United States of America v. Domingo Francisco-Juan

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted October 21, 2025
Decided October 23, 2025
Before
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
Nos. 24-1594 & 24-1595
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DOMINGO FRANCISCO-JUAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
Nos. 2:22-CR-20020 & 2:22-CR-20057
Colin S. Bruce,
Judge.
O R D E R
In two separate criminal cases, Domingo Francisco-Juan was charged for conduct
relating to kidnapping, forced labor, and illegally re-entering the United States. He
pleaded guilty to several charges, and the district court imposed a life sentence.
Francisco-Juan appeals, but his appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous
and moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Counsel’s brief
details the nature of the case and discusses issues that an appeal of this kind might be
expected to involve. Because the analysis appears thorough and Francisco-Juan did not
respond to the motion, see C IR . R. 51(b), we limit our review to the subjects that counsel
discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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Nos. 24-1594 & 24-1595 Page 2
Starting in December 2015, Francisco-Juan and others conspired to bring a minor
to the United States from Guatemala in a scheme to compel her labor. As part of the
conspiracy, Francisco-Juan persuaded the minor’s mother that the minor would receive
educational opportunities in the United States. Instead, for over five years, Francisco-
Juan and his co-conspirators forced the minor to engage in labor against her will,
restrained and threatened her, and prevented her from contacting her mother.
Francisco-Juan also sexually abused the minor. Separately, in December 2020, Francisco-
Juan re-entered the United States without authorization after having been deported on
eight prior occasions.
Based on these events, Francisco-Juan was charged in two separate cases. In the
first case, No. 22-20020, Francsico-Juan was charged with one count of re-entering the
United States without authorization after having been deported, 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). In
the second case, No. 22-20057, Francisco-Juan was charged with several counts of forced
labor and conspiracy to commit forced labor, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1594(a), (b), 1589(a), 2; and
kidnapping and conspiracy to commit kidnapping, id. §§ 1201(c), 1201(a)(1), (c), 2.
Francisco-Juan pleaded guilty without a plea agreement to illegal re-entry in No. 22-
20020. In a written plea agreement in No. 22-20057, Francisco-Juan agreed to plead
guilty to one count each of conspiracy to commit forced labor, forced labor, conspiracy
to commit kidnapping, and kidnapping, in exchange for the government’s dismissal of
five other counts. By the terms of that agreement, Francisco-Juan agreed to waive “all
rights to appeal and/or collaterally attack his conviction and sentence,” with an
exception for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
During a consolidated plea hearing, the district court provided Francisco-Juan
with an interpreter because he is not fluent in English. Francisco-Juan confirmed that he
understood the nature of the charges, the applicable penalties, and the rights he was
giving up by pleading guilty. While reviewing the maximum possible penalties, the
government misstated that Francisco-Juan could be subject to consecutive terms of
supervised release, resulting in a potential maximum term of 23 years. The court
determined that Francisco-Juan was competent to enter a plea and accepted his guilty
pleas after finding the factual basis sufficient.
Before the sentencing hearing, the U.S. Probation Office prepared a presentence
investigation report (PSR) in each case. For the illegal reentry case, the probation officer
calculated a total offense level of 13, resulting in a guidelines range of 18 to 24 months’
imprisonment and 1 to 3 years’ supervised release. The four charges in the conspiracy
case resulted in a total offense level of 43, a criminal history category of III, and a

