United States of America v. Kendall Guyton

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted February 17, 2026
Decided February 19, 2026
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Chief Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 24-3114
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
KENDALL GUYTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:20-CR-00426(1)
Sara J. Ellis,
Judge.
O R D E R
Kendall Guyton pleaded guilty to sex trafficking, and the district court imposed
324 months’ imprisonment. Guyton appeals, but his appointed counsel asserts that the
appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
In her brief, counsel explains the nature of the case and addresses issues that an appeal
of this kind would typically involve. Because counsel’s analysis appears thorough, and
Guyton did not respond to the motion, C IR . R. 51(b), we limit our review to the subjects
that counsel discusses, United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). We grant
the motion and dismiss the appeal.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 24-3114 Page 2
From 2017 to early 2020, Guyton and Gregory Ingram engaged in a sex-
trafficking operation. Guyton recruited several women through online advertisements.
He exploited women with known drug addictions by providing them with narcotics to
compel their participation in commercial sex acts. Guyton scheduled appointments with
clients, provided supplies like condoms, and transported the women to appointments.
He also controlled the money the women earned from performing sex acts to prevent
them from leaving, and he physically and sexually abused two of the women.
The government charged Guyton and Ingram with conspiracy to commit sex
trafficking. The government also charged Guyton with three counts of sex trafficking,
involving two adult women and one minor.
Guyton entered into a plea agreement with the government, agreeing to plead
guilty to one count of sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a),
(b)(1). As part of the agreement, Guyton admitted to trafficking two other adult women.
The plea agreement noted the parties’ disagreement about whether the women
qualified as “vulnerable victims” for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines.
The U.S. Probation Office prepared a presentence investigation report (PSR). The
PSR concluded that Guyton had a total offense level of 36 and assigned Guyton
14 criminal history points, placing him in criminal history category VI. The resulting
guidelines range was 324 to 405 months’ imprisonment.
At sentencing, however, the parties agreed that the PSR contained an error in its
criminal history calculation. Specifically, the PSR had assessed criminal history points
for an Illinois conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, even though Guyton
had not been convicted of that offense. The district court therefore removed that
paragraph, and the corresponding points, from Guyton’s criminal history.
With that correction, the district court determined that Guyton had 12 criminal
history points for several Illinois convictions, including retail theft, criminal trespass,
and aggravated domestic battery. Guyton’s resulting criminal history category was V.
Guyton confirmed at sentencing that this criminal history calculation was correct.
The district court then determined Guyton’s offense level. It concluded that
Guyton had a base offense level of 34 for sex trafficking under § 1591(b)(1). See U.S.S.G.
§ 2G1.1(a)(1). The court added two levels because Guyton knew or should have known
the victims were vulnerable. See id. § 3A1.1(b)(1). The court applied this enhancement
because each woman Guyton trafficked suffered from a drug addiction, which he

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No. 24-3114 Page 3
exploited by conditioning the supply of narcotics on the commission of commercial sex
acts. Despite the statement in the plea agreement that Guyton disagreed with the
enhancement, Guyton stated at the sentencing hearing that he was not objecting to its
application. Further, because Guyton stipulated to trafficking two other women, the
court added three levels as a multiple-count adjustment. See id. § 3D1.4. The court also
reduced Guyton’s offense level by three levels for acceptance of responsibility. See id.
§ 3E1.1(a)–(b). With a total offense level of 36 and a criminal history category of V, the
advisory guidelines range was 292 to 365 months’ imprisonment. Guyton confirmed
that he had no objection to the guidelines calculation or the resulting sentencing range.
The court then invited the parties to present their positions on an appropriate
sentence. Guyton’s counsel initially argued for a 15-year sentence. But the district judge
interrupted, stating that to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, she would not
impose a sentence less than what Guyton’s codefendant Ingram received: 20 years.
Guyton’s counsel then requested a sentence “just over 20 years,” emphasizing Guyton’s
drug addiction, the sexual abuse he suffered as a child, and his rehabilitative efforts
during pretrial detention. The government requested a 30-year sentence, highlighting
the seriousness of Guyton’s conduct, the violence he inflicted on the victims, and his
lack of remorse. Finally, Guyton addressed the court and apologized for his conduct.
In announcing Guyton’s sentence, the court first addressed the nature and
circumstances of the offense, describing Guyton’s treatment of his victims, including his
use of violence, sexual assault, and control. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). The court
emphasized the need to protect the public from Guyton and to avoid an unwarranted
sentencing disparity with Ingram. See id. § 3553(a)(2)(C), (a)(6). The court acknowledged
Guyton’s mitigation arguments, including the sexual abuse he suffered as a child, his
drug addiction, and his difficult upbringing. Based on these considerations, the court
imposed 324 months’ imprisonment (27 years) and ordered Guyton to pay $105,000 in
restitution. Guyton confirmed that he had no objection to the amount of restitution.
In her Anders brief, counsel tells us that she advised Guyton about the risks and
benefits of challenging his guilty plea and determined that Guyton does not wish to
withdraw his plea. See United States v. Larry, 104 F.4th 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 2024). Counsel
thus properly omits discussion of whether the plea was knowing and voluntary. See id.
Counsel then concludes, correctly, that any procedural challenge to the sentence
would be frivolous. The district court agreed with Guyton’s objection to the PSR’s
calculation of his criminal history category. And Guyton confirmed that the guidelines
calculation, including the application of the vulnerable-victim enhancement, was

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No. 24-3114 Page 4
correct after the court incorporated the revised criminal history category. Thus, Guyton
has waived any challenge to the calculation of the guidelines range. See United States v.
Fuentes, 858 F.3d 1119, 1120–21 (7th Cir. 2017). Moreover, the court considered Guyton’s
mitigation arguments, noting his past sexual abuse, drug addiction, and difficult
upbringing. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 53 (2007).
We also agree with counsel that challenging the substantive reasonableness of
the sentence would be frivolous. Guyton received a within-guidelines sentence, so we
would presume that it is reasonable. See United States v. Major, 33 F.4th 370, 384 (7th Cir.
2022). Nothing in the record could rebut that presumption. The court explained its
reasons for the sentence by referencing multiple § 3553(a) factors, including the nature
and circumstances of the offense, the need to protect the public, and the goal of
avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(C), (a)(6).
Guyton also waived any challenge to the restitution order by expressly stating at
sentencing that he had no objection to the amount imposed. See United States v. Harris,
102 F.4th 847, 850 (7th Cir. 2024).
We therefore GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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