William Clyde Gibson Iii v. Ron Neal

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-2779
WILLIAM C LYDE GIBSON III,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v.
R ON NEAL,
Respondent-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:23-cv-00330-JMS-MG — Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge
____________________
A RGUED F EBRUARY 12, 2026 — DECIDED M ARCH 31, 2026
____________________
Before S CUDDER , LEE, and PRYOR , Circuit Judges.
S CUDDER , Circuit Judge. William Clyde Gibson III received
two death sentences for two separate murders he committed
in Indiana. Unsuccessful in challenging those convictions and
sentences in Indiana courts on direct appeal and in post-con-
viction proceedings, Gibson sought relief in federal court un-
der 28 U.S.C. § 2254. But the petition came two years after the
filing deadline, prompting the State to move to dismiss.

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2 No. 25-2779
This appeal comes amidst ongoing proceedings in the dis-
trict court to determine whether Gibson can show entitlement
to equitable tolling to excuse his untimely § 2254 petition. The
district court ordered an evidentiary hearing on the question
and, in connection with doing so, granted Gibson’s request
under the All Writs Act to be transported to an Indianapolis
hospital for certain mental health testing he sees as pertinent
to the equitable tolling inquiry. Believing the transportation
order reflected an abuse of discretion, the State invoked the
collateral order doctrine and sought our review.
Confident in our jurisdiction, we see the transportation or-
der as substantially, if not irreconcilably, in tension with the
Supreme Court’s decision in Shoop v. Twyford, 596 U.S. 811
(2022). And, even if we are mistaken on that point, Gibson fell
short of establishing the required nexus of the requested men-
tal health testing to his pursuit of equitable tolling. So we re-
verse.
I
A
In 2013 an Indiana jury found Gibson guilty of the murder
of Christine Whitis and recommended a death sentence. The
trial court imposed that sentence and the Indiana Supreme
Court affirmed. About eight months later, in a separate pro-
ceeding, Gibson pleaded guilty to the murder of Stephanie
Kirk, and the trial court again sentenced him to death. The
Indiana Supreme Court again affirmed, and in both cases the
United States Supreme Court denied review.
Gibson pursued relief in an Indiana post-conviction court,
which that court denied. Then the Indiana Supreme Court, in
a single opinion, denied relief from the capital sentences,

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No. 25-2779 3
rejecting Gibson’s contentions that his trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance in various ways. The Indiana Supreme
Court denied rehearing on February 3, 2020.
In addition to his two capital convictions, Gibson pursued
relief for a third murder conviction from 2014. He had
pleaded guilty in that case, and an Indiana court sentenced
him to 65 years’ imprisonment. Before us the parties under-
standably and primarily devote their attention to Gibson’s
capital cases, which we too use to focus and frame our review
of the challenged transportation order.
For Gibson’s capital sentences, the one-year deadline for
pursuing federal habeas relief, which tolled during his direct
appeals and pursuit of state post-conviction relief, began to
run when the Indiana Supreme Court declined to rehear Gib-
son’s post-conviction challenge. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). So
Gibson had until February 3, 2021 to file a § 2254 petition in
federal court.
Prior to the conclusion of Gibson’s state post-conviction
matters, his attorney contacted Kenneth Murray to ask if he
would represent Gibson in the federal habeas corpus proceed-
ings. Murray agreed, leading the district court to appoint him
and his co-counsel, Michael Benza, to represent Gibson on
May 11, 2020 and June 8, 2020, respectively—when nearly
eight months remained to file a § 2254 petition.
Murray and Benza’s representation of Gibson began dur-
ing the COVID-19 pandemic and brought with it challenges.
They were unable, for the most part, to visit Gibson in prison,
but managed to communicate with him multiple times by
phone and electronic messaging.

