Next Payment Solutions, Inc. v. Clear Esult Consulting , Inc .

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-1377
NEXT P AYMENT SOLUTIONS, INC.
Plaintiff- Appellant,
v.
CLEAR ESULT C ONSULTING , INC .
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:17-cv-08829 — Steven C. Seeger, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED NOVEMBER 6, 2024 — D ECIDED J ANUARY 13, 2026
____________________
Before BRENNAN, Chief Judge, and KOLAR and
MALDONADO, Circuit Judges.
MALDONADO, Circuit Judge. CLEAResult Consulting, Inc.
hired NEXT Payment Solutions, Inc. to develop appointment
scheduling software. After a few years of successful partner-
ship and use of NEXT’s application, CLEAResult decided to
shift to different scheduling software. Before making the tran-
sition, and without telling NEXT, CLEAResult modified and
refined its new program based on the functionality and

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2 No. 24-1377
features of NEXT’s application. CLEAResult then terminated
its relationship with NEXT and stopped using its scheduling
tool.
NEXT sued CLEAResult for misappropriation of trade se-
crets under federal law and unjust enrichment under Illinois
common law.1 After years of contentious litigation, the dis-
trict court entered summary judgment against NEXT on the
trade secrets claim because NEXT failed to define its secrets
with enough specificity. The case moved to pretrial proceed-
ings on the unjust enrichment claim, and the district court
granted a motion in limine limiting the scope of the claim.
NEXT then voluntarily dismissed the claim, and the district
court entered final judgment in favor of CLEAResult. We af-
firm.
BACKGROUND
I. Factual Background
NEXT designs and develops customer service software for
businesses. NEXT’s primary software platform is appropri-
ately called the “NEXT System.” NEXT offers customizable
versions of the NEXT System for its customers’ business
needs.
CLEAResult provides North American utilities with en-
ergy efficiency programs and services for utility customers.
As part of its services, CLEAResult offers utility customers the
opportunity to schedule in-home appointments for services
like home energy-efficiency assessments.
1 NEXT asserted several other common law claims that are not rele-
vant to this appeal.

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No. 24-1377 3
In 2014, CLEAResult hired NEXT to develop an online-
scheduling tool. NEXT worked with CLEAResult to under-
stand its needs and created a customized software application
for booking appointments called the “FAST Tool.”
The FAST Tool contained a public-facing side, where cus-
tomers could access their accounts and schedule appoint-
ments, and an internal side, where CLEAResult personnel
could manage appointments and access customer infor-
mation and data. There were also underlying software me-
chanics, including rules, algorithms, and source code to
which only NEXT had access.
CLEAResult used the FAST Tool for several years without
issue. Then in early 2017, CLEAResult acquired a separate
green technology company that had its own cloud-based ap-
plication, known as the DSMTracker. CLEAResult decided to
replace the FAST Tool with that new platform. According to
CLEAResult, it wanted to analyze how the DSMTracker
needed to be refined to meet its functionality needs. So
CLEAResult launched “Project Renaissance,” an internal
analysis of the gaps in the DSMTracker. As part of that effort,
CLEAResult developers looked at the internal-facing side of
the FAST Tool—the feature used by customer service person-
nel to manage appointments and customer data—to ensure
that the DSMTracker covered the same functionality.
NEXT presents a different picture of Project Renaissance.
According to NEXT, CLEAResult surreptitiously, and with-
out NEXT’s approval, stole secret information from the FAST
Tool to reverse engineer and replicate its features into the
DSMTracker. Notably, however, NEXT concedes that
CLEAResult personnel never had access to the underlying
processing engine or rules software of the FAST Tool. They

