Edward L. Ash v. City of Aurora

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted February 10, 2026*
Decided February 17, 2026
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2774
EDWARD L. ASH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF AURORA, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 21-cv-375
Martha M. Pacold,
Judge.
O R D E R
After he was acquitted in state court of a firearm offense, Edward Ash sued the
City of Aurora and several of its police officers for violating his rights under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments during his arrest and prosecution. The district court
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-2774 Page 2
entered summary judgment for the defendants, and Ash now appeals. Because his
claims are either time-barred or defeated by undisputed facts showing probable cause,
we affirm.
We recite the facts in the light most favorable to Ash, the non-moving party.
See Washington v. City of Chicago, 98 F.4th 860, 868 (7th Cir. 2024). Ash is a resident of
Aurora, Illinois, with a valid firearm-identification card and concealed-carry license. In
May 2017, Ash was driving in downtown Aurora. He stopped his car, walked to the
trunk, removed a shotgun covered in cloth, placed it in the backseat of the car’s
passenger compartment, and drove away. An observer called 911.
Two police officers responded to the dispatch and found Ash’s car parked across
the street from a middle school. The officers blocked the car, exited their vehicles, and
approached with their guns drawn. Ash, who was in the driver’s seat, told the officers
that he had a concealed-carry license, a firearm on his hip, and a shotgun in the
backseat. The officers placed Ash under arrest. Other officers later searched the car and
retrieved the shotgun, which contained at least five live rounds.
After spending a night in jail, Ash appeared before a state judge who found
probable cause to believe Ash had committed aggravated unlawful use of a weapon.
See 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A). To prove this charge, the state would have to
establish that Ash carried in his vehicle an uncased, loaded, and immediately accessible
firearm other than a pistol, revolver, or handgun. Id. Ash posted bond, and he was
released the same day. He could not leave the state while on bond.
In August 2017, a state grand jury indicted Ash for the aggravated firearm
offense. In January 2020, Ash was acquitted at a bench trial. The judge determined that
Ash’s firearm was an uncased, loaded shotgun but that it was not immediately
accessible because Ash could not reach it from the driver’s seat.
In January 2021, Ash sued the officers involved in his arrest and detention and
the City of Aurora under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his constitutional rights. He
brought seven claims against the officers, alleging false arrest and wrongful detention
before legal process (counts I and VI); unlawful search and seizure (counts II and III);
false charges (count IV); conspiracy to violate constitutional rights (count V); and failure
to intervene during the violations (count VII). Ash also brought three claims against the
City, alleging a policy or custom of constitutional violations caused by the City’s failure
to train its officers, see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), (count VIII);

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No. 24-2774 Page 3
malicious prosecution under state law (count IX); and indemnification obligations
covering the officers (count X).
The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The court
determined that the claims against the officers were untimely because they accrued on
the day of Ash’s arrest in May 2017, and the two-year limitations period expired before
Ash sued in January 2021. See 735 ILCS 5/13-202. The court concluded that the Monell
claim was likewise untimely and in the alternative that Ash did not demonstrate any
unconstitutional policy or custom. The court determined that the indictment provided
prima facie evidence of probable cause, which is an absolute defense to the state claim
for malicious prosecution. Finally, the court explained that the indemnification claim
could not survive without any underlying violations.
On appeal, Ash challenges the district court’s entry of summary judgment on
every claim except his Monell claim. He first argues that the district court erred by
concluding that the claims against the individual officers all accrued on the day of his
arrest in May 2017. We agree with the district court that the claims alleging unlawful
search and seizure (counts II and III) accrued on the day of Ash’s arrest because that
was the day they occurred. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). The claims
alleging false arrest and wrongful detention before legal process (counts I and VI),
however, did not accrue until the next day, when Ash’s detention ended and he was
released on bond. See id. at 389. This one-day difference does not change the result
because Ash sued more than a year after the two-year limitations period expired.
See Manuel v. City of Joliet, 903 F.3d 667, 668 (7th Cir. 2018).
Ash’s claim alleging false charges (count IV) is more difficult to categorize. As
Ash argues, this claim is most analogous to the tort of malicious prosecution because it
alleges improper use of the legal process without probable cause. See McDonough v.
Smith, 588 U.S. 109, 116 (2019). The claim therefore would have accrued when Ash was
acquitted. See id. at 117. But the Supreme Court has not yet decided whether a claim for
malicious prosecution exists under the Due Process Clause, which is how Ash
characterizes it. See Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 43 n.2 (2022). If we construe the claim
as arising under the Fourth Amendment, Ash would need to establish a seizure of his
person after the legal process began. See Neita v. City of Chicago, 148 F.4th 916, 939
(7th Cir. 2025). Ash argues that the bond condition restricting out-of-state travel
qualifies as a seizure, an issue that remains unsettled in this circuit. See Mitchell v. City of
Elgin, 912 F.3d 1012, 1017 (7th Cir. 2019).

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No. 24-2774 Page 4
But even if count IV is a timely claim for malicious prosecution, it fails for the
same reason that Ash’s corresponding state-law claim (count IX) fails: the undisputed
facts show that no reasonable jury could find that the officers lacked probable cause to
arrest Ash. The judicial determination at Ash’s preliminary hearing and the grand-jury
indictment each created a rebuttable presumption of probable cause, an absolute
defense to both federal and state claims for malicious prosecution. See Washington,
98 F.4th at 863; Coleman v. City of Peoria, 925 F.3d 336, 350–51 (7th Cir. 2019). To
overcome this presumption, Ash needed to offer evidence that the officers knew they
lacked probable cause and improperly or fraudulently obtained the judicial
determination and the indictment. See Washington, 98 F.4th at 863; Coleman, 925 F.3d
at 351.
Ash contends that the presumption of probable cause is rebutted because the
officers misrepresented that his firearm qualified as a shotgun under state law. Ash
modified his shotgun to have a pistol grip, so he asserts it was functionally a handgun,
which is excluded from the section of the Illinois statute under which he was charged.
But the state court found that the firearm qualified as a shotgun, acquitting him on
other grounds. Moreover, Ash admitted that he told the arresting officers that he had a
shotgun (not a handgun) in the vehicle. When the officers recovered the firearm, it was
wrapped in a scarf, loaded with live rounds, and stored in the backseat of the passenger
compartment. Ash’s admission and these observations provided the officers with a
good-faith basis to arrest him for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. Ash points to
no false evidence submitted to the judge at the preliminary hearing or to the grand jury.
Finally, without any underlying constitutional violation, Ash’s claims alleging
conspiracy and failure to intervene by the officers (counts V and VII) and for
indemnification by the City (count X) also fail. See Rosado v. Gonzalez, 832 F.3d 714, 718
(7th Cir. 2016) (conspiracy and failure to intervene); Esco v. City of Chicago, 107 F.4th 673,
683 (7th Cir. 2024) (indemnification).
AFFIRMED

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