United States of America v. Jerry J. Jones

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued December 16, 2025
Decided January 5, 2026
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Chief Judge
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
REBECCA TAIBLESON, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1117
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JERRY J. JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:97CR00118-001
Richard L. Young,
Judge.
O R D E R
In 1998, Jerry Jones was convicted of two carjackings, an armed bank robbery,
and using firearms during these crimes of violence, and he was sentenced to
840 months’ imprisonment. Following two resentencing proceedings, his sentence was
reduced to 660 months, which remains over 22 years above the guidelines range. In this
appeal, Jones argues that the district judge committed procedural error at the most
recent resentencing by failing to adequately justify a sentence significantly above the
guidelines range. He asserts that absent such a justification, his sentence “serves no
other purpose, other than to punish in excess … .”
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 25-1117 Page 2
We conclude that the district judge’s justification, which tied the deviation to
serious, uncharged conduct, was adequate for such a substantial departure, so we
affirm.
Factual Background
In 1997, Jerry Jones, Gregory Jones, and Anthony Bailey robbed a bank in
Indiana. As part of their plan to divert the bank manager’s attention during the robbery,
the group decided that Gregory would pose as a UPS driver. To that end, Gregory and
Bailey assaulted a UPS driver, held the driver at gunpoint, restrained him with
flex-cuffs, removed his UPS shirt, and drove the UPS vehicle to the Chesterfield Branch
of National City Bank of Indiana while Jerry drove to the bank in a separate car.
Once inside the bank, Gregory pretended to make a UPS delivery to the branch
manager. He then announced he was robbing the bank and tied the manager’s ankles
together with a flex-cuff. Jerry then brandished a gun, ordered everyone inside the bank
to the floor, and demanded a teller open the vault, from which he took the cash inside.
He also took additional money from a teller station, stealing a total of $105,691 from the
bank.
The three defendants left the bank: two drove away in the car while a third drove
the hijacked UPS truck. The three met a short distance away from the bank, abandoned
the UPS truck with the restrained UPS driver still in the rear cargo compartment, and
drove away in the car. After observing the car traveling southbound on the interstate,
state police attempted to stop the vehicle, which crossed the median into the
northbound lanes. After the car crashed into a ditch, the three defendants ran into an
adjacent cornfield and entered the Routte family residence.
The defendants were discovered when the Routtes’ teenage daughter found
Bailey inside her closet, pointing a gun at her. She screamed, and her parents, Michael
and Sherry Routte, ran to her, at which point Jerry and Gregory Jones confronted all
three Routte family members. Jerry ordered Michael and Sherry at gunpoint to sit down
in the hallway, then to go back to the daughter’s bedroom. The defendants then ordered
Michael to drive them to Indianapolis in his pick-up truck. Before they left, Jerry
warned Sherry that he would kill Michael if she called the police. The three defendants
then got inside the pick-up truck and Jerry directed Michael to a location in
Indianapolis where the three left Michael and the truck.

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No. 25-1117 Page 3
Procedural History
In 1998, a federal jury convicted Jerry Jones of two counts of carjacking, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2119, one count of armed bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d), and three counts of
using a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The district judge
imposed 840 months’ imprisonment: 180 months on each of the carjacking counts and
300 months on the armed bank robbery count, to be served concurrently, and a total of
540 months on the § 924(c) counts, to be served consecutively.1
In 2018, Jones prevailed on a petition for writ of habeas corpus, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. He argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S.
500 (2016), rendered his classification as a career criminal, see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, a
miscarriage of justice. Jones v. Kreuger, No. 2:17-cv-00497-WTL-MJD, 2018 WL 2416409
(S.D. Ind. May 29, 2018). The district judge vacated Jones’s sentence.
At the resentencing hearing that followed, Jones was again sentenced to
840 months’ imprisonment. The district judge calculated a guidelines range of 348 to
390 months’ imprisonment. See United States v. Jones (Jones I), 962 F.3d 956, 959 (7th Cir.
2020). The judge emphasized the effect of the crime on the Routte family, referring to
the break-in at the home and use of a gun as “horrific crimes of violence and
threatening individuals.” Id. at 961. He then imposed 180 months on each carjacking
count, 300 months on the armed bank robbery count, and 60 months on each of the
firearm counts, all to be served consecutively.2 Jones’s co-defendants, by contrast, had
received sentences of 675 months and 728 months. Jones I, 962 F.3d at 961.
Jones appealed, arguing that the district court had procedurally erred by failing
to justify its significant deviation from the guidelines range. Id. at 960–62. We agreed,
reasoning that while the judge emphasized the seriousness of the conduct at the
Routtes’ home, he did not make a finding that this conduct aggravated the offenses, and
1 The statute in effect at the time, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1996), authorized up to 60
months’ imprisonment for the first § 924(c) conviction and up to 240 months’
imprisonment for subsequent § 924(c) convictions.
2 By the time of Jones’s resentencing, Congress had passed the First Step Act,
which restricted the stacking of sentences under § 924(c) in the same prosecution.
See United States v. Black, 131 F.4th 542, 543 (7th Cir. 2025). Over the government’s
objection, the district court determined that the Act applied to Jones. Accordingly, Jones
was subject to 60 months’ imprisonment on each § 924(c) count.

