United States of America v. Lester Crowder

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-2143
U NITED STATES OF A MERICA ,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
LESTER C ROWDER ,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 20-CR-00066-1 — Martha M. Pacold, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED MAY 14, 2025 — D ECIDED J ANUARY 22, 2026
____________________
Before SYKES , J ACKSON-A KIWUMI, and P RYOR , Circuit
Judges.
P RYOR , Circuit Judge. A jury convicted Lester Crowder un-
der the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952, for using an interstate fa-
cility to promote bribery in violation of Illinois law. On ap-
peal, Crowder argues the district court erroneously omitted
an element of the offense in the jury instructions, the govern-
ment did not present sufficient evidence for his convictions,

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2 No. 24-2143
and the Illinois bribery statute is unconstitutional. Because
Crowder’s arguments do not warrant reversal, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Lester Crowder is a former City of Harvey, Illinois, build-
ing inspector who grew up alongside the City’s Mayor, Eric
Kellogg, and the Mayor’s two brothers, Derrick Muhammad
and Rommell Kellogg. Crowder’s employment with the City
concluded in January 2014.
Dennis DeZutter is the general manager of a strip club in
the City and a confidential informant for the FBI. In January
2018, in cooperation with an FBI investigation, DeZutter ex-
pressed to Rommell Kellogg an interest in opening a new strip
club; Rommell replied that he could “make that happen” and
introduced DeZutter to Crowder.
DeZutter and Crowder first met on February 13, 2018, at a
potential site for the new club. They met eight times thereaf-
ter, with their last meeting at the end of April 2018. The gov-
ernment, through DeZutter, recorded video and audio of each
meeting, as well as calls and text messages between DeZutter
and Crowder. DeZutter and Crowder arranged their meet-
ings by text or phone call.
At their first meeting, Crowder told DeZutter that he
could “streamline the start-up” for “five and a thousand a
month.” When DeZutter asked about obtaining a building
permit, Crowder told DeZutter not to “worry about … that.”
DeZutter paid Crowder $5,000 when they met again on Feb-
ruary 23. At that meeting, Crowder showed DeZutter a City
inspector badge and instructed that “everything’s through
me.”

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No. 24-2143 3
When they next met on March 1, Crowder and DeZutter
again discussed the prospective site for the strip club, with
Crowder referencing involvement in the process by the City’s
lawyer and “planning development.” Two weeks later, on
March 15, Crowder and DeZutter reconvened and discussed
licensing paperwork, with Crowder suggesting that they list
the name of the Mayor’s cousin on paperwork because the
cousin was part of the “group.” He also asked DeZutter for
another $5,000.
At a meeting on April 11, Crowder showed DeZutter a
proposal addressed to the planning department, which in-
cluded the names of individuals who were close to the Mayor
and Crowder. Crowder told DeZutter he would need “ten
stacks” to continue to “streamline” the process and “take care
of some people.” While discussing financials and the plan-
ning department proposal, Crowder told DeZutter, “this goes
upstairs,” in an apparent reference to the location of the build-
ing where Mayor Kellogg and other officials worked.
Crowder later asked for an additional $10,000, which he ex-
plained would go to the alderman of the second ward. He re-
assured DeZutter that he was going to “handle all … these
people.”
Two days later, on April 13, DeZutter asked whether the
alderman could attend their next meeting, acknowledging
Crowder’s earlier representation that the alderman would re-
ceive $10,000. Crowder rejected the request, reassured DeZut-
ter that “the license” was under discussion, and suggested
that Mayor Kellogg had been included in conversations.
Crowder warned that the process could not continue “with-
out us doing the steps” and clarified that he did not “set the
numbers.”

