United States of America v. Donald R. Felton

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-1352
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DONALD R. F ELTON ,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Central District of Illinois.
No. 19-cr-30035 — Sara Darrow, Chief Judge.
____________________
A RGUED A PRIL 16, 2024 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 25, 2025
____________________
Before S T. EVE, JACKSON -A KIWUMI , and PRYOR , Circuit
Judges.
PRYOR , Circuit Judge. On June 2, 2022, a jury found Donald
Felton guilty of possessing with intent to distribute fifty
grams or more of methamphetamine. See 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii). The district court sentenced Felton
to 240 months’ imprisonment followed by ten years of super-
vised release. Felton does not appeal any aspect of his jury
trial, but he challenges the district court’s denial of his motion

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2 No. 23-1352
to suppress and in the alternative for a Franks hearing. For the
reasons stated below, we reverse the denial of Felton’s motion
to suppress and remand for an evidentiary hearing under
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
1. Investigation
On May 21, 2019, two law enforcement officers inter-
viewed a confidential source. The confidential source told the
officers that Donald Felton had made several trips to St. Louis,
Missouri, to purchase methamphetamine for resale in Taylor-
ville, Illinois. The confidential source informed the officers
that Felton would be making another run soon. According to
the confidential source, Felton would be driving a white SUV
belonging to his girlfriend, Kourtneigh Oats. The confidential
source also told the officers that Felton had been pulled over
on a similar drug run about two weeks earlier. During that
encounter, according to the confidential source, police found
a “starter pistol” in the vehicle, after which Felton abandoned
his trip to St. Louis. The confidential source indicated Felton
would purchase two to three ounces of methamphetamine on
each trip.
After the interview, Inspector Sheriff Jeffrey Brown, as-
signed to the Illinois State Police, Central Illinois Enforcement
Group, set out to corroborate the confidential source’s infor-
mation.1 Inspector Brown was already familiar with Felton
1 Brown is a deputy sheriff with the Christian County (Illinois) Sheriff’s
Office and holds the rank of Inspector with the Central Illinois Enforce-
ment Group.

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No. 23-1352 3
because, in April 2017, he had arrested and charged Felton
with drug possession after finding methamphetamine and
drug paraphernalia in the home Felton shared with Oats. In-
spector Brown also knew that Oats had a white Mazda SUV
because on May 16, 2019—days before the informant’s inter-
view—Inspector Brown drove past Felton’s home and ob-
served the vehicle in the driveway. It was registered to Oats.
To further corroborate the source’s information, Inspector
Brown pulled police department records from April 21, 2019.
According to this documentation, at around 10:45 p.m. on
April 21, 2019, Deputy Goebel encountered Felton in a car reg-
istered to Kourtneigh Oats on Illinois Route 48.
On May 22, 2019, Inspector Brown spoke with Deputy
Goebel, who confirmed the April report. Deputy Goebel also
stated that he saw a “handgun which only shot blanks” and a
“wad” of cash he estimated to be around $2,000 in the vehicle
(though he did not count the bills himself). According to Dep-
uty Goebel, Felton claimed to be traveling to Mattoon, Illinois,
and the money was to purchase a smoker.
2. Affidavit and Search Warrant
Relying on this information, Inspector Brown presented
an affidavit in support of a search warrant to Judge Brad Pais-
ley of the Circuit Court of Christian County, Illinois. The
judge issued the warrant and authorized the police to install
an electronic tracking device on the white Mazda SUV. The
affidavit outlined the facts provided by the confidential
source, Inspector Brown’s corroborative efforts, and Felton’s
criminal history. The affidavit mentioned tersely that the con-
fidential source had “provided information which has proven

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4 No. 23-1352
to be reliable on a number of occasions” and that the source
“has a criminal history with a felony conviction for burglary.”
But the affidavit omitted key details concerning the confi-
dential source’s credibility. Critically, the affidavit did not
mention that the confidential source was paid $345 for his in-
formation concerning Felton; nor did it explain that, since
2013, the source had been cooperating with law enforcement
in exchange for consideration in his pending cases and those
of his friends. The affidavit also did not explain that at the
time of the confidential source’s interview concerning Felton,
law enforcement had discovered suspected methampheta-
mine in the source’s residence, and that the source may have
believed that he would not be charged if he continued to assist
in the Felton investigation. The affidavit also omitted addi-
tional details about the source’s criminal history, including
his eight arrests and four convictions for driving with a sus-
pended license, one arrest for resisting arrest, one conviction
for interfering with judicial proceedings, and one conviction
for assault. The confidential source also had a pending pos-
session of methamphetamine charge, which was not dis-
closed in the affidavit.
Without this additional information, Christian County
Judge Paisley issued the search warrant and authorized the
installation of the surveillance tracking device on May 23,
2019.
Inspector Brown located the Mazda SUV in Felton’s drive-
way and installed the tracking device on June 5, 2019. Three
days later, the device alerted Inspector Brown that the Mazda
had left Taylorville and was heading southwest on Route 48
toward St. Louis. When the Mazda returned to Christian
County, Inspector Brown arranged for a traffic stop—with the

