United States of America v. Samuel U. Aniukwu

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted January 20, 2026
Decided January 21, 2026
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 24-3134
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
SAMUEL U. ANIUKWU,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:20-CR-00352(1)
Steven C. Seeger,
Judge.
O R D E R
Samuel Aniukwu pleaded guilty to wire fraud and money laundering and was
sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment. He filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed
counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Counsel explains the nature of the case and
addresses the potential issues that an appeal like this could involve. Because the
analysis appears thorough, we limit our review to the subjects that counsel discusses,
see United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014), and the issues that Aniukwu
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-3134 Page 2
raises in his response brief, see C IR . R. 51(b). We grant the motion and dismiss the
appeal.
From 2017 through 2020, Aniukwu and other individuals participated in three
fraudulent schemes to bilk more than a dozen victims out of at least $1.6 million. In an
inheritance scam, he and his co-defendants—pretending to be bank employees—
convinced victims they were beneficiaries of a large inheritance and directed them to
pay fees to claim the funds. In a romance scam, Aniukwu and his co-defendants entered
into online dating relationships with victims, often widows, whom they persuaded to
send them money. In a business-email scam, he worked to compromise the email
accounts of legitimate companies, blocking or redirecting communications to and from
the accounts, and inducing victim companies to wire them money under false
pretenses.
Aniukwu pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and one
count of money laundering, 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a). The plea agreement provided that the
government would seek a downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 if satisfied with
Aniukwu’s cooperation.
Ahead of sentencing, a probation officer prepared a presentence investigation
report that calculated a guidelines range of 87 to 108 months’ imprisonment based on a
total offense level of 29 and a criminal history category of I. A key factor in the
assessment of Aniukwu’s total offense level was an 18-level enhancement based on
intended loss between $3.5 and $9.5 million. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(J).
In his sentencing memorandum, Aniukwu argued for a sentence of time
served—approximately 36 months—emphasizing his cooperation with the government
and first-time offender status. In its memorandum, the government sought a term of
87 months’ imprisonment and 3 years’ supervised release. The government explained
that it would not file a motion for a downward departure under § 5K1.1 because
Aniukwu had made false statements during his interviews that put his credibility into
question, dissuading the government from calling him as a witness at his
co-conspirator’s trial.
At sentencing, the district judge accepted the calculations in the PSR and
imposed an above-guidelines sentence of 120 months’ imprisonment, 3 years’
supervised release, and $865,976.88 in restitution. The judge discussed the factors under
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), emphasizing that this was a serious crime committed over three
years in which Aniukwu used his intelligence to prey on innocent and vulnerable

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No. 24-3134 Page 3
people, many of whom were elderly and whose life savings were all but wiped out by
his actions. The judge acknowledged that Aniukwu lacked any prior criminal history
and had cooperated with the government at some risk to his family in Nigeria, but he
sentenced Aniukwu above the guidelines range because the financial impact of his
crimes on the victims was “nothing less than devastating.”
In her Anders brief, counsel first informs us that she consulted with Aniukwu
about the risks and benefits of challenging his guilty plea and confirmed that he does
not wish to do so. See United States v. Larry, 104 F.4th 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 2024). Counsel
therefore properly omits discussion of whether the plea was knowing and voluntary. Id.
Counsel considers whether Aniukwu could challenge the guidelines calculation,
as the range calculated by the probation officer and adopted by the district court
exceeded the range contemplated in his plea agreement. But counsel appropriately
rejects this argument. By the time the probation officer prepared the PSR, the
government’s investigation revealed a higher amount of intended loss, resulting in an
18-level rather than a 16-level enhancement. See § 2B1.1(b)(1)(J). Aniukwu waived the
right to challenge the guidelines calculation on appeal when he stated at his sentencing
hearing that he did not object to the updated loss amount and affirmatively agreed with
all other aspects of the guidelines calculations. See United States v. Robinson, 964 F.3d
632, 641 (7th Cir. 2020).
Counsel also correctly concludes that any challenge to the government’s failure
to file a § 5K1.1 motion would be frivolous. This exercise of prosecutorial discretion is
proper if it is rationally related to a legitimate government end and not based on an
unconstitutional motive. United States v. Miller, 458 F.3d 603, 605 (7th Cir. 2006). The
government’s decision not to file a § 5K1.1 motion based on Aniukwu’s lack of
credibility as a witness was rational and within the government’s discretion. See id.
(government’s refusal to file § 5K1.1 motion based on defendant’s lack of forthrightness
was rationally related to legitimate end). For his part, Aniukwu contends that the
government acted in bad faith by not filing a § 5K1.1 motion, in breach of the plea
agreement. But he presents no evidence of bad faith or unconstitutional motive, and the
plea agreement left within the government’s discretion the determination of whether
his cooperation sufficed.
Next, counsel examines and rightly rejects any argument regarding a
discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of Aniukwu’s sentence and the written
judgment. At sentencing, the judge imposed a term of 120 months’ imprisonment and
3 years’ supervised release. The written judgment specified that the sentence was

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120 months’ imprisonment on each of the two counts, to run concurrently, and 3 years’
supervised release on each of the two counts, to run concurrently. As counsel explains,
the written judgment only clarifies, rather than conflicts with, the oral pronouncement
at sentencing, so an argument on this ground would be frivolous. See United States v.
Harris, 51 F.4th 705, 721–22 (7th Cir. 2022).
Counsel also correctly concludes that Aniukwu cannot plausibly argue his
above-guidelines sentence is either substantively or procedurally unreasonable. The
court considered each § 3553(a) factor, discussing the seriousness of the offense and
Aniukwu’s background (noting his education, lack of prior criminal history,
cooperation with the government, and the threats his family experienced because of his
cooperation). The judge reasonably justified the above-guidelines sentence with
reference to the devastation suffered by the victims. See United States v. Hendrix, 74 F.4th
859, 871–72 (7th Cir. 2023). Having sufficiently explained the basis for the above-
guidelines sentence, the district judge committed no procedural error. Aniukwu urges
that the judge wrongly glossed over his cooperation with the government and gave too
much weight to aggravating factors, but Aniukwu’s disagreement with the weight the
judge imputed to the aggravating and mitigating factors does not make the sentence
substantively unreasonable. See United States v. Cook, 108 F.4th 574, 586 (7th Cir. 2024).
Counsel next asks whether Aniukwu could argue that the judge erred by not
considering his argument under 28 U.S.C. § 994(j) that prison is not normally
appropriate for a first-time offender like himself. But counsel rightly rejects this
argument as frivolous based on our precedent that the Guidelines generally account for
the appropriateness of withholding prison terms in less serious cases. United States v.
Lueddeke, 908 F.2d 230, 232–33 (7th Cir. 1990).
Finally, counsel considers and properly rejects any argument that the judge erred
by imposing supervised release. Aniukwu waived any potential challenge when he told
the judge at sentencing that he did not object to any supervised release conditions.
See United States v. Flores, 929 F.3d 443, 449 (7th Cir. 2019).
We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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