Christi Bigger v. FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of Social Security

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued April 15, 2024
Decided November 17, 2025
Before
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2514
CHRISTI BIGGER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.1
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.
No. 1:22-cv-162
Susan L. Collins,
Magistrate Judge.
O R D E R
Christi Bigger applied for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental
Security Income, alleging disability due to a learning disability, ADHD, bipolar
disorder, anxiety, depression, obsessive compulsive disorder, and chronic back pain.
An administrative law judge (ALJ) denied Bigger’s applications in January 2022. And
1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c), Commissioner of Social
Security Frank Bisignano is automatically substituted for former Commissioner Martin
J. O’Malley as Defendant-Appellee.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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the district court affirmed the ALJ’s decision. Before us, Bigger argues the ALJ erred
when it failed to expressly state the standard of proof Bigger was required to meet for
relief and subjected her to a higher standard of proof to find she did not qualify for
disability benefits. For the reasons below, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Based on the alleged disabilities described above with an onset date of August 5,
2020, Bigger filed applications for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental
Security Income. She later pushed back the onset date of her alleged disabilities by a
year, to August 5, 2019. Bigger’s two claims were denied initially and upon
reconsideration.
She then requested a hearing on her applications before an ALJ. At the hearing,
Bigger submitted medical records into evidence and the ALJ heard testimony from her
as well as from a vocation expert.
Soon thereafter, the ALJ issued a written decision denying Bigger’s applications
because he concluded that she was not disabled as defined by the relevant regulations.
In doing so, he made various findings. He first found that Bigger had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of August 5, 2019. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a), 416.920(a). To make that finding, the ALJ reviewed Bigger’s reported
earnings from 2019 to 2021 and decided she made less than each year’s minimum for
substantial gainful activity.
The ALJ then determined Bigger had the following impairments: polysubstance
abuse/stimulant abuse, cocaine abuse, borderline personality disorder, unspecified
anxiety disorder, bunions and residuals of bunionectomy, kyphotic deformity and
Scheuermann’s kyphosis (an abnormally curved spine), and “lumbar sway back
deformity/hyperlordosis.” The ALJ analyzed whether he should find Bigger disabled
per se because her impairments met or medically equaled one of the impairments listed
in 20 C.F.R. Part 404 Subpart P, Appendix 1, but he found no match. Moreover, after
thoroughly analyzing years of her medical records, the ALJ found Bigger had no more
than mild and moderate mental limitations, so he did not consider any of her mental
impairments to be a “mental disorder” under the administrative code. See 20 C.F.R. Part
404 Subpart P, App’x 1, Listings 12.06 & 12.08.
Bigger’s impairments did not resolve her disability determination, so the ALJ
proceeded to assess her residual functional capacity—her ability to work. For example,

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he found Bigger had certain physical limitations, like lifting up to 10 pounds due to a
deformity in her lumbar spine, but he found no other physical limitations given reports
of Bigger’s normal gait and use of her extremities. He concluded Bigger could perform a
limited range of sedentary work. In doing so, the ALJ tied his conclusion to detailed
descriptions of Bigger’s medical records between 2019 and 2021.
Based on Bigger’s residual functional capacity and testimony from a vocational
expert, the ALJ decided Bigger could not perform her past relevant work in the fast-
food industry but could perform other jobs. These other jobs included circuit board
assembler, address clerk, final assembler, and surveillance systems monitor. Given
these findings, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Bigger was not disabled. The
Social Security Administration’s Appeals Council denied Bigger’s request to review the
ALJ’s decision, and it thereby became the final decision of the Commissioner. Wilder v.
Kijakazi, 22 F.4th 644, 650 (7th Cir. 2022) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.981).
Bigger challenged the ALJ’s unfavorable determination in federal district court.
She requested reversal of the ALJ’s decision or remand for a new hearing because, in
her view, none of the ALJ’s findings were made by a preponderance of the evidence. As
support, Bigger pointed to the conspicuous omission of the words “preponderance of
the evidence” in the ALJ’s decision. Upon review of the ALJ’s decision, however, the
district court found the ALJ applied the appropriate preponderance standard.
Moreover, because Bigger did not challenge any specific finding by the ALJ, the district
court affirmed his decision.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Bigger revives her district court argument. Specifically, she contends
the ALJ failed to cite the applicable standard of proof in his decision. She also argues,
for the first time, that his use of the word “establish” indicates that he, in fact, applied a
higher standard of proof.
A. Standard of Review
We review the district court’s decision de novo. Gedatus v. Saul, 994 F.3d 893, 900
(7th Cir. 2021). We will affirm the Commissioner’s denial of disability benefits so long
as the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, meaning “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id.
(quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). We have described the ALJ’s