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4 No. 25-2779
On January 21, 2021, less than two weeks prior to the stat-
utory deadline, Murray and Benza filed what they styled as a
preemptive motion for equitable tolling. The request focused
not only on the communication challenges presented by the
COVID-19 pandemic, but also on Gibson’s mental health,
which they believed warranted further investigation. The mo-
tion argued that Murray and Benza needed more time for a
psychiatric evaluation, a review of Gibson’s medical records,
and interviews of various unidentified witnesses. The motion
requested a one-year extension of the § 2254 filing deadline,
from February 3, 2021 to February 3, 2022.
The district court declined to preemptively toll the limita-
tions period. The motion was a procedural oddity, as it sought
a one-year extension of time for a deadline that had not yet
expired. So the district court denied it as premature, and the
deadline remained February 3, 2021.
That deadline came and went without any § 2254 filing.
The case went mostly dormant for about eighteen months,
with the next relevant event coming in August 2022, when
Murray sought to withdraw as counsel for health reasons.
Benza withdrew two months later.
On August 9, 2022, the district court appointed Oliver
Loewy to represent Gibson in the federal habeas proceedings.
Six months later, on February 23, 2023, Loewy filed a § 2254
application on Gibson’s behalf. Indiana, through Warden Ron
Neal, responded by moving to dismiss the application as un-
timely, observing that the filing came two years too late. Gib-
son replied that he should be entitled to equitable tolling and
moved for discovery and an evidentiary hearing to support
this request. He pointed to the challenges wrought by the
pandemic, allegations of misconduct and abandonment by

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No. 25-2779 5
his prior federal habeas counsel (Murray and Benza), and—
as most relevant here—his mental health limitations.
B
Seeking to develop support for equitable tolling at a pos-
sible evidentiary hearing, Gibson also invoked the All Writs
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), and asked the district court for an or-
der directing his transportation to an Indianapolis hospital for
mental health testing. He sought two types of brain scans, “an
MRI with Diffusion Tensor Imaging scan and a Positron Emis-
sion Tomography scan.”
Gibson explained the relevance of the brain scans without
much elaboration. He contended that, during the period sur-
rounding the deadline for his § 2254 petition, “his untreated
mental health conditions left him unable to manage his legal
affairs.” He acknowledged and sought to distinguish the Su-
preme Court’s recent decision in Shoop v. Twyford, suggesting
that the evidence he sought from the brain scans would be
admissible in the forthcoming evidentiary hearing on the is-
sue of equitable tolling. See 596 U.S. 811, 823 (2022).
Gibson reinforced his request for a transportation order
with declarations from mental health professionals. Dr. Dale
Watson, a neuropsychologist who had visited Gibson in
prison in February 2025 and conducted various psychological
tests, represented that “Gibson likely has white matter integ-
rity problems,” which result in deficient information pro-
cessing and likewise are “associated with depression and cog-
nitive decline.” Dr. Watson recommended additional testing,
to include the requested brain scans which he stated “would
help further determine the nature and extent of Mr. Gibson’s

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6 No. 25-2779
deficits and the effects they have on his cognitive abilities and
emotional state.”
A second declaration from Dr. R. Andrew Chambers, a
professor of psychiatry, explained (based on a review of med-
ical records, a 2017 psychiatric assessment, and a 2025 psychi-
atric interview) that Gibson suffers “today” from “bipolar dis-
order, addictive disorders, and a history of significant trau-
matic brain injury (TBI).” Those conditions result in his “de-
cision-making and emotional stability” being “significantly
impaired,” with the TBI itself “significantly amplif[ying]
those impairments.” Dr. Chambers added that Indiana prison
officials stopped providing Gibson certain (and perhaps all)
psychiatric medication for all or part of 2018 to 2023—a deci-
sion that “significantly undermined [Gibson’s] ability to man-
age his affairs, recognize and care [whether he was executed],
about his legal rights, and act upon them.”
Gibson also submitted a declaration from Dr. Jeffrey Lew-
ine, a professor of translational neuroscience. Dr. Lewine
stated that Gibson’s history of mental illness likely meant that
he suffered from a “brain injury, including the disruption of
white matter integrity.” The requested brain scan testing, Dr.
Lewine continued, “often reveals the likely etiology of the
brain abnormalities and their associated timeline.”
C
The district court granted Gibson’s requests for an eviden-
tiary hearing and discovery. The requested discovery and en-
suing hearing, the court reasoned, would flesh out facts relat-
ing to the impact of the pandemic, whether the conduct of
prior counsel amounted to abandonment, and whether

