Yves Aubert v. Laurie Lee Poast

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-2976
Y VES A UBERT,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
LAURIE LEE POAST,
Respondent-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Wisconsin.
No. 3:24-cv-00926-jdp — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.
____________________
A RGUED J ANUARY 30, 2026 — DECIDED F EBRUARY 3, 2026
____________________
Before BRENNAN , Chief Judge, and R OVNER and HAMILTON ,
Circuit Judges.
PER C URIAM . Petitioner-Appellant Aubert shares two
daughters with Respondent-Appellee Poast. Aubert has
appealed the denial of his petition for the return of those
daughters to Norway under the 1980 Hague Convention,
known more formally as the Convention on the Civil Aspects
of International Child Abduction. On January 30, 2026, this
court heard oral argument in Appeal Nos. 25-2732 and

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2 No. 25-2976
25-2976. Appeal No. 25-2732 challenges the denial of return
on the merits. This court will issue a decision in that appeal in
due course. In Appeal No. 25-2976, Aubert challenges the
district court’s denial of his request, filed after the first notice
of appeal, to reinstate regular visitation with his daughters
while the appeal is pending. We are told that Poast stopped
allowing further visitation with Aubert after the district
court’s decision on the merits of the petition for return. We
need not delay our decision on the denial of Aubert’s request
for interim visitation while Appeal No. 25-2732 remains
pending.
The district court concluded that the filing of the first
notice of appeal deprived it of jurisdiction to issue or modify
what amounts to an injunction or a denial of an injunction
pending appeal. We appreciate its caution toward
maintaining clear boundaries between its jurisdiction and
ours.
In fact, however, the district court retains jurisdiction to
grant, continue, or modify such interim injunctive relief
pending appeal. While an appeal is pending from an
interlocutory order or a final judgment involving a request for
an injunction, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(d) permits a
district court to “suspend, modify, restore, or grant an
injunction on … terms that secure the opposing party’s
rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(d). A party asking for such relief
while an appeal is pending must move first in the district
court itself. Fed. R. App. P. 8(a)(1)(C). These two rules work
together to give the district court some power to manage
equitable relief even while the case is pending on appeal. See
Eli Lilly and Co. v. Arla Foods, Inc., 893 F.3d 375, 381, 384 (7th
Cir. 2018) (describing as “permissible procedure” district

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No. 25-2976 3
court’s grant of preliminary injunction and then, after it was
appealed, modification of injunction to correct technical
defects identified in appellate briefing); United States v.
Spectrum Brands, Inc., 924 F.3d 337, 346 (7th Cir. 2019) (district
court modified terms of permanent injunction pending on
appeal, in part to specify remedial measures “consistent with
the spirit of its original permanent injunction”); MillerCoors
LLC v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., 940 F.3d 922, 923 (7th Cir. 2019)
(recognizing that district court could, consistent with Rule 62,
grant relief to “secure the opposing party’s rights,” which is
different from “a blanket grant of permission to impose new
obligations, and substantially alter the issues, while appeals
are pending”). Reinstating interim visitation would not
interfere with or undermine this court’s consideration of the
lead appeal on the merits of Aubert’s petition for return of the
children to Norway.
We see nothing in the statutes implementing the Hague
Convention in the United States, 22 U.S.C. § 9001 et seq., that
would interfere with the ordinary operation of Rules 62(d)
and 8(a) in cases involving the Hague Convention. Section
9004(a) grants courts exercising jurisdiction under the statutes
and convention the power to issue provisional remedies
“before the final disposition of the petition.” Such power may
be exercised to further the purposes of the Convention,
including to protect the well-being of the children involved.
The district court’s decision denying Aubert’s petition is
pending before this court, so there has been no “final
disposition” in this case. Accordingly, the district court
presently has jurisdiction pertaining to grant such provisional
remedies under 22 U.S.C. § 9004, including interim visitation
rights.

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4 No. 25-2976
The contrary position, taken by Poast, is not supported by
the applicable statutes or rules. It would also produce an
improbable and perverse effect under the Hague Convention
and federal statutes. It would leave a district court powerless
to take important action in the best interests of the affected
children while appellate processes go forward at a pace
beyond the control of the parties, the district court, or the
children themselves.
Accordingly, the district court’s order denying Aubert’s
request for continued visitation rights while the lead appeal
on the merits is pending is REVERSED. Our mandate shall
issue immediately. The district court may immediately
exercise jurisdiction over Aubert’s motion for interim
visitation and/or a renewed motion to that effect.

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