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4 No. 24-1377
further agree that there is no evidence CLEAResult ever ac-
cessed the FAST Tool’s underlying source code.
In November 2017, after CLEAResult finished Project Re-
naissance and transitioned several customers to the
DSMTracker, it informed NEXT it was ending their relation-
ship.
II. Procedural History
Shortly thereafter, NEXT initiated this lawsuit asserting,
among other things, claims for misappropriation of trade se-
crets under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1836 et
seq. (“DTSA”), and unjust enrichment under Illinois common
law. NEXT alleged that CLEAResult violated the DTSA by
misappropriating trade secret information from the FAST
Tool to better the DSMTracker’s functionality. As to unjust
enrichment, NEXT pled two separate theories of recovery:
that CLEAResult refused to pay certain invoices, and that
CLEAResult had “access to NEXT trade secrets and other pro-
prietary information” and was unjustly enriched when it
“misused NEXT’s trade secrets and proprietary information
… to create competitive systems.”
Following discovery, CLEAResult twice moved for sum-
mary judgment on NEXT’s DTSA claim arguing that NEXT
failed to identify its software secrets with sufficient specific-
ity. In its first summary judgment ruling, the district court
agreed with CLEAResult in part that NEXT’s secrets were too
nonspecific and narrowed the DTSA claim to “those parts of
the FAST Tool that were not present in the DSMTracker be-
fore Defendant transitioned” to its new program.
Later, the court ordered NEXT to provide more infor-
mation on the features of the FAST Tool that it contended

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No. 24-1377 5
were misappropriated and to explain why they were trade se-
crets. NEXT produced a spreadsheet identifying a list of
thirty-four software “modules,” and five “combinations of
modules and features” that it said CLEAResult took from the
FAST Tool. The modules—discussed in more detail below—
had titles such as “Online Self Scheduling” and “Dashboard
Client.” NEXT describes the modules with generic language
such as “manages the inventory of appointments,” “pre-
sent[s] real-time appointment availability,” and “create[s]
open appointment slots, to update appointment availability.”
CLEAResult, unsatisfied with NEXT’s updated descrip-
tions, again moved for summary judgment. This time, the dis-
trict court granted the motion in full. The court explained that
NEXT had been given multiple opportunities to identify “spe-
cific and concrete” misappropriated secrets in its software but
came forward with nothing more than “broad descriptions
and jargon-laden terminology” describing what its software
did, not how it did it, which made it “hazy what, exactly,
NEXT is claiming as its alleged trade secrets.”
More than a year later—during pretrial proceedings on
NEXT’s remaining claims—a dispute arose over the scope of
NEXT’s unjust enrichment claim. In a pretrial status report,
NEXT asserted for the first time that it intended to bring to
trial an independent claim for unjust enrichment based on the
theory that CLEAResult misused “other proprietary infor-
mation” separately and apart from misusing NEXT’s trade se-
crets.
On a motion in limine from CLEAResult, however, the dis-
trict court excluded any evidence or argument of misuse of
“other proprietary information” as a basis for unjust enrich-
ment. The court found that this theory of unjust enrichment

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6 No. 24-1377
had never before been presented as a separate theory from
misappropriation of trade secrets. The court held such a late
change was improper and that NEXT was, in essence, trying
to put forth a new theory on the eve of trial as an end-run
around the dismissal of its DTSA claim.
After the ruling in limine, NEXT voluntarily dismissed its
remaining claims with prejudice. It appeals the district court’s
dismissal of its DTSA claim and the in limine order on its claim
for unjust enrichment.
DISCUSSION
I. Summary Judgment on NEXT’s DTSA Claim
We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary
judgment. REXA, Inc. v. Chester, 42 F.4th 652, 662 (7th Cir.
2022). Summary judgment is appropriate when, drawing all
reasonable inferences in the nonmovant’s favor, there is no
genuine dispute of material fact, so the moving party is enti-
tled to judgment as a matter of law. See id.
To prevail on a DTSA misappropriation claim, a plaintiff
must show that (1) their information was a trade secret; (2) it
was misappropriated; and (3) it was used in the defendant’s
business. See Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. PlayWood Toys, Inc.,
342 F.3d 714, 721 (7th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).2 This case
turns on the first element: whether the software modules
2 While this case involves the DTSA, the parties agree that we may
rely on caselaw applying identical state trade secrets statutes (e.g., Illinois,
Wisconsin, and California), which, like the DTSA, are based on the Uni-
form Trade Secrets Act. See generally Mickey's Linen v. Fischer, No. 17 C
2154, 2017 WL 3970593, at *8 n.1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2017) (collecting cases
discussing the overlap between the DTSA and various other state statutes
based on the UTSA).

