Bakul Dave v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, Carbondale

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted January 27, 2026*
Decided January 28, 2026
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1465
BAKUL DAVE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF SOUTHERN
ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY, CARBONDALE,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Illinois.
No. 3:18-cv-02122-GCS
Gilbert C. Sison,
Magistrate Judge.
O R D E R
Bakul Dave, formerly an associate professor of chemistry, sued his employer,
Southern Illinois University, alleging that the University violated his rights under the
substantive and anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-3, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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(ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). The district court granted the University’s motion for
summary judgment, concluding that Dave did not provide sufficient evidence of
discrimination or retaliation. We affirm.
We construe the evidence presented at summary judgment in the light most
favorable to Dave, drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor. Paterakos v. City of
Chicago, 147 F.4th 787, 795 (7th Cir. 2025). Since 1996, Dave worked at the University as
an associate professor of chemistry and achieved tenure in 2002. In that capacity, he
conducted research and taught CHEM 410–411, an inorganic chemistry class and lab
that he designed; CHEM 579, a graduate-level research course; and other graduate-level
courses. As a member of the faculty union, Dave was covered by a collective bargaining
agreement.
In May 2014, Dave was fired for allegedly sexually harassing a student. He was
instructed to retrieve any personal items from his office and laboratory, but he did not
comply. Some of the items he left behind were discarded, some equipment was
distributed to other faculty, and other items were stored in boxes that Dave refused to
collect. His office and laboratory were reassigned to other faculty members. The union
filed a grievance on Dave’s behalf. An arbitrator found that the University had not
established just cause to fire him and ordered the University to reinstate Dave.
Upon his return to campus in January 2016, Dave asked to be assigned to his
former office and laboratory, both of which were now occupied by other faculty. Dave
rejected the University’s alternative options, and so the University gave Dave identical
spaces across the hall. Dave then complained that he could not resume his research
without the equipment and materials from his former office and laboratory. After the
arbitrator ordered Dave to submit a list of the equipment and materials he needed,
Dave provided only a partial list of books.
In the spring, Dave met with the then-department chair, Dr. Gary Kinsel, to
discuss his teaching assignments for the upcoming academic year. Under Article 8 of
the collective bargaining agreement, the department chair is responsible for assigning
teaching duties each year, subject to the dean’s approval. The agreement requires the
chair to consider, among other things, the faculty member’s expertise and interest in
seeking tenure, and to discuss assignments with the faculty member. Upon the dean’s
approval, changes are authorized only in limited circumstances (e.g., death or disability
of a faculty member, employment of new faculty, increase or decrease in enrollment of
assigned courses, and grant funding).

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No. 25-1465 Page 3
At their meeting, Dave told Kinsel that he wanted to teach CHEM 410–411. But
when Dave was fired, those courses were assigned to Dr. Sean Moran, a newer faculty
member. According to Dave, Kinsel said that Moran would continue to teach those
courses because Kinsel was “giving preference to younger faculty members.” Kinsel
assigned Dave to teach CHEM 579 in the fall and CHEM 106, an introductory course for
non-science majors, in the spring. The dean approved Dave’s assignment.
Dr. Lichang Wang became the new department chair in August 2016 and met
with Dave that month to discuss his teaching assignment. Dave told Wang that he could
not teach CHEM 579 without his notes and items that had been in his old office and that
he had never taught CHEM 106. Wang offered course materials for CHEM 106, canceled
CHEM 579 for the fall semester (due to low enrollment), and sent Dave a new teaching
assignment that would give him more time to prepare: In the fall, Dave would not teach
any classes, and in the spring, he would teach both CHEM 106 and CHEM 579.
Four days before the spring semester started, Dave told Wang that he could not
teach his assigned courses because the University had not given him any resources. On
the first day of classes, Dave did not show up to teach. The University placed him on
unpaid administrative leave while it investigated whether disciplinary action was
warranted. The investigation concluded that Dave was assigned to teach CHEM 106
and CHEM 579 in the spring, knew of his assignment, and did not fulfill his teaching
duties. After notice and a hearing, the University fired Dave for cause in June 2017.
Meanwhile, Dave pursued multiple complaints with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. He had filed a complaint in April 2017, alleging that the
University’s decisions to reassign CHEM 410–411 and to suspend him without pay were
improperly motivated by race and age and were retaliatory. After he was fired in June,
he filed another complaint alleging that his dismissal was retaliatory and motivated by
his race, national origin, and age. He received right-to-sue notices and filed this lawsuit
in November 2018.
Dave sued the University, alleging that it violated his rights under Title VII and
the ADEA, and the University moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted the motion, explaining that Dave’s substantive Title VII claim failed under the
burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03
(1973), and the holistic approach of Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765–66
(7th Cir. 2016). Dave did not provide comparator evidence showing that the
University’s decisions to suspend and fire him were based on his race or national origin.
The court also determined that his teaching assignment was not an adverse

