United States of America v. James A. Cohen

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-1746
U NITED STATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JAMES A. C OHEN ,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 24-CR-00437 — Lindsay C. Jenkins, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED SEPTEMBER 5, 2025 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 24, 2025
____________________
Before ST. EVE, J ACKSON -A KIWUMI , and LEE, Circuit Judges.
ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. James A. Cohen accepted payments
in exchange for falsely representing that a registered sex of-
fender lived at his address. After he was charged for making
that representation to United States marshals, Cohen pleaded
guilty to knowingly and willfully making a materially false
statement in a matter within the jurisdiction of the United
States. The district court sentenced Cohen to 21 months’ im-
prisonment. Cohen appeals, contending the district court

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2 No. 25-1746
improperly used a sentencing guideline applicable where the
matter relates to “sex offenses” under named laws. We affirm.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
By August 2016, James Cohen began accepting monthly
payments of around $235 to help a person—pseudonymously
named Individual A—conceal his true residential address
from authorities. In exchange for the payments, Cohen per-
mitted Individual A to falsely represent Cohen’s residence as
his residential address to sex offender registration authorities.
Cohen also agreed to represent that Individual A resided with
him if questioned by authorities during compliance checks.
Cohen knew that Individual A had been convicted of a sex
offense and was obligated to register his place of residence as
a sex offender.
In May 2023, the United States Marshals Service began in-
vestigating Individual A’s compliance with sex offender reg-
istration requirements. As part of the investigation, a United
States marshal visited Cohen’s residence. The marshal in-
formed Cohen he was there to investigate Individual A’s com-
pliance with registration requirements. The marshal also in-
formed Cohen of the legal consequences of making a false
statement. Undeterred, Cohen told the marshal that Individ-
ual A resided with him and had rented a room since Septem-
ber 2020. Cohen knew this was false, as Individual A had
never resided with him.
B. Procedural History
Cohen was charged in an information with knowingly and
willfully making a materially false statement in a matter
within the jurisdiction of the executive branch of the United

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No. 25-1746 3
States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). Although the pen-
alty is generally up to five years’ imprisonment, the maxi-
mum term rises to eight years “[i]f the matter relates to an of-
fense under chapter … 109B.” 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a). The only
statute under chapter 109B, 18 U.S.C. § 2250, criminalizes fail-
ing to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Noti-
fication Act.
Cohen entered into a plea agreement. In that agreement,
Cohen admitted he was pleading guilty to an offense with a
maximum sentence of eight years’ imprisonment. The agree-
ment further provided that the base offense level was 14 un-
der U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(a), and that this level increases four levels
pursuant to § 2J1.2(b)(1)(A) because “the matter relates to a
sex offense under chapter 109B of Title 18, United States
Code.”
Cohen’s plea agreement resulted in a Guidelines range of
21 to 27 months’ imprisonment. Cohen and the government
acknowledged, however, that the Guidelines calculations
were nonbinding.
Prior to sentencing, the Probation Department and the
government both recommended a sentence within the Guide-
lines range set forth in the plea agreement: 21 to 27 months’
imprisonment. In his sentencing memorandum, Cohen pro-
vided three objections to this sentence. First, guideline § 2J1.2
should not apply because Cohen’s “offense does not consti-
tute a sex offense under federal law.” Second, application of
the four-level increase under § 2J1.2(b)(1)(A) on top of the
base offense level of 14 under § 2J1.2(a) constitutes “improper
double enhancement” because the application of § 2J1.2(a)
and subsection (b)(1)(A) turn on the same criteria. And third,
applying § 2J1.2 violates Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466

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4 No. 25-1746
(2000), by increasing the statutory maximum from five to
eight years without decision by a jury.
At his sentencing hearing, Cohen’s counsel withdrew the
second and third objections. As for the second objection, Co-
hen’s counsel stated:
May I also say just in advance that defendant is no
longer disputing the enhanced offense of four points—
the specific Offense Level of four points based on the
Seventh Circuit—based on a Seventh Circuit ruling.
The district court later asked if Cohen maintained his third,
Apprendi-based objection. Defense counsel responded, “No,
your Honor. We withdraw that.”
The court overruled Cohen’s first objection, finding that
§ 2J1.2 applied. The court subsequently determined that Co-
hen’s Guidelines range was 21 to 27 months’ imprisonment,
and sentenced him to 21 months in prison.
II. Discussion
As with other procedural challenges, we review claims of
miscalculated Guidelines de novo. See United States v. Feeney,
100 F.4th 841, 844 (7th Cir. 2024). If a defendant forfeits his
claim by “accidentally or negligently” failing to object to an
erroneous Guidelines range, we review for plain error. United
States v. Castaneda, 77 F.4th 611, 614 (7th Cir. 2023). “Waiver
occurs when a defendant intends, as a strategic matter, to re-
linquish a known right.” United States v. Pankow, 884 F.3d 785,
790 (7th Cir. 2018). A finding of “[w]aiver precludes appellate
review.” Id.
Cohen brings three arguments on appeal. First, his state-
ment in a matter relating to an offense under chapter 109B—

