MEDLEGAL SOLUTIONS , INC., doing business as Atticus Medi- cal Billing v. Premium Healthcare Solutions , LLC

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-1419
MEDLEGAL SOLUTIONS , INC., doing business as Atticus Medi-
cal Billing,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
P REMIUM H EALTHCARE SOLUTIONS , LLC,
Defendant,
A PPEAL OF : VIVEK BEDI.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:24-cv-00463 — Jorge L. Alonso, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED NOVEMBER 12, 2025 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 3, 2026
____________________
Before BRENNAN, Chief Judge, and ST . EVE and KIRSCH , Cir-
cuit Judges.
BRENNAN, Chief Judge. In this case two judgment creditors
compete for the same assets. An individual, Vivek Bedi, se-
cured a money judgment in state court against Premier

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2 No. 25-1419
Healthcare Solutions, LLC. Years later, a company, MedLegal
Solutions, Inc., secured a money judgment in federal court
against Premium Healthcare Solutions, LLC.
Their collection efforts collided. When Bedi intervened in
MedLegal’s post-judgment proceedings, he discovered that
his judgment was incorrectly against Premier, not Premium.
So he sought and received an order in state court to correct
the misnomer. Although this corrective order was entered af-
ter MedLegal obtained its judgment, the state court made it
effective as of Bedi’s original judgment entered years before.
Concerned that the corrective order would unfairly prejudice
its claim to Premium’s assets, MedLegal sought an order
deeming its secured interest superior to any interest Bedi
might have. The district court granted MedLegal’s request.
Before evaluating the merits of that ruling on priority, two
jurisdictional questions must be addressed: whether the dis-
trict court entered a final order on which appellate jurisdic-
tion may rest, and whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars
the district court from ruling against Bedi on priority. We con-
clude that appellate jurisdiction is secure and Rooker-Feldman
is no bar. On the merits, we affirm the district court’s holding
that MedLegal’s secured interest is superior to Bedi’s pur-
ported interest.
I. Background
The judgment debtor in both cases, Premium Healthcare
Solutions, LLC, is a limited liability company in Illinois.
Rajeev Batra organized Premium to provide medical imaging
services to personal injury and workman compensation
claimants. To ensure payment, Premium often obtained
health care liens against those plaintiffs’ recoveries pursuant

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No. 25-1419 3
to the Illinois Health Care Services Lien Act. 770 ILCS 23/1 et
seq.
A. Competing Liens and Collection Proceedings
1. Bedi obtains a state court lien on the assets of “Premier.”
Over the years, Batra and Premium borrowed money from
Vivek Bedi as cash flow needs arose. To secure the debt, the
parties executed a promissory note in 2019. When Premium
defaulted, Bedi sued Batra and “Premier [sic] Healthcare So-
lutions, LLC.” In October 2022, the DuPage County, Illinois,
Circuit Court entered a judgment against Batra and “Premier”
and in favor of Bedi in the amount of $1,578,000, a sum repre-
senting unpaid principal and interest.1
Based on the October 2022 judgment, Bedi began collec-
tion proceedings. The clerk of court issued a citation to dis-
cover assets—a court notice, similar to a subpoena, to obtain
information about a debtor’s assets available to satisfy a judg-
ment. After Batra responded to the citation, the state court
entered an order against Batra’s membership interest in
“Premier” and a continuing impressed lien—a lien that re-
mains in effect until a debt is fully satisfied—against “Prem-
ier[‘s] tangible and intangible assets in favor of Bedi.
Yet Bedi’s October 2022 judgment and the state court’s
subsequent orders contained a misnomer—each referred to
“Premier” rather than Premium. Premier Healthcare Solu-
tions is a distinct entity unrelated to Batra or Premium. This
made Bedi’s lien effectively undiscoverable to any creditors
searching for liens on Premium’s assets. We turn next to one
such creditor.
1 All monetary sums are rounded to the nearest thousand.

