Yumarcus H. Anderson v. AMERICAN FOODS GROUP LLC and GREEN BAY DRESSED BEEF LLC

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted December 3, 2025*
Decided January 21, 2026
Before
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1069
YUMARCUS H. ANDERSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
AMERICAN FOODS GROUP LLC and
GREEN BAY DRESSED BEEF LLC,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 1:23-cv-1287-WCG
William C. Griesbach,
Judge.
O R D E R
Plaintiff YuMarcus Anderson, a former employee of Green Bay Dressed Beef
LLC, appeals from a summary judgment rejecting his claims of employment
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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discrimination. The district court concluded that Anderson presented insufficient
evidence to support his claims. We affirm.
We describe the events based on the properly submitted evidence, viewed in the
light most favorable to Anderson and in accord with the district court’s local rules.
See Flint v. City of Belvidere, 791 F.3d 764, 767 (7th Cir. 2015); E.D. WIS. L.R. 56(b)(4).
Anderson, who is African American, worked at Green Bay Dressed Beef LLC in its
meat-processing plant. In November 2020, Anderson was called the N-word by a Latino
co-worker in front of other employees. A couple of weeks later, Anderson approached
his supervisor who was discussing a workplace injury with a white co-worker in the
lunchroom. The co-worker called Anderson the N-word and told him to mind his own
business.
The following spring, Anderson requested non-powdered rubber gloves because
he had eczema. A foreman told Anderson he was acting like a “little girl.” Anderson
filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, invoking the
“little girl” and N-word comments and alleging harassment based on his race, sex, and
medical condition.
Several months after filing the complaint, the same foreman who made the
“little girl” comment approached Anderson and told Anderson that he had dropped
something. When Anderson looked down, the foreman held up a pair of women’s
underwear, prompting laughter from other employees.
Soon after that, Anderson was fired for insubordination after threatening and
swearing at a supervisor. He later filed a second complaint with the EEOC describing
the underwear incident and the circumstances of his discharge.
Anderson sued Green Bay Dressed Beef LLC, and its parent company, American
Foods Group LLC, for employment discrimination. He alleged that they violated
Title VII by creating a hostile work environment based on his race and sex, by
retaliating against him for filing a complaint, and by firing him because of his race and
sex. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3, 2000e-5. He also alleged retaliation under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12203, as well as violations of several other
laws, 18 U.S.C. §§ 242 & 1514; 42 U.S.C. § 1981; 41 C.F.R. § 60-20.8.
The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all
claims. Because Anderson responded to the defendants’ motion with arguments only
about the Title VII claims, the court deemed his arguments about the remaining claims

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No. 25-1069 Page 3
waived. The court also accepted as true the defendants’ proposed facts because
Anderson failed to respond to them under Rule 56(b)(4) of the Eastern District of
Wisconsin’s Local Rules. On the merits of Anderson’s Title VII claims, the court granted
summary judgment for the defendants because he failed to provide sufficient evidence
from which a reasonable jury could find that he faced severe or pervasive harassment
related to his race or sex; that he engaged in a protected activity that led to his firing; or
that his race or sex contributed to his firing.
On appeal, Anderson first challenges the district court’s decision to enforce Local
Rule 56(b)(4). He maintains that a more lenient approach to filing requirements should
apply to pro se litigants like him. District courts have discretion to enforce their local
rules strictly, even against pro se litigants. See Robinson v. Waterman, 1 F.4th 480, 483
(7th Cir. 2021). Regardless, Anderson’s summary-judgment response did not question
the defendants’ version of the facts, so we see no abuse of discretion in the court’s
application of the rule.
On the merits, Anderson argues that the district court either overlooked or
wrongly discounted favorable evidence supporting his Title VII claims. For his
race-based hostile work environment claim, for instance, he points to evidence that
management did not discipline the co-workers who called him the N-word. To hold his
employer liable for a hostile work environment, Anderson must show that (1) he was
subject to unwelcome harassment; (2) the harassment was based on his race; (3) the
harassment was severe or pervasive to a degree that it altered the conditions of his
employment; and (4) there is a basis to hold the employer itself liable. Gates v. Bd. of
Educ. of the City of Chicago, 916 F.3d 631, 636 (7th Cir. 2019).
Anderson is correct that an employee may hold his employer liable for failing to
address his co-workers’ use of racial epithets. See Paschall v. Tube Processing Corp., 28
F.4th 805, 815 (7th Cir. 2022). But Anderson’s claim fails for a separate reason: he has not
shown that the two incidents subjected him to severe or pervasive harassment based on
the totality of the circumstances. See id. To assess this element, we consider the
frequency of the harassment, how offensive a reasonable person would find it, whether
it is physically threatening or humiliating (rather than verbal abuse), whether it
unreasonably interferes with the employee’s work, and whether it is directed at the
employee. Scaife v. United States Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 49 F.4th 1109, 1116 (7th Cir.
2022).
Although some factors weigh in Anderson’s favor, the totality of the
circumstances does not warrant reversal. Anderson maintains that two co-workers

