Joshua Lee Vinson, Sr. v. Jason Debruin

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted November 4, 2025*
Decided November 10, 2025
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1188
JOSHUA LEE VINSON, SR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JASON DEBRUIN, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 19-cv-1237-bhl
Brett H. Ludwig,
Judge.
O R D E R
Joshua Vinson sued several police officers from the Racine Police Department in
Wisconsin, alleging that they used excessive force and discriminated against him based
on his race in violation of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. At a trial in which Vinson represented himself, a jury concluded
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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that the officers were not liable for violating Vinson’s rights. On appeal, Vinson argues
that the district court made multiple errors before and during the trial. We affirm.
I
A. The Traffic Stop
Shortly after midnight on February 19, 2015, officers Justin Schmidt-Quist and
Stephen Jaskowiak pulled over Vinson for driving a car with a suspended license plate.
Schmidt-Quist approached Vinson’s car on the driver’s side, while Jaskowiak
approached on the passenger’s side. Vinson’s behavior during the traffic stop—holding
his license out of the window while the officers approached, staring blankly in response
to Schmidt-Quist’s questions, and repeatedly dropping his right hand towards his pants
pocket—concerned Schmidt-Quist, and he decided to remove Vinson from the car to
pat him down for weapons. But when Schmidt-Quist began to open the car door,
Vinson grabbed the handle from the inside and tried to pull it shut. Schmidt-Quist and
Vinson struggled until the inside door handle ripped off, and Schmidt-Quist was able to
open the car door. Schmidt-Quist lunged into the vehicle on top of Vinson’s lap to
separate his hands from his pants pocket.
While Schmidt-Quist and Vinson struggled, Officer Jason DeBruin arrived and
broke the rear driver-side window. Jaskowiak ran around the car to the broken
window, leaned in, and tased Vinson on his lower left back. Because the taser was used
from such a close distance, its probes were unable to separate, so the taser hurt Vinson
but did not incapacitate him. Jaskowiak saw that Vinson was still trying to access his
pocket, so he used the taser twice more on Vinson’s back.
By that point, DeBruin had broken the front passenger-side window and opened
the door. He leaned into the car and grabbed Vinson’s hands as Vinson was struggling.
Sergeant Steven Fish arrived and joined DeBruin to assist with holding Vinson’s arms.
DeBruin and Fish handcuffed Vinson’s hands over his head and pulled Vinson out of
the car through the passenger-side door.
B. Procedural History
Vinson sued, alleging that several police officers violated his Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court screened his
complaint, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and allowed the claims to proceed. Vinson twice
moved for recruitment of counsel, which the district court denied, and the officers

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moved for summary judgment. The court granted in part the officers’ motion but
concluded that Vinson could proceed to trial on two claims: (1) Schmidt-Quist,
Jaskowiak, DeBruin, and Fish used excessive force against him; and (2) in carrying out
the stop, Schmidt-Quist and Jaskowiak discriminated against him because he is Black.
Considering the complexity of trying a case before a jury, the court recruited
counsel to represent Vinson. But the attorney moved to withdraw because of a health
condition and Vinson’s unreasonable expectations. The court granted counsel’s motion.
The court then recruited a second attorney. That attorney moved to withdraw at
Vinson’s request, and the court granted the motion. Vinson then represented himself at
trial, with the assistance of two attorneys recruited as standby counsel.
The court empaneled a jury. Vinson raised a challenge to the officers’
peremptory strike of a potential Black juror, and the officers explained that they saw the
juror fall “sound asleep, twice.” The court overruled Vinson’s challenge, explaining that
while it did not see the potential juror fall asleep, it did see that he was not paying
attention and was drowsy, and therefore it was not surprised by the officers’ assertion
that the potential juror had fallen asleep.
Because Vinson was incarcerated at the time of the trial, he wore a “shock”
bracelet on his ankle and was escorted to the courtroom by officers from the Wisconsin
Department of Corrections. Vinson objected to the correctional officers sitting directly
behind him during the proceedings. He requested they move to the back of the
courtroom so they would not affect the jury’s perception of him. The court overruled
the objection, deferring to the correctional officers’ requirements for security, but it
asked them to be as inconspicuous as possible.
During a break in the trial when the jurors left the courtroom, Vinson was
escorted by security to the restroom in handcuffs. Vinson alerted the court that one of
the jurors saw him in the hallway. When the court asked Vinson if the juror saw him in
handcuffs, Vinson responded, “I don’t think he [saw] the handcuffs.” The court
acknowledged Vinson’s concern that this could prejudice the juror against him but
concluded that because the juror did not see Vinson’s restraints, there was no problem.
In support of his case, Vinson tried to introduce several exhibits detailing the
policies and procedures of the Racine Police Department. He argued that the documents
were relevant because the officers were trained based on those procedures and they
may not have acted in accordance with the policies. The district court excluded the