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4 No. 25-1419
2. MedLegal secures a federal judgment against Premium.
MedLegal Solutions, Inc., a Delaware corporation with a
principal place of business in California, provides medical
billing management services to healthcare providers. Med-
Legal paid Premium for the right to manage Premium’s out-
standing accounts receivable—amounts owed by customers
for products sold or services rendered on credit. As part of the
deal, MedLegal agreed to negotiate and recover payments
from patients or their personal injury attorneys pursuant to
Premium’s health care liens. In return, Premium agreed that
MedLegal could keep a portion of each payment before hand-
ing over the remainder.
But MedLegal discovered that Premium was collecting
and retaining payments on accounts subject to their agree-
ment without notice or payment. So, MedLegal filed an arbi-
tration demand seeking damages for breach of contract. The
arbitrator entered a money judgment for MedLegal and
against Premium and awarded MedLegal attorney’s fees and
costs. After this, but before filing a complaint, MedLegal’s
search of Illinois state and federal court records did not reveal
any judgments against Premium.
With arbitration award in hand, MedLegal petitioned the
Northern District of Illinois district court to confirm the
award plus post–judgment interest. In July 2024, the district
court, sitting in diversity, entered a judgment in favor of Med-
Legal and against Premium for $488,000. Based on this July
2024 judgment, MedLegal issued a third-party citation to dis-
cover Premium’s assets at BMO Bank and JP Morgan Chase
Bank. Combined, the accounts held only a few thousand dol-
lars, far less than what could satisfy MedLegal’s or Bedi’s
judgments.

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No. 25-1419 5
3. Bedi and MedLegal initiate separate collection efforts.
MedLegal’s discovery process apparently resulted in a
freeze on the BMO Bank account, which held funds to which
Bedi believed he was entitled. After nearly two years Bedi re-
newed collection efforts in the Illinois state court. In August
2024, the DuPage County Clerk of Court issued a third-party
citation to discover Premium’s assets held by Innovative
Management Solutions, Inc., a billing management company
which, like MedLegal, serviced Premium’s accounts receiva-
ble from plaintiffs in worker’s compensation and personal in-
jury cases. The state court issued a turnover order directing
Innovative to pay all proceeds of these accounts, contract
rights, and accounts receivable to Bedi “until the judgment
entered in favor of Vivek Bedi is satisfied in full.”
MedLegal’s collection efforts also continued apace. A
month after the state court issued a turnover order on Bedi’s
behalf, MedLegal moved to allow third-party citation pro-
ceedings by deposition, which the district court granted. The
district court also issued a citation to discover Premium’s as-
sets, which MedLegal served on Premium in the days that fol-
lowed.
B. Bedi’s Petition to Intervene
1. Bedi intervenes in MedLegal’s federal collection efforts.
Before Premium had responded, however, Bedi petitioned
to intervene in MedLegal’s post-judgment collection proceed-
ings in federal court. See FED. R. C IV. P. 24. In the meantime,
that court issued nearly 70 citations on third parties, consist-
ing mainly of law firms holding accounts receivable for

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6 No. 25-1419
Premium. One citation was issued against Innovative, which
was already subject to Bedi’s state court lien and turnover or-
der.
During a hearing on his petition to intervene, Bedi learned
of the misnomer in his October 2022 judgment and subse-
quent orders. So he returned to state court the next day to fix
it. In September 2024, the state court issued a corrective order,
changing the caption of Bedi’s case (so that Premium replaced
“Premier”) and amending Bedi’s October 2022 judgment and
related orders to reflect that change.
Importantly, this corrective order was issued nunc pro tunc
(“now for then”), announcing the decrees would remain “in
full force and effect” as of the date the orders had been en-
tered. This meant that the state court intended the judgment
to be treated as if it were entered properly against Premium
in October 2022, notwithstanding that the correction was
made years later and MedLegal lacked notice.
Believing this corrective order gave him priority, Bedi
returned to federal court and filed an amended petition to in-
tervene, attaching a copy of his September 2024 corrective or-
der.
2. MedLegal withdraws opposition to Bedi’s intervention.
A month later, the federal court conducted a hearing on
Bedi’s motions to intervene and to amend, which MedLegal
opposed. But Premium’s counsel revealed information that
moved things forward. His client, despite the small sums dis-
covered in its bank accounts, possessed about $7,500,000 in
accounts receivable that Innovative was managing—more
than enough to satisfy both judgments. Out of caution, Pre-
mium’s counsel made clear that collecting on these accounts

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No. 25-1419 7
receivable from Innovative depended on contingencies of on-
going personal injury and workmen’s compensation cases in
other fora. Yet even if the full $7,500,000 is not realized, coun-
sel was confident that over time enough cases would settle for
both judgments to be satisfied.
Given these assets available for collection, MedLegal
quickly agreed to withdraw its opposition to Bedi’s petition
to intervene and to set a briefing schedule on the issue of pri-
ority. And, to avoid dueling collection proceedings, Bedi was
content to let the district court handle orderly enforcement
until both judgments were satisfied. That progress notwith-
standing, MedLegal—still uncertain of how the priority issue
would turn out in federal court—filed its own petition to in-
tervene in state court and to vacate Bedi’s September 2024 cor-
rective order.
C. Partial Summary Judgment
MedLegal then moved for partial summary judgment in
federal court, asking that its lien on Premium’s assets be
judged superior to “any supposed interest” of Bedi’s. Med-
Legal argued that Bedi had no secured interest and, even if he
did now, the corrective order could not retroactively destroy
MedLegal’s prior secured interest under Illinois law.
Bedi offered no counter on the merits, instead advancing
a jurisdictional point. To him, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine—
that federal courts cannot exercise appellate review over state
courts—barred the district court from ruling on priority. In
Bedi’s view, that would necessarily implicate the validity of
his October 2022 judgment.
On January 7, 2025, the district court rejected Bedi’s
Rooker-Feldman argument because MedLegal was not a state-