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No. 24-1377 7
NEXT identified in the FAST Tool constitute protectable trade
secrets. Under the DTSA, information qualifies as a “trade se-
cret” if (1) the owner has taken “reasonable measures” to keep
it secret, and (2) the information derives independent value
from the fact that it is not generally known and not readily
ascertainable. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3); Life Spine, Inc. v. Aegis
Spine, Inc., 8 F.4th 531, 540 (7th Cir. 2021).
The parties dispute whether NEXT has described its trade
secrets with enough specificity to support a DTSA claim. Our
“[c]ase law requires a high level of specificity when a plaintiff
makes a claim for misappropriation of a trade secret.” REXA,
42 F.4th at 663 (citations omitted). “[A] plaintiff must show
‘concrete secrets’ rather than ‘broad areas of technology.’” Id.
at 662 (quoting Life Spine, 8 F.4th at 540). Whether the plaintiff
has provided the requisite level of detail depends on the cir-
cumstances of each case. At the least, a plaintiff must present
enough specifics for the fact finder to distinguish between in-
formation that is generally known and information that is not
readily ascertainable and thus qualifies as a statutory secret.
See IDX Sys. Corp. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 285 F.3d 581, 584 (7th Cir.
2002) (“[A] plaintiff must do more than just identify a kind of
technology and then invite the court to hunt through the de-
tails in search of items meeting the statutory definition.” (cit-
ing Composite Marine Propellers, Inc v. Van Der Woude, 962 F.2d
1263, 1266 (7th Cir. 1992))).
To shoulder this burden, NEXT points to its list of thirty-
four software modules and five combination modules of its
FAST Tool program. For each module, NEXT provides a title
and description of what the feature does, and then it purports
to identify the secret of its software program that makes each
module work. But NEXT’s descriptions face a fundamental

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8 No. 24-1377
problem: NEXT only ever tells us the end result of what its
software does, not how it does it. See, e.g., Silvaco Data Sys. v.
Intel Corp., 184 Cal. App. 4th 210, 221–22 (Cal. App. Ct. 2010)
(the “finished (compiled) product” of what a software pro-
gram does is not a trade secret because it is “evident to anyone
running the finished program”), disapproved of on other grounds
by Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Ct., 51 Cal. 4th 310, 337 (Cal. 2011).
NEXT does not identify any specific algorithms, source code,
or methodologies underlying the FAST Tool’s functionality.
Instead, NEXT defines its modules in vague and generic lan-
guage that describes the software’s function. This lack of de-
tail makes it impossible to distinguish between the aspects of
the FAST Tool that are generally known and ascertainable,
and those which NEXT contends are secret and derive value
from being kept as such. See IDX Sys., 285 F.3d at 583–84 (soft-
ware developer’s tender of a “a 43-page description of the
methods and processes underlying and the inter-relation-
ships among various features making up IDX's software
package” left it “mysterious” what it contended were trade
secrets, because it did not separate its purported secrets from
the “other information that goes into any software package”).
Take, for example, the “Online Self Scheduling” module
used as an exemplar by NEXT in its briefing. NEXT states that
this module operates on the public-facing side of the FAST
Tool and displays a calendar highlighting available technician
appointments that a customer can select. The customer can
only schedule an appointment if their pre-entered data meets
certain “pre-determined criteria.” NEXT then describes what
it claims is the trade secret that makes the online self-schedul-
ing module work. But its description uses generic functional
verbiage that simply describes the process in circular terms. It
claims that the module’s “secret” process is that it “manages

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No. 24-1377 9
the inventory of appointments” by interfacing with numerous
other modules to “present real-time appointment availabil-
ity” and “pre-set the number of available appointments based
on the customer’s geographic location … [and] the availabil-
ity of technicians.” In short, NEXT describes the “Online Self-
Scheduling” module generically as allowing customers to
schedule appointments based on existing data in the system.
But how the software achieves that process is left unspecified.
NEXT uses similarly nondescript language for the other
FAST Tool modules. For example, the “Email & Text Messag-
ing” module is described as distributing notifications and
alerts to customers about appointments, but the purported
“secret” behind the module is simply that it “generates auto-
mated notifications … based on certain triggers.” Other mod-
ules allow CLEAResult personnel to generate PDF documents
and “track,” “manage,” or “see” appointments and customer
data, all through the purported “secret” process of collecting
and displaying data across different modules and criteria in
the systems.
The descriptions of the combination modules are no more
specific. For example, the “FAST Tool Residential Appoint-
ment Management” is said to “permit[] consumers to sched-
ule, cancel, or reschedule appointments online using a public-
facing web page that required customers to enter information
sufficient to automatically determine eligibility or potential
eligibility for a program.”
None of the above descriptions articulate a concrete secret
that derives economic value from being generally unknown
and not readily ascertainable. It is not a trade secret for a soft-
ware program to manage appointment inventory, schedule
appointments, collect and display data, send notifications, or