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No. 25-2779 7
Gibson’s untreated mental health limitations contributed to
the untimely § 2254 filing.
As for the transportation order, the district court deter-
mined that the requested brain scans were relevant and war-
ranted, as they would allow Gibson “to develop evidence that
could be admitted to support equitable tolling of the statute
of limitations.” Without further elaboration, the court granted
the requested transportation order under the All Writs Act.
The State then appealed the transportation order.
II
We begin with Gibson’s contention that we lack appellate
jurisdiction. By his account, the transportation order is not a
“final decision[] of the district court[],” leaving us without au-
thority to hear Indiana’s appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We disagree. In Twyford the Supreme Court determined
that transportation orders issued under the All Writs Act are
immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine.
See 596 U.S. at 817 n.1. Such orders, the Court explained,
“(1) conclusively require transportation; (2) resolve an im-
portant question of state sovereignty conceptually distinct
from the merits of the prisoner’s claims; and (3) are entirely
unreviewable by the time the case has gone to final judg-
ment.” Id. (cleaned up).
So, too, here, as the factual and procedural posture is akin
to the one before the Court in Twyford. In short, our jurisdic-
tion is secure under the narrow confines of the collateral order
doctrine. See Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 113
(2009) (“[W]e reiterate that the class of collaterally appealable
orders must remain ‘narrow and selective in its member-
ship.’” (quoting Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 350 (2006))); see

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8 No. 25-2779
also Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545–47
(1949).
III
A
Congress imposed a one-year timeline for applying for
federal habeas corpus relief under the Antiterrorism and Ef-
fective Death Penalty Act of 1996. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
But the timeline is not jurisdictional, see Day v. McDonough,
547 U.S. 198, 205 (2006), and thus “is subject to equitable toll-
ing in appropriate cases.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645
(2010). Equitable tolling allows for untimely, delayed filings
in some circumstances. See id. at 649; see also 4 Charles Alan
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 1056 (4th ed. 2025) (explaining that “the doctrine of equita-
ble tolling … halts the running of the limitations period”
when certain conditions are met).
Gibson may only receive the benefit of equitable tolling
upon showing “both that extraordinary circumstances pre-
vented him from timely filing and that he has been diligently
pursuing his rights.” Conroy v. Thompson, 929 F.3d 818, 820
(7th Cir. 2019) (citing Holland, 560 U.S. at 649). The Supreme
Court has recognized that professional abandonment by an
attorney justifies equitable tolling. See Holland, 560 U.S. at 651
(“[P]rofessional misconduct” may “amount to egregious be-
havior and create an extraordinary circumstance that war-
rants equitable tolling.”). Abandonment occurs when “an at-
torney no longer acts, or fails to act, as the client’s representa-
tive,” effectively leaving the represented party to fend for
himself. Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266, 281 (2012); see also id.
at 283 (reasoning, in the context of excusing a procedural

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No. 25-2779 9
default, that “a client cannot be charged with the acts or omis-
sions of an attorney who has abandoned him”); Schmid v.
McCauley, 825 F.3d 348, 350 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Maples and
acknowledging that “[a]bandonment by counsel is one poten-
tially extenuating circumstance” warranting equitable toll-
ing).
While a petitioner’s incompetency alone does not justify
an indefinite stay of habeas proceedings, see Ryan v. Gonzales,
568 U.S. 57, 76–77 (2013), we have concluded that a proper as-
sessment of abandonment may warrant consideration of the
mental health of the petitioner at the relevant times of the rep-
resentation. See Schmid, 825 F.3d at 350 (“[A] prisoner’s men-
tal disability in conjunction with abandonment by counsel
may justify … toll[ing] the period of limitations.”); see also
Brian R. Means, Introduction to Habeas Corpus: A Primer on Fed-
eral Collateral Review 297 (2022) (“Although the Supreme
Court has not directly spoken to [using mental illness as a]
basis for equitable relief, the legal theory has received consid-
erable attention by lower courts.”).
Further, a district court may hold an evidentiary hearing
to allow the parties to elicit facts to aid its determination on
whether abandonment or other factors weigh in favor of
granting equitable tolling. See Lairy v. United States, 142 F.4th
907, 917 (7th Cir. 2025) (“A petitioner’s burden for receiving
an evidentiary hearing is therefore ‘relatively light.’” (quoting
Torres-Chavez v. United States, 828 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir.
2016))).
In ordering an evidentiary hearing here, the district court
acted well within its discretion. The remaining question is
precise and narrow: whether the district court abused its