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8 No. 25-1419
court loser (“January 7, 2025 Order”). Then, reaching the mer-
its, the court decided that Bedi waived his opposition.
MedLegal’s interest in Premium’s assets therefore was
deemed superior to Bedi’s supposed interest, so MedLegal
could collect first. That court later entered a continuing im-
pressed lien against Premium’s assets and issued turnover or-
ders against various law firms and BMO Bank.
Back in state court, MedLegal’s efforts did not meet with
the same success. The next day, MedLegal’s petition to inter-
vene and motion to vacate Bedi’s September 2024 corrective
order were denied. But the state court assured MedLegal that
it could seek resolution of lien priority in federal court. Unde-
terred, MedLegal appealed, seeking review in the Illinois Ap-
pellate Court.
D. Bedi’s Rule 59(e) Motion and Appeal
Not content with the district court’s ruling, Bedi moved to
alter or amend the January 7, 2025 Order under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 59(e). Because the state court had already
reached this issue, he alleged that the Full Faith & Credit Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1738, precluded, and Rooker-Feldman barred, the
federal court from ruling on priority. Notwithstanding Bedi’s
objections, MedLegal moved for turnover orders against sev-
eral third parties, including Innovative.
The district court denied Bedi’s Rule 59 motion (“February
11, 2025 Order”). Even assuming the nunc pro tunc order’s
effect, “Bedi has not explained why that lien was perfected
before and is superior to MedLegal’s lien.” As for Rooker-Feld-
man and issue preclusion, the court re-emphasized that the
state court had not ruled on priority, so nothing precluded the
district court from doing so.

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No. 25-1419 9
For these reasons, the district court issued a turnover or-
der against Innovative and various other third parties, requir-
ing them to immediately transfer to MedLegal any assets cur-
rently held on behalf of Premium, and to pay any future assets
acquired or bills collected on behalf of Premium directly to
MedLegal (“February 11, 2025 Turnover Order”). Bedi ap-
peals.
E. Further Developments
Weeks after oral argument before us, the Illinois Appellate
Court affirmed the state trial court, which had denied Med-
Legal’s motion to intervene and to vacate Bedi’s corrective or-
der. The Illinois Appellate Court, however, assured MedLegal
that it could pursue collection in federal court, where it was
“by all accounts doing a good job” and where the “federal
judge has decided that [MedLegal] takes first priority.”
* * *
The issues before us are whether the district court entered
a final order on which appellate jurisdiction may rest;
whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred the district court
from granting MedLegal’s motion for partial summary judg-
ment; and whether the district court erred in ranking Med-
Legal’s interest in Premium’s assets superior to Bedi’s under
Illinois law.
II. Appellate Jurisdiction
We start, as we must, with jurisdiction. Chi. Tchrs. Union,
Local 1 v. Educators For Excellence, Inc., 159 F.4th 524, 528 (7th
Cir. 2025).
The first question is whether the district court entered a
final order. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, federal “courts of appeals

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10 No. 25-1419
… shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of
the district courts of the United States.” A decision is final for
purposes of § 1291 if it “ends the litigation on the merits and
leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.”
Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Cent. Pension Fund of Int'l Union of
Operating Eng'rs & Participating Emps., 571 U.S. 177, 183
(2014). Conversely, orders that “specifically contemplate fur-
ther activity in the district court are generally not final.” Star
Ins. Co. v. Risk Mktg. Grp. Inc., 561 F.3d 656, 659 (7th Cir. 2009)
(citation omitted). However, “[a] question remaining to be de-
cided after an order ending litigation on the merits does not
prevent finality if its resolution will not alter the order or
moot or revise decisions embodied in the order.” HSBC Bank
USA, N.A. v. Townsend, 793 F.3d 771, 775–76 (7th Cir. 2015)
(quoting Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 199
(1988)). And “if an order contemplates only ministerial ac-
tions by the court, finality may exist.” Star Ins. Co., 561 F.3d at
659. Thus, “finality is to be given a practical rather than a tech-
nical construction.” Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 582 U.S. 23, 37
(2017) (citation omitted).
Evaluating the finality of the orders in this case is compli-
cated. They were all entered after MedLegal’s final judgment
against Premium, as well as after Bedi intervened in the post-
judgment proceedings. Yet courts evaluate the finality of
post-judgment orders without reference to the underlying fi-
nal judgment. For purposes of appeal, post-judgment pro-
ceedings are treated as separate, free-standing lawsuits. Star
Ins. Co., 561 F.3d at 659.
Bedi proposes two orders that could be final: the January
7, 2025 Order granting MedLegal’s motion for partial sum-
mary judgment on the issue of priority and the February 11,