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called him the N-word on separate occasions in front of other employees and a
supervisor. True, the N-word is so egregious that a one-time use can trigger Title VII
liability in some circumstances. Id. And here the slur was directed at Anderson twice
without remedial action from defendants even though a supervisor witnessed at least
one incident. But that is where the support for Anderson’s claim ends and the
weaknesses begin. For one, neither of the incidents involved physical threats or
humiliation. See Nichols v. Michigan City Plant Plan. Dep't, 755 F.3d 594, 601 (7th Cir.
2014). And Anderson points to no properly submitted evidence establishing that these
two incidents unreasonably interfered with his work performance. Id. Furthermore,
both incidents occurred very early in Anderson’s employment, weeks apart, and the
record lacks any indication that Anderson complained about his employer’s inaction
following either incident. Ford v. Minteq Shapes & Servs., Inc., 587 F.3d 845, 847–48 (7th
Cir. 2009) (concluding that the harassment the plaintiff complained of was not severe
enough to alter his working conditions because he reported the issue only once in
fourteen months and failed to follow up when the employer took no action within
seven months of his complaint). Based on the totality of these circumstances, Anderson
has not presented evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that defendants’
failure to discipline his co-workers for their use of the N-word on two separate
occasions created an environment so severe as to alter the conditions of his
employment. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998).
For the sex-based hostile work environment claim, Anderson argues that the
district court minimized the significance of the foreman’s “little girl” comment and
underwear prank. Employers are generally not liable for off-color comments, isolated
incidents, or teasing by coworkers. Anderson v. Street, 104 F.4th 646, 652 (7th Cir. 2024).
Although the foreman’s behavior was obnoxious and entirely inappropriate, no facts
suggest that his conduct in these two encounters interfered with Anderson’s ability to
do his job.
For the retaliation claim, Anderson argues that the district court (1) erred in
finding that his EEOC complaint was not a protected activity and (2) overlooked
evidence that he was fired days after speaking with management about further action
with the EEOC, which supports an inference of causation between the protected activity
and his firing. The court found that Anderson’s complaint was not a protected activity
because the court found no actionable harassment.
Anderson notes correctly that a retaliation claim does not fail just because the
complained-of conduct did not actually violate Title VII. We have made this point time

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and again. See, e.g., Rongere v. City of Rockford, 99 F.4th 1095, 1104 (7th Cir. 2024); Fine v.
Ryan Int’l Airlines, 305 F.3d 746, 752 (7th Cir. 2002); Mattson v. Caterpillar, Inc., 359 F.3d
885, 891 (7th Cir. 2004) (underlying claim “must not be utterly baseless”); see also
Seventh Circuit Pattern Civil Jury Inst. 3.02 (comment c). This long line of cases shows
that what matters is whether the record supports the plaintiff’s objectively reasonable
belief that the employer discriminated against him. Even so, Anderson’s claim still fails
on causation because the record nowhere bears out his contention that he spoke with
management about filing another EEOC complaint or that management otherwise
learned of such a complaint before Anderson was fired.
Finally, for the wrongful termination claim, Anderson argues that the court
improperly resolved a credibility dispute in the defendants’ favor by accepting as non-
pretextual their explanation that he was fired for insubordination. But Anderson
waived this argument by raising it for the first time on appeal. See Bradley v. Village of
University Park, 59 F.4th 887, 897 (7th Cir. 2023).
We have reviewed Anderson’s remaining arguments, and none has merit.
AFFIRMED

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