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No. 23-1352 5
Taylorville K-9 unit assisting—because the vehicle’s front li-
cense plate was missing. Officers initiated the stop and Felton
was driving. During the traffic stop, the K-9 alerted to the
presence of drugs in the Mazda. A search of the vehicle by law
enforcement revealed a plastic bag filled with a substance that
later tested positive for methamphetamine.
B. Procedural Background
On July 9, 2019, a federal grand jury indicted Felton for
possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(A)(viii). Felton moved to suppress the drugs retrieved
from the Mazda, arguing that the search warrant was insuffi-
cient to support probable cause because it failed to disclose
information about the confidential source’s credibility. He
also maintained that the good faith exception under United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) did not apply. In the alterna-
tive, Felton requested a Franks hearing to determine whether
Inspector Brown intentionally or recklessly included materi-
ally false statements or omitted material information from the
warrant affidavit.
The district court denied Felton’s motion to suppress and
his request for a Franks hearing. Although the government
conceded that the affidavit should have included more details
about the informant’s credibility, the district court concluded
that the confidential source’s information was sufficiently de-
tailed as to Felton’s criminal activity and this information was
corroborated by law enforcement. A Franks hearing was not
warranted in the district court’s view because Felton had
failed to make a substantial preliminary showing “that any
falsehood or omission regarding the nature of the April 2019

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6 No. 23-1352
encounter was material to Judge Paisley’s finding of probable
cause.”2 Felton appeals.
II. A NALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
For a motion to suppress, “we review legal conclusions de
novo and factual findings for clear error.” United States v.
Glover, 755 F.3d 811, 815 (7th Cir. 2014). Similarly, we review
a district court’s decision on whether to order a Franks hearing
for clear error, but we review de novo any legal determina-
tions that factored into that decision. United States v. Bell, 925
F.3d 362, 372 (7th Cir. 2019).
B. Legal Background
The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable
searches.” U.S. C ONST. amend. IV. Warrantless searches are
“per se unreasonable … subject only to a few specifically es-
tablished and well-delineated exceptions.” Arizona v. Gant,
556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357 (1967)). Installing a tracking device on a vehicle is a
2 Felton also argued that suppression was warranted because the officers
failed to install the tracking device within ninety-six hours of the warrant’s
issuance, in violation of Illinois law, 725 I LL . C OMP . S TAT. 5/108-6, or within
ten days, in violation of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, FED . R.
C RIM. P. 41(e)(2)(C)(i). But “foibles in the administration of Rule 41” are
not grounds for suppression under the Fourth Amendment. United States
v. Trost, 152 F.3d 715, 722 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Hornick,
815 F.2d 1156, 1158 (7th Cir. 1987)). Neither are violations of state law.
United States v. Brewer, 915 F.3d 408, 414 (7th Cir. 2019) (“If … law enforce-
ment executes a state-issued warrant beyond the limits of state law, the
search may nevertheless comply with the Fourth Amendment.”); Virginia
v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 168, 178 (2008). For these reasons, we will not ad-
dress this argument further.

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No. 23-1352 7
search, United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012), so offic-
ers must obtain a search warrant before installing such a de-
vice. Search warrants must be supported by probable cause,
which exists “if there is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” United
States v. Hueston, 90 F.4th 897, 902 (7th Cir. 2024) (citation
omitted). We give great deference to an issuing judge’s prob-
able cause determination. Glover, 755 F.3d at 816 (citing Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983)).
C. Probable Cause for the Search Warrant
As is the case here, when a warrant affidavit relies primar-
ily on the reports of a confidential source, the existence of
probable cause is based on the totality of the circumstances.
Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. We have identified five primary factors,
along with other pertinent concerns, that inform this inquiry:
(1) the level of detail the informant provided; (2) the extent of
the informant’s firsthand knowledge; (3) the degree to which
the information has been corroborated; (4) the time between
the events reported and the warrant application; and
(5) whether the informant appeared before the magistrate
judge. Bell, 925 F.3d at 371 (citing United States v. Musgraves,
831 F.3d 454, 460 (7th Cir. 2016)).
None of the aforementioned factors, however, are dispos-
itive. Instead, “the issuing judge must make a practical, com-
monsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set
forth in the affidavit before him, including the veracity and
basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay infor-
mation, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence
of a crime will be found in a particular place.” United States v.
Bell, 585 F.3d 1045, 1049 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations
omitted) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238).