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exhibits because the minimal relevance they had was outweighed by the chance that
they would confuse the jury.
At the close of the trial, the jury returned a verdict for the officers on both counts.
II
Vinson appeals, arguing that the district court made several errors leading up to
and during trial. First, Vinson contends that he should have been allowed to proceed on
a claim against the City of Racine under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S.
658 (1978). Vinson next asserts that the district court erred in not recruiting counsel
earlier in the case and that the attorneys recruited to represent him at trial were
deficient. Finally, Vinson argues that multiple errors made during his trial rendered it
fundamentally unfair.
A. Monell Claim
Vinson first argues that the district court should have allowed him to bring a
Monell claim against the City of Racine. Vinson had named the Racine Police
Department in his original complaint. But at screening, the district court noted that the
department was not a suable entity and construed the department as a placeholder for
the as-yet unnamed police officers. We review a challenge to a screening order de novo.
Sargeant v. Barfield, 87 F.4th 358, 361 (7th Cir. 2023).
Vinson contends that the district court should have understood him to be
bringing a Monell claim. But simply naming a municipal entity as a defendant is not
enough to state a Monell claim. The relevant inquiry is “whether the raw materials of
[the] complaint—the facts—plausibly suggested” that the entity was the moving force
behind the alleged constitutional violations. Id. at 362. Vinson’s complaint did not
include factual allegations concerning the police department’s policies and customs or
suggesting that the challenged conduct was attributable to the department. See Thomas
v. Neenah Joint Sch. Dist., 74 F.4th 521, 524 (7th Cir. 2023) (requirements to plead a Monell
claim).
Vinson also asserts that the district court should have allowed him to amend his
complaint to expand his allegations related to municipal liability. But Vinson amended
his complaint once, and he did not include any factual allegations about municipal
policies, customs, or practices that caused his injuries. And his two additional motions
for leave to amend did not allege facts that could be construed as a Monell claim.

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B. Recruited Counsel
Vinson also argues that the district court erred in not recruiting counsel earlier in
the case. Vinson filed two motions for counsel before summary judgment, and the
district court denied both. We review the denial of a motion to recruit counsel for abuse
of discretion. Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 658 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc). In considering a
motion to recruit counsel, the district court must evaluate whether the plaintiff appears
competent to litigate his case considering its difficulty. Id. at 654. Here, the district court
applied the correct legal standard and evaluated appropriately Vinson’s circumstances
at the time of each motion. See Romanelli v. Suliene, 615 F.3d 847, 852 (7th Cir. 2010). It
denied the first motion because Vinson had personal knowledge of the facts and was
able to litigate the case on his own, having submitted documents that were organized
and easy to understand. It denied the second motion because Vinson’s claims were
straightforward and based on his memory of the events and his detailed and organized
filings showed that he was able to represent himself through summary judgment.
Vinson also contends that his recruited attorneys were deficient and made errors
in preparing for trial. The court twice recruited attorneys for Vinson and both
withdrew, citing conflicts with Vinson. But there is no right to counsel in civil cases.
Walker v. Price, 900 F.3d 933, 938 (7th Cir. 2018). So even if Vinson’s recruited attorneys
had erred, Vinson would not have been entitled to a new trial or a new attorney.
See Diggs v. Ghosh, 850 F.3d 905, 911 (7th Cir. 2017).
Vinson additionally asserts that, had he been represented by counsel at trial, he
would have prevailed. But the court’s earlier decisions to recruit counsel did not create
a right to a lawyer or “an obligation for the court to search indefinitely for one.” Austin
v. Hansen, 139 F.4th 604, 607 (7th Cir. 2025). The district court acted within its discretion
to not recruit a third attorney for Vinson and instead recruit standby counsel.
C. Trial Errors
Vinson also argues that the district court made several errors during his trial that
cumulatively deprived him of a fair trial. To prevail on such an argument, he must
show that multiple errors occurred and that, “in the context of the entire trial,” those
errors “were so severe as to have rendered [the] trial fundamentally unfair.” Christmas
v. City of Chicago, 682 F.3d 632, 643 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Powell,
652 F.3d 702, 706 (7th Cir. 2011)).