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10 No. 24-1377
fill out PDFs. Anybody using the FAST Tool application and
seeing these features, either on the public-facing or internal
web application, would be able to ascertain that the software
was acting to perform these tasks. IDX Sys., 285 F.3d at 584
(“things that any user or passer-by sees at a glance,” such as
the appearance of a data-entry screen in a billing software
program, are “exceedingly hard to call trade secrets”). The
fact that NEXT describes what its software does in generic
terms that any user can discern means that it has failed to
identify any information that might qualify for protection. Id.;
see also BondPro Corp. v. Siemens Power Generation, Inc., 463
F.3d 702, 710 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[A] process described in general
terms … will usually be widely known and thus not worth
incurring costs to try to conceal and so not a trade secret.”).
Put another way, NEXT does exactly what we have said a
trade secret plaintiff cannot do: it points to broad areas of soft-
ware technology and asks us to sort out what aspects of that
technology may or may not meet the statutory requirements
for protection. But the onus is on NEXT to identify concrete
secrets. See REXA, 42 F.4th at 663; IDX Sys., 285 F.3d at 584
(citing Composite Marine, 962 F.2d at 1266).
It may be that there is some unknown methodology or
process that allows the FAST Tool to manage inventory, dis-
play data, and create appointments. The most likely candi-
date would be the FAST Tool’s underlying source code, rules,
and algorithms. See generally IDX Sys., 285 F.3d at 584 (noting
that the algorithms that a software program uses to perform
functions may be trade secrets); Fin. Info. Techs., LLC v. iCon-
trol Sys., USA, LLC, 21 F.4th 1267, 1273 (11th Cir. 2021) (“As a
general matter, software source code is not readily ascertain-
able and, accordingly, qualifies for trade-secret protection.”).

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No. 24-1377 11
But NEXT has not produced evidence of any such secret
source code or unascertainable algorithms. And it even con-
ceded that CLEAResult did not have access to the FAST Tool’s
code or processing engine. NEXT is thus left with nothing
more than its generic descriptions of what its software does
in a manner that anybody using it could ascertain. This is not
enough to send its claims to a jury. See IDX Sys., 285 F.3d at
584; cf. Silvaco, 184 Cal. App. 4th at 221–22 (contrasting suc-
cessful claim based on a software’s source code with a failed
claim based on the “22 pages of technical verbiage” describ-
ing “various features, functions, and characteristics of the de-
sign and operation” of the software); Syntel Sterling Best Shores
Mauritius Ltd. v. TriZetto Grp., Inc., 68 F.4th 792 (2d Cir. 2023)
(plaintiff described its software trade secrets with sufficient
specificity where it provided documentation identifying the
underlying source code and architecture behind the claimed
software trade secrets).
As the district court explained, “[d]escribing the software
functions without disclosing the underlying methods is like
saying someone stole your top secret apple pie recipe, but
never identifying the secret recipe itself.” NEXT Payment Sols.,
Inc. v. CLEAResult Consulting, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-08829, 2020 WL
2836778, at *15 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 2020). NEXT’s failure to iden-
tify the programs, methodology, or processes underlying its
software makes it impossible for a fact finder to determine
whether the functions the FAST Tool performs are protectable
secrets.3
3 To be clear, we do not hold that a plaintiff who brings a claim for
misappropriation of trade secrets in their software products must always
provide their underlying source code or algorithms to survive summary

