Keyona Campbell v. Edward-Elmhurst Health

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted February 24, 2026*
Decided February 24, 2026
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Chief Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1115
KEYONA CAMPBELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
EDWARD-ELMHURST HEALTH, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 23-cv-02799
John F. Kness,
Judge.
O R D E R
Keyona Campbell sued Edward-Elmhurst Health, alleging religious
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a). The district court dismissed Campbell’s complaint for lack of subject
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 25-1115 Page 2
matter jurisdiction because she lacked standing. Because Campbell has not alleged an
injury in fact, we affirm.
Edward-Elmhurst offered Campbell a nursing position in its Medical Oncology
Department. Campbell accepted the job offer and began the onboarding process. At the
time, Edward-Elmhurst required its staff to be vaccinated against COVID-19, unless
approved for a disability or religious exemption. Campbell applied for a religious
exemption. Edward-Elmhurst denied her request because it “did not meet the legal
requirements for a religious exemption.” Edward-Elmhurst gave Campbell seven days
to appeal the decision or be vaccinated. Campbell appealed. Edward-Elmhurst then
granted Campbell a temporary exemption—after three months, she would need to
reapply. Campbell then withdrew from the onboarding process and sought other
employment opportunities.
Campbell sued Edward-Elmhurst, alleging that it violated Title VII by
discriminating against her based on religion by requiring that she reapply for the
exemption after three months. She alleged Edward-Elmhurst’s vaccine requirement
caused her fear of having to be vaccinated against her religious beliefs and suffer
ostracization and humiliation. Campbell also sued Illinois officials, arguing that Illinois
law permitting mandatory vaccination policies violated the Illinois Constitution, the
United States Constitution, and Illinois, federal, and international law. Campbell stated
that she was underemployed because of these vaccine policies.
The district court dismissed Campbell’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction,
concluding that Campbell lacked standing. The court reasoned that Campbell’s
underemployment was not attributable to the defendants; the existence of vaccine
requirements for other jobs was at most a hypothetical future harm; and masking, social
distancing, and other public-health measures aimed at slowing transmission of the
virus were a generalized grievance rather than a particularized injury. The court
concluded that, at bottom, Campbell lacked standing under Klaassen v. Trs. of Indiana
Univ., 24 F.4th 638, 639 (7th Cir. 2022) (per curiam), which acknowledged that
qualification for an exemption to a vaccine mandate precludes a justiciable controversy.
Campbell appeals the district court’s order only as to her standing to bring the
Title VII claims against Edward-Elmhurst. Campbell first maintains that the threat of
Edward-Elmhurst refusing to continue the exemption after three months was a concrete
injury. But the mere risk of future harm, without more, is not a concrete harm in a suit
for damages. TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 437 (2021). Campbell’s allegation

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No. 25-1115 Page 3
that her exemption could have been denied upon reapplication is just that, a risk that
never materialized. Hypothetical harms are insufficient to confer standing, Clapper v.
Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 416 (2013), and Campbell did not continue at Edward-
Elmhurst long enough for her to seek renewal of her exemption. Because Campbell
qualified for an exemption to Edward-Elmhurst’s vaccine policy, she lacked standing to
challenge it. Klaassen v. Trs. of Indiana Univ., 24 F.4th at 639; Klaassen v. Trs. of Indiana
Univ., 7 F.4th 592, 593 (7th Cir. 2021).
Campbell also proposed that she suffered an emotional injury due to the
uncertainty of whether her exemption would be extended upon reapplication. The
Supreme Court has recognized that exposure to the risk of future harm can, in some
instances, itself be a separate concrete harm. See TransUnion LLC, 594 U.S. at 437. In the
Title VII context specifically, “humiliation, embarrassment, and like
injuries … constitute cognizable and compensable harms.” Gracia v. SigmaTron Int'l,
Inc., 986 F.3d 1058, 1064 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc., 222
F.3d 289, 300 (7th Cir. 2000)). But here, Campbell does no more than recast her fear
about the threat of future injury as an emotional injury. Campbell’s complaint states she
“became subject to … ostracization and humiliation,” but she did not clearly allege facts
in support of this conclusion, as she must. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016).
Moreover, it is hardly plausible that Campbell could have endured an injury while
awaiting the outcome of her reapplication when she did not wait at all—she
discontinued the onboarding process and sought other employment. See Silha v. ACT,
Inc., 807 F.3d 169, 174 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting conclusory allegations are insufficient to
plausibly allege a factual basis for standing). Whatever emotional injury Campbell may
have suffered is not sufficiently concrete to confer standing, as it concerned the outcome
of an application she never made.
AFFIRMED

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