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employment action because Dave did not point to anything in the record from which a
reasonable juror could conclude that his assignment negatively impacted his career.
Moreover, the court found that the University did not retaliate against Dave
because he had not opposed any practice made unlawful by Title VII, like race or
national-origin discrimination. Moreover, although the filing of his April 2017 EEOC
complaint was a protected activity as to age discrimination, Dave had not presented
evidence to establish that but for the complaint, he would not have been fired.
Regarding the ADEA claim, the court concluded that Dave did not provide
enough evidence to establish that his teaching assignment was an adverse employment
action. And, given the undisputed fact that Dave did not teach his assigned courses, no
reasonable juror could conclude he was fired because of his age.
On appeal, Dave uses his briefs to advance a maelstrom of abusive and
conclusory accusations that his opponents perpetrated a vast criminal conspiracy
against him. Nearly all of the assertions in his briefs do not engage with the district
court’s reasoning, and he asks us instead to vacate the summary judgment as void
because of the “crime-fraud” committed by the district court, the University, and
opposing counsel. As a result, we considered whether this appeal should be dismissed
because the briefs do not contain discernible arguments challenging the district court’s
reasoning and support for those arguments. See F ED. R. A PP . P. 28(a)(8)(A); Atkins v.
Gilbert, 52 F.4th 359, 361 (7th Cir. 2022).
But because Dave’s brief contains a passing reference to the district court’s
resolution of his claim that his teaching assignment was motivated by age
discrimination, we address it. Dave seems to suggest that the court ignored Kinsel’s
statement that he did not assign CHEM 410–411 to Dave because “he was giving
preference to younger faculty” members.
The ADEA makes it unlawful for employers to “discharge ... or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). To
defeat summary judgment, Dave needed to present enough evidence that would permit
a reasonable jury to find that he suffered “an adverse action because of [his] age.”
Arnold v. United Airlines, Inc., 142 F.4th 460, 469 (7th Cir. 2025) (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Vassileva v. City of Chicago, 118 F.4th 869, 873 (7th Cir. 2024)). An action is

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adverse where it causes “some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of
employment.” Id. at 470 (quoting Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 355 (2024)).†
Dave’s argument fails for several reasons. The record is devoid of any evidence
related to Dr. Moran’s age or qualifications. Dave does not address the evidence
provided by the University that Dr. Moran had taught CHEM 410–11 in Dave’s absence.
The fact that a professor younger than Dave was assigned to teach a course that Dave
previously taught does not itself evince age discrimination. Moreover, Dave does not
point to any evidence in the record that would support a finding that Kinsel’s decision
not to assign him to his preferred courses was an adverse action that left him “worse
off” with respect to the terms and conditions of his employment. Muldrow, 601 U.S.
at 359. To be sure, Dave had not taught CHEM 106 before, and he says he no longer had
his notes from CHEM 579. But Dave was offered course materials and an additional
semester without any teaching duties to prepare for these courses. No evidence in the
record supports a finding that his assignment to teach these courses changed his
position, job duties, salary, or benefits. See Arnold, 142 F.4th at 471 (explaining that
changes in assignment within the normal scope of employment did not adversely affect
terms and conditions of employment).
Finally, the University asks us to award attorneys’ fees and double costs because
Dave’s appeal is frivolous. See F ED. R. A PP . P. 38. But the University did not file a
separate motion as required by the rule, so we deny the request. See id. Nevertheless, we
acknowledge that alongside the abusive language in Dave’s briefs, he has repeatedly
filed “notices” accusing his opponents of ongoing criminal activity. Accordingly, we
warn Dave that abusive and frivolous filings in this court may result in sanctions,
including fines and a possible filing bar. See Support Sys. Int’l, Inc. v. Mack, 45 F.3d 185,
186 (7th Cir. 1995).
AFFIRMED
† We note that the district court decided this case under then-controlling
precedent requiring a Title VII plaintiff to show that he suffered a “materially adverse
employment action.” But after the district court entered judgment, the Supreme Court
decided Muldrow, which modified the standard for determining what constitutes an
adverse employment action. See, e.g., Arnold, 142 F.4th at 470. Under Muldrow, plaintiffs
are not required “to meet a ‘heightened threshold of harm,’ such as demonstrating
‘significant harm’ or a ‘materially adverse’ action.” Id. (quoting Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 353
& n.1). Though Dave does not raise this point in his brief, we apply the reasoning of
Muldrow here. See id. at 470–71; Paterakos, 147 F.4th at 796–97.

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