United States of America v. Leontis Cornelius

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued November 18, 2025
Decided November 21, 2025
Before
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1411
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
LEONTIS CORNELIUS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, South Bend Division.
No. 3:21CR090-001
Jon E. DeGuilio,
Judge.
O R D E R
A jury found Leontis Cornelius guilty of two counts of possessing a firearm as a
felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and the district court sentenced him to 97 months’
imprisonment. On appeal, Cornelius argues that the court improperly increased his
offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines based on its own finding that he
possessed a firearm in connection with another felony offense, rather than having a jury
resolve that dispute. He also argues that the court clearly erred in rejecting his
self-defense argument regarding that other felony offense. Because the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments do not require a jury to find facts relevant to advisory guidelines
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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calculations and the court did not clearly err in assessing Cornelius’s self-defense
argument, we affirm.
Background
In May 2020, police officers responded to reports of gunfire in South Bend,
Indiana, and spoke to Cornelius at the scene. Cornelius reported that unknown
assailants drove by his house, exited their vehicle, and opened fire. The officers
observed damage to several parked cars and a bullet hole in the side of the house.
Cornelius admitted that he returned fire, using his sister-in-law’s .45 caliber handgun.
The assailants then returned to their vehicle and drove away, while Cornelius
continued firing and shattered their vehicle’s windows.
A few days later, a detective collected the .45 caliber handgun, which was
consistent with the shell casings found at the scene and confirmed Cornelius’s account.
The detective’s criminal history check, however, revealed that Cornelius had multiple
felony convictions.
A year later, a different group of officers responded to a domestic disturbance
call, where they observed Cornelius in possession of a loaded rifle.
A grand jury indicted Cornelius on two counts of unlawful firearm possession as
a felon. The grand jury soon returned a superseding indictment further alleging that
Cornelius had three prior convictions supporting an enhanced sentence under 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e). Although Cornelius testified that he handled the firearms during both
incidents only for self defense, a jury found him guilty of both counts in May 2023.
Notably, Cornelius’s jury was not asked to find whether his prior felony convictions
occurred on separate occasions.
Because Cornelius’s offenses were committed before the 2022 amendments to
18 U.S.C. § 924, his convictions each carried a maximum sentence of up to ten years’
imprisonment by default. Id. § 924(a)(2) (2021). But if a defendant has three prior
convictions for a “violent felony” or “serious drug offense” that were “committed on
occasions different from one another,” that defendant faces a minimum sentence of 15
years and a maximum of life imprisonment. Id. § 924(e)(1). In Erlinger v. United States,
602 U.S. 821, 825 (2024), the Supreme Court held that for the longer sentence to apply,
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require that a jury determine whether the prior
offenses were, in fact, committed on different occasions. Because the jury was not asked

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No. 25-1411 Page 3
to make that finding here, the parties agreed that the court could impose sentences only
up to ten years’ imprisonment for each count.
Before sentencing, the probation office prepared a presentence investigation
report and recommended increasing Cornelius’s offense level by four levels under
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (2024) because Cornelius possessed the handgun during the
May 2020 incident in connection with another felony offense: criminal recklessness
under Indiana law. See I ND. C ODE § 35-42-2-2(b). Cornelius objected on two grounds.
First, he argued that he acted in self defense, so the court could not find he committed
criminal recklessness. Second, he contended that Erlinger requires a jury—not the
court—to find he committed criminal recklessness beyond a reasonable doubt before
the court could increase his offense level and therefore his guidelines range.
The district court rejected both arguments. Concerning the self-defense
argument, the court accepted Cornelius’s version of events but found that although he
may have initially acted in self defense, once the assailants fled the scene in their
vehicle, Cornelius was no longer defending himself when he continued firing
recklessly. Regarding Erlinger, the court explained that because the increase in his
offense level did not increase a statutory minimum or maximum sentence, the jury right
was not implicated. The court then imposed concurrent prison terms of 97 months, a
sentence at the bottom of his enhanced guidelines range.
Analysis
Cornelius renews his challenges to the § 2K2.1(b)(6) enhancement on appeal. We
review the district court’s factual findings at sentencing for clear error but review de
novo whether those findings “adequately support the imposition of the enhancement.”
United States v. Barker, 80 F.4th 827, 834 (7th Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Brown,
843 F.3d 738, 742 (7th Cir. 2016)).
Cornelius first maintains that under Erlinger, a jury must find him guilty of
violating Indiana’s criminal recklessness law before the court can increase his advisory
guidelines range. This theory fundamentally misunderstands the jury right. See United
States v. Miedzianowski, 60 F.4th 1051, 1057 (7th Cir. 2023). In Erlinger and its
antecedents, the Supreme Court held that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require a
jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt any fact that increases a defendant’s statutory
minimum or maximum sentence. Erlinger, 602 U.S. at 834, 838; see also Alleyne v. United
States, 570 U.S. 99, 111–16 (2013); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). But
ever since the Supreme Court rendered the Sentencing Guidelines advisory in United

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States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the calculation of the offense level does not change
the minimum or maximum sentence. Instead, it merely guides the court’s discretion in
choosing a sentence within the range, and the judge remains the one who finds the facts
relevant to that determination. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481; Miedzianowski, 60 F.4th at
1057.
Here, Cornelius faced a statutory maximum of ten years in prison (with no
minimum) because the jury found him guilty of only possessing the firearms as a felon.
18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g), 924(a)(2) (2021). And regardless of the offense-level adjustment to
his advisory guidelines range, Cornelius’s statutory maximum did not change. Thus,
neither § 924 nor the Fifth or Sixth Amendments require that the jury find him guilty of
criminal recklessness beyond a reasonable doubt before the district court applied the
applicable sentencing-guidelines enhancement. Instead, the court needed only to find
that he engaged in conduct constituting criminal recklessness related to his possessing
the firearm, and that this conduct warranted a longer sentence for that possession within
the range of zero to ten years established by the jury’s verdict. See United States v.
Holton, 873 F.3d 589, 591–92 (7th Cir. 2017).
The district court also did not clearly err in finding that Cornelius’s conduct
amounted to criminal recklessness as defined by Indiana law. Cornelius argues that the
district court misplaced the burden of proof. But the court correctly recognized that it
was the government’s burden to disprove Cornelius’s self-defense argument before
applying the four-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).
To prevail on a self-defense argument, Cornelius had to show that: (1) he was
lawfully present; (2) he did not provoke or participate in the violence; and (3) he
reasonably feared death or serious harm. See Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 800
(Ind. 2002) (citing I ND. C ODE § 35–41–3–2). If Cornelius met this showing, the
government had to disprove at least one element. Id. Because these findings were made
for purposes of choosing a sentence, and not to establish guilt, the court needed to find
this conduct by only a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Watts,
519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997); United States v. Sandidge, 784 F.3d 1055, 1062 (7th Cir. 2015).
Although Cornelius introduced evidence on all three elements, the district court
properly reviewed the evidence and found that the government successfully negated
the third element—reasonable fear—by a preponderance of the evidence. One fact is
dispositive: Cornelius admitted to officers and at trial that he continued firing at the
assailants as they drove away. And in Wilson, the Supreme Court of Indiana upheld a
conviction where the defendant continued shooting after the threat had subsided

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because the defendant’s reasonable fear had ended in that moment. 770 N.E.2d at 801.
The same reasoning applies here: once the assailants retreated, the district court
permissibly found that Cornelius no longer reasonably feared death or serious harm
and so was not acting in self defense.
AFFIRMED

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