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thus it was not clear “whether the court fully appreciated that it was adding 450 months
to the range and why it thought it was appropriate to do so.” Id. at 962. We also
observed that the district judge had relied on inaccurate facts during the hearing—
including that Jones had discharged a firearm in the Routtes’ home and that he had
broken into multiple homes—and had not explained why Jones received a longer
sentence than his co-defendants. Id. at 959–61. Therefore, in 2020, we vacated the
judgment and remanded for resentencing, instructing the district judge to “specify ‘the
reasons why [Jones] is different from the vast majority of defendants’” and “explain
why its sentence serves the considerations it cites.” Id. at 961–62 (quoting United States v.
Lockwood, 789 F.3d 773, 782 (7th Cir. 2015)).
In 2025, the district judge held another resentencing hearing in which he adopted
the PSR’s guidelines calculations and findings regarding the offense conduct. The PSR
again calculated a guidelines range of 348 to 390 months’ imprisonment. The judge then
considered the parties’ sentencing arguments. The government requested 840 months’
imprisonment, emphasizing the psychological trauma to the victims and highlighting
the uniqueness of the case “in terms of its horror.” Jones requested a sentence within the
guidelines range, arguing that he had demonstrated an “exceptional commitment to
rehabilitation” during his time in prison, and emphasizing that he did not physically
injure any of the victims in this case.
After considering the arguments, as well as a victim statement from Sherry
Routte, the judge turned to the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), focusing
chiefly on the nature and circumstances of the offense. The judge repeatedly referred to
the crime as “horrific” and acknowledged the significant trauma Jones inflicted on the
victims. He said that in his 35 years of sentencing individuals with criminal convictions,
he had seen death penalty cases and murder cases, and that “[t]he facts of this case are
right up there at the top of the horrific cases [he had] heard over the years.” He then
referenced our opinion in Jones I in concluding that the Guidelines did not “entirely
account” for Jones’s conduct at the Routtes’ house and that this conduct aggravated the
offenses.
The judge next turned to the history and background of the defendant, noting
that Jones had multiple prior convictions for armed conduct and that prior to this
offense he committed a murder for which he was convicted and sentenced to 270 years’
imprisonment in Indiana. He also acknowledged, however, that Jones had a record of
taking advantage of the educational and work opportunities available to him in prison,
and that he had been commended for his work as an employee for UNICOR at the
Bureau of Prisons. The judge also noted Jones’s lack of any disciplinary history during

