United States of America v. Alfredo Juarez -Perez

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-3019
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
A LFREDO J UAREZ -PEREZ ,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for
the Western District of Wisconsin.
No. 3:25-cr-00103-wmc-1 — William M. Conley, Judge.
____________________
S UBMITTED NOVEMBER 26, 2025 — DECIDED DECEMBER 1, 2025
PUBLISHED DECEMBER 22, 2025
____________________
Before EASTERBROOK, S CUDDER , and PRYOR , Circuit Judges.
S CUDDER , Circuit Judge. Sometime in 2024 or 2025 Alfredo
Juarez-Perez, a citizen of Mexico, reentered the United States
illegally for the third time. This time around he turned up in
Sun Prairie, Wisconsin. Officers arrested Juarez-Perez and,
because of his status as an undocumented person, U.S. Immi-
gration and Customs Enforcement lodged a detainer against
him. Juarez-Perez has a lengthy criminal record, including

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2 No. 25-3019
state convictions for sexual assaults, failure to register as a sex
offender, and driving while intoxicated, as well as federal
convictions for distributing cocaine and illegal reentry. All
along he has repeatedly used aliases to deceive law enforce-
ment and has violated conditions of release by failing to ap-
pear for legal proceedings.
Following an indictment in October 2025 on a new illegal
reentry charge, a magistrate judge ordered Juarez-Perez
released, concluding that the immigration detainer precluded
a finding that he presented a risk of flight in his criminal case.
The district court revoked the release order and ordered
Juarez-Perez detained, seeing the need for detention as open
and shut under the standards Congress prescribed in the Bail
Reform Act. We agree and deny Juarez-Perez’s motion for
release pending trial on the illegal reentry charge.
I
We need say little more about Juarez-Perez’s criminal his-
tory. Suffice it to add that the history dates to at least 1992 and
has come to be marked by a pattern of Juarez-Perez being re-
moved from the United States only to see him reenter using
aliases and committing further crimes.
When law enforcement found Juarez-Perez back in Wis-
consin in March 2025, a new illegal reentry charge followed
with an accompanying request by the government for pretrial
detention. A magistrate judge held a hearing and denied the
government’s request, finding that it would not hesitate to
conclude that Juarez-Perez poses a serious risk of a flight
within the meaning of the Bail Reform Act absent the immi-
gration detainer. The detainer as well as the presence of an
ICE agent in the courtroom during the hearing persuaded the

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No. 25-3019 3
magistrate judge that Juarez-Perez “would remain in govern-
ment custody, albeit with ICE,” pending his removal from the
United States. The government then asked the district court
to revoke the release order.
The district court applied the Bail Reform Act and found
that “[a]part from [Juarez-Perez’s] immigration status and de-
tainer,” application “of the statutory factors found in [18
U.S.C.] § 3142(f)(2)(A) and § 3142(g) compels a conclusion
that a serious risk of flight exists and there are no conditions
of release sufficient to secure the defendant’s appearance in
this case under the circumstances unique to him.” Four spe-
cific findings drove the court’s analysis:
• Juarez-Perez’s criminal record includes con-
victions for “more than one sex offense, mul-
tiple [operating while intoxicated] convic-
tions, and a federal drug trafficking of-
fense.”
• The present charge against Juarez-Perez is
“supported by what appears to be substan-
tial evidence [showing] that he has—for a
third time—illegally reentered the United
States following removal.”
• Because Juarez-Perez faces a “likelihood of a
longer prison sentence for a third illegal-
reentry offense, [he] has every incentive to
consent to what will almost certainly be
rapid deportation if released to ICE cus-
tody.”
• “[P]erhaps more concerning, is [Juarez-
Perez’s] demonstrated propensity to return

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4 No. 25-3019
to the United States almost immediately
following removal, aided by his repeated
use of fraudulent documents and aliases to
evade authorities, including the
requirement that he register as a previously
convicted sex offender.”
II
We agree with all aspects of the district court’s reasoning.
Housed in Title 18 of the U.S. Code, the Bail Reform Act
authorizes pretrial detention only when a criminal defendant
faces charges for certain crimes enumerated in § 3142(f)(1) or
presents a serious risk of flight or obstructing justice,
§ 3142(f)(2). Upon a finding that one of these criteria is met,
the ultimate inquiry is whether any “condition or combina-
tion of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of
the person as required and the safety of any other person and
the community.” Id. at § 3142(e).
The enactment’s twofold focus on safety and appearance
proceeds vis-à-vis a criminal proceeding, whether pretrial or
on appeal. Put another way, ICE’s decision to lodge a detainer
against Juarez-Perez alongside (or in the backdrop of) his
criminal prosecution does not obviate the need to apply the
statutory factors enumerated in § 3142(g) informing pretrial
release. Nor is it the role of the judicial branch to mediate the
preferences of the Department of Justice and the Department
of Homeland Security when it comes to the prosecution or an-
ticipated removal (or the sequencing of either) of a non-citizen
like Juarez-Perez. Instead, and just as the district court rea-
soned, the controlling question is whether detaining Juarez-

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No. 25-3019 5
Perez ahead of his trial is appropriate under standards Con-
gress prescribed in the Bail Reform Act.
Because the government did not move forward with pros-
ecuting Juarez-Perez for failing to register as a sex offender,
he was not charged with a crime that justified a detention
hearing under § 3142(f)(1). Nor does the government contend
that he posed any risk of obstructing or attempting to obstruct
justice. See id. at § 3142(f)(2)(B). Rather, the government ar-
gues that detention is appropriate because Juarez-Perez pre-
sents a serious risk of flight and non-appearance in his crimi-
nal case. See id. at § 3142(f)(2)(A); see also id. at § 3142(g). For
his part, Juarez-Perez urges that his inevitable detention by
ICE eliminates that risk.
We see no infirmity in the district court’s finding that even
if ICE removed Juarez-Perez, he would swiftly reenter and, in
all likelihood, return to his ways of using aliases to hide from
authorities. Temporary detention in an ICE facility prior to re-
moval, then, does not substantially reduce that risk. Nothing
about the immigration detainer, in short, operated to some-
how insulate Juarez-Perez from pretrial detention in this
criminal prosecution.
Juarez-Perez also seems to suggest that any consideration
of a risk of flight is limited to leaving the jurisdiction where
he faces the federal criminal charge (here, the Western District
of Wisconsin). By his account, then, the government’s belief
that he will return to Wisconsin shows that he does not pose
a flight risk. We cannot agree.
Congress used the term flight within the Bail Reform Act
to refer to an “intentional act by a defendant to evade criminal
prosecution”—and the prototypical example involves

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6 No. 25-3019
“leaving the jurisdiction.” United States v. Storme, 83 F.4th
1078, 1083 (7th Cir. 2023). But evasion can be accomplished
even within a district. Indeed, Juarez-Perez’s history of illegal
reentry, use of aliases, and failure to register as a sex offender
more than supports the conclusion that such a concern is pre-
sent here regardless of what jurisdiction he winds up in. This
same history shows that Juarez-Perez is unlikely to abide by
any court-imposed requirements, and so we agree with the
district court that no condition or combination of conditions
can reasonably assure his presence in court.
Finally, it warrants emphasis that detention decisions un-
der the Bail Reform Act require an assessment of the individ-
ual circumstances presented by the criminal defendant. See
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751–52 (1987). Detention
here is warranted for the reasons articulated by the district
court, allowing us to leave for another day different applica-
tions of the Bail Reform Act to different individualized cir-
cumstances.
For these reasons, we DENY Juarez-Perez’s motion for re-
lease pending trial.

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