United States of America v. Joseph Raoul Iii

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued December 16, 2025
Decided December 31, 2025
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Chief Judge
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
REBECCA TAIBLESON, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1292
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JOSEPH RAOUL III,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:22-cr-00343 (1)
Virginia M. Kendall,
Chief Judge.
ORDER
Joseph Raoul III pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud, see 18 U.S.C. § 1343,
for defrauding six people of over $700,000. The district judge sentenced Raoul to
30 months’ imprisonment and ordered him to pay restitution to the victims. Raoul now
argues that the judge sentenced him based on inaccurate information—by failing to
appreciate that his medical condition had deteriorated since he committed the crime—
and without considering probation as an alternative sentence. Because Raoul has not
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1

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No. 25-1292 Page 2
shown that the judge sentenced him based on a misunderstanding of the facts or a
misapplication of the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), we affirm.
Between 2017 and 2022, Raoul—pretending to be a successful day trader,
investment consultant, and client fund manager—persuaded five individuals to invest
their money with him and persuaded one individual to loan him money to pay
fictitious attorney’s fees. But instead of investing their money or paying attorney’s fees,
he used it to pay his personal living expenses. To keep up the charade, Raoul fabricated
consulting agreements, spreadsheets listing stock purchases, and account statements
showing increases in account value. When his victims asked him to return their
investments, he lied to them; and when the FBI questioned him, he lied to them too. In
total, Raoul defrauded his victims of approximately $700,000.
The government indicted Raoul for six counts of wire fraud, see 18 U.S.C. § 1343,
and one count of making a false statement, see 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). Under an
agreement between the parties, Raoul pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud.
The judge adopted (without objection) a Presentence Investigation Report that
calculated Raoul’s guidelines range as 30 to 37 months’ imprisonment. The PSR
reported that Raoul was diagnosed with morbid obesity, heart failure, and respiratory
arrest in 2012 and Type II diabetes in 2015. It stated that he was hospitalized for
multiple weeks in 2012, four times in 2015, and twice in 2023. The PSR also noted that
Raoul must wear corrective lenses and that he “believes he is legally blind.” When
given the opportunity, Raoul declined to submit any medical records to the probation
office, though he did file a sentencing memorandum that detailed his health condition.
Raoul’s health conditions were also the focus of multiple status hearings before
sentencing, during which the parties discussed his current health, his ability to travel to
court, and when to schedule the sentencing.
At the sentencing hearing, Raoul acknowledged the severity of his crime and the
unlikelihood that he could ever compensate his victims, but he argued that his
declining health obviated the need for a sentence other than probation. As a result of his
heart and respiratory failure, his counsel said, Raoul needed a wheelchair to move more
than a few feet and an oxygen tank to leave his bed for more than 15 minutes. Raoul’s
counsel also stated that he was nearly blind and had an incurable skin condition
requiring daily care. Counsel explained that Raoul’s conditions required him to live in a
nursing home, and in the 18 months before sentencing, he left the nursing home only
for hospitalizations and court appearances. Because the limitations imposed by his

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No. 25-1292 Page 3
health would prevent him from committing any further crimes, he argued, specific
deterrence was unnecessary and probation would be adequately punitive.
The prosecutor, insisting that probation would be insufficiently punitive, asked
the court to impose a sentence within the guidelines. He acknowledged that Raoul’s
condition had worsened but noted that Raoul suffered from many of the same
symptoms when he committed the offense. And because Raoul would never repay his
victims, he argued that serving probation at a nursing home of his choice would
amount to “no punishment.”
The judge sentenced Raoul to 30 months’ imprisonment (the bottom of the
guidelines range) and ordered Raoul to pay $712,386 in restitution. Regarding Raoul’s
health problems, the judge noted that “you committed the crimes when you were in a
bad medical state, so it’s difficult for me to say that you couldn’t commit another
crime.” The judge’s written statement of reasons similarly stated that “[w]hile Raoul
suffers from severe health issues, Raoul committed this offense while suffering from
these health issues, such that their existence does not meaningfully diminish the
possibility of recidivism and the need for specific deterrence.” The judge also
emphasized the need for punishment: “[T]here has to be a sense that this crime has
consequences, consequences that are for your actions, not for your medical state.”
Raoul’s first claim on appeal is that the district judge procedurally erred by
sentencing him based on inaccurate information. The record, Raoul maintains, shows
that the judge did not appreciate the extent to which his health had deteriorated
between the time he committed the offense and sentencing. To successfully challenge
his sentence on this ground, Raoul must show both that the information before the
judge was inaccurate and that the judge relied on the inaccurate information in
choosing the sentence. See United States v. Harris, 118 F.4th 875, 887 (7th Cir. 2024).
Raoul cannot make either showing. He does not identify any inaccurate
information presented to the judge or any mistakes that the judge made about his
condition. It is undisputed that Raoul committed the offense while suffering from
morbid obesity, heart failure, respiratory failure, and diabetes. And although the judge
did not specify that Raoul’s condition had worsened before sentencing, she also said
nothing to suggest disagreement with the PSR or the parties’ submissions, which
reflected Raoul’s deteriorating condition over time. Raoul, at bottom, disagrees with the
judge’s determination that he remained capable of reoffending, but he fails to identify
“false information” that was a basis for that determination, as he must for us to vacate
his sentence. See id. (citations omitted).

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No. 25-1292 Page 4
Second, Raoul argues that the judge procedurally erred by equating probation
with “no sentence” and failing to consider other available “kinds of sentences,” as
required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(3). This argument is frivolous. In reality, the judge
simply concluded that probation would not provide adequate sanction or specific
deterrence in this case, as she explained:
It’s an interesting argument, [prosecutor], that you make that … what are
we essentially saying? If you [defendant] stay in your nursing home, then
what is the sentence? There is no sentence because you’re staying in the
same situation that you’re in. . . . [T]here has to be specific deterrence. And
there has to be a sense that this crime has consequences, consequences that
are for your actions, not for your medical state.
As for Raoul’s argument that the judge should have further considered
alternative sentences (e.g., restrictions to make probation more punitive), a judge need
not “write a comprehensive essay,” United States v. Reyes-Medina, 683 F.3d 837, 840
(7th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted), so long as she “consider[s] the sentencing factors in
toto and create[s] an adequate record for review,” United States v. Hendrix, 74 F.4th 859,
867 (7th Cir. 2023) (citations omitted). Here, the judge considered the sentencing factors
and determined that probation would be inappropriate in her efforts to impose “a
sufficient sentence that’s not greater than necessary.” Raoul has identified no error in
that analysis.
AFFIRMED

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