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12 No. 24-1377
NEXT’s counterarguments are unavailing. It first argues
that its software modules are trade secrets because they are
kept on the non-public side of the FAST Tool. NEXT seems to
be suggesting (without any case support) that the fact that the
internal web application accessed by CLEAResult was not
available to the general public necessarily renders the soft-
ware modules on that non-public side a secret. But we are not
aware of any authority holding that “not readily ascertaina-
ble” or “not generally known” means not accessible to the
public writ large. NEXT sold its software to clients such as
CLEAResult, and the functions performed by that software
(scheduling appointments, managing inventory, etc.) would
be obvious and apparent to any client that was using the in-
ternal web application. That the functions are obvious to any
user means they do not qualify for protection. See IDX Sys.,
285 F.3d at 584; see also iControl Sys., 21 F.4th at 1273 (“aspects
judgment. In practical terms, pointing to source codes or algorithms is of-
ten the most efficient way to identify a protectable secret. See iControl Sys.,
21 F.4th at 1273; Silvaco, 184 Cal. App. 4th at 221–22. But we do not exclude
the possibility that a plaintiff may, under some circumstances, be able to
come forward with other kinds of evidence demonstrating that its soft-
ware functions in a manner that is not generally ascertainable and derives
value from being kept secret. See, e.g., Integrated Cash Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v.
Digital Transactions, Inc., 920 F.2d 171, 174 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding a protect-
able trade secret in a software package that combined various generic pro-
grams where an expert testified that, although each individual program
was in the public domain, the architecture of the combined end product
“could not be readily duplicated without the secret information acquired
by [plaintiff] through years of research.”). It is enough to say that NEXT
has offered nothing from which we can identify a protectable secret here,
as its generic descriptions of its software functions—the only thing it has
put forward—are insufficient on their own.

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No. 24-1377 13
of computer software that are readily ascertainable don't
qualify” for trade secret protection).4
Second, NEXT argues that FAST Tool modules, such as its
appointment scheduling functions, performed something
“new and valuable.” It asserts that they were tailored to the
specific needs of CLEAResult’s utility customers and allowed
those customers to be matched with technicians based on real-
time appointment availability in set geographic areas.
We are unpersuaded. We will take it as true that its pro-
gram, in allowing utility companies to match customers with
technicians to schedule appointments, does something “new
and valuable”—though we are skeptical of this unsupported
claim given the ubiquity of scheduling applications across a
variety of industries. But regardless, something being “new
and valuable” does not itself render it a trade secret. See Sil-
vaco, 184 Cal. App. 4th at 222 (the finished software product
“might have distinctive characteristics resulting from that de-
sign—such as improved performance—[but] they cannot con-
stitute trade secrets because they are not secret but are evident
to anyone running the finished program”). Protectable trade
secrets must be generally unknown, not readily ascertainable,
and must be described with specificity. These requirements
are lacking here.
4 We acknowledge CLEAResult personnel were subject to nondisclo-
sure agreements in their use of the FAST Tool web application. The exist-
ence of those agreements might be relevant to misappropriation, i.e.,
whether CLEAResult personnel could lawfully use what they saw in the
FAST Tool to make their own software. But here, the issue is not misap-
propriation but whether there was a protectable trade secret at all.

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14 No. 24-1377
In sum, we conclude that NEXT failed to come forward
with evidence from which a jury could conclude that its FAST
Tool software modules qualify as trade secrets. The district
court therefore properly entered summary judgment on this
claim.
II. NEXT’s Unjust Enrichment Claim
We turn next to the district court’s ruling in limine, which
precluded NEXT from arguing a theory of unjust enrichment
based on misappropriation of “other proprietary infor-
mation.” We review de novo the district court’s legal conclu-
sions underlying a ruling in limine, though we review its ulti-
mate decision for abuse of discretion. United States v. Wade,
962 F.3d 1004, 1011 (7th Cir. 2020).
The district court provided several independent grounds
for its ruling, but we focus on just one here. Specifically, the
court found that NEXT’s unjust enrichment theory based on
misuse of “other proprietary information” was a new theory
of liability not previously pursued by NEXT, and that it
would prejudice CLEAResult and delay the proceedings to al-
low NEXT to add the claim after summary judgment. Because
we find this provided an adequate basis to grant the motion
in limine, we do not discuss the court’s alternative holdings.
District courts enjoy wide discretion to refuse attempts to
raise new theories of liability at late stages of the case if such
changes will prejudice the opposing party or unduly delay
the proceedings. See Crest Hill Land Dev., LLC v. City of Joliet,
396 F.3d 801, 804 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Fort Howard Paper Co.
v. Standard Havens, Inc., 901 F.2d 1373, 1380 (7th Cir. 1990))
(“‘Surprises’ such as new arguments or defense theories prop-
agated after the completion of discovery and filing of