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8 No. 23-1352
Felton argues that Inspector Brown’s affidavit provided
an insufficient basis for the warrant because it (1) rested al-
most entirely on the word of a source who provided no details
about his relationship with Felton, (2) lacked detail of the
source’s relationship with Felton, (3) provided no basis for the
source’s knowledge of Felton’s drug deals, and (4) was not
supplemented by testimony from the source to the issuing
judge. Felton also contends Inspector Brown’s efforts at cor-
roboration were insufficient because he failed to tie Felton to
any ongoing criminal drug activity. In the alternative, Felton
argues his case should be remanded for a Franks hearing be-
cause the affidavit omitted material information concerning
the credibility of the confidential source.
The government responds that the inclusion of details
about the vehicle Felton was driving, the amount of metham-
phetamine he typically purchases, and the information In-
spector Brown corroborated with Deputy Goebel about the
April 2019 encounter and Felton’s criminal history were suf-
ficient to support probable cause for the warrant and obviated
the need for a Franks hearing.
Here, the only evidence tying Felton to any contemporary
drug activity was the source’s uncorroborated tip. Though the
source’s general description of Felton’s April 2019 encounter
with police was correct, that incident itself was not indicative
of drug activity. Deputy Goebel did not find any drugs or wit-
ness a controlled buy during the April 2019 encounter. In-
stead, the only details revealed by that encounter were the un-
counted “wad” of cash, a lookalike firearm, and Felton’s ex-
planation for where he was going. But those facts on their
own do not corroborate the confidential source’s specific con-
tention that Felton was driving to St. Louis to obtain

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No. 23-1352 9
methamphetamine. Those details from the April 2019 encoun-
ter—when viewed independently from context provided by
the confidential source—do not necessarily bear any connec-
tion to contemporaneous drug distribution. So any sugges-
tion that Felton might have been on a drug run in the weeks
leading up to the state judge’s May 2019 probable cause de-
termination is meager at best. See United States v. Clark, 935
F.3d 558, 566 (7th Cir. 2019). The affidavit also fails to explain
how the confidential source acquired firsthand knowledge of
Felton’s suspected recent drug activity. See United States v.
Garcia, 528 F.3d 481, 486 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding that the affi-
davit established probable cause because it specifically stated,
among other things, that the source had been inside the de-
fendant’s apartment, observed what he believed to be cocaine,
and believed it was cocaine because he had been involved in
selling cocaine in the past). And Inspector Brown’s general
knowledge of Felton’s prior criminal history does not add
much to the equation, as one’s status as a convicted felon “is
not itself indicative of criminal activity.” Glover, 755 F.3d at
817; compare Clark, 935 F.3d at 565–66 (finding similarly mini-
mal corroborative efforts too weak to stave off a Franks hear-
ing), with United States v. Woodfork, 999 F.3d 511, 516–17 (7th
Cir. 2021) (finding officers’ independent investigation, includ-
ing four controlled buys, sufficient to overcome any omitted
information about a source).
So, the affidavit rested almost entirely on the word of a
source. Yet, the affidavit reflects no details about the source’s
relationship with Felton or firsthand knowledge of any drug
activity. Nor did the confidential source in this case testify be-
fore the judge. This minimal corroboration is especially prob-
lematic because the issuing judge knew next to nothing about
the confidential source. Without more information about the

