United States of America v. Eric Krieg

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted December 11, 2025*
Decided December 18, 2025
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
No. 24-3267
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ERIC KRIEG,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, Hammond Division.
No. 2:17CR146-001
Joseph S. Van Bokkelen,
Judge.
O R D E R
Eric Krieg, a federal inmate, challenges the denial of his motion for a sentence
reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on the retroactive application of
Amendment 821 to the Sentencing Guidelines. We affirm.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-3267 Page 2
In 2017 Krieg, angered by an attorney who helped bring a lawsuit against him,
tried to mail to the attorney a package containing a pipe bomb. The bomb exploded at a
post office in East Chicago, Indiana, where Krieg had dropped it off, and injured a
postal worker. About three weeks later, Krieg mailed to someone else an envelope that
contained a bullet and a note saying, “The next one will be in the back of your head.”
Krieg was indicted for making an unregistered destructive device, 26 U.S.C.
§§ 5861(f), 5845(a), (f) (Count 1); mailing a destructive device, 18 U.S.C. § 1716(j)(2)
(Count 2); malicious use of explosive materials, id. § 844(i) (Count 3); possessing a
destructive device in furtherance of a crime of violence, id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), (B)(ii)
(Count 4); and mailing a threatening communication, id. § 876(c) (Count 5). Counts 1, 2,
3, and 5 carried a combined statutory maximum of 900 months’ imprisonment. Count 4
carried a statutory minimum of 360 months’ imprisonment and a maximum of life
imprisonment.
Krieg pleaded guilty under a plea agreement to Counts 1, 2, 3, and 5. In exchange
for the dismissal of Count 4, Krieg and the government agreed to a binding 348-month
prison sentence. The agreement acknowledged that a judge would ultimately determine
Krieg’s sentence after considering the presentence investigation report, the parties’
input, relevant sentencing statutes, and the Guidelines.
The district judge adopted the sentencing calculations set forth in the PSR. In that
report, the probation officer calculated a guidelines range of 97 to 121 months (based on
a total offense level of 30 and a criminal history category of I, with zero criminal history
points). The probation officer addressed the plea agreement’s impact, noting that Krieg
stood to receive a “significant benefit”—the dismissal of Count 4 and its 360-month
statutory minimum sentence, up to a maximum of life. The judge imposed the agreed
348-month sentence, concluding that it was sufficient but not greater than necessary to
accomplish the purposes set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), that the counts to which
Krieg pleaded guilty adequately reflected the seriousness of his crimes, and that
accepting the plea agreement would not undermine the statutory purposes of
sentencing or the Guidelines.
In 2024 Krieg moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based
on Amendment 821 to the Guidelines, a retroactive amendment that authorizes a two-
offense-level reduction for offenders with zero criminal history points and whose
offense conduct did not involve specified aggravating factors such as credible threats of
violence and possessing or transferring a dangerous weapon. U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1(a)(1), (3),
(7). Krieg conceded that he did not qualify for the adjustment but challenged the

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No. 24-3267 Page 3
Sentencing Commission’s basis for creating the eligibility criteria. He also asserted that
the government was required under New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S.
1 (2022), to present a historical analogue for the challenged exclusionary criteria.
The district judge denied the motion, agreeing with Krieg’s assessment that he
did not meet the § 4C1.1(a) criteria for relief. The judge also determined that the
Sentencing Commission acted within its authority when it enacted § 4C1.1(a) based on
extensive data and public comment. Noting that the Sentencing Guidelines are subject
to rational-basis review, the judge further determined that § 4C1.1(a)’s exclusionary
criteria relate rationally to the government’s legitimate interest in sentencing offenders
based on the seriousness of their offenses and aggravating factors. As for Krieg’s Bruen-
based argument, the judge distinguished the case on grounds that it applies only to
challenges to firearm regulations. Krieg appealed.
Krieg does not contest the district judge’s conclusion that he does not qualify for
a sentence reduction under § 4C1.1(a) and instead asserts that the provision does not
survive rational-basis review. He maintains that the exclusionary criteria in § 4C1.1(a)
are based on incorrect data and create unwarranted sentencing disparities between
eligible and ineligible offenders.
We agree with the judge that § 4C1.1(a) readily passes rational-basis review. A
sentencing provision survives scrutiny under this deferential standard if it is rationally
related to a legitimate government interest. United States v. Carroll, 110 F.3d 457, 461–62
(7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Sharma, 119 F.4th 1141, 1145–46 (9th Cir. 2024)
(addressing U.S.S.G. §§ 2G2.2(b)(6) and 2G2.2(b)(7)), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1457 (2025).
We agree with the judge that § 4C1.1(a)’s exclusionary criteria have a rational basis:
they recognize that some offenses or offense conduct can be so serious (e.g., involving
violence or credible threats of violence) to disqualify zero-point offenders from
eligibility. U.S.S.G. app. C at 242 (2024). To the extent that Krieg challenges the data
relied on by the Commission when promulgating Amendment 821, he fails to develop
this argument sufficiently. See F ED. R. A PP . P. 28(a)(8).
We have considered Krieg’s remaining arguments and none has merit.
AFFIRMED

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