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No. 25-1746 5
failure to register—warrants the lower guideline of § 2B1.1 in-
stead of § 2J1.2 because failure to register is not a sex offense.
Second, § 2J1.2 can only apply if Cohen’s false statement re-
lates to his own failure to register. Third, Cohen’s information
did not allege he had the mens rea required for the eight-year
maximum, as required under Apprendi. We address each ar-
gument in turn.
A. “Sex Offenses” as a Limiting Term
We begin with Cohen’s argument that the district court in-
correctly applied guideline § 2J1.2. Under the Sentencing
Guidelines, § 2J1.2 applies to convictions under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001 where “the matter relates … to sex offenses under 18
U.S.C. § 1591 or chapters 109A, 109B, 110, 117 of title 18,
United States Code.” U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2 comment. (statutory
provisions); U.S.S.G. App. A.1 Cohen does not dispute that his
false statement was in a matter relating to an offense under
chapter 109B: that chapter contains only one statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2250, entitled “[f]ailure to register” and criminalizing failing
to register pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration and No-
tification Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250. Cohen claims that failure
to register is not a “sex offense.” Therefore, he argues there
was no sex offense for the “matter” involving his false state-
ment to “relate[] to.” This error, Cohen asserts, requires resen-
tencing under § 2B1.1, which would otherwise apply.
We first must decide whether, as the government con-
tends, Cohen waived this argument because his plea agree-
ment provided that the matter “relate[d] to an offense under
1 Cohen’s argument assumes that the descriptor, “sex offenses,” ap-
plies to chapter 109B. We need not assess this claim because we reject Co-
hen’s argument on other grounds.

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6 No. 25-1746
chapter 109B of Title 18,” and consequently noted that § 2J1.2
applied. He did not. The plea agreement described the Guide-
lines calculations as “preliminary,” “non-binding predictions
upon which neither party is entitled to rely,” and provided
that either party could seek to correct errors in applying or
interpreting the Sentencing Guidelines. Cohen exercised this
right by timely raising a challenge to the interpretation of the
Guidelines at sentencing. In doing so, Cohen preserved ap-
pellate review.
The government correctly points out that a defendant
might waive through a plea agreement the right to contest
facts that justify the application of certain guidelines. See
United States v. Scott, 657 F.3d 639, 640 (7th Cir. 2011). In such
cases, the distinction between factual admissions and a “legal
designation” can be “illusory.” United States v. Issa, 21 F.4th
504, 509 (7th Cir. 2021). But our precedent has distinguished
such cases from “an error in interpretation” of the Guidelines,
see United States v. Martinez, 122 F.3d 421, 422 (7th Cir. 1997),
which, when raised at sentencing, preserves an argument. See
United States v. Chagoya-Morales, 859 F.3d 411, 415–16, 421–22
(7th Cir. 2017). This is a more appropriate characterization of
Cohen’s argument. Cohen does not attempt to backpedal any
factual admissions. Nor did Cohen waive his argument by
failing to timely raise it below. See United States v. Fuentes, 858
F.3d 1119, 1121 (7th Cir. 2017).
We also reject the government’s assertion that Cohen for-
feited his argument. Defense counsel preserved the objection
by arguing below that Cohen’s statement concerned registra-
tion rather than sexual conduct.
With waiver and forfeiture aside, we now turn to the mer-
its of Cohen’s argument. Cohen begins by attempting to show

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No. 25-1746 7
that failing to register cannot constitute a sex offense, but Co-
hen faces an initial hurdle under the plain text of the guide-
line. The Guidelines instruct courts to apply § 2J1.2 where
“the matter relates … to sex offenses under chapter[] … 109B.”
U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2 comment. (statutory provisions); U.S.S.G.
App. A. The only statute within chapter 109B is 18 U.S.C.
§ 2250, “[f]ailure to register,” the offense to which Cohen ad-
mits the matter underlying his false statement relates. If, as
Cohen suggests, failure to register is not a sex offense, then
the Guidelines’ reference to chapter 109B is empty. “The ‘car-
dinal principle’ of textual interpretation is to ‘give effect, if
possible, to every clause and word’ of the text.” United States
v. Feeney, 100 F.4th 841, 845 (7th Cir. 2024) (quoting Loughrin
v. United States, 573 U.S. 351, 358 (2014)). In this sense, the
plain text of the Sentencing Guidelines supports the applica-
tion of § 2J1.2 to Cohen.
Cohen attempts to overcome this hurdle by pointing to the
statutory prohibition in 18 U.S.C. § 2250(d) within chapter
109B. While § 2250(a) criminalizes failing to register on its
own, § 2250(d) prohibits committing a “crime of violence” af-
ter failing to register. The possibility that a “crime of violence”
under § 2250(d) could constitute a sex offense, according to
Cohen, rebuts the proposition that his interpretation renders
the Guidelines’ reference to chapter 109B empty. Cohen there-
fore asks us to assess each conviction to determine whether it
qualifies as a sex offense or a non-sex offense. Cohen does not,
however, supply a standard to distinguish between sex of-
fenses and non-sex offenses.
Although Cohen points to a litany of definitions of “sex
offenses” not referencing registration, none of these defini-
tions apply to § 2J1.2. In fact, the flexibility of “sex offenses”