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Nos. 24-1594 & 24-1595 Page 3
guidelines range of life. Each of the four counts carried a supervised release term of no
more than 5 years. The parties did not object to these calculations.
At the consolidated sentencing hearing, the district court adopted the guidelines
calculations and heard statements from the minor victim and Francisco-Juan. The
district court also considered the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), noting the severity of
Francisco-Juan’s conduct and his repeated unlawful entries into the country to facilitate
the conspiracy. The court then imposed a life sentence and 5 years’ supervised release
on each count in the conspiracy case to run concurrently. For the count of unlawful re-
entry, the court imposed 18 months’ imprisonment and 3 years’ supervised release to
run concurrently to the sentence imposed in the conspiracy case.
In her Anders brief, counsel tells us that she advised Francisco-Juan about the
risks of challenging his guilty pleas but that he still wishes to challenge them. Counsel
therefore properly discusses potential challenges to the validity of the pleas. See United
States v. Larry, 104 F.4th 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 2024). Because Francisco-Juan did not move
in the district court to withdraw his pleas, we would review the court’s acceptance of
them only for plain error. United States v. Collins, 986 F.3d 1029, 1030 (7th Cir. 2021). The
district court determined that Francisco-Juan was competent to enter a plea, and it
confirmed that he understood the charges against him, the possible penalties, and the
rights he was waiving by pleading guilty. See FED. R. C RIM. P. 11(b)(1)(B)–(O). The
district court ensured that these admonishments were translated into Francisco-Juan’s
native language, Kanjobal.
As counsel notes, the only error was the government’s assertion at the plea
hearing that Francisco-Juan faced a maximum term of supervised release of 23 years.
Because terms of supervised release run concurrently, Francisco-Juan faced a maximum
term of only 5 years. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e). Counsel correctly concludes, however, that this
error would not affect Francisco-Juan’s substantial rights. See FED. R. C RIM. P. 11(h). That
would require him to show a reasonable probability that he would not have entered the
pleas but for the error. See United States v. Schaul, 962 F.3d 917, 924 (7th Cir. 2020).
Francisco-Juan faced life sentences on multiples charges and the district court advised
him that he faced removal from the country upon release from any term of
imprisonment. Under these circumstances, it would be frivolous to argue that
Francisco-Juan would not have pleaded guilty if he had been properly advised of the
shorter maximum term of supervised release. Moreover, the PSRs correctly calculated
the potential supervised release terms, and the district court adopted the correct

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Nos. 24-1594 & 24-1595 Page 4
calculations and imposed the 3- and 5-year terms of supervised release to run
concurrently.
Counsel points out that Francisco-Juan’s appeal waiver in the conspiracy case
further renders frivolous any argument challenging the guilty plea or sentence on those
charges. In the conspiracy case, Francisco-Juan stipulated in the plea agreement to
waive “all rights to appeal and/or collaterally attack [the] conviction[s] and sentence,”
except for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. An appeal waiver stands or falls
with the guilty plea, see United States v. Nulf, 978 F.3d 504, 506 (7th Cir. 2020), and as
already discussed, the plea colloquy was adequate and Franciso-Juan entered the plea
voluntarily. We would decline to enforce a valid appeal waiver only where the sentence
exceeds the statutory maximum or the record suggests that the court relied on a
constitutionally impermissible factor such as race. Id. Neither circumstance is present
here. Moreover, any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is best saved for collateral
review, where the record could be more fully developed. See Massaro v. United States,
538 U.S. 500, 504–05 (2003); United States v. Flores, 739 F.3d 337, 341 (7th Cir. 2014).
Counsel next rightly concludes that Francisco-Juan could not raise a nonfrivolous
challenge to the district court’s calculation of his sentence for illegal reentry. The court
correctly determined that Francisco-Juan’s guidelines range was 18 to 24 months.
Francisco-Juan agreed with the guidelines calculation and so any challenge to it would
be waived on appeal. See United States v. Boyle, 28 F.4th 798, 802 (7th Cir. 2022).
Finally, counsel considers and appropriately rejects any argument that the
sentence for illegal reentry is substantively unreasonable. The within-guidelines
sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment is presumptively reasonable. United States v.
Williams, 85 F.4th 844, 847 (7th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 1046 (2024). And the
court adequately justified the sentence based on the factors set forth in § 3553(a),
discussing Francisco-Juan’s repeated unauthorized border crossings to carry out the
kidnapping and forced labor conspiracy.
We therefore GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS these appeals.

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