United States of America v. Darius Gavin

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted December 3, 2025
Decided December 4, 2025
Before
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1477
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DARIUS GAVIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:17-CR-00729(2)
Andrea R. Wood,
Judge.
O R D E R
Darius Gavin pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery affecting commerce and
one count of brandishing a firearm during a violent crime. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a),
924(c)(1)(A)(ii). The district court sentenced him to a below-guidelines sentence of
168 months’ imprisonment and 3 years’ supervised release. Gavin filed a notice of
appeal, but his appointed attorney seeks to withdraw because he asserts the appeal is
frivolous. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We notified Gavin of counsel’s
motion to withdraw, and he did not respond. See C IR . R. 51(b). Counsel’s brief explains
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-1477 Page 2
the nature of the case and raises potential issues that an appeal of this kind would be
expected to involve. Because counsel’s brief appears thorough, we limit our review to
the subjects counsel discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).
We grant the motion and dismiss the appeal.
In 2017, a federal grand jury indicted Gavin, in relevant part, on two counts of
committing a robbery affecting commerce, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), and one count of
brandishing a firearm in connection to a crime of violence. Id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). The
charges arose from robberies of a Chicago supermarket and a liquor store carried out by
Gavin and two co-conspirators. In the first robbery, the co-conspirators brandished
guns while Gavin took approximately $1,700 in cash from the store. In the second
robbery a few months later, one co-conspirator fired a gun into a padlock to gain access
to the store’s rear office, where they took a large sum of cash. In total, they made off
with approximately $3,700 in the second robbery.
Gavin pleaded guilty to these charges. In his plea agreement, he stipulated that
he participated in two other armed robberies and possessed a firearm as a felon. The
district court adopted the presentence investigation report’s recommended guidelines
range of 97 to 121 months for the robbery charges (based on an offense level of 28 and
criminal history category of III) and an 84-month consecutive, statutory minimum
sentence for brandishing a firearm during the commission of the robberies. 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). The court then weighed the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and
sentenced Gavin to a below-guidelines term of 168 months’ imprisonment and three
years’ supervised release.
In discussing potential issues to raise on appeal, counsel first confirms that he
communicated with Gavin and that Gavin does not wish to challenge his guilty plea.
Counsel therefore properly refrains from addressing the plea’s validity. See United States
v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671
(7th Cir. 2002).
Counsel considers arguments about the calculation of Gavin’s guidelines range
but correctly concludes that any such attacks would be frivolous. Gavin did not object
to the PSR’s guidelines calculations or make any argument against them at sentencing,
so he would be entitled to plain-error review at most. United States v. Burgess, 22 F.4th
680, 686 (7th Cir. 2022). Like counsel, we cannot discern any potential error, let alone an
obvious one, that affected Gavin’s substantial rights. The district court correctly
assessed an offense level of 28 based on the highest offense level for Gavin’s convictions
(27), see U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(a), (b)(2)(A); the multiple-count adjustment (+4), see id. § 3D1.4;

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No. 24-1477 Page 3
and Gavin’s acceptance of responsibility (-3), see id. § 3E1.1. And the court correctly
assessed a criminal history category of III based on Gavin’s prior convictions for
possession of a stolen motor vehicle (3 points) and criminal trespass to a vehicle
(2 points). See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a)–(b); id. § 5A.
We also agree with counsel that a challenge to the substantive reasonableness of
Gavin’s sentence would be frivolous. We presume that a below-guidelines sentence is
reasonable. United States v. Oregon, 58 F.4th 298, 302 (7th Cir. 2023). Counsel rightly
concludes that the district court adequately justified the prison term under the
applicable § 3553(a) factors. The court highlighted Gavin’s history and characteristics
(noting his unstable childhood), the seriousness of the offense (emphasizing the danger
associated with robberies involving firearms and the effect of the offenses on the
victims), and the nature and circumstances of the offense (noting as “a slight factor in
mitigation” that Gavin was not the person who brandished or used a firearm during the
robberies).
Finally, counsel asks whether Gavin could plausibly challenge one term of his
supervised release as impermissibly vague—the term permitting a probation officer to
visit him “at any reasonable time” and at any “reasonable location specified.” But as
counsel points out, we rejected a vagueness challenge to a nearly identical condition in
United States v. Armour, 804 F.3d 859, 870 (7th Cir. 2015). See also United States v. Downey,
908 F.3d 205, 207 (7th Cir. 2018).
We thus GRANT counsel’s motion and DISMISS the appeal.

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