again declined. On this record, Siegel waived the challenge he now presses
on appeal. See, e.g., id. (concluding that defendant’s affirmative answer to whether court
addressed his principal arguments in mitigation waived later procedural challenge).
Siegel quibbles with the language of the district court’s inquiry, contending that the
word “consider” is improper because the correct question is whether a defendant is
“satisfied” that his arguments have been addressed. See Brown, 932 F.3d at 1019. But
district courts have broad discretion at sentencing, Tyler, 139 F.4th at 602, and we have
never required a district court to follow a precise script when it inquires whether it
considered arguments advanced in mitigation. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 21 F.4th 490,
494 (7th Cir. 2021) (concluding that a challenge was waived when court asked defendant,
“Are there other issues you feel I haven’t addressed or any other recommendations you
think I should make?”); Brown, 932 F.3d at 1019 (determining that an argument was
waived when the court asked whether parties requested “further amplification” of the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors).
The district court’s questions were unequivocal: the court drew Siegel’s attention to
its discussion of his arguments in mitigation and the reasons for his sentence and twice
asked whether he wanted further consideration or elaboration. That is sufficient to trigger
waiver. Compare United States v. Donelli, 747 F.3d 936, 941 (7th Cir. 2014) (observing that
an inquiry was satisfactory when the court asked whether defendant “had any
disagreement with the sentence or required further elaboration of the court’s reasons”),
with United States v. Morris, 775 F.3d 882, 866 (7th Cir. 2015) (concluding that a general
inquiry whether parties had “anything further in this matter” was not sufficient). Taken
together, the district court’s inquiries gave Siegel more than one opportunity to raise any
arguments the court may have overlooked or to request additional explanation for his
sentence. Siegel’s failure to use those opportunities constitutes waiver. See Perez, 21 F.4th
at 494.
Even if Siegel had not waived this argument, it fails on the merits. A district court
only needs to address a defendant’s primary arguments in mitigation and may do so
implicitly or imperfectly so long as the record “gives us confidence” that the court did so.

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United States v. Sanchez, 989 F.3d 523, 540 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Jones,
798 F.3d 613, 618 (7th Cir. 2015)). The district court satisfied that standard here.
Siegel’s challenge to the substantive reasonableness of his sentence also falls short.
Indeed, for the first time on appeal, he argues that his sentence violates 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(6) because it is disproportionately long when compared to the sentences of
other first-time offenders guilty of similar conduct. Even setting aside considerations of
forfeiture, we have said many times over that a sentence within a properly calculated
guidelines range “necessarily complies with § 3553(a)(6).” Sanchez, 989 F.3d at 541
(quoting United States v. Bartlett, 567 F.3d 901, 908 (7th Cir. 2009)). Indeed, a sentence
within the guidelines range automatically considers unwarranted disparities with others
who committed the same crime. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347–50 (2007).
In any event, the district court stated that it had considered the need to avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities. And Siegel did not present any specific comparators
for the district court to consider. A district court cannot abuse its discretion by failing to
consider an argument not presented to it. See United States v. Reibel, 688 F.3d 868, 872 (7th
Cir. 2012). And the other defendants Siegel now identifies are not readily comparable to
him. The specific facts of each case and individual characteristics of each comparator
defendant are relevant. See United States v. Newsom, 428 F.3d 685, 689 (7th Cir. 2005).
While Siegel points to other first-time offenders who pleaded guilty to the same or similar
crimes, he does not identify any defendant who, like himself, encouraged another person
to abuse children, record the abuse, and share it.
For these reasons, we AFFIRM.

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