Jessie Hatcher v. John Jones

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted February 2, 2026*
Decided February 2, 2026
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Chief Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1432
JESSIE HATCHER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JOHN JONES, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:22-cv-01944-TWP-KMB
Tanya Walton Pratt,
Judge.
O R D E R
Jessie Hatcher, an Indiana prisoner, sued one of his prison’s doctors, John Jones;
a nurse practitioner, Jodean Ayres; and an administrative assistant, Lynette King,
alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs related to a
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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surgical wound, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He also
sued their employer, Centurion Health of Indiana, LLC, alleging that it maintained an
unconstitutional policy of refusing to follow specialists’ recommendations. See Monell v.
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). The district court entered summary
judgment for all defendants. We affirm.
We recount the facts in the light most favorable to Hatcher and draw all
reasonable inferences in his favor. See Riley v. Waterman, 126 F.4th 1287, 1295 (7th Cir.
2025). While incarcerated at the Correctional Industrial Facility in Pendleton, Indiana,
Hatcher developed a benign cyst on the right side of his neck. Prison medical staff
referred Hatcher to an outside facility for an exam. There, an otolaryngologist (a
physician specializing in the ears, nose, and throat) examined Hatcher and
recommended minor surgery to remove the cyst. After the specialist explained the risks
(including the possibility of infection or scarring), Hatcher elected to undergo an off-site
surgery. The surgery, completed on February 22, 2022, was a success. In a postoperative
report to Centurion providers, the specialist suggested treating Hatcher’s surgical
wound with antibiotic ointment for one week, Ibuprofen and Tylenol for pain relief,
and removing the sutures the following week. Separately, the specialist instructed
Hatcher to clean the wound with half-strength hydrogen peroxide as needed.
Hatcher then returned to the care of the prison’s medical staff. An on-site
physician, Dr. Jones, reviewed and signed the specialist’s postoperative report. But
during the week after Hatcher’s surgery, medical staff did not provide medication,
antibiotic ointment, or additional supplies to clean the wound. During that same time,
however, Hatcher did not report any pain, request treatment, or indicate any challenges
obtaining items from the commissary. Eight days after his operation, Hatcher went to
the clinic to have the sutures removed and complained of drainage from his wound.
Observing that the wound had become infected, Nurse Ayres left the sutures in place
and gave him an oral antibiotic. The following day, Dr. Jones prescribed a stronger oral
antibiotic and pain medication. At a subsequent visit, Hatcher requested antibiotic
ointment, but a nurse denied the request, citing concerns that it could cause skin to heal
over the sutures. A few weeks later, on April 1, staff removed the sutures and reported
no signs of continuing infection. Throughout this time, Ms. King completed
administrative tasks related to Hatcher’s care.
From April until July 2022, Hatcher reported continued irritation at the site of the
wound, which by this point had become a scar. At later appointments, providers
monitored healing, scarring, and swelling, and did not observe any signs of further

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No. 25-1432 Page 3
infection. To address the irritation, they provided him with Tylenol. Eventually the
providers ordered an ultrasound, revealing only mild lymph node enlargement in his
neck.
Hatcher sued Dr. Jones, Nurse Ayres, Ms. King, and Centurion. Hatcher alleged
that the individual defendants violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment by
acting with deliberate indifference toward the postoperative care of his surgical wound.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He asserted that they disregarded a substantial risk of harm by
ignoring the specialist’s suggestions for treatment—that he keep his wound clean with
hydrogen peroxide and antibiotic ointment—and failing to provide him with fresh
bandages, pain medication, and other items for postoperative care. Hatcher also alleged
that Centurion instituted a policy of refusing to follow specialists’ recommendations as
a cost-cutting measure, in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment.
See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.
Eventually, the district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. As
relevant to this appeal, the court determined that no reasonable jury could conclude
that Dr. Jones or Nurse Ayres violated Hatcher’s rights because undisputed evidence
showed that their decisions to deviate from the specialist’s suggested treatment were
based on medical judgment. Moreover, the district court found that Hatcher introduced
no evidence that the providers were responsible for assisting him after surgery. To the
contrary, the specialist’s recommendation assigned responsibility for wound cleaning to
Hatcher, and the record showed that soap, bandages, and Tylenol were available from
the commissary, allowing Hatcher to manage his recovery independently. As to
Ms. King, the administrative assistant, the court determined that there was no evidence
from which a reasonable jury could conclude that she had a direct role in Hatcher’s
treatment or failed to order necessary post-surgical items. Further, as there was no
underlying constitutional violation, the court concluded that Centurion was entitled to
summary judgment on Hatcher’s Monell claim as well.
On appeal, Hatcher generally challenges the district court’s entry of summary
judgment for the individual defendants. He asserts that his providers’ deviation from
the specialist’s suggestions, and their failure to provide him with certain items for
wound care and pain management, was sufficient evidence from which a trier of fact
could infer that medical staff knew of and disregarded a substantial risk to his health.
We disagree.