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his 30 years of imprisonment. The judge touched on several remaining § 3553(a) factors
without elaboration on how they applied to Jones’s case.
The judge then sentenced Jones to a total term of 660 months’ imprisonment. The
judge imposed 180 months on each of the carjacking counts to be served concurrently,
300 months on the armed bank robbery to be served consecutively, and 60 months on
each of the firearm counts to be served consecutively.
Analysis
On appeal, Jones argues that the district judge committed procedural error by
failing to explain adequately why he imposed a sentence that exceeded the upper limit
of the guidelines range by 270 months, or over 22 years. He asserts that such a large
upward deviation should be accompanied by a “more significant justification,” and that
the judge’s explanation that the Guidelines did not account for Jones’s conduct at the
Routtes’ house was not sufficiently compelling. Further, he points out that, due to the
lengthy sentence he will serve on his state murder conviction, he will be spending his
life in prison regardless, and therefore the 660-month sentence serves no purpose “other
than to punish in excess.”
A district judge may impose a sentence outside the guidelines range, but in
doing so, the judge “must consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the
justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of variance.” United States v.
Ballard, 12 F.4th 734, 740 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Miller, 601 F.3d 734, 739
(7th Cir. 2010)). The more significant the deviation, “the more detailed the district
court’s explanation must be.” United States v. Padilla, 520 F.3d 766, 775 (7th Cir. 2008).
There is no “rigid mathematical formula” required to determine whether an
explanation is sufficient, nor must appellate courts find “extraordinary” circumstances
to uphold a significant deviation. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 47 (2007). But the
judge must “give a reason, however brief, for ignoring” the Guidelines. Jones I, 962 F.3d
at 961 (quoting United States v. Robertson, 648 F.3d 858, 860 (7th Cir. 2011)).
While the district judge here imposed a sentence significantly above the top end
of the guidelines range (nearly 70 percent), we conclude that his explanation for the
deviation was sufficient. In Jones I, we advised the judge that he was “free to conclude”
that the break-in at the Routtes’ home aggravated the offenses, so long as he made that
determination. 962 F.3d at 962. Before announcing the sentence, the judge found
expressly that “the guidelines really don’t entirely account for the break-in” of the
Routtes’ home and concluded that this conduct aggravated the offenses. The judge also

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repeatedly acknowledged the seriousness of the crime, § 3553(a)(2)(A), describing it as
“horrific and appalling.”
Jones contends that the judge’s explanation of his sentence does not account for
such a significant deviation. He argues that “it is unclear in this case how the individual
circumstances of the uncharged conduct were actually used” to calculate his sentence.
He takes issue with the judge’s explanation that the Guidelines did not account for his
conduct at the Routtes’ residence, and points out that the PSR did add offense levels for
“abduction of an individual in the commission of the offense,” “carjacking,” and
“recklessly creating a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury in the course of
fleeing law enforcement.”
But the increase in offense level for recklessly creating a risk of death or bodily
injury refers to the PSR’s enhancement for obstruction of justice on the armed bank
robbery count when Jones “fled at a high rate of speed,” crossed the median, and
crashed on the side of the interstate. Jones is correct that the PSR accounts for his
conduct when he and the other defendants coerced Michael into driving them to
Indianapolis during the second carjacking. Yet, importantly, the judge recited multiple
inculpatory facts that were not accounted for by the PSR’s calculations. These included
breaking into and hiding in the Routtes’ home, brandishing a firearm and pointing it at
the family, and tying up the family. The judge emphasized the seriousness of these
actions by characterizing the effect on the Routtes as “a very tragic and horrific lifelong
horror story.” In this way, the district judge’s explanation for imposing a sentence
above the top of the guidelines range was sufficient. Regardless, to the extent that
Jones’s conduct already was accounted for in the guidelines calculation, it “did not bar
the sentencing court from weighing the information differently than the Sentencing
Commission.” United States v. Hayden, 775 F.3d 847, 850 (7th Cir. 2014).
To be sure, in Jones I, we advised the district judge to show that he “gave
‘respectful consideration to the judgment embodied in the guidelines range’” and that
he had understood “the relation between the guidelines and the ultimate sentence.”
962 F.3d at 960 (quoting Bradley, 675 F.3d at 1024, 1028). At this second resentencing, the
judge discussed the extent to which the previous 840-month sentence deviated from the
Guidelines, although he did not acknowledge the degree to which the sentence
exceeded the high end of the guidelines range.
Nevertheless, appellate courts “must give due deference to the district court’s
decision that the § 3553(a) factors” justify a deviation from the Guidelines. Gall, 552 U.S.
at 597. To that end—and crucially here given Jones’s argument on appeal—a

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“sentencing court need not frame its explanation of a sentence in terms of a departure
from the guidelines range.” United States v. Vasquez-Abarca, 946 F.3d 990, 994 (7th Cir.
2020) (quoting United States v. Kuczora, 910 F.3d 904, 908 (7th Cir. 2018)). Moreover,
judges do not need to evaluate every § 3553(a) factor. It is sufficient for a judge to
accurately calculate the guidelines range and to explain why the defendant’s
circumstances warrant a deviation. United States v. Johnson, 612 F.3d 889, 896 (7th Cir.
2010). The district judge here satisfied that requirement. He applied multiple § 3553(a)
factors, determined that the Guidelines did not account for the extent of Jones’s
conduct, and imposed an above-guidelines sentence to account for it.
AFFIRMED

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