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No. 25-1419 11
2025 Order denying Bedi’s motion to alter or amend that rul-
ing pursuant to Rule 59(e). But there is also the February 11,
2025 Turnover Order, which required certain third parties, in-
cluding Innovative, to pay MedLegal any funds currently
held on behalf of Premium, and to do the same with any fu-
ture funds acquired on behalf of Premium. We consider each
of these three orders to determine if any provides appellate
jurisdiction.2
A. January 7, 2025 Order
Bedi submits the district court’s January 7, 2025 Order
granting partial summary judgment—ranking MedLegal’s in-
terest in Premium’s assets superior to Bedi’s purported inter-
est—is a final judgment under § 1291. If not, he advances two
alternative arguments. First, Bedi invites us to construe the
grant of partial summary judgment as a declaratory judg-
ment, which “shall have the force and effect of a final judg-
ment.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a); see Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Foster
Bancshares, Inc., 457 F.3d 619, 621 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[A]lthough
[a declaratory judgment] does not specify relief” it is “deemed
final.”). Second, Bedi contends that the January 7, 2025 Order
is an interlocutory decision immediately appealable under the
collateral order doctrine. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
2 Bedi’s notice of appeal references the January 7, 2025 Order and the
February 11, 2025 Order, but not the February 11, 2025 Turnover Order. If
the turnover order is final, then these other orders merge into it. The turn-
over order therefore can be considered for appellate jurisdiction. See F ED .
R. A PP. P. 3(c)(4), (7); see also 16A WRIGHT & M ILLER ’S F EDERAL P RACTICE &
P ROCEDURE § 3949.4 (5th ed. 2025).

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12 No. 25-1419
1. Final decision under § 1291?
A grant of partial summary judgment is generally not a
final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, unless certified as such by
the district court under Rule 54(b). Mwangangi v. Nielsen, 48
F.4th 816, 822–23 (7th Cir. 2022). This rule permits courts to
“direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer
than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly deter-
mines that there is no just reason for delay.” FED. R. C IV. P.
54(b).
Rule 54(b) does not apply here, however. The district court
did not certify the appeal under Rule 54(b), nor could it. Rule
54(b) applies only to resolution of less than all claims or dis-
missal of parties, not to issues within a claim, see Mwangangi,
48 F.4th at 822–23, or what Rule 56(a) calls “part of [a] claim.”
FED. R. C IV. P. 56(a).
Certain discrete issues, however, may be immediately ap-
pealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), subject to the appellate
court’s discretion. Yet here the district court has not certified
a question for immediate interlocutory review under
§ 1292(b) nor even attempted to satisfy that statute’s require-
ments. So, we cannot exercise jurisdiction over this appeal ab-
sent a final order. See Martin v. Goodrich Corp., 95 F.4th 475,
478 (7th Cir. 2024) (28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) “allows for interlocu-
tory appeals when the district and appellate courts agree—so
long as the appeal meets certain [statutory] criteria”).
Where Rule 54(b) and § 1292(b) do not apply, a grant of
partial summary judgment generally is not immediately
appealable as a final order. But because we take a practical
approach to finality, Microsoft, 582 U.S. at 37, the characteriza-
tion of the order as “‘partial’ summary judgment … is not
controlling” for purposes of § 1291. Local P-171, Amalgamated

