Cedric E. Bradley v. Matthew Keppler

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted December 22, 2025*
Decided December 22, 2025
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Chief Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
No. 25-2077
CEDRIC E. BRADLEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MATTHEW KEPPLER, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Evansville Division.
No. 3:25-cv-00024-RLY-CSW
Richard L. Young,
Judge.
O R D E R
Cedric Bradley sued several entities and officials in Indiana, alleging violations
of his constitutional rights in connection with several child-support cases and his
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record
adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the
court. F ED . R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

-- 1 of 4 --

No. 25-2077 Page 2
required registration as a sex offender. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed
Bradley’s claims at screening. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). We affirm the judgment.
We accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and recount them in the
light most favorable to Bradley. Esco v. City of Chicago, 107 F.4th 673, 678 (7th Cir. 2024).
Bradley alleged that Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Matthew Keppler “engaged in
unlawful conduct” while serving as a “prosecutor, caseworker, or enforcement officer
within a child support enforcement division in Indiana.” Without identifying a specific
child-support case, Bradley said that Keppler withheld and misrepresented evidence,
manipulated dockets to “prevent timely resolution,” delayed action to “inflate child
support arrears,” and caused “unlawful incarceration or probation based on fraud.”
Bradley also alleged that an amendment to Indiana’s Sex Offender Registration
Act newly required him to register as a sex offender. Although Bradley did not identify
the specific amendment, he argued that the change to the Act retroactively imposed on
him a new punishment—the obligation to register as a sex offender—that did not exist
at the time he was convicted of past sex offenses.
A review of publicly available records shows that Keppler was involved in two
state-court proceedings in 2008 that established Bradley’s obligations to pay child
support. In re Paternity of Markel Labrador, No. 82D01-0805-JP-00201 (Sup. Ct.
Vanderburgh Cnty. July 28, 2008); In re Paternity of Keavont Labrador, No. 82D01-0805-JP-
00200 (Sup. Ct. Vanderburgh Cnty. May 27, 2008). Keppler then served as a prosecutor
in a 2014 case charging Bradley with failure to pay child support. Indiana v. Bradley, No.
82D02-1405-FC-00719 (Sup. Ct. Vanderburgh Cnty. Mar. 30, 2014); see IND. C ODE § 35-46-
1-5. Separately, Bradley, who was convicted of attempted rape and criminal deviate
conduct in 1998, see Indiana v. Bradley, No. 82C01-9702-CF-00152 (Sup. Ct. Vanderburgh
Cnty. Mar. 5, 1998), was convicted of a felony for failing to register as a sex offender in
Indiana in 2006, Indiana v. Bradley, No. 82C01-0606-FD-00611 (Cir. Ct. Vanderburgh
Cnty. Oct. 4, 2006); see IND. C ODE § 11-8-8-17(a)(1). Bradley was charged with failure to
register as a sex offender again in 2025. Indiana v. Bradley, No. 82D03-2504-F5-002630
(Sup. Ct. Vanderburgh Cnty. filed Apr. 21, 2025).
Bradley sued Keppler and other defendants for violating his constitutional
rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As relevant here, Bradley asserted that Keppler’s conduct
amounted to malicious prosecution and had violated Bradley’s rights to due process
and equal protection. Bradley also argued that his rights under the Ex Post Facto Clause
were violated by the amendment to Indiana’s Sex Offender Registration Act.

-- 2 of 4 --

No. 25-2077 Page 3
The district court permitted Bradley to amend his complaint twice and dismissed
the second amended complaint at screening. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The district
court dismissed Bradley’s claims against Keppler because the complaint did not plead
sufficient facts to give Keppler notice of the bases for those claims. The district court
also dismissed Bradley’s claim under the Ex Post Facto Clause because Indiana’s sex-
offender registration statute is not punitive. See Hope v. Comm’r of Ind. Dep’t of Corr.,
9 F.4th 513, 530–34 (7th Cir. 2021). Bradley appeals.
We first address Bradley’s pending motion to take notice of “supplemental filing
and preservation of claims.” He asks us to take notice of his filings in the district court
and a new lawsuit he filed in Indiana state court, “incorporating all relevant evidence,
exhibits, and filings previously submitted in the federal action.” We grant his motion to
the extent that we will consider all the facts in the record and the legal arguments
presented in the briefs Bradley submitted to this court.
Now, to the merits. Although Bradley’s brief fails to engage with the district
court’s analysis and is riddled with unexplained documents, we discern two general
arguments: The district court erred in dismissing his § 1983 claims against Keppler and
his claim under the Ex Post Facto Clause. We review de novo dismissals under
§ 1915(e)(2)(B). See Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1027 (7th Cir. 2013).
Bradley argues that his allegations against Keppler were sufficient to state a
claim that Keppler violated his rights to due process and equal protection. We first note
that Keppler has absolute immunity for core prosecutorial functions, such as initiating
and pursuing criminal prosecutions. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269–70 (1993);
Bianchi v. McQueen, 818 F.3d 309, 316 (7th Cir. 2016). To the extent that Bradley
challenges Keppler’s actions for which Keppler does not have absolute immunity, like
investigations, see Bianchi, 818 F.3d at 318, we agree with the district court that Bradley’s
allegations are too vague to provide Keppler “fair notice of what the claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Orr v. Shicker, 147 F.4th 734, 740–41 (7th Cir. 2025)
(quoting Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009)). Bradley alleges that Keppler
manipulated “dockets to prevent timely resolution” and delayed “action to inflate child
support arrears,” among other things. But beyond stating that a child-support
prosecution occurred in 2014, Bradley does not allege which dockets Keppler
manipulated, how he manipulated them, which proceedings were delayed, or how
Keppler improperly caused Bradley’s child-support obligations to increase. Bradley’s

-- 3 of 4 --

No. 25-2077 Page 4
allegations do not “present a story that holds together.” See id. at 741 (quoting Swanson
v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010)).
Bradley’s challenge to Indiana’s Sex Offender Registration Act fares no better. As
the district court correctly noted, we concluded in Hope that the Act does not violate the
Ex Post Facto Clause because it is not punitive. Hope, 9 F.4th at 530. The restrictions
imposed by the Act are neither traditionally punishments nor “sufficiently severe” and
are appropriately tailored to serve the permissible goal of protecting children.
See id. at 531–34. Bradley emphasizes that forcing him to register as a sex offender
imposes social stigma akin to punishment. But we considered and rejected that
argument in Hope, concluding that the stigma from “accurate information about a
criminal record” is not a punishment within the meaning of the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Id. at 531. Moreover, even though Bradley was convicted of a felony for failing to
register, a “criminal prosecution for failure to comply with reporting requirements” is a
“consequence distinct from the plaintiffs’ original offenses” and not additional
punishment. Id. at 532.
AFFIRMED

-- 4 of 4 --