James Paul Rogers v. Western Governors University

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted December 11, 2025*
Decided December 12, 2025
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1470
JAMES PAUL ROGERS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
WESTERN GOVERNORS
UNIVERSITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Illinois.
No. 23-cv-3774-JPG
J. Phil Gilbert,
Judge.
O R D E R
James Rogers, a white veteran who suffers from several medical conditions, sued
Western Governors University for disability and race discrimination, breach of contract,
and fraudulent misrepresentation. He appeals the summary judgment for the
University. Because no reasonable jury could find that the University engaged in race or
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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disability discrimination, breached its contract with Rogers, or fraudulently
misrepresented its program, we affirm.
In March 2023, Rogers began taking classes at Western Governors University. He
enrolled after seeing advertisements marketing the University’s Accelerated
Information Technology program, which allows students to complete a bachelor’s and
master’s degree in information technology at the same time. The promotional materials
advertised that the program was “flexible” and allowed students to “go at [their] own
pace.” Rogers interpreted this to mean that he could earn both degrees in twelve to
eighteen months by taking several courses in the program at the same time and
finishing his bachelor’s degree in one semester. Shortly after he began classes, Rogers
asked the University to allow him to take six to eight classes at a time. Consistent with
its policies, however, the University restricted him to four classes. The University
allowed Rogers to complete classes at an accelerated pace, however, by permitting him
to immediately enroll in a new class when he finished one of his four courses.
In May 2023, Rogers had a severe heart attack, and as a result, suffered from
mental and physical health issues, including cardiovascular disease, anxiety, and sleep
apnea. Rogers also has tinnitus from his military service. Because he was anxious about
completing his degrees on his preferred timeline, and as an accommodation for his
health issues, Rogers asked his university-provided mentor to pause his current classes
and enroll him in other classes that involved lower-stress academic work. Rogers also
renewed his request with the University to take six to eight classes at a time. But the
University denied the requests, informing Rogers that he could not start new courses
until he completed the ones in which he already was enrolled.
In July 2023, the University’s disability-services office contacted Rogers to initiate
the process of providing disability accommodation. Rogers did not respond because he
believed that his mentor had been able to facilitate his enrollment in additional classes.
The office told Rogers that to receive an accommodation, he needed to complete certain
forms. The office explained where the forms could be found, but Rogers never filled
them out. The office then closed Rogers’s file and provided instructions on how to
reopen the process. Rogers did not respond.
Although Rogers never reported racial discrimination to anyone at the
University and acknowledges that he did not experience any hostility or harassment
based on race, he said that the University’s Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion
programming was discriminatory because it favored non-white students and forced

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No. 25-1470 Page 3
white students to believe in things like “white guilt.” Having become dissatisfied with
his experience at the University, Rogers withdrew from the program in September 2023.
Two months later, Rogers sued the University. He alleged that the University
had engaged in disability discrimination in violation of Title III of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); race
discrimination in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; breach
of contract, see TAS Distrib. Co. v. Cummins Engine Co., 491 F.3d 625, 631 (7th Cir. 2007)
(stating elements of Illinois breach-of-contract claim); and fraudulent misrepresentation,
Doe v. Dilling, 888 N.E.2d 24, 35–36 (Ill. 2008) (stating elements of Illinois
fraudulent-misrepresentation claim).
The University moved for summary judgment. After Rogers responded and the
University filed a reply, Rogers moved for leave to file a sur-reply. The judge denied the
motion because the court’s local rules do not allow sur-replies. S.D. I LL. R. 7.1(a)(4).
Rogers also filed a motion under Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
asking the judge to withhold ruling on the summary-judgment motion because the
University had been unresponsive to Rogers’s discovery requests and was withholding
or altering records. Rogers also asked the court to draw certain negative inferences from
the University’s alleged misconduct during discovery.
The district judge entered summary judgment for the University. The judge first
disregarded the facts in Rogers’s response that were not supported by citations to the
record or were supported only by unsworn statements or unauthenticated documents.
The judge also denied the motion under Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure because Rogers did not submit an affidavit in support of his request and did
not describe what further discovery he needed to oppose summary judgment.
Moreover, the court observed, Rogers supported his request for additional documents
with merely his own speculation that the University was withholding or altering key
evidence. The judge refused to draw negative inferences from the University’s conduct
because Rogers’s discovery requests were overly broad, irrelevant, and not proportional
to the needs of the case. See F ED. R. C IV. P. 26(b)(1).
Next, the judge determined that no reasonable jury could conclude that the
University discriminated against Rogers based on his disabilities or race. The judge
pointed out that the University enforced its course-limitation policy and denied
Rogers’s requests to take more classes both before and after his heart attack. And
because Rogers did not provide information to the University when it reached out to

