United States of America v. Jason Brown

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted November 13, 2025
Decided November 13, 2025
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Chief Judge
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2981
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JASON BROWN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:19-CR-00858(1)
Mary M. Rowland,
Judge.
O R D E R
Jason Brown pleaded guilty to crimes arising from his support for the Islamic
State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and was sentenced to 18 years in prison. Although his
plea agreement included a broad appellate waiver, Brown filed a notice of appeal. His
appointed attorney seeks to withdraw because he asserts the appeal is frivolous. Anders
v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We notified Brown of counsel’s motion to
withdraw, and he did not respond. See CIR . R. 51(b). Counsel’s brief explains the nature
of the case and raises potential issues that an appeal of this kind would be expected to
involve. Because counsel’s brief appears thorough, we limit our review to the subjects
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-2981 Page 2
counsel discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). We grant the
motion and dismiss the appeal.
In 2021, a federal grand jury returned a superseding indictment that charged
Brown with three counts of materially supporting a designated foreign terrorist
organization, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1); four counts of possessing and intentionally
distributing a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); one count of possessing a
firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); and one count of knowingly possessing a
firearm with intent to distribute a controlled substance, id. § 924(c)(1)(A). The
§ 2339B(a)(1) charges related to three cash payments of $500 that Brown made to a
confidential source to send to ISIS. As for the other charges, in 2019, Brown mailed
packages containing fentanyl and marijuana from California to a residence in Illinois
and possessed multiple firearms in furtherance of this illegal trafficking operation.
Brown entered a written plea agreement with the government in which he
pleaded guilty to one count of materially supporting a designated terrorist
organization, one count of distributing a Schedule II Controlled Substance, and one
count of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. The plea
agreement contained a broad appellate waiver, including waiving the right to appeal
his conviction and sentence. The district judge sentenced Brown to 13-year concurrent
prison terms for the terrorism and drug convictions as well as a 5-year consecutive
prison term for the § 924(c)(1)(A) conviction. The judge also imposed 5-year supervised
release terms.
In discussing potential issues to raise on appeal, counsel first confirms that
Brown wishes to contest his guilty plea. See United States v. Larry, 104 F.4th 1020, 1022
(7th Cir. 2024); United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012). Counsel
explores whether there is a nonfrivolous basis to do so under Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and we agree with him that any challenge to the plea
would be frivolous. Brown did not move to withdraw his guilty plea in the district
court, so our review would be for plain error. United States v. Davenport, 719 F.3d
616, 618 (7th Cir. 2013). A review of the plea-colloquy transcript reflects that, after
finding the defendant competent, the district judge substantially complied with Rule 11.
Brown confirmed under oath that he understood the nature of the charges against him,
the minimum and maximum penalties, the trial rights he was giving up, and how his
sentence would be calculated—and such statements under oath are presumed true. See
United States v. Smith, 989 F.3d 575, 582 (7th Cir. 2021).

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No. 24-2981 Page 3
Counsel also considers whether Brown could contest his sentence and correctly
concludes that his appellate waiver precludes such a challenge. Brown waived his right
to appeal his “conviction, any pre-trial rulings by the Court, and any part of the
sentence (or the manner in which that sentence was determined).” Because an appellate
waiver “stands or falls with the underlying agreement and plea,” and Brown’s plea is
valid, we must enforce his waiver. United States v. Nulf, 978 F.3d 504, 506 (7th Cir. 2020).
Counsel also appropriately rejects any argument that an exception to the appellate
waiver could apply: Neither Brown’s 18-year prison term nor his 5-year term of
supervised release exceeds the combined statutory maximum for the three counts, see
18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), and the district judge did not
consider any constitutionally impermissible factor at sentencing, Nulf, 978 F.3d at 506.
We therefore GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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