Matthew Metzler v. Loyola University Chicago

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-2956
M ATTHEW M ETZLER ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LOYOLA U NIVERSITY C HICAGO,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 18-cv-7335 — Steven C. Seeger, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED SEPTEMBER 22, 2025 — DECIDED J ANUARY 13, 2026
____________________
Before EASTERBROOK, R OVNER , and S T. EVE, Circuit Judges.
ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Loyola University Chicago expelled
Matthew Metzler in January 2017 after the University found
him culpable for sexual misconduct. Metzler sued Loyola,
claiming his expulsion amounted to unlawful sex discrimina-
tion under Title IX and a breach of contract. The district court
granted summary judgment to Loyola, reasoning there was
insufficient evidence to support a finding of sex

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2 No. 24-2956
discrimination for either a Title IX violation or Metzler’s con-
tract claim. We affirm.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
After Metzler and a fellow undergraduate student, pseu-
donymously named Jane Roe, met on a shuttle bus, the two
arranged a first date. This set off a short relationship involv-
ing three relevant encounters in mid-January 2016. Metzler
and Roe agree they engaged in sexual activity. But according
to Roe, Metzler pressured her into many sexual acts, without
obtaining her consent and over her protestations.
Roe described the events days later to her athletic coach,
which in turn led to a January 26 meeting with Loyola’s Dep-
uty Title IX Coordinator, Rabia Khan Harvey. Roe and Khan
Harvey discussed the incidents, but Roe said she did not want
to move forward with a formal complaint. Khan Harvey, sum-
marizing their conversation that day, wrote that although Roe
“doesn’t believe she was forced or coerced, she performed
oral sex on the accused student and now feels that he is trying
to manipulate the situation by accusing her that she’ll report
that he raped her.”
Later in the spring semester, Roe saw Metzler at an athletic
facility and met with the Title IX coordinator for athletics, Jay
Malcolm, to report her distress. Malcolm explained that given
the lack of a formal complaint, Loyola had limited options to
address her concerns.
The following fall, Roe saw Metzler again and reported to
Malcom that she felt unsafe. She expressed interest in trans-
ferring schools due to the anxiety of knowing she might run
into Metzler. Roe also met with Khan Harvey’s interim

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No. 24-2956 3
replacement, Tim Love. In late October, she decided to file a
complaint against Metzler.
Roe’s complaint triggered student misconduct procedures
outlined by Loyola’s community standards, which the parties
agree bound them as a contractual agreement. After notifying
Metzler of the complaint against him, Love assigned two Loy-
ola officials to investigate the accusations and prepare a final
investigation report. A hearing board composed of Loyola ad-
ministrators would consider that report and oversee a pro-
ceeding involving Roe and Metzler before resolving her com-
plaint. Love discussed this process in a meeting with Metzler.
Around the same time Roe filed her complaint, a former Loy-
ola student who had connected with Roe over allegedly simi-
lar experiences also filed a complaint against Metzler. Love
explained to Metzler that though the same investigators
would work on the report for each complaint, distinct hearing
boards would oversee the complaints to ensure fairness and
proper focus.
The investigators interviewed Roe and Metzler separately
in early December 2016, and they made audio recordings of
the interviews. During his interview, Metzler provided the
names of two potential witnesses. The first, Metzler’s room-
mate, was nearby before and during the first of the three inci-
dents. After that first incident, Metzler and Roe then visited
the second potential witness, according to Metzler’s appeal.
The investigators did not interview either individual, but they
did interview Roe’s roommate, to whom Roe confided her ac-
count of the events. They also considered evidence, provided
by Metzler, of text messages between Roe and Metzler.
The investigators and Love prepared the final investiga-
tion report, with Love drafting the “History of the Case”