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No. 25-1419 13
Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of N. Am. v. Thompson Farms
Co., 642 F.2d 1065, 1069–70 (7th Cir. 1981).
The question is whether the January 7, 2025 Order—which
resolved the issue of priority between MedLegal’s claim and
Bedi’s purported claim—was dispositive of all claims at issue
in the post-judgment proceeding. Ray Haluch Gravel Co., 571
U.S. at 183. If so, there is nothing “partial” about the judg-
ment; it is final under § 1291 without reference to Rule 54(b).
Thompson Farms Co., 642 F.2d at 1070 (concluding a purported
grant of “partial summary judgment” was partial in name
only, because it actually resolved all claims and was final un-
der § 1291 without Rule 54(b) certification).
One case appears to be on point. In King v. Ionization
International, Inc., this court held that an order fixing priorities
between competing claims in post-judgment proceedings is
final and appealable under § 1291. 825 F.2d 1180, 1184–85 (7th
Cir. 1987).
MedLegal distinguishes King. There, the court ruled on
the issue of priority, but also fully adjudicated each compet-
ing claim under Illinois law. See id. at 1186–88. Here, although
the court reached the issue of priority, “Bedi’s adverse
claim … has not been adjudicated and remains pending.” So,
unlike in King, the January 7, 2025 Order contemplates further
activity on the merits. This further activity is not mere minis-
terial action. Star Ins. Co., 561 F.3d at 659. Additionally, were
the court to rule against Bedi on this remaining question of
validity, it would moot the decision on priority because there
would be no competing claim left to rank. The January 7, 2025
Order on priority is thus not a final decision. See Star Ins. Co.,
561 F.3d at 659; HSBC Bank, 793 F.3d at 775–76 (7th Cir. 2015)
(quoting Budinich, 486 U.S. at 199).

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14 No. 25-1419
Bedi disagrees. He submits the January 7, 2025 order fully
resolved his claim, resolved all issues between him and Med-
Legal, and left nothing in the district court’s “pending litiga-
tion that involves Bedi.”
Bedi’s argument has two major flaws. First, although
nothing is pending in the district court involving Bedi, this is
self-made: Bedi chose to appeal the ruling on priority before
adjudicating the validity of his claim. A party cannot
manufacture finality with a premature appeal. See Brown v.
Columbia Sussex Corp., 664 F.3d 182, 186–190 (7th Cir. 2011)
(premature notice of appeal does not support appellate juris-
diction until a final judgment enters). Second, Bedi does not
explain how a ruling on priority is dispositive on the validity
of his claim.
On that second point, both parties overlook the crux of the
issue. Whether the ruling on priority was dispositive of all
material issues turns on the availability of assets to satisfy the
judgments. This presents two scenarios with different results
for appellate jurisdiction:
Scenario 1: If the assets are insufficient to satisfy
the superior claim’s full judgment, then the rul-
ing on priority is dispositive. To be first is to get
everything; to be second is to get nothing. In this
scenario, Bedi’s adverse claim could be dis-
missed as moot without adjudicating its valid-
ity. So, the order would be final and appealable.
Scenario 2: But if the assets are sufficient to sat-
isfy the superior claim’s full judgment and then
some, the ruling on priority is not dispositive of
Bedi’s claim. To be first is to get everything
owed; to be second is to get whatever is left. So,

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No. 25-1419 15
even if we affirm and find that MedLegal’s
claim is superior to Bedi’s, Bedi would still have
to adjudicate the validity of his claim before col-
lecting on the remainder in federal court.3 So,
the order is not final and not appealable.
We cannot be sure which scenario applies. On initial re-
view this case could present the second scenario. Premium
has about $7,500,000 in accounts receivable from which its
creditors can collect. That is more than enough to fully satisfy
both judgments. And the federal court did not dismiss Bedi
after ruling on priority, which suggests the ruling was not dis-
positive.
But bills owed and bills collected are two different things.
The amount that will become available for collection remains
unclear. It depends on the contingencies of ongoing personal
injury and workmen’s compensation cases in other fora. Pre-
mium’s counsel represented that, even if the full $7,500,000 is
not realized, in time enough cases will settle for both judg-
ments to be satisfied. Yet that is speculation, which will not
do where appellate courts have an independent obligation to
police the constitutional and statutory limits on our jurisdic-
tion. Cont.’l Indem. Co. v. BII, Inc., 104 F.4th 630, 636 (7th Cir.
2024).
In Bedi’s reply brief he argues that he intervened only to
dispute $85,000 in frozen BMO accounts. Because that amount
3 Of course, if we reverse and conclude that Bedi has a superior inter-
est to MedLegal’s, Bedi would have to adjudicate the validity of his claim,
no matter the extent of assets available if he wanted to collect in federal
court. For purposes of finality under § 1291, however, that is not relevant.
Many orders reversing a grant of summary judgment, in ordinary civil
litigation too, result in the case going to trial on further issues.