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When a prisoner believes he has received inadequate medical care in violation of
the Eighth Amendment, he must establish “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to
evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
105–06 (1976); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). To meet this standard,
a prisoner must make two showings. First, he must demonstrate that he “suffered from
an objectively serious medical condition.” Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir.
2016) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). Second, he must show that the “individual
defendant was deliberately indifferent to that condition.” Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S.
at 834).
Against that legal backdrop, the record does not support Hatcher’s claim that
either of his providers’ treatment decisions amounted to deliberate indifference. As the
district court recognized, a defendant’s refusal to take instructions from a specialist
may, in some circumstances, support a finding of deliberate indifference. See Petties,
836 F.3d at 728. But providers have discretion to diverge from such instructions when
relying upon their professional judgment and when doing so is consistent with
accepted professional standards. See Holloway v. Delaware Cnty. Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063,
1074 (7th Cir. 2012). Hatcher has not provided any evidence from which a reasonable
jury could find that the actions of Dr. Jones and Nurse Ayres substantially departed
from professional standards, even if they conflicted with the outside specialist’s
recommendation. Nor does Hatcher dispute that Dr. Jones and Nurse Ayres withheld
antibiotic ointment based on their professional belief that oral antibiotics were
preferrable because an ointment might cause the skin to heal over the sutures. Hatcher’s
argument that deliberate indifference can be inferred from Dr. Jones’s and
Nurse Ayres’s failure to ensure that he had Tylenol after his surgery fares no better. As
a “keep-on-person” medication at his prison, Hatcher could have purchased his own
Tylenol during the week after his surgery. See Poole v. Isaacs, 703 F.3d 1024, 1026–27
(7th Cir. 2012). And once he reported his pain to medical staff at the end of that week,
his providers prescribed pain medication and saw him for numerous follow-up
appointments to monitor his infection and healing.
We also agree with the district court that no reasonable jury could find deliberate
indifference based on the defendants’ failure to provide Hatcher with hydrogen
peroxide, soap, or fresh bandages for cleaning his wound. In an answer to an
interrogatory, Dr. Jones explained that he did not give Hatcher hydrogen peroxide out
of concern that it could slow healing. And Hatcher presented no evidence that medical
staff were responsible for changing his bandage or cleaning the wound, that he
requested those items before his appointment on March 2, 2022, or that any items he

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needed were unavailable at the commissary. Medical records show that the specialist
instructed Hatcher himself to keep the wound clean. And in any event, the Eighth
Amendment does not require prisons to provide free medical services to prisoners who
are able to contribute to the cost of their care. See Poole, 703 F.3d at 1026–27. Records of
Hatcher’s trust account balance indicate that he had funds available to purchase any
items he needed from the commissary.
Finally, as to his Monell claim against Centurion, Hatcher argues that the district
court erred when it concluded that he failed to identify a particular policy or practice of
refusing to follow specialists' recommendations or treatment plans. But a Monell claim
requires that the plaintiff first demonstrate an underlying constitutional violation.
See Johnson v. Prentice, 29 F.4th 895, 905 (7th Cir. 2022). Because Hatcher did not do so,
the district court needed not reach the pattern-or-practice issue.
We have considered Hatcher’s other arguments, and none requires discussion.
AFFIRMED

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