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25-1752•United States of America v. Andre L. McClinton
25-1752Court of Appeals for the Seventh CircuitJan 6, 2026
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted January 6, 2026*
Decided January 6, 2026
Before
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1752
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ANDRE L. MCCLINTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin.
No. 21-cr-20-jdp
James D. Peterson,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
Andre McClinton, a federal prisoner, appeals the denial of his motion for
compassionate release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Because the district court did not
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1
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No. 25-1752 Page 2
abuse its discretion in concluding that the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553 weighed
against reducing McClinton’s sentence, we affirm.
In December 2021, McClinton pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess with intent
to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, and
possessing firearms as a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He waived his right to appeal his
conviction and sentence, and the district court imposed 108 months’ imprisonment.
In July 2024, McClinton moved for compassionate release. He argued that he had
an extraordinary and compelling reason for release because his wife, the caregiver of
their eight children, was incapacitated by severe postpartum depression and their
two-year-old son’s chronic medical condition. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(3)(A). McClinton
attached a letter from his mother stating that his wife was suffering from possible
postpartum depression; a letter from his neighbor stating that his wife was
overwhelmed by caring for the children by herself; and medical records showing that
his son had visited the emergency room four times since 2022, including once to treat a
febrile seizure.
The district court denied McClinton’s motion. First, it found no extraordinary or
compelling reason justified compassionate release. The court explained that it was not
persuaded that McClinton’s wife was incapacitated because no medical records
established that she was diagnosed with depression or that his son’s medical condition
was chronic. In the alternative, the court found that the sentencing factors listed in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) weighed against a sentence reduction because McClinton committed
a serious offense and had served only about one-third of his sentence. The court quoted
from its original statement of reasons for imposing the sentence, where it noted that
McClinton ran a sophisticated drug trafficking operation involving vehicles with
hidden compartments and companies that invested the proceeds in real estate.
On appeal, McClinton argues that the district court’s § 3553(a) analysis
improperly considered uncharged facts. In particular, he objects to the court’s reference
to hidden compartments built into his vehicles and his investment of the trafficking
proceeds in real estate.
But we see no abuse of discretion in the court’s § 3553(a) analysis. The court
relied on these facts to impose the original sentence, and McClinton cannot use a
motion for compassionate release to challenge a sentencing error. See United States v.
Martin, 21 F.4th 944, 946 (7th Cir. 2021). In its § 3553(a) analysis, the court may
reconsider how it evaluated evidence at sentencing, but it is not required to do so.
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No. 25-1752 Page 3
See id. Moreover, the court properly considered the seriousness of McClinton’s offense
and the fact that he had served only one-third of his sentence. See United States v.
Saunders, 986 F.3d 1076, 1078 (7th Cir. 2021) (affirming denial of compassionate release
where district court based § 3553(a) analysis on seriousness of offense and having
served only one-third of sentence). And it needed only one good reason to deny
compassionate release. United States v. Rucker, 27 F.4th 560, 563 (7th Cir. 2022).
McClinton also argues that the court erred by overlooking evidence of his wife’s
incapacitation as the caregiver of their eight children. But we need not consider whether
the evidence established his wife’s incapacitation under § 1B1.13(b)(3)(A) because the
court’s § 3553(a) analysis is an independent and sufficient reason to affirm. Id.
Finally, McClinton contends that the district court should have considered his
request for home confinement. But district courts lack power to order a transfer to home
confinement, so the court appropriately declined to consider a request it could not
grant. See Saunders, 986 F.3d at 1078.
AFFIRMED
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