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16 No. 25-1419
is less than either judgment, that could present the first sce-
nario. But Bedi’s reply brief contradicts his argument to the
district court at its hearing on his petition to intervene. There,
he expressed his desire to have the district court guide orderly
collection between the two parties until both judgments are
fully paid. Just as with speculation, appellate jurisdiction can-
not rest on a party’s representation about litigation strategies
to which they will not be bound once back in the district court.
See Cont. Ind. Co., 104 F.4th at 636.
2. Declaratory Judgment?
Bedi further contends the January 7, 2025 Order should be
construed as a declaratory judgment, which would be imme-
diately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) and § 1291.
Wachovia Bank, 457 F.3d at 621. In support, he notes that Med-
Legal’s motion for partial summary judgment asked the court
to “enter an order declaring” the parties’ legal rights and re-
lation on the issue of priority. And this court takes a practical
approach to construing judgments as declaratory judgments.
Id.
But Wachovia is distinguishable. There, it was appropriate
to construe the grant of summary judgment as a declaratory
judgment because the initial pleading was an action for a de-
claratory judgment. Id. Not so here. Bedi petitioned to inter-
vene and did not file a declaratory action. The Declaratory
Judgment Act permits courts to issue declaratory judgments
in response to, among other things, an “appropriate plead-
ing.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Without an appropriate pleading, as in
Wachovia, we cannot construe the January 7, 2025, order as a
declaratory judgment.
3. Collateral order?

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No. 25-1419 17
Bedi’s third argument—that the January 7, 2025 Order is a
collateral order—fares no better. Interlocutory decisions may
be immediately appealable if they conclusively determine the
disputed question, resolve an important issue completely sep-
arate from the merits, and are effectively unappealable after
final judgment is reached. E. Gate-Logistics Park Chicago, LLC
v. CenterPoint Props. Tr., 144 F.4th 990, 993 (7th Cir. 2025) (ci-
tation omitted); Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546.
The issue of priority is not separate from the merits of
Bedi’s claim. His petition to intervene stated he has a valid
and superior claim. A decision on the merits, like the order
fixing priorities in King, must decide both. 825 F.2d at 1184–
88. Nor is the ruling “effectively unreviewable” after a final
judgment. East Gate-Logistics, 144 F.4th at 993. Bedi could ap-
peal the priority ruling after adjudicating his claim.
For these reasons, Bedi’s arguments that the January 7,
2025 Order is final and appealable fall short. So, the district
court’s grant of partial summary judgment and ruling that
MedLegal’s interest was superior to any purported interest of
Bedi’s does not provide appellate jurisdiction.
B. February 11, 2025 Order Denying Motion to Amend
In search of a final order, Bedi also points to the district
court’s denial of his Rule 59(e) motion. Such motions to alter
or amend a judgment are appropriate when the underlying
judgment is final. See Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504, 507–08
(2020); FED. R. C IV. P. 59(e) (“A motion to alter or amend a
judgment must be filed … after the entry of the judgment.”);
see also Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 177 (1989)

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18 No. 25-1419
(Rule 59(e) appropriate only when the underlying order is fi-
nal without reference to the Rule 59(e) motion).
Despite being filed under Rule 59(e), the district court ex-
pressly treated this as a Rule 60(b) motion to reconsider,
which does not require finality. F ED. R. C IV. P. 60(b) (allowing
courts to relieve parties from a “final judgment, order, or pro-
ceeding”). But even if the district court implied finality in the
underlying “judgment” by ruling on Bedi’s motion, we re-
view that conclusion of law de novo. Trs. of Funds of IBEW Loc.
701 v. Pyramid Elec., 223 F.3d 459, 463 (7th Cir. 2000).
Because we already concluded that the January 7, 2025 Or-
der was not final, the February 11, 2025 Order denying Bedi’s
motion to alter or amend a “judgment” also is not final. See,
e.g., Pyramid Elec., 223 F.3d at 465 (concluding an order deny-
ing a motion to reconsider, based on a non-final underlying
“judgment,” and where there was more left to do, was non-
final). A party cannot transform the underlying order into a
final judgment simply by filing a Rule 59 motion.
C. February 11, 2025 Turnover Order
The docket contains one more order that could be final.
The same day the federal court denied Bedi’s motion to alter
or amend the January 7, 2025 Order, that court issued a turn-
over order. This February 11, 2025 Turnover Order required
Innovative, along with other third parties, to “immediately
turn over to MedLegal … the specific funds of Pre-
mium … that they are currently holding.” The order specified
a precise amount: Innovative was to immediately turn over
nearly $30,000. The turnover order also required Innovative
and the other third parties to “turn over … funds or assets of