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No. 25-1470 Page 4
initiate the accommodation process, no reasonable jury could find that the University
failed to accommodate Rogers’s disabilities. As for the claim of race discrimination, the
judge concluded that no reasonable jury could conclude that the University created a
racially hostile educational environment because Rogers admitted that he had never
suffered any adverse action, hostility, or harassment based on his race.
The judge also determined that the University was entitled to summary
judgment on the state-law claims. He concluded that no reasonable factfinder could
conclude that the University breached its contract with Rogers because there was no
evidence that the University violated any provision of its catalogs, bulletins, or
handbooks. The judge also concluded that no reasonable jury could find that the
University’s promotional materials contained fraudulent misrepresentations because
they were “puffing, that is, unmeasurable opinions that are not statements of fact.”
On appeal, Rogers first argues that the district judge overlooked the University’s
post-judgment discovery misconduct. Rogers alleges that 16 days after the court entered
judgment, he received a disclosure that did not contain records that had been
previously disclosed during discovery. He asserts that the University’s omission of
these documents from the post-judgment disclosure amounted to misconduct. But
Rogers could have raised this issue in a motion to alter or amend the judgment.
See Vesey v. Envoy Air, Inc., 999 F.3d 456, 463 (7th Cir. 2021) (discussing Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 59(e)). Because he did not, this claim is not preserved for appellate
review. See Kathrein v. City of Evanston, 752 F.3d 680, 688–89 (7th Cir. 2014). Regardless,
Rogers admits that he received the documents before summary judgment, so it is
unclear how the second disclosure omitting the records would have changed the
outcome.
Next, Rogers argues that the judge improperly struck his sur-reply and
disregarded assertions in Rogers’s response to the University’s motion for summary
judgment that were not supported by admissible evidence or citations to the record.
Rogers insists that his sur-reply was necessary to correct the deficiencies in his response
and that his facts were supported by self-authenticating public records, medical
statements, or records that were “authenticable by context.” But the judge acted within
his discretion to strike Rogers’s sur-reply because the court’s local rules prohibit sur-
replies. See S.D. I LL. R. 7.1(a)(4). The judge also appropriately exercised his discretion
when he disregarded facts that were not supported by citations to the record,
see Hinterberger v. City of Indianapolis, 966 F.3d 523, 528 (7th Cir. 2020), were supported
only by inadmissible material, see Igasaki v. Ill. Dep’t of Fin. and Pro. Regul., 988 F.3d 948,

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No. 25-1470 Page 5
955–56 (7th Cir. 2021), or were supported only by unauthenticated documents, see Castro
v. DeVry Univ., Inc., 786 F.3d 559, 578 (7th Cir. 2015).
Rogers next argues that the judge erred by denying his motion under Rule 56(d)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because the judge ignored the University’s
discovery misconduct. But we see no error. Rogers did not provide an affidavit in
support of his request as required by the rule. F ED. R. C IV. P. 56(d); see also Alicea v. Cnty.
of Cook, 88 F.4th 1209, 1219 (7th Cir. 2023). And his motion was based only on
speculation that the University was tampering with evidence. See Helping Hand
Caregivers, Ltd. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 900 F.3d 884, 890 (7th Cir. 2018). Rogers also never
explained how more discovery would have allowed him to survive summary judgment.
See F.C. Bloxom v. Tom Lange Co. Int’l, 109 F.4th 925, 936 (7th Cir. 2024).
Rogers also contends that the judge erred when he refused to draw negative
inferences from the University’s alleged discovery misconduct. We disagree. A district
judge may draw negative inferences when a party intentionally destroys documents in
bad faith for the purpose of hiding adverse information. Reed v. Freedom Mortg. Corp.,
869 F.3d 543, 548–49 (7th Cir. 2017). Here, Rogers does not explain what evidence
satisfies the bad-faith requirement. See Everett v. Cook Cnty., 655 F.3d 723, 727 (7th Cir.
2011). He merely gestures to records that he received during discovery that were later
omitted from a post-judgment disclosure. But Rogers does not provide any evidence
that these omissions were made to hide adverse information. See Reed, 869 F.3d at 549.
As for Rogers’s claims of disability discrimination, he argues that the judge
overlooked the fact that the University was aware of his disabilities and then
discriminated against him by preventing him from taking a higher course load. Under
both the Rehabilitation Act and Title III of the ADA, Rogers would need some evidence
“that, ‘but for’ his disability, he would have been able to access the services or benefits
desired.” A.H. ex rel. Holzmueller v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 881 F.3d 587, 593 (7th Cir. 2018)
(quoting Wisconsin Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 465 F.3d 737, 754 (7th Cir.
2006)). But the University applied its four-course limit to Rogers both before and after
he suffered disabilities from his heart attack. Moreover, Rogers never explained to the
University why his requested accommodation of taking six to eight classes
simultaneously was a reasonable and necessary accommodation. See Youngman v. Peoria
Cnty., 947 F.3d 1037, 1042 (7th Cir. 2020) (discussing necessary “causal nexus” between
disability and accommodation in Title I employment context). Rogers also admits that
he did not inform the University of his tinnitus.

