Karanpreet Singh v. PAMELA J. BONDI, Attorney General of the United States

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted December 11, 2025*
Decided December 15, 2025
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1578
KARANPREET SINGH,
Petitioner,
v.
PAMELA J. BONDI,
Attorney General of the United States,
Respondent.
Petition for Review of a Final
Administrative Removal Order.
No. 220 471 650
O R D E R
Karanpreet Singh petitions for review of a final administrative removal order
issued against him by the Department of Homeland Security. He contends that the
Department committed procedural errors when issuing the order and requests that the
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 25-1578 Page 2
order be vacated. But because Singh has not demonstrated any prejudice arising from
the alleged errors, we deny the petition.
Singh, a citizen of India and permanent resident of Canada, entered the United
States from Canada in November 2021 on a visitor visa. In April 2024, he pleaded guilty
to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1); United States v. Singh, No. 0645 2:22CR20124 (2) (E.D. Mich. May 2, 2024).
The district court imposed 60 months’ imprisonment.
In December 2024, the Department served Singh with a Notice of Intent to Issue a
Final Administrative Removal Order under 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b). The order charged Singh
as removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) based on his conviction for an
aggravated felony.
Singh responded three days later, raising three points. First, he stated that he
wanted to be removed to Canada, where he is a lawful permanent resident. Second, he
argued that his removal proceedings should proceed under § 1228(a) and § 1229a—
before an immigration judge—rather than under § 1228(b), where the Department
makes the final determination. Finally, he said that the Department should issue a
detainer notice rather than a final removal order so that he could apply toward early
release or prerelease custody the time credits he earned under the First Step Act.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A), (E).
Ten weeks later, the Department issued a final removal order. It directed Singh’s
removal to “India and or Canada or to any alternate country prescribed in section 241 of
the [Immigration and Nationality] Act.”
Singh petitions for review of the removal order, arguing that the Department
violated his procedural rights. Singh contends that the Department violated the Act and
its implementing regulations by failing to: (1) provide a list of free legal services,
8 C.F.R. § 238.1(b)(2)(iv); (2) order him removed to his designated country, id.
§ 238.1(b)(2)(ii); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(A)(ii); (3) translate his Notice into his native
language, Punjabi, 8 C.F.R. § 238.1(b)(2)(v); and (4) grant his requests for additional time
to respond to the Notice and for a copy of the Department’s evidence, id. § 238.1(c)(1).
To the extent that these arguments involve “constitutional claims or questions of law,”
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), we have limited jurisdiction to review them. See, e.g., Issaq v.
Holder, 617 F.3d 962, 967 (7th Cir. 2010).

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No. 25-1578 Page 3
We do not address the Department’s contention that Singh failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies by not raising these arguments with the Department. A failure
to exhaust does not affect our jurisdiction, id. at 968, and at least some of Singh’s
arguments could not have been raised until this petition. So we proceed to the merits.
Even if Singh could demonstrate procedural error, he cannot obtain relief unless
those errors caused prejudice. See Silais v. Sessions, 855 F.3d 736, 745 (7th Cir. 2017)
(“Courts … do not set aside agencies’ decisions unless mistakes cause prejudice.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). In other words, Singh must show that the
Department’s errors affected the outcome of the proceedings. See id.
Singh cannot demonstrate prejudice because he does not dispute the allegation in
the Notice that he was convicted of an aggravated felony. Because of his conviction,
Singh is “conclusively presumed to be subject to removal and is ineligible for
cancellation of removal, voluntary departure, and registration as a permanent resident
alien.” United States v. Santiago-Ochoa, 447 F.3d 1015, 1020 (7th Cir. 2006). Moreover,
8 U.S.C. § 1228(b)(5) bars noncitizens in expedited removal proceedings from any
discretionary relief that the Attorney General may grant, so “the absence of prejudice is
deducible almost as a matter of law.” Santiago-Ochoa, 447 F.3d at 1020.
Singh contends that he suffered prejudice because he was unable to review the
Department’s evidence. But Singh does not explain how reviewing the evidence, in light
of his admission that he was convicted of an aggravated felony, would change the
outcome. Moreover, Singh had the opportunity to request a copy of the government’s
evidence and additional time to respond to the Notice, but he did neither. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 238.1(c). Although Singh argues in his brief that he made these requests, the
administrative record does not support his assertion. See Vergara v. Bondi, 154 F.4th 572,
574 (7th Cir. 2025) (only documents in administrative record may be considered in
resolving petition); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A) (same). The record contains only one
response from Singh, which includes neither request.
Singh further contends that he is prejudiced because the removal order, which
states that he may be removed to “India and or Canada,” disregards his stated
preference for removal only to Canada. An alien “may designate one country to which
the alien wants to be removed, and … the Attorney General shall remove the alien” to
the designated country. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(A). But the Department may disregard the
designation on several grounds, including where the designated country will not accept
the alien or removal to the country would be prejudicial to the United States.
Id. § 1231(b)(2)(C); see Jama v. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 543 U.S. 335, 346 (2005). When the

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designated country is not used, the statute directs removal to the country of citizenship
or, if that is not possible, one of several other countries. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(D), (E).
Singh’s removal order accurately captures the statutory requirements: He designated
Canada as his preferred country of removal, and he is a citizen of India and has not
stated a fear-based reason why he could not return. In any event, the Department has
not yet determined Singh’s country of removal and will not have to until he finishes his
prison term and the removal period begins. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(g)(1)(i)(C). So any
alleged prejudice is speculative.
Finally, Singh contends that the removal order deprives him of his time credits
under the First Step Act. But this argument, which is not directed at Singh’s
removability, is meritless.
Accordingly, we DENY the petition for review.

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