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4 No. 24-2143
At their next meeting, on April 17, DeZutter paid Crowder
$2,500. Crowder expressed frustration at the amount and
stated he would take the money “upstairs.” DeZutter paid
Crowder another $2,500 on April 19. Crowder again told De-
Zutter the money would go “upstairs,” remarked that he and
DeZutter would “owe” an additional $3,000, and gave DeZut-
ter a revised proposal addressed to the City. DeZutter paid
Crowder the final $3,000 at their last meeting on April 27. In
total, DeZutter paid Crowder $13,000.
B. Procedural History
A grand jury charged Crowder with five counts of using a
facility in interstate commerce (i.e., a cell phone) with intent
to promote or facilitate the promotion of an unlawful activity
(i.e., bribery in violation of Illinois law), and thereafter per-
forming or attempting to perform an act to facilitate the pro-
motion of such unlawful activity. See 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3)
(the Travel Act). Each count corresponded to a phone call or
text message through which Crowder and DeZutter arranged
a meeting where Crowder accepted or agreed to accept
money from DeZutter.
The case proceeded to trial. The district court instructed
the jury that the government was required to prove the fol-
lowing elements of a Travel Act violation beyond a reasona-
ble doubt:
(1) The defendant used or caused to be used a
facility in interstate commerce;
(2) The defendant did so with intent to promote,
manage, carry on, or facilitate the promo-
tion, management, or carrying on of an

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No. 24-2143 5
unlawful activity, namely, bribery, in viola-
tion of Illinois law; and
(3) Thereafter the defendant did or attempted to
promote, manage, establish, or carry on an
unlawful activity, or facilitated or attempted
to facilitate the promotion, management, es-
tablishment, or carrying on of an unlawful
activity, namely bribery in violation of Illi-
nois law.
Because the last two elements of the instruction referenced
“bribery in violation of Illinois law,” the district court in-
structed the jury as follows:
Under Illinois law, a person commits the offense
of bribery when he receives, retains, or agrees to
accept any property or personal advantage
knowing that the property or personal ad-
vantage was tendered or promised with intent
to cause him to influence the performance of
any act related to the employment or function of
a public officer or public employee. The Illinois
bribery law does not require that the defendant
ever intended to pay a bribe.
The district court did not instruct the jury that bribery also
requires that the defendant was “not authorized by law to ac-
cept” the property in question. 720 ILL . C OMP. STAT . 5/33-1(d).
The parties agreed that this “not authorized by law” require-
ment presented an issue of law for the court to resolve and
not an issue of fact for the jury.
The jury found Crowder guilty of all five counts, and the
district court denied Crowder’s motions for a judgment of

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6 No. 24-2143
acquittal, which Crowder made both after the government’s
case-in-chief and following the jury’s verdict. The district
court sentenced Crowder to 14 months in prison, and this ap-
peal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
Crowder seeks reversal of his convictions because (1) there
was insufficient evidence on which to convict him; (2) the dis-
trict court omitted an element of the offense from the jury in-
structions; and (3) the Illinois bribery statute is unconstitu-
tionally vague. For the reasons below, we reject each of
Crowder’s arguments.
A. Sufficiency of Evidence
Crowder argues the government failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he (1) was “not authorized by law” to
accept the money from DeZutter; (2) used a facility in inter-
state commerce to promote bribery in violation of Illinois law;
and (3) had the requisite mens rea.
“We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion
for a judgment of acquittal.” United States v. Sorensen, 134
F.4th 493, 497 (7th Cir. 2025). “[P]ractically speaking, how-
ever, the standard of review is that for sufficiency of the evi-
dence.” United States v. Peterson, 823 F.3d 1113, 1120 (7th Cir.
2016). In applying this standard, “[w]e consider the evidence
in the light most favorable to the government and affirm the
conviction if any rational trier of fact could find the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
1. “Not Authorized by Law”
Crowder was convicted of a Travel Act violation which
“occurs when a person uses any facility in interstate

