JOSE D. DERAS LOPEZ and SALVADOR ALAMILLA v. E. EMMERICH, Warden

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted November 13, 2025*
Decided November 13, 2025
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Chief Judge
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
Nos. 24-3195; 25-1066; 25-1095
JOSE D. DERAS LOPEZ and
SALVADOR ALAMILLA,
Petitioners-Appellants
v.
E. EMMERICH, Warden,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeals from the United States District
Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin.
No. 24-cv-369-wmc
William M. Conley,
Judge.
O R D E R
Jose D. Deras Lopez and Salvador Alamilla—who are both federal prisoners and
noncitizens subject to final orders of removal—seek relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. They
argue that a statute barring them, as noncitizens subject to final orders of removal, from
applying earned rewards from recidivism reduction programs toward early release is
* We have agreed to decide these cases without oral argument because the briefs
and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would
not significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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Nos. 24-3195; 25-1066; 25-1095 Page 2
unconstitutional. The district judge dismissed their petition, concluding that the
provision does not violate their rights to due process or equal protection. We affirm.
The First Step Act allows most prisoners who complete recidivism reduction
programs to earn various rewards. These include: additional phone and visitation
privileges, 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(1); transfer to a facility closer to their anticipated release
location, id. § 3632(d)(2); other incentives that the Bureau of Prisons may implement, id.
§ 3632(d)(3); and time credits that can be applied towards early release or placement in
prerelease custody, id. § 3632(d)(4). Noncitizen prisoners subject to a final order of
removal may earn these rewards but may not apply them toward early release or
placement in prerelease custody. Id. § 3632(d)(4)(E).
Petitioners do not dispute that they are noncitizens and that they are subject to
final orders of removal. In June 2024, they filed a joint petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
arguing that § 3632(d)(4)(E) violates their rights to equal protection by discriminating
against them based on their noncitizen status. They also contend that restricting how
they use their rewards deprives them of a protected liberty interest, thereby violating
their due process rights.
The district judge dismissed the petition. On the equal protection claim, the
judge concluded that petitioners were not members of a suspect class and the restriction
did not involve a fundamental right; thus, heightened scrutiny was not warranted. The
judge then determined that Congress had a rational basis for denying time credits to
prisoners who are subject to a final order of removal. As to due process, the judge ruled
that petitioners did not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in these time
credits and therefore could not establish a due process violation.
Petitioners appeal, and we review the district judge’s denial of their § 2241
petition de novo. See Camacho v. English, 872 F.3d 811, 813 (7th Cir. 2017). Petitioners
first challenge the district judge’s application of rational basis review instead of
heightened scrutiny on their equal protection claim. But the judge correctly applied
rational basis review because federal statutory distinctions between subclasses of
noncitizens do not burden a suspect class. See City of Chicago v. Shalala, 189 F.3d 598,
603–05 (7th Cir. 1999) (relying on Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80–86 (1976)). In Shalala,
the federal statute at issue broadly excluded noncitizens from receiving Social Security
and food stamp benefits while exempting certain subclasses, such as asylees and
refugees. Id. at 601–02. Section 3632(d)(4)(E) likewise distinguishes between subclasses
of noncitizens: noncitizen prisoners subject to final orders of removal versus all other

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Nos. 24-3195; 25-1066; 25-1095 Page 3
noncitizen prisoners. Because the statute does not burden a suspect class, the judge
correctly considered whether there is a rational basis for the statutory distinction.†
The district judge correctly concluded that there is a rational basis for denying
time credits under § 3632(d)(4)(E) to noncitizens subject to a final order of removal.
Petitioners bear the burden of establishing that there is no “reasonably conceivable state
of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” See Lopez Ramos v. Barr,
942 F.3d 376, 381 (7th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). But recidivism reduction programs
are an investment to reduce crime and help former prisoners successfully re-enter
society. Therefore, Congress had a rational basis for prioritizing the most cost-effective
programs that specifically target those returning to domestic society rather than those
who will be removed upon release. See Cheng v. United States, 132 F.4th 655, 658 (2d Cir.
2025); see also United States v. Tamayo, 162 F. App’x 813, 816 (10th Cir. 2006)
(nonprecedential).
Petitioners also challenge the district judge’s dismissal of their due process claim.
They argue that § 3632(d)(4)(C) creates a liberty interest because the statute mandates
that the Bureau “shall” transfer prisoners who have earned time credits into prerelease
custody or supervised release. They contend that § 3632(d)(4)(E) is unconstitutional
because it prevents them from applying their rewards from recidivism reduction
programs toward prerelease custody or early release, contrary to the liberty interest
created by the mandatory language of § 3632(d)(4)(C).
We see no due process violation because use of the word “shall” does not create
a liberty interest in this context, where the same statute limits the scope of its
application. As we have explained, “due process is not violated by the fact that a statute
places substantive conditions, themselves legitimate, on the availability of a particular
entitlement.” See Garcia v. INS, 7 F.3d 1320, 1326 (7th Cir. 1993). That principle applies
here: § 3632(d)(4)(E) restricts noncitizen prisoners subject to a final order of removal
from using time credits for prerelease custody or early release. The statute does not
† Petitioners’ reliance on Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), is misplaced
because the states’ authority to classify by citizenship is more circumscribed than that of
the federal government. Id. at 371–72. And that Mathews itself dealt with economic
benefits has no bearing on the analysis. We have applied Mathews in a variety of other
contexts. See, e.g., Canto v. Holder, 593 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010) (removability); United
States v. Montenegro, 231 F.3d 389, 395 (7th Cir. 2000) (criminal convictions and
sentencing).

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Nos. 24-3195; 25-1066; 25-1095 Page 4
retroactively annul rewards previously earned; it prohibits a certain class of prisoners—
those who are noncitizens and subject to a final order of removal—from using them
toward prerelease custody and early release. Petitioners remain free to participate in
recidivism reduction programs and to use earned rewards for additional phone
privileges, transfers, and other Bureau programs. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3632(d)(1), (d)(2), (d)(3),
(d)(4)(E).
Further, even if petitioners had a liberty interest in applying time credits toward
prerelease custody or early release notwithstanding their statutory ineligibility, these
interests are not absolute. Liberty interests can be taken away so long as there is
constitutionally adequate process. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978) (“Procedural
due process rules are meant to protect persons not from the deprivation, but from the
mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property.”). And petitioners do
not contend that they are not subject to final orders of removal, nor that the process for
making that determination was constitutionally inadequate. Accordingly, they cannot
prevail on this theory, and the district judge correctly dismissed their due process claim.
Last, petitioners note their constitutional challenge to § 3632(d)(4)(E) is novel,
and thus the district judge erred in dismissing it at screening instead of allowing factual
development. But for the reasons discussed, “it plainly appears from the petition … that
the petitioner[s] [are] not entitled to relief,” and no additional fact-finding would
change that outcome, so dismissal at screening was proper. See Sanders v. Radtke,
48 F.4th 502, 508–09 (7th Cir. 2022) (citing Dellenbach v. Hanks, 76 F.3d 820, 823 (7th Cir.
1996) and Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 414 (7th Cir. 1993)).
AFFIRMED

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