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10 No. 23-1352
source’s own extensive criminal history, relationship to Fel-
ton, potential for bias, and receipt of favors and payments in
exchange for cooperation, the judge could not fairly conclude
that the information provided by the source was reliable. Re-
cently, we have cautioned that the omission of such critical
credibility information raises legitimate concerns about a con-
fidential source’s motives. Clark, 935 F.3d at 565; Glover, 755
F.3d at 817; Bell, 585 F.3d at 1050.
In sum, the sufficiency of the warrant affidavit hinged on
the testimony of a confidential source, but the affidavit omit-
ted critical information about that source’s credibility. Be-
cause “the affidavit did not provide the [issuing judge] with
even a minimum of information on credibility that might
have triggered further inquiry,” we “cannot defer to [this] un-
der-informed finding of probable cause.” Glover, 755 F.3d at
818. As mentioned earlier, other factors, such as additional
corroboration of the alleged drug activity, could have also
saved the affidavit. Clark, 935 F.3d at 565. While Inspector
Brown corroborated information such as Felton’s criminal
history, his current residence, and the vehicle Felton was driv-
ing, Inspector Brown did not corroborate any of the drug ac-
tivity that Felton was allegedly engaged in. Woodfork, 999 F.3d
at 516–17. Without any corroboration of the criminal activity
at issue, Brown’s probable cause affidavit supporting the
search warrant for the tracker was insufficient to support a
finding of probable cause.
D. Good Faith Exception
The Fourth Amendment “contains no provision expressly
precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its
commands.” United States v. Martin, 807 F.3d 842, 845 (7th Cir.
2015) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 906). But to “‘compel respect

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No. 23-1352 11
for the constitutional guaranty’ of freedom from unreasona-
ble searches,” the Supreme Court fashioned the exclusionary
rule. United States v. Hammond, 996 F.3d 374, 384 (7th Cir.
2021) (quoting Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236 (2011));
see also United States v. Lewis, 38 F.4th 527, 537 (7th Cir. 2022)
(explaining the exclusionary rule “is a judicially created rem-
edy”). “A defendant may invoke the rule to prevent tainted
evidence from being used against him at trial, but the exclu-
sionary rule is not a personal constitutional right, and its ap-
plication exacts a heavy toll on both the judicial system and
society at large.” Lewis, 38 F.4th at 537 (internal quotations
omitted). Therefore, the Supreme Court has explained the ex-
clusionary rule does not apply when it would serve no deter-
rent function, such as “when law enforcement has relied in
good faith on a facially valid warrant.” Hammond, 996 F.3d at
384 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 922); see also Woodfork, 999 F.3d at
519.
“[A]n officer’s decision to obtain a warrant creates a pre-
sumption that the officer acted in good faith.” Woodfork, 999
F.3d at 519 (quoting Yarber, 915 F.3d at 1106). We have identi-
fied three ways a defendant is able to rebut this good faith
presumption, including (1) when the affiant was dishonest or
reckless when preparing the affidavit, (2) when the judge
abandons the judicial role of neutrality, or (3) when the affi-
davit is so “bare bones” and lacking in probable cause that
reliance on it is unreasonable. Id.; see also Glover, 755 F.3d at
818–19.
The district court held Leon’s good faith exception pre-
vented suppression of the evidence recovered from the search
of the vehicle Felton was driving because law enforcement
was entitled to rely on the search warrant. On appeal, Felton

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12 No. 23-1352
argues the good faith exception should not apply because In-
spector Brown obtained the warrant by omitting material in-
formation about the confidential source and this omission
was sufficient to support an inference that Inspector Brown
acted with reckless disregard for the truth, entitling Felton to
a Franks hearing.
The government contends that Felton is not entitled to a
Franks hearing because he cannot make a substantial prelimi-
nary showing that Inspector Brown intended to mislead the
judge, and the credibility information left out of the affidavit
was more limited than Felton claims and, therefore, not mate-
rial to the probable cause determination. We disagree.
To obtain a Franks hearing, a defendant must make a sub-
stantial preliminary showing that (1) the warrant affidavit
contained material falsehoods or omissions that would alter
the probable cause determination; and (2) the affiant omitted
the information intentionally or with a reckless disregard for
the truth. Clark, 935 F.3d at 563.
For the reasons discussed above, Felton has made a sub-
stantial preliminary showing that the affidavit supporting the
search warrant for the tracker was defective. Therefore, the
only factor that remains is the inquiry into Inspector Brown’s
state of mind.
“[C]redibility omissions themselves, even in the absence
of more direct evidence of the officer’s state of mind, provide
sufficient circumstantial evidence to support a reasonable and
thus permissible inference of reckless disregard for the truth.”
Glover, 755 F.3d at 820. We draw that inference here. Inspector
Brown omitted crucial credibility information about the con-
fidential source who provided the most relevant and specific

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No. 23-1352 13
information about Felton’s alleged drug trafficking activity.
We leave it to the district court, however, to determine
whether these omissions were deliberate or reckless. See Clark,
935 F.3d at 567.
Because Felton has made the substantial preliminary
showing required for an evidentiary hearing on his Franks
challenge, we remand.
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we REVERSE the denial of the suppres-
sion motion and REMAND for an evidentiary hearing con-
sistent with this decision.

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