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4 No. 24-2956
section. Although that section represented that Roe had met
with Khan Harvey, it did not relay Khan Harvey’s description
of Roe’s account, namely that Roe did not believe Metzler had
forced or coerced her. The report contained Metzler’s account
of the events, including that, in a conversation immediately
preceding the second incident, Metzler and Roe “mutually
agreed that they had moved fast physically and ‘that no one
was coerced.’” An investigator sent Metzler a draft of the final
investigation report for his review and input. Aside from not-
ing an additional fact not material here as “the only change
[he] would somehow incorporate,” Metzler wrote back “con-
firm[ing]” that the report “accurately represent[ed] [his] per-
spective from the interviews.”
Two days later, Metzler and Roe appeared before the hear-
ing board. Each brought an advisor, who was limited to play-
ing a minimal, supportive role. The chair of the hearing board
outlined that neither Metzler nor Roe could cross-examine
one another, but they could propose questions for the board
to ask the other party. They also could provide uninterrupted
closing statements to the board, review documents concern-
ing the alleged violations, and refute any information.
During the proceeding, the board’s chair raised Metzler’s
account that, as written in the report Metzler reviewed and
approved, he and Roe “mutually agreed that they had moved
fast physically and ‘that no one was coerced’” in a conversa-
tion preceding the second incident. When the chair asked
Metzler how the subject of coercion came up in this conversa-
tion, however, Metzler responded that the subject did not
arise. Metzler said the quotation marks around “no one was
coerced” misrepresented his comment to the investigators as
stating a precise topic of discussion. After the chair turned to

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No. 24-2956 5
one of the investigators for input, the investigator said they
had intentionally put the phrase in quotation marks because
Metzler repeatedly used that language in describing what he
and Roe agreed upon in their conversation. Metzler’s hearing
regarding the second complaint took place later that same
day.
A few days later, the hearing board overseeing Roe’s com-
plaint issued a letter of decision. The board found Metzler “re-
sponsible for engaging in non-consensual sexual contact and
non-consensual sexual penetration” and ordered Metzler ex-
pelled. The board rested its rationale largely on Roe’s stronger
credibility. While Roe presented a consistent account and
even provided information against her interest, including by
correcting the investigation report to indicate she at points re-
moved some of her clothing herself, the board questioned
Metzler’s credibility given his apparent inconsistency on
whether he discussed coercion with Roe. In light of the gov-
erning preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, the board
adopted Roe’s account for the purpose of assessing whether
Metzler violated the community standards.
The board overseeing the second complaint issued a deci-
sion letter the same day. It found Metzler not responsible for
any alleged policy violations.
Metzler appealed the decision on Roe’s complaint. His ap-
peal criticized the board for not considering his two witnesses
and the transcript of his interview with the investigators. Dur-
ing the appeal, Roe heard about Metzler’s presence on cam-
pus and complained to Love, who apologized for not inform-
ing her beforehand that the University had stayed Metzler’s
expulsion pending the decision on his appeal. The appeals of-
ficer affirmed the board’s decision in January 2017 on the basis

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6 No. 24-2956
Metzler had not established any of the three grounds justify-
ing reversal: new substantive information not previously dis-
coverable, a “substantive procedural error” denying the re-
spondent the right to a fair hearing, or a finding manifestly
contrary to the evidence. Loyola reinstated its expulsion. Af-
ter informing Roe of the outcome, Love shared with col-
leagues his impression that they could “expect continued pos-
itive relations and partnership with [Roe] and the survivor
community moving forward.”
B. Procedural Background
Metzler filed suit against Loyola in November 2018 under
the pseudonym John Doe. He brought claims for violation of
Title IX and breach of contract. The parties filed cross-motions
for summary judgment, and the district court granted sum-
mary judgment for Loyola. Metzler appealed. We remanded
the case for the district court to determine whether Metzler
could proceed anonymously and whether Metzler’s gradua-
tion from a separate undergraduate institution rendered his
claims moot. See Doe v. Loyola Univ. Chi., 100 F.4th 910, 914
(7th Cir. 2024).
On remand, the district court ruled Metzler could no
longer proceed under the pseudonym John Doe, and Metzler
chose to continue litigation under his legal name. The district
court also found Metzler’s claims constituted a live contro-
versy.1 Assured of its jurisdiction, the district court then
1 The district court found Metzler’s claim for compensatory damages
justiciable in light of lost income and an application fee attributable to his
expulsion. The court similarly found Metzler’s claim for injunctive relief
justiciable, referencing caselaw holding claims seeking expungement of