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No. 24-2143 7
commerce with intent to promote or facilitate an unlawful ac-
tivity and thereafter promotes or facilitates the illegal activ-
ity.” United States v. Muskovsky, 863 F.2d 1319, 1326 (7th Cir.
1988) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)). The statute defines “‘unlaw-
ful activity’ as including ‘extortion, bribery, or arson in viola-
tion of the laws of the State in which committed or of the
United States.’” United States v. Cui, No. 24-2495, 2026 WL
73014, at *7 (7th Cir. Jan. 9, 2026) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b)).
“A Travel Act violation consists of three basic elements: (1)
traveling in, or using a facility of, interstate or foreign com-
merce, (2) with the intent to commit a specified unlawful act,
and (3) thereafter performing or attempting to perform that
act.” United States v. Dvorkin, 799 F.3d 867, 876 (7th Cir. 2015).
Here, the jury found Crowder committed a Travel Act vi-
olation by promoting bribery, in violation of Illinois law. Un-
der Illinois law, bribery occurs where, among other things, the
defendant receives or agrees to accept property which he “is
not authorized by law to accept” while knowing the property
was tendered or promised with intent to cause the defendant
to influence the performance of a public official or employee.
720 ILL . C OMP. STAT . 5/33-1(d).
Crowder argues the government did not prove he was
“not authorized by law” to accept DeZutter’s money. In
Crowder’s view, the government needed to identify a specific
law, separate from the Illinois bribery statute, that prohibited
him from receiving money from DeZutter. In other words,
Crowder believes the government needed to show he was pro-
hibited by law from accepting the money. Crowder also tacks
onto his argument a contention that the Illinois bribery statute
applies only to public officials who receive money but not pri-
vate citizens. Because Crowder was a private citizen when he

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8 No. 24-2143
accepted money from DeZutter, he argues the bribery statute
cannot apply to him.
Crowder’s arguments do not withstand the plain lan-
guage of the bribery statute. A defendant can be convicted of
bribery if the defendant receives property he is “not author-
ized by law to accept.” 720 ILL . C OMP. STAT . 5/33-1(d). In other
words, a defendant may be convicted when there is no legal
authority that would permit him to accept the property. Con-
versely, a defendant cannot be convicted if there is some legal
authorization permitting him to take the property. In People v.
Arriaga, for instance, an Illinois appellate court found a de-
fendant had a viable argument that she was authorized to ac-
cept money pursuant to a directive of the Secretary of State’s
office, and therefore that she was entitled to a jury instruction
on the “not authorized by law” requirement. 416 N.E.2d 418,
422 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
Unlike in Arriaga, Crowder identifies no legal authoriza-
tion permitting him to accept the money given to him by De-
Zutter. Instead, he seeks to rewrite the Illinois bribery statute
to require the government to identify a law—separate from
the bribery statute—that prohibited him from receiving the
funds. Because this is not what the language of the statute re-
quires, we reject Crowder’s argument.
We also reject Crowder’s suggestion that only a public of-
ficial can commit bribery under provision (d) of the Illinois
bribery statute. The statute expressly applies to a “person.”
720 ILL . C OMP. STAT . 5/33-1. It is not limited to cover only the
conduct of public officials. And although § 33-1(d) requires
the “person” accepting the property to have known the prop-
erty was given with intent to cause the “person” to influence
the performance of a public official, it contains no language

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No. 24-2143 9
requiring that the “person” himself be a public official. See 720
ILL . C OMP. STAT . 5/33-1(d).
2. Facility in Interstate Commerce
Crowder also argues his Travel Act conviction must be re-
versed because his use of a facility of interstate commerce was
too incidental to the illegal activity here, particularly given
that he did not solicit bribes over the phone.
To establish the Travel Act violation charged in the indict-
ment, the government was required to prove Crowder used a
facility in interstate commerce with intent to promote bribery
in violation of Illinois law. Importantly, the use of the inter-
state facility “must relate significantly, rather than inci-
dentally or minimally, to the illegal activity.” United States v.
Raineri, 670 F.2d 702, 717 (7th Cir. 1982). “This does not mean,
however, that the interstate use must be indispensable to the
illegal activity; it is enough that the use facilitates the illegal
activity.” Muskovsky, 863 F.2d at 1327. For instance, a defend-
ant’s “use of the interstate telephone system to attain credit
card approvals” was deemed “significantly related” to illegal
activity when the ability to receive “prior approval of credit
card transactions facilitated the prostitution activities by en-
suring that payment for those activities would be forthcom-
ing.” Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, a defendant’s “mainte-
nance and regular use of a bank account” in another state sat-
isfied the interstate use requirement even though the defend-
ant could have pursued the illegal enterprise by using a bank
within the state. Raineri, 670 F.2d at 717–18.
Here, there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that
Crowder’s use of the telephone related significantly to bribery
under Illinois law. A telephone is a facility in interstate