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No. 24-1377 15
summary judgment are wisely discouraged.”); Bethany Phar-
macal Co. v. QVC, Inc., 241 F.3d 854, 862 (7th Cir. 2001)
(“[A]llowing [plaintiff] to add [a new claim] would have re-
quired additional delays in the resolution of the case to allow
[defendant] to respond to a new theory of liability. We do not
require a district court to tolerate such delays.”); see also Soltys
v. Costello, 520 F.3d 737, 743 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Eleventh hour
additions ... [are] bound to produce delays that burden not
only the parties to the litigation but also the judicial system
and other litigants.” (citation omitted)). The district court was
firmly within its discretion in holding that NEXT was improp-
erly raising a new theory of liability shortly before trial and
that allowing it to do so would cause undue delays and prej-
udice.
NEXT notably does not make any argument regarding de-
lay or prejudice but simply asserts that its theory was not new
at all. It argues it pleaded this theory in the operative com-
plaint, which alleged that CLEAResult had been “unjustly en-
riched by having access to NEXT trade secrets and other pro-
prietary information” and that CLEAResult “misused NEXT’s
trade secrets and proprietary information to enable persons and
entities with no right to have access to NEXT’s trade secrets
and proprietary information to create competitive sys-
tems…that [CLEAResult] subsequently used to service [its]
customers.” (emphasis added). As NEXT sees it, these allega-
tions create two distinct theories of unjust enrichment: one
based on misuse of trade secrets, one based on misuse of
“other proprietary information.” NEXT thus maintains that it
always had a separate claim for unjust enrichment based on
misuse of proprietary information, and that it should have
been allowed to proceed to trial on that theory irrespective of
whether it could maintain a trade secret claim.

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16 No. 24-1377
We are not convinced. NEXT’s argument misrepresents
how its amended complaint reads as a whole. Cf. Scott v. City
of Chicago, 195 F.3d 950, 952 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Whether a com-
plaint provides notice [of a claim], however, is determined by
looking at the complaint as a whole.”). NEXT’s complaint
never identifies any “proprietary information” that is sepa-
rate and distinct from its claimed trade secrets. The term “pro-
prietary information” only appears four times, and three
times it is used in the unjust enrichment claim in conjunction
with trade secrets in the phrase “trade secrets and proprietary
information.” The other time NEXT refers to its “proprietary
information,” it does so in the context of describing its “NEXT
System Back End,” which is the software system that NEXT
identifies throughout the complaint as its protectable trade se-
cret. In other words, when the complaint refers to “proprie-
tary information,” it always does so in tandem with its trade
secrets. It never distinguishes “other proprietary infor-
mation” as representing some category of information sepa-
rate and apart from its trade secrets. There is thus no indica-
tion in the complaint that NEXT intended a free-standing
claim based on misuse of proprietary information apart from
its trade secrets.
And if NEXT intended to plead an independent unjust en-
richment claim based on some proprietary information dis-
tinct from its trade secrets, it never made that position known
in the lengthy history of this case. The district court’s in limine
ruling provides that history in exacting detail, and we need
not recite it all again. See NEXT Payment Sols., Inc. v. CLEARe-
sult Consulting, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-08829, 2023 WL 7196125, at
*2–*13. (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2023). There were multiple occasions
during discovery and the summary judgment proceedings
where NEXT argued (expressly or implicitly) that the scope

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No. 24-1377 17
of its unjust enrichment claim included, at most, two theories:
one based on unpaid invoices, the other based on misappro-
priation of trade secrets. The district court itself confirmed
this understanding in its first summary judgment ruling, de-
scribing NEXT’s unjust enrichment claims as seeking “redress
for Defendant’s misappropriation of trade secrets related to
the FAST Tool and failure to pay Plaintiff’s invoices for use of
the FAST Tool.” It was only after the court granted summary
judgment and dismissed NEXT’s trade secrets claim that it
sought to invent a new theory based on some other “propriety
information.”
In sum, the district court reasonably concluded that NEXT
was attempting to raise a new and undeveloped theory of li-
ability based on other proprietary information that it had
never previously presented nor even identified. It was within
its discretion to exclude that new theory of liability on the
grounds that it would prejudice CLEAResult and delay the
trial. The court did not abuse its discretion in precluding
NEXT from arguing this theory at trial.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of
the district court.

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