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No. 24-2956 7
issued an amended judgment in favor of Loyola. Metzler ap-
peals.
II. Discussion
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo. Vassileva v. City of Chicago, 118 F.4th 869, 873 (7th Cir.
2024) (citing Lewis v. Ind. Wesleyan Univ., 36 F.4th 755, 759 (7th
Cir. 2022)). In doing so, “we construe all facts and make all
reasonable inferences in the non-moving party’s favor.” Id.
(quoting Parkey v. Sample, 623 F.3d 1163, 1165 (7th Cir. 2010)).
We affirm “summary judgment only if ‘the pleadings, depo-
sitions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, to-
gether with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genu-
ine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’” Gupta v. Melloh, 19
F.4th 990, 997 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “[A]
movant may prevail at summary judgment by showing an ab-
sence of evidence to support the non-movant’s claims.” Up-
church v. Indiana, 146 F.4th 579, 586 (7th Cir. 2025) (citing Ce-
lotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986)).
Metzler appeals the district court’s judgment with respect
to both his Title IX and contract claims, so we consider each
in turn.
A. Title IX Claim
A plaintiff proves a Title IX claim by showing “(1) the ed-
ucational institution received federal funding, (2) [the]
disciplinary violations constitute a live controversy. See Doe v. Purdue
Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 666 (7th Cir. 2019); Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 825
(9th Cir. 2007). We are satisfied Metzler’s claims are not moot.

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8 No. 24-2956
plaintiff was excluded from participation in or denied the
benefits of an educational program, and (3) the educational
institution in question discriminated against [the] plaintiff
based on gender.” Doe v. Univ. of S. Ind., 43 F.4th 784, 792 (7th
Cir. 2022) (alteration in original) (quoting Doe v. Columbia Coll.
Chi., 933 F.3d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 2019)); see 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
Loyola does not dispute the first two elements; Loyola re-
ceived federal funding and denied Metzler educational bene-
fits by expelling him. See Gash v. Rosalind Franklin Univ., 117
F.4th 957, 961 (7th Cir. 2024). Therefore, Metzler’s claim de-
pends on whether Loyola discriminated against him “on the
basis of sex.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a); see Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928
F.3d 652, 667 (7th Cir. 2019).
To avoid summary judgment, Metzler must show there is
enough evidence in the record from which a reasonable fact-
finder could conclude “the university discriminated against
[him] ‘on the basis of sex.’” See Purdue, 928 F.3d at 667–68
(quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)); accord Gash, 117 F.4th at 962. The
“ultimate inquiry must consider the totality of the circum-
stances.” Id. (quoting S. Ind., 43 F.4th at 792). Consistent with
this, we view the evidence holistically to assess an overall like-
lihood of discrimination rather than ask whether a “particular
piece of evidence proves the case by itself.” Gash, 117 F.4th at
962 (quoting Joll v. Valparaiso Cmty. Sch., 953 F.3d 923, 924 (7th
Cir. 2020)).
Title IX specifically prohibits sex discrimination, not
botched disciplinary proceedings. “Coming to the wrong an-
swer in deciding who was to blame for unwelcome events in
a romantic relationship, … or interviewing the wrong poten-
tial witnesses, or listening to too few or too many witnesses
… are of no concern under federal law unless the defendants

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No. 24-2956 9
treated men worse than women (or the reverse).” Doe v. Trs.
of Ind. Univ., 101 F.4th 485, 489 (7th Cir. 2024). For that reason,
“a plaintiff cannot prove gender discrimination by merely
identifying mistakes or imperfections in the process.” S. Ind.,
43 F.4th at 793.
Just as procedural errors are themselves inadequate to
support sex discrimination, so too are other sex-neutral is-
sues, like anti-respondent bias. See Gash, 117 F.4th at 965; Co-
lumbia Coll. Chi., 933 F.3d at 856. An error “facially divorced
from sex” or “no more suggestive of sex discrimination than
… of lawful alternative explanations, like incompetence, im-
patience, or pro-complainant bias” does not support a claim
of sex discrimination. Gash, 117 F.4th at 967 (citation modi-
fied). “[P]ro-victim or pro-complainant bias [] cannot support
a claim for sex discrimination because both men and women
can be victims of sexual assault.” Id. (citing S. Ind., 43 F.4th at
798 n.8).
Metzler relies on several categories of evidence to support
his claim.
1. Public Pressure
Metzler points to evidence of public pressure on Loyola to
support his sex-discrimination claim. We have held that evi-
dence of public pressure on a university concerning its han-
dling of sexual misconduct can be relevant to Title IX sex-dis-
crimination claims. Purdue, 928 F.3d at 668. This pressure may
motivate a university to demonstrate its vigorous