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10 No. 24-2143
commerce, Muskovsky, 863 F.2d at 1321, and the government
offered evidence that Crowder used a telephone to arrange
the meetings at which he accepted or agreed to accept money
from DeZutter. The Travel Act does not require the govern-
ment to prove the defendant violated state law. United States
v. Campione, 942 F.2d 429, 434 (7th Cir. 1991). Instead, “the fed-
eral crime to be proved in § 1952 is use of the interstate facili-
ties in furtherance of the unlawful activity.” Id. Accordingly,
that Crowder did not solicit bribes over the phone did not ren-
der Crowder’s use of the telephone incidental to the illegal
activity. What matters is that Crowder’s use of the telephone
consistently facilitated bribery under Illinois law by serving
as the means through which Crowder coordinated the receipt
of payments. Id.
3. Mens Rea
Finally, Crowder argues the government did not offer suf-
ficient evidence of his intent to support a Travel Act convic-
tion, and that the intent requirements within the Travel Act
and Illinois bribery statutes cannot be simultaneously satis-
fied because they are “diametrically opposed.”
To prove intent under the Travel Act in this case, the gov-
ernment was required to prove Crowder intended to pro-
mote, manage, carry on, or facilitate bribery, in violation of
Illinois law. 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3). To commit bribery under
Illinois law, a defendant must have accepted or agreed to ac-
cept property knowing that the property was tendered or
promised with intent to cause the defendant to influence the
performance of any act related to the employment or function
of a public officer or employee. 720 ILL . C OMP. STAT . 5/33-1(d).
There is nothing incompatible about these requirements.

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No. 24-2143 11
Crowder argues, however, that he did not have the requi-
site intent under the Travel Act because he did not intend to
promote bribery under Illinois law and instead intended to
scam DeZutter by taking DeZutter’s money. Crowder also
testified to this effect, representing to the jury that he never
planned to bribe the Mayor with DeZutter’s money and in-
stead planned to keep the money for himself. But even assum-
ing Crowder’s story could undermine a finding of intent un-
der the Travel Act, “the trier of fact was entitled to disbelieve
[that] story.” United States v. Harris, 729 F.2d 441, 449 (7th Cir.
1984). Plus, Crowder acknowledges in his appellate brief that
he had been impeached on cross examination, conceding his
credibility was in question. The jury was permitted to dis-
credit Crowder’s testimony and find more probative the evi-
dence of Crowder’s communications with DeZutter.
Crowder also argues he did not accept DeZutter’s money
knowing it was tendered with intent for him to influence a
public official because, as he reasons, DeZutter was a confi-
dential informant and therefore did not truly intend bribery
to occur. But what matters is Crowder’s mindset, not DeZut-
ter’s. Proving that Crowder knew DeZutter intended his pay-
ments to be used to influence a public official does not require
proving that DeZutter’s subjective intent was in fact to influ-
ence a public official. In other words, the government was not
required to prove that Crowder’s understanding of DeZut-
ter’s intent was correct. And given the nature of the conversa-
tions between Crowder and DeZutter, a jury could reasonably
find Crowder knew that DeZutter intended his payments to
be used to influence public officials. Indeed, DeZutter ex-
pressly conveyed this intent to Crowder when acknowledg-
ing that some of his payments to streamline the strip club de-
velopment would be given to the alderman.