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1. Batson Challenge
Vinson contends that the officers’ strike of a Black potential juror violated his
rights under the Equal Protection Clause. See Lisle v. Welborn, 933 F.3d 705, 714 (7th Cir.
2019) (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986)). At trial, Vinson raised a Batson
challenge to the officers’ strike of Juror 10 from the venire panel. The officers responded
that they saw the juror fall “sound asleep, twice.” The court overruled the Batson
challenge, stating: “I did notice that he seemed to be not paying attention and drowsy. I
did not see him completely fall asleep, but that doesn’t surprise me.”
The Batson process requires three steps. First, the challenging party must object
to a peremptory strike by making a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Lisle,
933 F.3d at 714. Second, the burden shifts to the striking party to provide a race-neutral
explanation for the strike. Id. Third, and at issue here, the trial court must “make factual
findings on the record regarding whether the striking party’s proffered reason for the
strike is pretextual.” Carter v. City of Wauwatosa, 114 F.4th 866, 875 (7th Cir. 2024). We
review whether a court properly conducted a Batson inquiry de novo and review the
court’s factual findings for clear error. Id.
Vinson argues that the district court failed to conduct properly the Batson inquiry
because it did not complete the third step. “[W]hile the district [court] need not use any
magic words in completing the step-three inquiry, [it] must do more than summarily
deny the challenge or merely categorize the striking party’s reason as race-neutral.” Id.
A remand is necessary where the district court is silent as to step three or its findings
are insufficient because it “merely repeated the striking party’s facially neutral reason
for the strike.” Id. at 876.
Here, the district court completed the third step of the Batson inquiry by
weighing the credibility of the officers’ race-neutral reason for striking Juror 10. The
court explained that although it did not see Juror 10 completely fall asleep, it was not
surprised by the officers’ assertion that he was sound asleep. The court did more than
just restate the officers’ race-neutral reason for the strike: It “indicate[d] whether [it]
believed the defense, whether [it] found them credible.” Id. at 877. Although the court
did not explicitly state that it had moved to the third step, it did make a finding about
the officers’ reason for the strike, which is enough to satisfy the requirement to conduct
a three-step Batson analysis. Cf. United States v. McMath, 559 F.3d 657, 665–66 (7th Cir.
2009) (remand necessary where district court made no findings as to whether it agreed
with prosecutor’s description of juror’s demeanor and did not evaluate prosecutor’s
credibility).

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Vinson further argues that the district court erred in finding the officers’
race-neutral reason credible because Vinson and the court did not see Juror 10 fall
asleep, and to the contrary, Juror 10 was paying close attention. Vinson also refers to the
comments of standby counsel. When the officers stated that Juror 10 fell asleep, standby
counsel responded: “While we were here?” But the court credited the officers’
assertions, commenting that it saw Juror 10 was not paying attention and drowsy, and
these factual findings are “accorded great deference on appeal.” Morgan v. City of
Chicago, 822 F.3d 317, 327 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352,
364–65 (1991)). Moreover, whether the court saw Juror 10 fall asleep is immaterial:
“[W]e will not reject the explanation of a juror’s drowsiness as a pretext for a
discriminatory strike merely because the district [court] did not observe the juror
asleep.” United States v. Lovies, 16 F.4th 493, 501 (7th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).
2. Juror Prejudice
Vinson next asserts that the jury was prejudiced against him for three reasons:
(1) the jury saw the “shock” bracelet he wore on his ankle during trial, (2) one juror saw
him handcuffed in the hallway of the courthouse, and (3) correctional officers sat
directly behind him during the trial.
Vinson waived two of these arguments. Vinson never raised the ankle-bracelet
issue at trial, so it is waived. See Walker v. Groot, 867 F.3d 799, 802 (7th Cir. 2017). Vinson
also waived the argument that a juror was prejudiced because the juror saw Vinson
wearing handcuffs. When the court asked Vinson about the incident, he said that he did
not think the juror had seen the handcuffs. This statement and Vinson’s choice not to
pursue the matter any further in the district court foreclose any argument on appeal
that the juror was prejudiced. See id. at 804.
Finally, we consider Vinson’s argument that the jury was prejudiced against him
because correctional officers were seated behind him during trial. Vinson argued that
the officers’ placement was unnecessary because he did not pose a security risk and did
not have any “tickets” with the Department of Corrections. The district court overruled
Vinson’s objection, stating:
[The correctional officers are] here for security purposes. I will ask them to
try to remain as sort of out of the way, innocuous as possible and not to
make their presence known too much. But I defer to them with respect to
security concerns. And if this is where they think they need to be, I’m going
to allow them to stay there.