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10 No. 24-2956
enforcement of Title IX by discriminating against men ac-
cused of sexual assault. See id.2
As evidence of this pressure, Metzler cites policy guidance
the Department of Education shared in 2011 with universities
receiving federal funding and thus subject to Title IX in the
form of a “Dear Colleague” letter. Metzler is not the first
plaintiff to cite this guidance. See Gash, 117 F.4th at 962–63
(collecting cases). The letter encouraged schools to adopt “a
more rigorous approach to campus sexual misconduct
allegations” through measures like broadening the definition
of sexual harassment, applying a preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard, and prioritizing the resolution of sexual
harassment claims. Purdue, 928 F.3d at 668 (citing United
States Department of Education, Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter (2011),
https://perma.cc/4MQV-8RPC). The letter also suggested that
schools risked losing all federal funding if they did not
demonstrate vigorous enforcement of sexual misconduct
violations. See id. Metzler further cites pressure on Loyola
from student groups like Students for Reproductive Justice to
more strictly enforce sexual misconduct policies. He claims
2 The district court did not consider the evidence of public pressure
when considering Metzler’s Title IX claim, reasoning that generalized ev-
idence was only relevant if Metzler provided facts creating an inference of
sex bias in his specific proceeding. This view misapplies our totality-of-
the-circumstances test, the point of which is to consider all relevant cir-
cumstances. See Gash, 117 F.4th at 962 (“[T]he ‘ultimate inquiry must con-
sider the totality of the circumstances.’” (quoting S. Ind., 43 F.4th at 792)).
As explained below, however, considering the evidence of public pressure
does not change the outcome here.

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No. 24-2956 11
this pressure supports Loyola’s motive to tilt the disciplinary
process against men.
This evidence of public pressure is relevant to Metzler’s
Title IX claim. See id. at 669 (“The [‘Dear Colleague’] letter and
accompanying pressure gives John a story about why Purdue
might have been motivated to discriminate against males ac-
cused of sexual assault.”); S. Ind., 43 F.4th at 792. Still, Metzler
provides less evidence of a discriminatory motive than was
present in Purdue, to which he analogizes his case. There, un-
like here, contemporaneous federal investigations into the
university’s handling of sexual misconduct cases made the
public pressure “far from abstract.” Purdue, 928 F.3d at 668.
Even putting aside Metzler’s analogy, though, we have made
clear that “[p]ublic pressure is not enough on its own to sup-
port a claim of discrimination ….” S. Ind., 43 F.4th at 792 (first
citing Purdue, 928 F.3d at 669; and then citing Columbia Coll.
Chi., 933 F.3d at 855); see also Gash, 117 F.4th at 963 (same). A
plaintiff must also show evidence of discrimination “particu-
lar to his case.” See Columbia Coll. Chi., 933 F.3d at 855 (citing
Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 586 (6th Cir. 2018)); Purdue, 928 F.3d
at 669; S. Ind., 43 F.4th at 792. Metzler fails to do that here.
2. Credibility Assessment
Metzler also relies on the board’s credibility determination
to show sex bias in his proceeding. As Metzler notes, a mem-
ber of the hearing board later testified he was skeptical of
Metzler’s claim that Roe eagerly initiated sex given she char-
acterized the first incident as her first sexual experience. Metz-
ler describes the board member’s inference as “in line with
gender stereotypes” of women as passive and men as aggres-
sive. But the board member’s inference did not refer to this
sex-based stereotype. Instead, the board member based his

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12 No. 24-2956
inference on sexual inexperience. Even accepting the rele-
vance of a board member’s post-hoc rationalization, Metzler
does not contest the reasonableness of the board member’s in-
ference that sexually inexperienced persons are less likely to
eagerly and comfortably initiate sexual activity. Metzler does
not overcome that the board member’s inference was “di-
vorced from gender.” Columbia Coll. Chi., 933 F.3d at 856; see
Gash, 117 F.4th at 967.
Metzler also claims that the credibility determination itself
supports sex bias because it was incorrect. Showing the board
made an incorrect credibility determination is insufficient to
show sex bias, however; the plaintiff must show the board’s
decision to credit Roe was on the basis of sex. See S. Ind., 43
F.4th at 799; Gash, 117 F.4th at 967 (“Even if Gash is correct
that based on these facts the panel reached the wrong conclu-
sion [on credibility], he has not alleged facts that the panel did
so because he is male.”). And Metzler’s only evidence that the
board relied on gender in its credibility determination, as ad-
dressed above, is divorced from sex.
Metzler’s further assertion that the record supports sex
discrimination because the credibility determination was un-
reasonable similarly fails. Although we have suggested an er-
roneous determination in a “sufficiently lopsided” case may
support gender bias, we indicated such circumstances arise
where a board reached its determination “without an appar-
ent reason based in the evidence.” S. Ind., 43 F.4th at 799–800
(Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 57 (2d Cir. 2016)). Here,
the board made its credibility determination after hearing di-
rectly from Metzler and Roe. Cf. Purdue, 928 F.3d at 664. The
board also cited sound reasons for crediting Roe, such as her
offering statements against her interest and an apparent