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No. 25-1419 19
Premium … that they hereafter acquire or that comes [sic]
due to Premium … after the date of this Order.”
While opposing appellate jurisdiction at oral argument be-
fore us, MedLegal conceded a turnover order would be final.4
Turnover orders often resolve the post-judgment proceeding
and are treated as final. See Kelley v. Stevanovich, 40 F.4th 779,
784 (7th Cir. 2022); but see Pyramid Elec., 223 F.3d at 465–66.
This court has found turnover orders final even where, as
here, the order requires a fixed amount to be paid now but
also requires uncertain amounts to be paid in the future. La-
borers’ Pension Fund v. Dirty Work Unlimited, Inc., 919 F.2d 491,
493–94 (7th Cir. 1990).
In Dirty Work, a post-judgment order required a third
party to turn over a fixed amount of money to the federal
court plaintiff immediately, based on the citation to discover
assets process. Id. But it also “provided for additional recov-
ery of amounts owed” to the defendant by the third party,
which were contingent on the outcome of state court litigation
between the defendant and third party. Id. at 493. This court
held that the order was final under § 1291 because there was
nothing left to be done in the district court. Id. at 493–94. Any
“unresolved element” in the turnover order was only contin-
gent on litigation in other forums, making the turnover order
final and appealable. Id.
This case is like Dirty Work. Like there, the February 11,
2025 Turnover Order requires Innovative, among others, to
pay a fixed amount immediately, based on the citation to
4 Oral Argument, November 12, 2025, at 13:47–14:21 (ca7-
ecf.sso.dcn/sound/storagelinkdir/oralArguments/2025/ch.25-1419.25-
1419_11_12_2025.mp3).

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20 No. 25-1419
discover assets process. But the order also provides that addi-
tional amounts must be paid when Innovative acquires funds
or assets on Premium’s behalf after the date of the turnover
order.
Although Innovative’s collections and future payments to
MedLegal pursuant to this turnover order depend on the out-
come of worker’s compensation and personal injury cases, lit-
igation in other fora requires nothing more from the district
court. So this February 11, 2025 Turnover Order is final just as
the turnover order in Dirty Work was.
But there is one distinction to consider. The turnover order
in Dirty Work was based on a final judgment in the underlying
litigation. Id. at 492. The February 11, 2025 Turnover Order is
partially based on a final judgment in the underlying litiga-
tion—MedLegal’s judgment against Premium—and partially
based on a non-final judgment in the post-judgment proceed-
ings—the ruling that MedLegal’s claim was superior to Bedi’s
purported claim.
Although it is odd to find a turnover order final even
when it is partially based on a non-final order, this is a dis-
tinction without a difference. Whatever is left to be done in
the district court as to the validity of Bedi’s claim—although
it could moot the order ruling on priority, see supra II.A.1.—
could not alter or moot this turnover order. MedLegal’s right
to immediately collect on the turnover order would remain
unaffected whether Bedi has a valid claim or not. The Febru-
ary 11, 2025 Turnover Order is thus final and appealable un-
der § 1291. HSBC Bank, 793 F.3d at 775–76 (7th Cir. 2015).

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No. 25-1419 21
* * *
Congress limited appellate jurisdiction to the “final deci-
sion” of the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The district court’s
January 7, 2025 Order granting partial summary judgment
and its February 11, 2025 Order denying Bedi’s motion to alter
or amend that prior order were not final. But the February 11,
2025 Turnover Order was final. Therefore, we have appellate
jurisdiction under § 1291.
III. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
The next question is whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
bars the district court from exercising jurisdiction. The doc-
trine recognizes that the Supreme Court alone has “appellate
jurisdiction to review and modify or reverse a state-court
judgment; the lower federal courts do not.” Mitchell v. Durham
Enters., Inc., 99 F.4th 978, 986 (7th Cir. 2024) (citing Exxon Mo-
bil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291–92 (2005)).
It “is confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine
acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers com-
plaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered
before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting
district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Mitch-
ell, 99 F.4th at 986 (quoting Exxon, 544 U.S. at 284).
Because Rooker-Feldman applies narrowly, the Supreme
Court has held that, to be a state-court loser, the party against
whom the doctrine is invoked must have been a party to the
underlying state-court proceeding. Mitchell, 99 F.4th at 986;
Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 466 (2006) (“The Rooker-Feldman
doctrine does not bar actions by nonparties to the earlier state-
court judgment.”). This is because a federal litigant who was
“absent from the underlying litigation and judgment in state