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We review the court’s decision overruling Vinson’s objection for abuse of discretion.
See Lemons v. Skidmore, 985 F.2d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 1993).
A prisoner who is a party in a civil case may be restrained “when it is ‘necessary
to maintain the security of the courtroom.’” Woods v. Thieret, 5 F.3d 244, 247 (7th Cir.
1993) (quoting United States v. Amaro, 816 F.2d 284, 285 (7th Cir. 1987)). When the
prisoner objects to the use of a security measure, the district court must balance the
need for security against the risk of prejudice to the prisoner. Id. at 247–48. While the
court has wide discretion to determine the minimal measures necessary to maintain
security, it cannot delegate the discretion to another party. Lemons, 985 F.2d at 358;
United States v. Brooks, 125 F.3d 484, 502 (7th Cir. 1997).
Here, the district court did not weigh the need for the correctional officers’
presence directly behind Vinson with the risk of prejudice. Instead, it “defer[red] to [the
correctional officers] with respect to security concerns.” But a court may not “delegate[]
the decision to the Department of Corrections employees.” Lemons, 985 F.2d at 358.
This error was harmless, however, because it did not “result in actual prejudice”
to Vinson. Id. at 359. Vinson was not physically restrained in the presence of the jury,
and although looming correctional officers can “create the [] impression of a
dangerous” prisoner, they are a preferred alternative to restraints. Stephenson v. Wilson,
619 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir. 2010). Moreover, the correctional officers’ placement directly
behind Vinson did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining the jury’s verdict.” Lemons, 985 F.2d at 359 (quoting United States v. Beasley,
809 F.2d 1273, 1280 (7th Cir. 1987)). The video evidence of the traffic stop presented at
trial corroborated the testimony of the defendant officers about the justification for their
use of force against Vinson.
3. Exhibits of Police Policies
Vinson also argues that the district court erred in excluding his proposed
evidence of the policies and procedures of the Racine Police Department. We review the
district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Arrington v. City of Chicago,
147 F.4th 691, 703 (7th Cir. 2025). The court excluded Vinson’s exhibits, explaining that
the issue at trial was whether the officers violated his constitutional rights, not whether
they violated their department’s policies. The court determined that the policies had
minimal relevance to Vinson’s claims and that any relevance was outweighed by the
chance that the policies would confuse the jury.

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The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding these exhibits. Federal
Rule of Evidence 403 provides for the exclusion of relevant evidence if the probative
value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of confusing the issues
or misleading the jury. Vinson’s claim that the officers used excessive force against him
in violation of the Fourth Amendment is “governed by constitutional principles, not
police-department regulations.” United States v. Brown, 871 F.3d 532, 536–37 (7th Cir.
2017). Vinson attempted to introduce the exhibits to show that the officers did not
comply with their department’s policies and training, but “[a]n officer’s compliance
with or deviation from departmental policy doesn’t determine whether he used
excessive force.” Id. at 537. Accordingly, the district court acted within its discretion in
concluding that the probative value of the exhibits was outweighed by the risk they
would confuse or mislead the jury about the standard for excessive-force claims.
Cf. Thompson v. City of Chicago, 472 F.3d 444, 454–55 (7th Cir. 2006).
4. Cumulative Error
The district court erred only in deferring to the correctional officers’ security
assessment that they had to be seated behind Vinson during the trial but, in this case,
we have determined that error was harmless. Accordingly, Vinson cannot show that a
collection of errors rendered his trial fundamentally unfair.
* * *
In closing, we note that Vinson waived any challenge to the district court’s entry
of summary judgment because he raised arguments about it only in his reply brief.
See White v. United States, 8 F.4th 547, 552 (7th Cir. 2021).
AFFIRMED

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