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No. 24-2956 13
inconsistency in Metzler’s account. We do not hold a univer-
sity’s disciplinary board “to a higher standard than we hold
district courts,” id. at 800 (quoting Samford, 29 F.4th at 691),
and “[w]e give substantial deference to a district court’s cred-
ibility determinations,” United States v. Brown, 809 F.3d 371,
373 (7th Cir. 2016). Metzler does not point to evidence over-
coming this hurdle.
3. Procedural Errors
Metzler also points to procedural irregularities that he
claims cumulatively show Loyola’s effort to discriminate
against him based on sex. See S. Ind., 43 F.4th at 793. Metzler
must show these errors constitute “evidence of gender bias
rather than at most simply mistakes.” S. Ind., 43 F.4th at 799;
accord Gash, 117 F.4th at 965–66.
There are two facts that, viewed in the light most favorable
to Metzler, support a possible inference that Loyola breached
its own policies in Metzler’s proceeding. The first of these is
the more concerning of the two: neither the investigators nor
the hearing board considered Khan Harvey’s account of Roe’s
belief soon after the disputed events that she was not “forced
or coerced.” Khan Harvey’s report qualifies as “relevant in-
formation,” which the community standards charged the in-
vestigators with collecting for their final investigation report.
Metzler has no evidence, however, connecting this error to sex
bias, and the error alone does not create an issue of fact. We
have explained that an error is unpersuasive when it is “no
more suggestive of sex discrimination than it is of lawful al-
ternative explanations, like incompetence, impatience, or pro-
complainant bias.” Gash, 117 F.4th at 967. Metzler has no evi-
dence distinguishing the omission of Khan Harvey’s

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14 No. 24-2956
summary from a mistake based on incompetence, impatience,
or pro-complainant bias.
The second possible error concerns the investigators’ deci-
sion not to interview Metzler’s witnesses even as they inter-
viewed Roe’s roommate. This decision might have contra-
vened the policy that “investigators will interview … relevant
witnesses that can provide a firsthand account of something
… related to the alleged incident.” But again, Metzler presents
no evidence that this decision was tied to sex bias; he relies on
the decision itself. That may be more persuasive where a uni-
versity “refus[ed]” the respondent permission to present wit-
nesses. See id. at 965 (citing Purdue, 928 F.3d at 658). But, cru-
cially, Metzler does not claim he informed the investigators of
the witnesses’ relevance or asked the investigators to inter-
view the witnesses before he appealed the board’s unfavora-
ble decision—at which point he could prevail on only three
narrow grounds. Metzler’s claim therefore falls under our
warning that, absent evidence of sex bias, simply showing the
university “listen[ed] to too few … witnesses [is] of no con-
cern” under Title IX. Trs. of Ind., 101 F.4th at 489. To be sure,
some communication suggests Loyola was influenced by a
desire to reach a decision before the end of the fall semester.
But impatience is not sex bias. See Gash, 117 F.4th at 967.
Metzler argues that a number of other procedural irregu-
larities support sex bias, yet he lacks evidence not only con-
necting the purported irregularities to sex bias but also show-
ing them as irregularities at all. See S. Ind., 43 F.4th at 794 (re-
jecting alleged procedural irregularities that were “not errors
at all” or “applied equally to both” respondent and complain-
ant); see also Columbia Coll. Chi., 933 F.3d at 856 (rejecting alle-
gations of procedural deficiency not reflecting deficiency).