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10 No. 25-2779
discretion in granting Gibson’s request for a transportation
order under the All Writs Act.
B
Answering the question requires returning to Shoop v.
Twyford. Raymond Twyford received a death sentence for a
murder he committed in Ohio. See 596 U.S. at 814–15. In time
he pursued federal habeas relief under § 2254 and, like Gib-
son, sought an order under the All Writs Act for transporta-
tion “to a hospital for medical testing” and brain scans that
“could reveal evidence helpful in his effort to obtain habeas
corpus relief.” Id. at 814. The district court granted Twyford’s
request and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. See id. at 816. But the
Supreme Court reversed. See id. at 824.
The Court determined that “[a] transportation order that
allows a prisoner to search for new evidence is not [in the lan-
guage of the All Writs Act] ‘necessary or appropriate in aid
of’ a federal court’s adjudication of a habeas corpus action, 28
U.S.C. § 1651(a), when the prisoner has not shown that the de-
sired evidence would be admissible in connection with a par-
ticular claim for relief.“ Id. Even more, the Court focused on
the relationship between the evidence sought to be developed
through the transportation order and the limitations Con-
gress imposed within the federal habeas statutory scheme, in-
cluding the restrictions on evidentiary hearings in federal
court. See id. at 819–20 (first citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A) &
(B); and then citing Shinn v. Martinez Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366,
389–90 (2022)). In particular, where the habeas petitioner
failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in state court, a
district court “shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the
claim unless” it relies on either “a new rule of constitutional
law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the

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No. 25-2779 11
Supreme Court” or “a factual predicate that could not have
been previously discovered through the exercise of due dili-
gence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A).
Even then, the Court further emphasized, the petitioner
must show that “the desired evidence would demonstrate ‘by
clear and convincing evidence’ that ‘no reasonable factfinder’
would have convicted him of the charged crime.” Twyford,
596 U.S. at 819 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B)). Those re-
strictions ensure that the All Writs Act cannot be used to al-
low a “prisoner to fish for unusable evidence, in the hope that
it might undermine his conviction in some way.” Id. at 821.
In addition to pursuing the brain scans to support the mer-
its of certain (preserved) claims for habeas relief, Raymond
Twyford contended it was “plausible” the testing could help
him respond to arguments that other claims were procedur-
ally defaulted. Id. at 816. But he did not identify any specific
claims he sought to excuse from default, “nor did he explain
how the testing would matter to his ability to do so.” Id. at
823. And even if he had, the Court saw no purpose in devel-
oping evidence merely for the purpose of excusing proce-
dural default if that same evidence was ultimately inadmissi-
ble under the stringent requirements of § 2254(e)(2). See id.
Twyford, in short, requires a nexus between the evidence
sought to be developed through a transportation order en-
tered under the All Writs Act and its relevance and proposed
use and admissibility in the § 2254 proceeding. Stated another
way, any authority conferred by the All Writs Act must be
exercised within the limitations Congress imposed for habeas
relief and the development of evidence to pursue such relief.