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12 No. 24-2143
Because the government presented sufficient evidence to
find Crowder, using his cell phone, intended to facilitate brib-
ery under Illinois law, the district court did not err in denying
Crowder’s motions for acquittal.
B. Jury Instructions
Crowder also seeks reversal of his convictions on the basis
that the district court omitted from the jury instructions the
“not authorized by law” requirement of bribery under Illinois
law. The government responds that this argument is waived.
A defendant waives an objection to jury instructions on
appeal when he affirmatively agrees to a proposed instruction
before the district court. United States v. Leal, 72 F.4th 262, 265–
66 (7th Cir. 2023). And, generally, a defendant who waives his
objection has no recourse and must live with the decision.
United States v. Morgan, 929 F.3d 411, 432 (7th Cir. 2019). That
is what happened here. Before the district court, defense
counsel expressly acknowledged that the parties omitted the
“not authorized by law” language from the proposed jury in-
structions “by design”; explained that the omission was based
on the comments to Illinois’ pattern instructions which pro-
vide that the “not authorized by law” requirement generally
poses a question of law rather than issue of fact for the jury;
and represented that it was the parties’ “collective opinion”
that there was no dispute of fact for the jury to decide. Because
defense counsel affirmatively agreed to omit the language
within the instruction, Crowder waived an objection to the
omission on appeal, extinguishing his right. United States v.
LeBeau, 949 F.3d 334, 342 (7th Cir. 2020).

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No. 24-2143 13
C. Unconstitutional Vagueness
Crowder’s final argument seeks reversal of his conviction
on the basis that Illinois’ bribery statute is unconstitutionally
vague in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. He again focuses on the “not authorized by law” re-
quirement, asserting that it is open to multiple reasonable in-
terpretations and therefore fails to provide notice of the con-
duct that is prohibited. He also contends the requirement
lacks clarity as to whether it applies only to public officials or
whether it can apply to private citizens.
The parties agree that Crowder’s constitutional argument
is subject to plain error review because Crowder did not raise
the argument before the district court. See United States v.
Schrode, 839 F.3d 545, 554 (7th Cir. 2016). Plain error review
requires a defendant to show that (1) there was an error; (2)
the error was plain; and (3) the error affected the defendant’s
substantial rights. United States v. Page, 123 F.4th 851, 864 (7th
Cir. 2024) (en banc). “If those three elements are met,” we
“may grant plain error relief only if … ‘the error had a serious
effect on the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.’” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quot-
ing Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503, 508 (2021)).
Finding no error, we reject Crowder’s constitutional
vagueness challenge. A criminal statute is unconstitutionally
vague if it (1) “fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the
conduct it punishes” or (2) is “so standardless that it invites
arbitrary enforcement.” Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591,
595 (2015). “[A] litigant challenging the statute ordinarily
must show that it is vague as applied to him; and if the statute
undoubtedly applies to his conduct, he will not be heard to
argue that the statute is vague as to one or more hypothetical

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14 No. 24-2143
scenarios.” United States v. Cook, 970 F.3d 866, 873 (7th Cir.
2020).
The plain language of the Illinois bribery statute indicates
that a defendant may commit bribery when the defendant’s
acceptance of funds was “not authorized by law.” 720 ILL .
C OMP. STAT . 5/33-1(d). That Crowder prefers to replace that
language with “prohibited by law” does not render the stat-
ute susceptible to competing reasonable interpretations. And
that Crowder believes the relevant portion of the statute only
proscribes the receipt of funds by a public official does not
render the statute vague, as the provision cannot reasonably
be construed in the manner Crowder proposes. The statute
applies to “[a] person.” Id.
We note Crowder also appears to suggest that the Illinois
bribery statute is unconstitutionally vague because
Crowder’s conduct may fall under two provisions of the brib-
ery statute and not merely provision (d), on which the jury
was instructed. This contention has no merit. When a provi-
sion under which a defendant was convicted “unambigu-
ously specif[ies] the activity proscribed,” it does not matter
that the defendant’s “conduct may violate [another law].”
United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979). Crowder is
not entitled to reversal on the basis of unconstitutional vague-
ness.
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we AFFIRM.

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