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obligation as “build[ing] an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his
conclusion.” Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 2000).
B. Analysis
An ALJ applies a “familiar five-step test” to decide whether a person is disabled
under the Social Security Act and “determines whether the parties have met their
burden by a preponderance of the evidence.” Martinez v. Kijakazi, 71 F.4th 1076, 1079
(7th Cir. 2023); see Fetting v. Kijakazi, 62 F.4th 332, 336 (7th Cir. 2023) (laying out the
steps); 20 C.F.R. § 404.953(a) (requiring an ALJ’s written decision to be supported by
“the preponderance of the evidence offered at the hearing or otherwise included in the
record”). A preponderance of the evidence exists where “such relevant evidence … as a
whole shows that the existence of the fact to be proven is more likely than not.” 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.901, 416.1401. Bigger presses us to reverse the ALJ’s decision because he
omitted stating that relevant standard of proof in his decision.
Social security ALJs face “extraordinary demands,” however, and we subject
them “to only the most minimal of articulation requirements.” Warnell v. O’Malley, 97
F.4th 1050, 1053 (7th Cir. 2024). We simply require them to explain “how the evidence
leads to their conclusions” in enough detail for us to assess the validity of their ultimate
findings and to provide the appellant with a meaningful opportunity for judicial
review. Id. at 1054. Accordingly, while an ALJ’s “decision” must be “based on the
preponderance of the evidence,” we have emphasized that the law does not require
“the ALJ expressly state” so. Martinez, 71 F.4th at 1079 n.2.
In other words, our precedent focuses on the “substance” of the ALJ’s decision
“and not [its] form.” Warnell, 97 F.4th at 1053. While the ALJ did not explicitly refer to
the preponderance of the evidence standard in his decision here, he did not have to do
so to pass muster. He needed only to provide a sufficient explanation of his factual
findings and his conclusions to permit judicial review. The substance of the ALJ’s
decision systematically analyzing Bigger’s claims based on her medical records and the
testimony he heard at the hearing shows he did just that.
Bigger also claims the ALJ’s framing that she failed to “establish” certain claims
in his decision implies he required her to meet an impermissible higher standard of
proof. Relying on certain definitions, she claims the word “establish” suggests a level of
certainty exceeding preponderance of the evidence. For one, Bigger waived this
argument by failing to present it below. See Bradley v. Vill. of Univ. Park, 59 F.4th 887, 897
(7th Cir. 2023). For another, the word, “establish” is not tied to any one standard of

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proof. E.g., Erdman v. City of Madison, 91 F.4th 465, 476 (7th Cir. 2024) (“establish by a
preponderance of the evidence”); NLRB v. Haven Salon + Spa, Inc., 60 F.4th 1058, 1060
(7th Cir. 2023) (“establishes by clear and convincing evidence”); United States v. Jones, 79
F.4th 844, 852 (7th Cir. 2023) (“establish beyond a reasonable doubt”). Left without
more, “given the context,” the ALJ’s reasoning that Bigger failed to establish her claims
was “a polite way to say the weight of the evidence did not support” them. Gedatus, 994
F.3d at 900.
III. CONCLUSION
Bigger does not challenge any of the ALJ’s specific findings or conclusions as
being unsupported by substantial evidence or resting on legal error, see Gedatus, 994
F.3d at 900, and after our own review of the record, we conclude the ALJ provided a
sufficient logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusions under the proper
standard. We have considered Bigger’s other arguments and find them unpersuasive.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

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