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12 No. 25-2779
IV
A
While Twyford is amenable to either a broad or narrow
reading, the transportation order challenged here falls short
under either.
At a broad level, Twyford may require that any evidence
sought to be developed through an order entered pursuant to
the All Writs Act “be admissible in connection with a partic-
ular claim for relief” under § 2254. Id. at 824. Gibson makes no
such claim here. Much like Raymond Twyford, he does not
attempt to show that the results of any brain scans would sup-
port a particular claim for federal habeas relief or, at a more
detailed level, satisfy the stringent criteria Congress estab-
lished for admitting new evidence in a federal habeas pro-
ceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A) & (B).
Even focusing more narrowly on the forthcoming eviden-
tiary hearing the district court will hold on equitable tolling,
Gibson’s position comes up short. He fails to connect the evi-
dence sought to be developed from the two brain scans with
his request for equitable tolling. Both in the district court and
again on appeal Gibson tells us that the scans would further
support the argument that his untreated mental health condi-
tions left him “unable to manage his affairs, understand his
legal rights, and act upon them.” But he never explains to us
how. Nowhere has he articulated how the specific mental
health testing he seeks would contribute to his request for eq-
uitable tolling.
We pressed Gibson’s counsel on the point at oral argu-
ment but came up empty. For example, counsel—undoubt-
edly mindful of adverse Supreme Court precedent—did not

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No. 25-2779 13
contend that the brain scans might show that Gibson was in-
competent in the time leading up to the § 2254 filing deadline.
See Gonzales, 568 U.S. at 76–77 (concluding that incompetence
alone is not a basis for indefinitely staying federal habeas cor-
pus deadlines).
Nor did counsel, either in his brief or in oral argument,
persuade us that the brain scans were sought to position Gib-
son to contend that his mental limitations left him unable,
upon learning that his former counsel (Kenneth Murray and
Michael Benza) intended not to file a timely § 2254 petition, to
take matters into his own hands by instructing them to do so
or, alternatively, by firing counsel and then acting pro se to file
a federal habeas application before the February 3, 2021 dead-
line. Any contention like this would require careful consider-
ation along multiple dimensions, but Gibson has not ad-
vanced this position, at least not with sufficient clarity. So we
can leave all consideration of it for another day.
Finally, we see no suggestion that Gibson seeks the brain
scans to develop an anticipated claim under Ford v. Wain-
wright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
No matter how many times we review the record, we re-
turn to the same observation: Gibson requested the brain
scans to show, as he put it, “that his mental impairments left
him unable to manage his affairs, understand his legal rights,
and act upon them.” But we remain unable to give that state-
ment any specific content. We recognize one of the experts
Gibson offered in the district court, Dr. Lewine, explained that
the requested brain scan testing “often reveals the likely etiol-
ogy of the brain abnormalities and their associated timeline.”
But, again, we do not see how knowing the etiology—the

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14 No. 25-2779
cause or origin—of his mental limitations informs his position
on equitable tolling.
To be certain, we acknowledge that Dr. Watson stated that
the additional brain scan testing “would help further deter-
mine the nature and extent” of Gibson’s deficits and their ef-
fect on his “cognitive abilities and emotional state.” But we
conclude that the All Writs Act requires more—either broadly
in terms of the admissibility of such evidence to a claim for
relief under § 2254, or narrowly in terms of more particular
and specific linkage to Gibson’s pursuit of equitable tolling
through, for example, a theory of abandonment.
In the final analysis, Gibson remains unable to tie with suf-
ficient particularity—with the directness demanded by the
Supreme Court in Twyford—the etiology-focused brain scan
testing to his claim of abandonment for purposes of equitable
tolling or, more broadly, to a claim for ultimate relief under
§ 2254.
B
Today’s decision is narrow and limited to our vacating the
transportation order issued pursuant to the All Writs Act. We
underscore this point because, when the case resumes in the
district court, the next order of business will be the eviden-
tiary hearing on Gibson’s plea for equitable tolling. The filings
in our court, as well as information we see in the broader rec-
ord developed in the district court, leave us with the clear im-
pression that Gibson has amassed considerable evidence
bearing on the inquiry, including his contention of attorney
abandonment. Some of that evidence relates to his mental
functioning and indeed limitations in the period leading up
to the § 2254 filing deadline, see Schmid, 825 F.3d at 350, which

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No. 25-2779 15
we do not see etiology-focused brain scans as contributing to
in any clear or demonstrated way.
In no way do we intend these observations to put a thumb
on one side or the other of the forthcoming proceedings in the
district court. We leave those proceedings in the skilled and
experienced hands of the district judge. With these closing ob-
servations, we REVERSE the district court’s transportation or-
der and REMAND for further proceedings.

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