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No. 24-2956 15
Metzler notes Love communicated with Roe and the appeals
officer during the proceedings and that Love related the exist-
ence of a second complaint to a member of his hearing board,
but he does not connect these facts to sex bias. He also lacks
any evidence these communications deviated from any gov-
erning policy or practice. Metzler points to no rules barring
Love’s communications and Love still upheld his personal as-
surance to Metzler of two distinct hearing boards.
Similarly, Metzler’s complaint that the University deleted
the audio recording of his interview with investigators rings
hollow when there is no evidence Loyola acted on the basis of
sex. For example, there is no evidence Loyola treated Roe’s
recording differently. Nor does Metzler substantiate a proce-
dural error. In fact, the community standards provided that
the audio recordings would “not be shared beyond the
[i]nvestigators” and would be “retained as needed at the dis-
cretion of the university.” Without any evidence Loyola vio-
lated rules or norms, much less that these facts connect to sex
bias, this evidence provides no support for the conclusion that
Loyola flouted rules to discriminate against Metzler on the ba-
sis of sex.
Although Metzler has identified at most two procedural
errors—ignoring Khan Harvey’s report and failing to inter-
view his witnesses —he lacks evidence connecting those two
procedural errors to sex bias, leaving them indistinguishable
from mistakes. See S. Ind., 43 F.4th at 793. As we noted in Uni-
versity of Southern Indiana, “few trials in civil courts are error-
free, [and] appellate courts do not quickly infer that proce-
dural errors in a trial show the judge was biased.” Id. Nor can
Metzler fall back on the possibility that the sheer magnitude
of the procedural errors itself supports sex bias. See id. With

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16 No. 24-2956
these two errors alone and the process Loyola provided Metz-
ler, this is far from such a case. See id. at 799 (errors reflected
mistakes rather than sex bias); Gash, 117 F.4th at 967 (same).
Federal courts do not micro-manage disciplinary hearings for
universities.
4. Totality of the Circumstances
In aggregate, we are left with a background of non-indi-
vidualized pressure on all universities receiving federal fund-
ing, credibility determinations divorced from gender, and
two procedural errors that similarly lack an adequate eviden-
tiary connection to gender bias. When it comes to several
other purported procedural errors, Metzler lacks evidence
that they were in fact errors, much less reflect sex bias.
Though we view the record in the light most favorable to
Metzler, we do not fill in evidentiary holes with speculation.
See Overly v. KeyBank Nat. Ass'n, 662 F.3d 856, 864 (7th Cir.
2011) (citing Davis v. Carter, 452 F.3d 686, 697 (7th Cir. 2006)).
Considering the circumstances together, no reasonable fact-
finder could conclude Loyola discriminated against Metzler
on the basis of sex. Indeed, “‘generalized allegations’ about
‘the “Dear Colleague” letter,’ even when combined with alle-
gations of procedural impropriety,” do not support a claim of
sex discrimination under Title IX. Gash, 117 F.4th at 963 (quot-
ing Columbia Coll. Chi., 933 F.3d at 855–56)).
B. Breach of Contract
Metzler argues that, because the community standards
bound Metzler and Loyola, Loyola breached that contract by
expelling him through a disciplinary proceeding inconsistent
with the community standards. Metzler acknowledges that
Loyola could expel him for breaching the community

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No. 24-2956 17
standards and that, in light of Loyola’s academic discretion,
we only find a breach when a university’s decision is “without
any rational basis.” Columbia Coll. Chi., 933 F.3d at 858 (citing
Frederick v. Nw. Univ. Dental Sch., 617 N.E.2d 382, 387 (Ill.
1993)). These circumstances arise when a university “did not
exercise its academic judgment at all, instead acting arbitrar-
ily or in bad faith in its treatment of plaintiff.” Id. (quoting
Raethz v. Aurora Univ., 805 N.E.2d 696, 700 (Ill. 2004)); Gash,
117 F.4th at 968. Metzler argues that he meets this standard by
proving gender was a motivating factor in Loyola’s decision
to expel him. Because Metzler relies on his Title IX argument,
we reject this contract claim for the same reasons we reject his
Title IX claim.
Metzler’s second theory of contractual liability, that Loy-
ola lacked a rational basis in expelling him because the Uni-
versity made its decision in order to placate Roe and campus
activists, also fails. Metzler acknowledges Loyola only needs
a rational basis for expulsion and that his breach of the com-
munity standards would entitle the University to expel him.
But identifying procedural errors does not negate a rational
basis. Even if his proceeding suffered from errors, a substan-
tiated accusation of sexual misconduct constituted a rational
basis. Metzler does not muster evidence to displace that con-
clusion.
* * *
It is not this court’s responsibility to provide a “fourth fo-
rum[] … to decide what actually happened” between Metzler
and Roe. See S. Ind., 43 F.4th at 792. “Coming to the wrong
answer in deciding who was to blame for unwelcome events
in a romantic relationship … [is] of no concern to federal law
unless the defendants treated men worse than women ….”

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18 No. 24-2956
Trs. of Ind., 101 F.4th at 489. Metzler did not marshal enough
evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude
that Loyola made its disciplinary decision on the basis of sex.
* * *
The judgment of the district court is
A FFIRMED.

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