Maja McDonald v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE and NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LETTER CARRIERS, BRANCH 11

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted December 3, 2025*
Decided December 10, 2025
Before
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 24-3291
MAJA MCDONALD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE and
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LETTER
CARRIERS, BRANCH 11,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
No. 22-cv-07314
Jeremy C. Daniel,
Judge.
O R D E R
Maja McDonald, a city carrier assistant for the United States Postal Service,
appeals the dismissal of her “hybrid” claim against the Postal Service and her union,
alleging that the Postal Service breached the collective bargaining agreement and the
union did not adequately represent her. The district court dismissed the suit for failure
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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to state a claim, concluding that McDonald brought it after the six-month statute of
limitations had expired. But the current record, at the pleadings stage, does not
establish that McDonald knew or should have known her claim accrued more than six
months before her complaint. We therefore vacate the district court’s judgment and
remand for further proceedings.
McDonald worked subject to a collective bargaining agreement between the
Postal Service and her union, the National Association of Letter Carriers. The agreement
included a three-step grievance resolution procedure. At Step 1, the employee must
discuss her grievance with her supervisor no later than 14 days after an incident. The
union takes over at Step 2, meeting with management and then, if necessary, a
resolution team at Step 3 to resolve the grievance without the employee’s direct
participation. These meetings occur by default within one or two weeks of each other
but may be rescheduled by agreement between the union and management.
In early 2020, McDonald filed a charge with the National Labor Relations Board
alleging that her union had, for the past six months, failed to file and prosecute
grievances on her behalf and refused to accept her withdrawal from the union. While
her charge was pending, McDonald emailed the NLRB other grievances she had filed
(concerning, for example, how management breached the agreement by denying her
work) and explained that the union did not address them. In response, the NLRB
confirmed that her current charge covered only the union’s failure to file and prosecute
grievances on her behalf and failure to tell her how to withdraw from the union. To
address any new allegations, the NLRB explained, she needed to file a new charge.
McDonald replied by describing more issues with management.
Later that year, the NLRB worked with McDonald on a proposed settlement
agreement. After receiving the proposed settlement agreement in August 2020,
McDonald asked the NLRB agent to clarify its terms. The NLRB agent explained the
proposal and then sent McDonald information about filing a new charge for the union’s
failure to represent her fairly in meetings with management. A day after receiving this
information and hearing the agent’s explanation of the proposed settlement, McDonald
rejected the settlement. In December 2020, the NLRB emailed McDonald an amended
settlement agreement. McDonald rejected the amended proposal because it did not
include all her grievances. According to McDonald, she did not hear more about the
proposed settlement until almost a year later, in September 2021, when an NLRB agent
contacted her to explain that the union had been making progress on the grievances
addressed in the proposal. The agent explained that the NLRB had asked the union to
update McDonald about those grievances.

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No. 24-3291 Page 3
The union emailed an update to McDonald in December 2021. In the update, the
union stated that, between March 2020 and November 2021, it had appealed to Step 2 at
least six grievances that remained pending. The union’s update also listed the next steps
McDonald should take for her other grievances. McDonald does not explain whether or
how she responded, but she alleges this was the last update she ever received from the
union.
McDonald sued the Postmaster General in December 2022, alleging various torts
and describing her (non-defendant) managers’ harassment and improper denial of
hours and pay. The district court dismissed the complaint but allowed her to amend.
In her amended complaint, McDonald dropped her claims against the
Postmaster General and brought only a “hybrid” claim against the Postal Service and
the union under the Postal Service Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. § 1208(b), and § 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). See DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 165 (1983). McDonald alleged that between 2019 and 2021, the
Postal Service repeatedly breached the collective bargaining agreement and that,
although she told the union, it failed to fulfill its duty to represent her by filing and
prosecuting grievances on her behalf. She further alleged that she had contacted the
NLRB about the status of her grievances in July 2022 and had spoken with an agent as
recently as March 2024 about her pending charges.
The Postal Service moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a
claim, asserting McDonald’s hybrid claim was untimely under the six-month statute of
limitations borrowed from the National Labor Relations Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(b);
DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 169; Truhlar v. U.S. Postal Serv., 600 F.3d 888, 891 n.1 (7th Cir.
2010). The district court granted the motion, concluding that although McDonald stated
a hybrid claim, it was untimely because her initial complaint was filed in December
2022, more than a year after the union last updated her in December 2021.
We start with a potential jurisdictional issue. The district court’s order addressed
only the Postal Service’s motion to dismiss, and judgment was entered in favor of only
the Postal Service. But McDonald also sued her union, which, the Postal Service notes,
she never served. A decision is not typically final and appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291
until it disposes of all claims against all parties. E.g., Chessie Logistics Co. v. Krinos
Holdings, Inc., 867 F.3d 852, 856 (7th Cir. 2017). Nevertheless, an unserved defendant
does not negate the finality of the district court’s dismissal if service upon that
defendant would be untimely under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) and any new
complaint would be time barred. Manley v. City of Chicago, 236 F.3d 392, 395 (7th Cir.