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22 No. 25-1419
court is ‘in no position to ask [the Supreme Court] to review
the state court’s judgment’ but instead is ‘merely seek[ing] to
litigate its … case for the first time’ in federal court.” Mitchell,
99 F.4th at 986 (citation omitted). MedLegal was not a party
to Bedi’s state-court proceeding or the state-court judgment
against Premium, so Rooker-Feldman was no bar.
Bedi rests his argument on a footnote in Lance in which the
Supreme Court declined to address “whether there are any
circumstances, however limited, in which Rooker-Feldman
may be applied against a party not named in an earlier state
proceeding.” Id. (quoting Lance, 546 U.S. at 465 n.2). To illus-
trate the open question, the Court provided an example: “e.g.,
where an estate takes a de facto appeal in a district court of an
earlier state decision involving the decedent.” Id. (quoting
Lance, 546 U.S. at 465 n.2).
In Mitchell, we acknowledged “[t]he Court’s example
makes sense considering the logic of the doctrine: a dece-
dent’s estate simply steps into the decedent’s shoes and like
the decedent cannot seek de facto appellate review of a state-
court judgment in district court.” Id. “But this example
doesn’t remotely fit the procedural facts of this case.” Id. In
arguing that it has a superior interest in Premium’s assets rel-
ative to Bedi’s purported interest, “[MedLegal] is not step-
ping into the shoes of [Premium]” against Bedi. Id.
Bedi counters that “MedLegal is stepping into the shoes of
Premium to collect assets of Premium and any assets owed
Premium from third parties.” Yet this argument fails to grasp
the distinction between asserting Premium’s rights against a
third-party debtor, which MedLegal is doing based on its own
federal court money judgment, and asserting Premium’s

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No. 25-1419 23
rights against Bedi to undo Bedi’s money judgment, which
MedLegal is not doing.
If there is room for such an exception in future cases, it is
not invoked by a party with a competing claim to the state-
court loser’s assets based on a separate federal court money
judgment. Because MedLegal was not a state-court loser, we
do not reach the remaining elements of the test.5 The district
court’s ruling, therefore, faced no jurisdictional bar.
IV. Priority
On the merits, we can be brief. The issue is whether, under
Illinois state law, MedLegal’s lien against Premium’s assets is
superior to Bedi’s purported interest. We do not decide this
question. Even if Bedi had advanced persuasive arguments in
his opening and reply briefs, he did not raise them in the dis-
trict court. In its motion for partial summary judgment, Med-
Legal advanced arguments under Illinois state law on the is-
sue of priority. See supra I.C. Bedi failed to respond.
5 Another source of confusion is Bedi’s failure to distinguish between
Rooker-Feldman and issue preclusion. Exxon, 544 U.S. at 283 (Rooker-Feld-
man does not “supersed[e] the ordinary application of preclusion law.”).
Bedi raised a preclusion defense under the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1738, in his motion to alter and amend the judgment (albeit in a
cursory and undeveloped fashion). But he failed to raise it again in his
opening appellate brief. Because preclusion is not jurisdictional, Exxon,
544 U.S. at 293 (“Preclusion, of course, is not a jurisdictional matter.”), Bedi
waived the argument on appeal, Bradley v. Village of University Park, 59
F.4th 887, 897 (7th Cir. 2023) (“An appellant may waive a non-jurisdic-
tional issue or argument … by failing to raise it at all in the party’s opening
brief.”). In any event, the Illinois Appellate Court order and opinion,
which Bedi submitted after oral argument before us, showed that even the
state court believed nothing decided in the state forum prevented or pre-
cluded the district court from ruling on priority as it did.

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24 No. 25-1419
Instead, Bedi risked his entire litigation strategy on the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. That choice did not pay off. At oral
argument, we asked why Bedi’s arguments on the merits
were not waived. Stopping short of fully conceding the point,
Bedi’s counsel acknowledged that Bedi did not make merit-
based arguments in the district court. He nevertheless asked
that the issue be decided based on the record before us and
based on the “undisputed” legal proposition that the “first in
time has priority.”6 But that is not how waiver works.
Notwithstanding the record, Bedi failed to raise these ar-
guments in the district court. He thus waived them on appeal.
Bradley, 59 F.4th at 897 (appellants waive arguments “by fail-
ing to raise the issue or argument in the district court”).
V. Conclusion
Because the February 11, 2025 Turnover Order was a final
decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we have appellate jurisdic-
tion. And because MedLegal was not a state-court loser, and
no purported exception applies, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
did not bar the district court’s jurisdiction. As to the merits on
priority, Bedi waived his arguments by not raising them in
the district court, so we do not reach the question of Illinois
state law on appeal.
A FFIRMED.
6 Oral Argument, November 12, 2025, at 8:45–9:01, 9:36–10:56 (ca7-
ecf.sso.dcn/sound/storagelinkdir/oralArguments/2025/ch.25-1419.25-
1419_11_12_2025.mp3).

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