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Rogers contends that he never disengaged from providing the University with
the necessary information to determine an accommodation but was instead impeded by
a “circular bureaucracy.” He argues that he was told to go to his mentor to file a request
for a disability accommodation but then his request was closed without resolution. But
the University repeatedly reached out to Rogers to explain that he needed to request an
accommodation through official channels, and he did not respond. The University
cannot be held liable for failing to provide a reasonable accommodation where it lacks
the necessary information from Rogers. See A.H. ex rel. Holzmueller, 881 F.3d at 594
(“Whether a requested accommodation is reasonable or not is a highly fact-specific
inquiry and requires balancing the needs of the parties.” (quoting Oconomowoc
Residential Programs v. City of Milwaukee, 300 F.3d 775, 784 (7th Cir. 2002))).
Next, Rogers argues that the judge overlooked evidence that the University’s
diversity programming mandated “racial guilt for white students.” He maintains that
the mere existence of diversity initiatives creates a racially hostile educational
environment. We disagree. To establish a racially hostile educational environment,
Rogers must show that the alleged harassment was severe or pervasive enough to
deprive him of access to educational benefits. Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty.
Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 640–41 (1999); Doe v. Galster, 768 F.3d 611, 613–14, 616–17
(7th Cir. 2014). But Rogers admitted that he never experienced any harassment because
of his race, and he did not identify any educational benefit that he was denied.
Next, Rogers argues that the judge erred in concluding that the University’s
advertisements were “puffing” because they made specific and material
representations. Under Illinois law, a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation cannot be
based on “puffing,” which “denotes the exaggerations reasonably expected of a seller as
to the degree of quality of his or her product, the truth or falsity of which cannot be
precisely determined.” Barbara’s Sales, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 879 N.E.2d 910, 926 (Ill. 2007).
We agree with the district court that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that
the University’s statements that its program was flexible and allowed students to go at
their own pace were fraudulent misrepresentations. The statements are subjective and
their truth cannot be precisely determined. See id. Rogers believed that “flexible” and
“go at your own pace” meant that he could take as many classes as he wanted. But no
reasonable person would understand the University’s marketing to mean that a student
is exempt from University policy. See id. And even if the University’s marketing was not
puffing, no reasonable jury could conclude that the statements were fraudulent. The
course-limitation policy was available to Rogers before and after he enrolled. The

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University also exercised flexibility with Rogers, allowing him to complete courses at an
accelerated pace.
Finally, Rogers makes several arguments for the first time on appeal. He asserts
that he filed a motion in limine that was misfiled by the clerk and not served on the
University. He says that the University violated federal law by misrepresenting its
program’s flexibility, affordability, and veteran-friendly features. See 38 U.S.C. § 3696.
He also argues that the University retaliated against him for seeking an
accommodation. But because he did not raise these arguments in the district court, they
are waived. Lewis v. Ind. Wesleyan Univ., 36 F.4th 755, 760–61 (7th Cir. 2022).
AFFIRMED

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