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2001). By now it is far too late to serve the amended complaint under Rule 4, and the
short statute of limitations has surely passed even if, at the time of the complaint, it had
not. Thus, McDonald is now limited to her claim against the Postal Service, though she
had no obligation to sue the union on her hybrid claim in the first place. See Wince v.
CBRE, Inc., 66 F.4th 1033, 1039 n.1 (7th Cir. 2023).
On the merits of her appeal, McDonald argues that the district court erred in
dismissing her complaint as untimely because she did not have reason to know her
claim had accrued more than six months before she filed her complaint.
An affirmative defense, like the statute of limitations, can rarely be resolved on a
motion to dismiss. A complaint need not anticipate such defenses, and dismissal is
appropriate only when a plaintiff has pleaded herself out of court by conclusively
establishing the facts supporting the defense in her complaint. E.g., Luna Vanegas v.
Signet Builders, Inc., 46 F.4th 636, 640 (7th Cir. 2022). Timeliness issues often are fact-
dependent and require a developed record to resolve. See Reilly v. Will Cnty. Sheriff’s
Off., 142 F.4th 924, 930 (7th Cir. 2025). If any conceivable facts that would defeat a
statute-of-limitations defense are consistent with the complaint, then resolution of that
defense must be deferred to later proceedings, like summary judgment. See Sidney
Hillman Health Ctr. of Rochester v. Abbott Lab’ys, Inc., 782 F.3d 922, 928 (7th Cir. 2015).
A hybrid claim like McDonald’s accrues at the time of a final decision on a
grievance, or when the plaintiff “discovers or in the exercise of reasonable diligence
should have discovered, that no further action would be taken.” Moultrie v. Penn
Aluminum Int’l, LLC, 766 F.3d 747, 751–52 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Chapple v. Nat’l Starch
& Chem. Co. & Oil, 178 F.3d 501, 505 (7th Cir. 1999)). Although McDonald insists she did
not know of this deadline, accrual depends on when she can discover the injury, not on
her knowledge of her legal rights. See Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634, 646 (7th Cir. 2018).
The district court determined that her suit, initially brought in December 2022,
was untimely because the union last contacted her, by email, in December 2021. But the
court and the Postal Service do not explain why McDonald should have known when
she received the December 2021 email that it would be the union’s last contact.
McDonald’s amended complaint alleges that the email stated that her grievances were
still pending, suggesting the union would take further action. And she maintains on
appeal that throughout 2022, at least, she thought the union was processing her
grievances. Indeed, her amended complaint alleges she contacted the NLRB in July
2022—less than six months before her initial complaint that December—to ask about the
grievances that the NLRB had told her were being resolved, and she further alleges that

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the NLRB suggested she had matters pending as recently as March 2024, two months
before her amended complaint. Mere inquiry about grievances does not toll the statute
of limitations, see Christiansen v. APV Crepaco, Inc., 178 F.3d 910, 916–17 (7th Cir. 1999),
but the inquiries (and responses or lack thereof) alleged here are consistent with the
possibility that McDonald had no reason to know her claim had accrued.
We recognize that McDonald’s complaint seems to conflate her many distinct
grievances and charges with the NLRB. It is possible that she should have known the
union had resolved or abandoned particular grievances long before the time when
other, unrelated issues were still pending. But even if her allegations were “not exactly
artful,” she “made reasonably clear that [she] was trying to allege that [she] did not
learn of [her] injury until some point outside of the limitations period,” so dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6) was premature. Clark v. City of Braidwood, 318 F.3d 764, 768 (7th Cir.
2003). Because it is conceivable on this undeveloped record that McDonald had no
reason to know more than six months before she filed her complaint that the union had
stopped processing her grievances, we cannot say she has pleaded herself out of court.
In addition to disputing accrual, McDonald also contends that the statute of
limitations should have been tolled because she was waiting to receive a right-to-sue
letter from the EEOC. But pursuing administrative remedies does not toll a claim unless
there is a “complete identity of the causes of action.” Xanthopoulos v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab.,
991 F.3d 823, 832–33 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Johnson v. Artim Transp. Sys., Inc., 826 F.2d
538, 550 (7th Cir. 1987)). A charge filed with the EEOC (and any resulting lawsuit)
alleges an employer or union discriminated against the plaintiff. A hybrid claim like
McDonald’s alleges the employer’s breach of the collective bargaining agreement that
the union did not adequately prosecute. EEOC proceedings, therefore, do not toll the
limitations period for these claims related to the collective bargaining agreement once
they have accrued. See Johnson, 826 F.2d at 551. And although McDonald invokes
equitable tolling, she has not identified any “extraordinary circumstances” that
prevented her from timely filing her complaint under the collective bargaining
agreement after her claim accrued. Watkins v. Mohan, 144 F.4th 926, 943 (7th Cir. 2025).
Regardless, this question, too, is often best resolved after the pleading stage. Id. at 946.
On the limited record before us, we cannot conclude that McDonald’s complaint
conclusively establishes that her claim against the Postal Service is time-barred. We
therefore VACATE the judgment and REMAND for further proceedings.

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