Emmanuel John v. John E. Petalas

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted November 13, 2025*
Decided November 13, 2025
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Chief Judge
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1452
EMMANUEL JOHN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JOHN E. PETALAS, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, Hammond Division.
No. 2:24-CV-195-TLS-APR
Theresa L. Springmann,
Judge.
O R D E R
Emmanuel John, an Indiana pastor, sought damages for two tax sales of his
church’s real property and an injunction to prevent the county officials from engaging
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 25-1452 Page 2
in allegedly discriminatory tax collection. Because an adequate state remedy exists, the
district judge dismissed the claims for lack of jurisdiction. We affirm the judgment.
John was the pastor and board president for the Christ Temple Church of God in
Christ, Inc., a nonprofit corporation. The church owned two parcels in Lake Station,
Indiana, consisting of its building and its parking lot. After the church failed to pay a
storm-water fee, Lake County initiated a tax-sale proceeding for each parcel. State
Magistrate Lisa Berdine presided over both proceedings, and a state judge adopted her
recommendations to grant the county’s request to sell the properties in 2022. John and
the church did not appeal.
Instead, about two years later, John filed a pro se complaint in federal court
against county officials and Magistrate Berdine. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that the
parcels were tax-exempt as church property and that Magistrate Berdine ignored the
state judge’s prior ruling that John says precluded the tax. He asked the district court
for damages related to the loss of property and an injunction to prevent the county from
collecting the storm-water fee from “minority cities” in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, with the county raising
jurisdictional objections and Magistrate Berdine asserting immunity. The district judge
dismissed all of John’s claims for lack of jurisdiction. First, she decided that the church
was the real party in interest and could not proceed pro se. See Rowland v. Cal. Men’s
Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 201–02 (1993). And John lacked standing to enforce the church’s
rights himself. Regardless, the judge found other jurisdictional defects based on the Tax
Injunction Act, see 28 U.S.C. § 1341; the related doctrine of comity, see Fair Assessment in
Real Est. Ass'n, Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 116 (1981); and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,
see Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Finally, she
concluded that even if the court had jurisdiction, Magistrate Berdine was immune for
her acts as a magistrate. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355–56 (1978).
On appeal, John continues to assert his own rights and the church’s rights
interchangeably. But the district judge rightly determined that the church is the real
party in interest for the bulk of his claims because the church—not John—owned both
parcels. See F ED. R. C IV. P. 17(a)(1). As a corporation, the church must appear through
counsel. See In re IFC Credit Corp., 663 F.3d 315, 318 (7th Cir. 2011). And John, as a
non-lawyer, can represent only himself to litigate his own personal claims. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1654; Georgakis v. Ill. State Univ., 722 F.3d 1075, 1077 (7th Cir. 2013).

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No. 25-1452 Page 3
It is not clear that John himself was injured by any of the defendants’ actions, but
we may address jurisdictional issues in any order. See Church Mut. Ins. Co. v. Frontier
Mgmt., LLC, 124 F.4th 1047, 1051 (7th Cir. 2025) (citing Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer,
601 U.S. 1, 4 (2023)). The district judge correctly dismissed the asserted claims even to
the extent John is the proper party to bring them.
John argues the district judge erred in viewing his case as a mere property tax
dispute instead of a case about free-exercise rights. But the district judge correctly
determined she could not reach the constitutional issue because John’s claims seek to
interfere directly with Indiana’s tax system. The Tax Injunction Act deprives federal
courts of jurisdiction to enjoin state tax collection provided that a “plain, speedy and
efficient remedy” exists in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1341; Ghelf v. Town of Wheatland,
132 F.4th 456, 466 (7th Cir. 2025). The doctrine of comity is functionally identical to the
Act, see Fair Assessment, 454 U.S. at 116 n.8, but requires the federal courts to abstain
from resolving damages claims if a “plain, adequate, and complete” remedy exists in
state court, Perry v. Coles County, 906 F.3d 583, 588 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Fair
Assessment, 454 U.S. at 116).
We have held that Indiana provides a sufficient remedy for tax disputes through
its administrative and judicial processes, each of which offers multiple levels of review.
Hay v. Ind. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 312 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 2002). John had the
opportunity to raise his constitutional defenses in state court and seek review of
Magistrate Berdine’s recommendations before the state judge who approved them, the
Indiana Court of Appeals, the Indiana Supreme Court, and even the Supreme Court of
the United States, if necessary. John does not argue that the process was inadequate and
indeed suggests that in a prior dispute the church convinced the state judge to remove
the parcels from a scheduled tax sale. His failure to take full advantage of this process
for these later sales does not allow him to challenge them in federal district court
instead. See Ghelf, 132 F.4th at 467.
Because the Tax Injunction Act and the doctrine of comity prohibit the federal
courts from considering John’s claims for damages and injunctive relief against the
county defendants and Magistrate Berdine, we cannot review John’s (or his church’s)
constitutional claims on the merits.
AFFIRMED

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