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8 No. 25-1746
favors consulting the immediate context. See United States v.
Hansen, 599 U.S. 762, 776 (2023) (“[A] word capable of many
meanings is refined by its neighbors ….” (citing Dubin v.
United States, 599 U.S. 110, 124–25 (2023))). So, the best place
to look for a definition of a sex offense for the purposes of ap-
plying § 2J1.2 is § 2J1.2 itself, which refers to chapter 109B in
its entirety.
We also note that, even accepting Cohen’s reading, the lan-
guage merely requires that the matter “relates to” sex of-
fenses—not that the matter qualify as a sex offense itself. In
this context, mere “relat[ion] to” sex offenses broadens the
scope of matters that may qualify for the application of § 2J1.2.
The Supreme Court has described “relate to” as “expansive”
and noted that the phrase is used “to reach any subject that
has ‘a connection with, or reference to,’ the topics the statute
enumerates.” Coventry Health Care of Mo., Inc. v. Nevils, 581
U.S. 87, 95–96 (2017) (quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992)); see also Lamar, Archer & Cofrin,
LLP v. Appling, 584 U.S. 709 (2018); United States v. Kraemer,
933 F.3d 675, 679–80 (7th Cir. 2019). Failure to register under
the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act readily
bears a connection to sex offenses, and Cohen does not per-
suade us otherwise.
Cohen’s false statement was in a matter relating to failing
to register as a sex offender under chapter 109B, which § 2J1.2
plainly embraces. Therefore, the district court did not err in
applying § 2J1.2 to Cohen.
B. Relationship of Statement to Sex Offense
Cohen also argues that § 2J1.2 requires the false statement
pertain to the defendant’s own sex offense. Cohen did not

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No. 25-1746 9
make this objection in the district court, so he has forfeited it.
See Castaneda, 77 F.4th at 614. We therefore review for plain
error.
“To establish eligibility for plain-error relief, a defendant
must satisfy three threshold requirements: (1) there must be
an error; (2) the error must be plain; and (3) the error must
affect ‘substantial rights,’ which generally means that there
must be a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different.”
United States v. Page, 123 F.4th 851, 864 (7th Cir. 2024) (en banc)
(citation modified). If the defendant meets his burden on all
three elements, the court confronts a fourth, discretionary el-
ement by which it grants relief only if “the error had a serious
effect on ‘the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.’” Id. (quoting Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503,
508 (2021)).
Cohen cannot proceed beyond the first two elements.
First, Cohen points to no support for his claim in the operative
text. Second, he provides no caselaw indicating that it is erro-
neous for a court to apply § 2J1.2 when the matter does not
relate to a defendant’s own sex offense. This is important be-
cause “[o]n plain error review, we cannot grant relief ‘unless
the error is clear under current law.’” United States v. McClel-
lan, 794 F.3d 743, 755 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v.
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993)).2
2 Cohen’s argument that we should apply the rule of lenity given am-
biguous language in the Sentencing Guidelines fails because Cohen does
not identify ambiguity through either of his first two arguments. See
United States v. Tinsley, 62 F.4th 376, 390 n.8 (7th Cir. 2023).

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10 No. 25-1746
C. Alleged Apprendi Violation
Cohen’s third challenge is that § 2J1.2 does not apply be-
cause the information did not allege his knowledge that the
matter being investigated related to a sex offense. Specifically,
he claims that the statutory enhancement for false statements
in a matter relating to offenses under chapter 109B carries an
additional mens rea requirement under Apprendi, 530 U.S. at
490. According to Cohen, the information’s failure to allege
his mens rea with respect to the eight-year maximum means
it has failed to state such an offense so as to render Cohen in-
eligible for § 2J1.2.
We need not address this claim because Cohen has waived
it. Cohen’s counsel affirmatively withdrew this argument be-
fore the district court. That decision is a hallmark of knowing
and voluntary waiver. See United States v. Young, 908 F.3d 241,
247 (7th Cir. 2018). Cohen also waived his right to challenge
the validity of the information by pleading guilty. See Grzegor-
czyk v. United States, 997 F.3d 743, 749 (7th Cir. 2021); United
States v. Grayson Enters., Inc., 950 F.3d 386, 402 (7th Cir. 2020).
* * *
The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.

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